Chinese policymakers have not yet set a national policy regarding highly enriched uranium (HEU). While China, a nuclear weapon state, uses HEU in its weapons program, it has only a few civilian installations that use HEU, and has been converting or shutting down these reactors. Therefore, forgoing the use of HEU in civilian applications would not entail a difficult choice for Beijing.

Although the China Experimental Fast Reactor (CEFR) has been loaded with HEU fuel, Beijing plans to use MOX fuel in its industrial-scale (600 MW) China Prototype Fast Reactor envisioned for 2020, and in future 1500 MW fast reactors by 2030.[1] China's first experimental fast reactor went into commercial operation in July 2011, according to its chief engineer Xu Mi. Xu stated that China's 20 megawatt reactor has been operating successfully, and that China will therefore attempt to put 40 percent of its power (8 MW) into the distribution network of the North China Grid.[2]

Other recent and planned Chinese research reactors use low-enriched uranium (LEU). Though not directly participating in the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors Program (RERTR), China has followed the research done under the program and is working along similar lines. In 2007, Beijing converted its High Flux Engineering Test Reactor (HFETR) from HEU to LEU fuel, as well as the Minjiang Test Reactor (MJTR), while it shut down the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor in Shanghai (MNSR-SH).[3] The HFETR critical assembly, reported as already shut down, was converted in 2007 as well (Note: this likely means the last HEU fuel was removed from the critical assembly in 2007). China has assisted Pakistan in the conversion of the Pakistan Research Reactor (PARR-1), and has been working on development of high density LEU fuels.[4] Beijing is also active in an IAEA program to convert the miniature reactors that it supplied to foreign countries, and has agreed to take back their HEU fuel.[5]

OVERVIEW OF CHINESE HEU HOLDINGS

There is very little information about China's HEU holdings, domestic or military. The International Panel on Fissile Materials estimated that China produced 20 +/- 4 tons of HEU, and currently holds approximately 16 +/- 4 metric tons.[6] David Albright and Kimberly Kramer have reported that China's holdings equal approximately 1 metric ton of civilian HEU. The latter was enriched in Russia as well as in China. In 2005, Albright and Kramer projected that the country would have 1.5 metric tons of civil HEU (including irradiated fuel) by 2020, because Beijing would continue using HEU fuel in some of its existing research reactors and did not appear to have the means to reprocess HEU spent fuel.[7]

Today, it appears that China's inventory will not increase if current trends continue. Information on Chinese reactors, production, security of stockpiles, and related issues is not made public, though Beijing has increasingly cooperated with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) on exchanging information on material protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A) equipment and measures.[8]

On the military side, China has not declared any military HEU excess. It should be noted, however, that unusually, Beijing uses LEU fuels in its naval propulsion reactors; thus, its military stocks are only used for weapons. There are no reports of China using HEU for space propulsion.

HEU PRODUCTION

China produced its own HEU for military use, but has imported some HEU fuel from Russia for civilian use. Since China treats details about a key enrichment plant as secret, information on Chinese enrichment is scarce.

China ended uranium enrichment for nuclear weapons around 1987, although Beijing has never made an official announcement to this effect.[9] Albright and Kramer's chapter on Chinese military inventories notes that unofficial Chinese statements indicate production ended by about 1991. In February 1997, a senior Chinese official "confirmed to the authors that production of fissile material for nuclear weapons in China had ceased."[10]

HEU COMMERCE

China supplied approximately 200 kg of 20.05% HEU to Brazil in the 1980s.[11] This material has since been blended down to LEU (slightly below 20% U-235).[12]

Chinese export of Miniature Neutron Source Reactors (MNSR) included sales of HEU fuel. These reactors require approximately 1 kg of HEU fuel. None appear to have been refueled since their sale. Although the Syrian reactor is due for refueling in the near future, it will likely be converted and fueled with LEU at that time. The overall effort to convert the MNSRs sold by China to other countries from HEU to LEU fuel made important progress in September 2010, as an agreement was reached in Beijing between the China Institute of Atomic Energy (CIAE) and the U.S. Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) to cooperatively establish a Zero Power Test Facility (ZPTF) in China. The ZPTF will be used to assemble and test LEU cores to replace the HEU cores currently operating in the MNSRs.[13]

The 2010 agreement in Beijing also included provisions for the establishment of an MNSR Working Group in 2011. This Working Group includes MNSR operators, designers, and stakeholders, and the group's purpose is to coordinate conversion efforts and the repatriation of HEU fuel to China. The scope of the Working Group may expand in the future to include exchange of information and experience in reactor utilization, maintenance, code upgrading, equipment and facility upgrading, training and R&D applications.[14]

CONTINUING HEU USE

As for imports, China's pilot fast neutron reactor, the Chinese Experimental Fast Neutron Reactor (CEFR), is using HEU fuel imported from Russia, at least in its initial stages of operation.[15] In 2004, Russia's Machine Engineering Plant (MSZ) reportedly supplied China with the fuel for the CEFR.[16] According to a Russian Government Directive of 19 April 1999, plans called for fuel enriched up to 64.4%. Additionally, Russia's Rosatom and China have worked toward a preliminary agreement for a fast neutron reactor in China, possibly a BN-800, though this reactor will likely be fueled with MOX and not HEU fuel.[17]

In 2007, China converted its HFETR reactor at the Southwest Reactor Engineering Research and Design Academy in Jiajiang, Sichuan Province. The test reactor MJTR employs fuel discharged from the HFETR, and thus will no longer use HEU fuel as soon as all of the older HFETR fuel is discharged. The HFETR critical assembly was also shut down in 2007, as was the MNSR-SH reactor.[18]

In November 2005, DOE officials announced that the MNSR in China (four reactors), as well as the ones that China had sold to other countries (one each in Ghana, Iran, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Syria), had become part of the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program; the IAEA is assisting with this program. This was China's first involvement in the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), following an initial April 2005 meeting at the IAEA on the possible conversion of the MNSRs.[19] Chinese scientists attended a Vienna meeting in April 2006, as well as the 2008 RERTR meeting in Washington (their first RERTR attendance in a decade). Should the Chinese fail to develop an LEU fuel that could be made available to convert the MNSRs outside the country, the RERTR program has a back-up plan of purchasing LEU fuel for the Chinese-built MNSRs from Canada.[20]

While in 2005 some Chinese officials had questioned the proliferation relevance of facilities with insignificant amounts of material (the reactors have only about 1 kg of HEU fuel); they recognized the importance of the principle of conversion.[21] Since 2007, the Chinese have been more engaged in the RERTR conversion program, though they have decided to convert Chinese reactors on their own. Additionally, Beijing has decided to shut down its own MNSRs and replace them with new facilities designed to use LEU fuel from the start, in lieu of converting the older HEU-fueled facilities.

China's gradually increasing involvement in the RERTR program resulted in the China Atomic Energy Authority hosting the program's annual meeting in 2009 in Beijing in cooperation with the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Global Threat Reduction, Argonne National Laboratory, Idaho National Laboratory, and the International Atomic Energy Agency. This was the 31st annual meeting on the subject of the conversion of reactors within the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI).[22] Papers released at the meeting evidenced that China is significantly investigating uranium molybdenum (U-Mo) fuel as a means to facilitate conversion from HEU to LEU.[23]

CONTINUING HEU USE

In November 2008, the China Experimental Fast Reactor was loaded with HEU, and it entered trial commercial operation in 2011. The CEFR was originally intended to be a mock up for the industrial-scale (600 MW) China Prototype Fast Reactor (CPFR), which would have been designed to use mixed oxide plutonium (MOX) fuel. However, China has recently showed signs of moving away from this indigenous production route as it continues to engage Russia's Rosatom for the potential supply of BN-800s.[24]

Future fast reactors are expected to use MOX fuel as well.[25] The CIAE is currently working with RERTR to convert its remaining two MNSRs to LEU fuel, and other recent and planned Chinese research reactors use LEU.

POLICY ISSUES

China has no national policy related to the civilian use of HEU. In July 2011, CNEA Chairman Zhang Huazhu told Japanese press that CNEA would compile a draft of China's first "Atomic Energy Act" by the end of the year, but did not specifically mention a policy vis-à-vis HEU.[26] The China Atomic Energy Agency is the senior official body dealing with nuclear exports and domestic research reactors.

However, an HEU minimization policy would clearly require the involvement of other executive bodies. The agency, for its part, does not appear to be set against the elimination of the civilian use of HEU. China does not use much HEU, and it has not declared any plans for future exports. China's justification for developing fast reactors is its insufficient uranium supply; therefore Beijing plans to focus on the use of MOX, not HEU in the future.

In 1994, China and the United States issued a joint statement on stopping the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons, agreeing to "work together to promote the earliest possible achievement of a multilateral, non-discriminatory, internationally and effectively verifiable convention banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."[27] This commitment was reaffirmed in a 1997 joint statement by the two nations.[28]

Beijing is a strong supporter of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), and has voted in favor of the resolution on an FMCT at each session of the General Assembly. However, it has linked negotiations of the FMCT to the negotiations on prevention of an arms race in outer space, with which the United States does not agree. This is one reason for the stalemate in FMCT negotiations.

As far as the security of sites with fissile material is concerned, China acceded to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material in 1989. However, there is no open-source information on its implementation of the convention's security recommendations.[29]

Given the importance Beijing places on its role as a supporter of nonproliferation worldwide, China could well decide to adopt a significant role in an international civilian HEU ban. In January 2011, the CAEA signed an agreement with the U.S. DOE to establish a "Center of Excellence" in China to promote nuclear security and safeguards. This, coupled with Beijing's hosting of the 2009 RERTR annual meeting, is a noteworthy step in the direction of championing shared nonproliferation goals.[30]

Sources:
[1] Mark Hibbs, "Chinese Breeder Reactor Criticality Delayed until 2008," Nucleonics Week, 18 August 2005; "Chinese Fast Reactor Nears Commissioning," World Nuclear News, 7 April 2009, www.world-nuclear-news.org.
[2] "Fast Reactor Will Soon Supply Power," China Daily, 24 March 2011; “Chinese Fast Reactor Starts Supplying Electricity,” World Nuclear News, 21 July 2011, www.world-nuclear-news.org.
[3] Gu Jianfeng, "The Nuclear Safety Regulation on Research Reactors in China," paper submitted to the First Technical Meeting of Research Reactor Decommissioning Demonstration Project, 26-30 March 2006, Manila, Philippines, www-ns.iaea.org; NNSA Factsheet, "GTRI: More Than Four Years of Reducing Nuclear Threats," October 2008, http://nnsa.energy.gov.
[4] The China Advanced Research Reactor, currently under construction, will use 19.75% dispersion fuel with a density of 4.3g/cm3. This fuel is being developed by the Southwest Reactor Engineering Research and Design Academy. Changgeng Yin, "Development of Fuel Element for Research Reactor in Nuclear Power Institute of China," Atomic Energy Science and Technology, Vol. 39 (July 2005).
[5] Zheng Lu, et al., "The Feasible Research on Developing Application of Miniature Neutron Source Reactor Loaded Low-Enrichment Fuel," Atomic Energy Science and Technology, Vol. 37 (March 2003).
[6] "Global Fissile Material Report 2010: Balancing the Books," International Panel on Fissile Materials, 2011, www.fissilematerials.org.
[7] David Albright and Kimberly Kramer, "Civil HEU Watch: Tracking Inventories of Civil Highly Enriched Uranium," Institute for Science and International Security, February 2005, revised August 2005, http://isis-online.org.
[8] Hui Zhang, "Evaluating China's MPC&A System," Paper Presented at the INMM 44th Annual Meeting, Phoenix, Arizona, 13-17 July, 2003.
[9] Ann MacLachlan, and Mark Hibbs, "China Stops Production of Military Fuel: All SWU Capacity Now for Civil Use," NuclearFuel, 13 November 1989. The 1987 data is from a personal communication to one of the authors of the Albright report from Hibbs, who was told in turn by the head of the China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation.
[10] David Albright and Kimberly Kramer, "Separated Civil Plutonium Inventories: Current Status and Future Directions," 10 June 2005, revised 8 July 2005, www.isis-online.org.
[11] David Albright and Kimberly Kramer, "Separated Civil Plutonium Inventories: Current Status and Future Directions," 10 June 2005, revised 8 July 2005, www.isis-online.org.
[12] ISIS Civil HEU Watch, August 2005, www.isis-online.org.
[13] "Argonne, China Sign Agreement to Develop Zero Power Test Facility," Argonne National Laboratory, 27 October 2010, www.ne.anl.gov.
[14] "US-China Agreement Advances Conversion of Small Research Reactors to Low Enriched Uranium Fuel," International Atomic Energy Agency, 21 September 2010, www.iaea.org.
[15] David Albright and Kimberly Kramer, "Separated Civil Plutonium Inventories: Current Status and Future Directions," 10 June 2005, revised 8 July 2005, p. 6, www.isis-online.org.
[16] "Produktsiya yaderno toplivnogo tsikla [Production for Nuclear Fuel Cycle]," Elemash, November 2008, www.elemash.ru.
[17] "Russia, China Ink Deal on Nuclear Power Plant, Plan more Deals," ITAR-TASS, 27 September 2010.
[18] "GTRI: Reducing Nuclear Threats," National Nuclear Security Administration, 1 February 2011, http://nnsa.energy.gov.
[19] "RERTR program adds MNSRs to reactor list," NuclearFuel, Vol. 30, No. 25, 5 December 2005, pp. 1, 13.
[20] CNS interview with IAEA official, October 2006.
[21] CNS interview with China Atomic Energy Agency official, 29 September 2005.
[22] "RERTR-2009 International Meeting," Argonne National Laboratory, November 2009, www.rertr.anl.gov.
[23] "The research status of U-Mo alloy fuel in NPIC," RERTR 2009: 31st International Meeting on Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors, November 2009, www.rertr.anl.gov.
[24] Mark Hibbs, "Sino-Russian Fuel Cycle Cooperation Poised to Move Beyond Enrichment," Platts Nuclear Fuel, 29 May 2009.
[25] Mark Hibbs, "Chinese Breeder Reactor Criticality Delayed until 2008," Nucleonics Week, 18 August 2005.
[26] "China Moving Toward Establishing its First Law on Nuclear Power," The Denki Shimbun (English edition), 8 July 2011, www.shimbun.denki.or.jp.
[27] "Joint United States-People's Republic of China Statement on Missile Proliferation/Stopping the Production of Fissile Materials for Nuclear Weapons," 4 October 1994.
[28] "Joint U.S.-China Statement," 29 October 1997, www.china-embassy.org.
[29] For information on Chinese physical protection requirements, see Nathan Busch, "China's Fissile Material Protection, Control, and Accounting: The Case for Renewed Collaboration," The Nonproliferation Review, Fall-Winter 2002, pp. 89-106.
[30] U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration, "Press Release: U.S., China Sign Agreement to Establish Center of Excellence on Nuclear Security," 19 January 2011, http://nnsa.energy.gov; "RERTR-2009 International Meeting," Argonne National Laboratory, November 2009, www.rertr.anl.gov.