While the German parliament resolved in 1993 to seek to avoid the use of HEU "as far as technologically possible," [1] the German federal government acted against a proposed measure to control HEU at the 1995 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference out of fear that this would hamper plans to construct a new research reactor in Garching, near Munich. [2] That reactor, Munich Technical University's Forschungsreaktor München II (Munich Research Reactor II or FRM-II), is the only HEU-fueled reactor that has been constructed in a Western country over the past two decades. In 2001, due to the controversy over the proposed use of highly enriched fuel, German lawmakers required that the FRM-II be converted to use fuel near or below 50% HEU by 31 December 2010. However, in 2010 the Minister-President of Bavaria announced the extension of the conversion deadline until at least 2018 due to the unavailability of high density fuel. At present, it is unclear whether the fuel will be available even by 2018. [3] All other German research facilities using HEU have been converted to LEU or shut down.

OVERVIEW

Germany is a non-nuclear weapon state party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and its entire nuclear materials stockpile is for use in civilian applications. The German government voluntarily declares its HEU holdings to the IAEA as part of the annual declaration of plutonium stocks (INFCIRC/549). Summary information from German declarations to the IAEA is presented in the below table.

Researchers at the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) estimated that—as of 2003—Germany possessed at least 1.4 but no more than 2.7 metric tons of HEU. A large part of this fuel (initial mass: 1.3 metric tons), was shipped from the Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe (Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Center, or KNK-II) reactor at the time of the reactor's closure, and was thought to be undergoing reprocessing in France at that time. However, this information was not confirmed and the status of this fuel remains unknown. [4]

The German declarations state that, "[t]he HEU is being used in some research reactors. The HEU in storage consists mainly of spent fuel of the pebble-bed high temperature reactor in storage casks. Smaller amounts in bulk form are handled in various research facilities." The German government has also consistently noted the following in its reports to the IAEA: "regarding any material that has been shipped abroad, especially for reprocessing, Germany would like to point out that the data on such material are not available at the German side," and that all nuclear material in Germany is the property of the European Union. [5]

Because Germany has relied on HEU imports in order to fuel its nuclear research program, historically from the United States and presently from Russia, the country has no facilities for the fabrication or processing of HEU. However, Germany houses Urenco's commercial centrifuge enrichment facilities at Gronau, and the Enrichment Technology Company's laboratory centrifuge facilities at the Jülich Research Center, all for the production of LEU. [6]

Germany uses 93.2 percent uranium-235 fuel only at its FRM-II reactor. [7] The rods for the FRM-II, each containing 8.1 kg of HEU, are fabricated by Cerca, in France, from Russian-supplied HEU. The reactor uses approximately 32.4 kg of HEU annually. [8] The amount of research reactor HEU stored in Germany is set to increase as long as the FRM-II is in operation, because that "spent fuel is not qualified for U.S. take-back and, by German law, spent fuel can no longer be shipped to France for reprocessing." [9]

German policy calls for sending nuclear fuel back to its country of origin whenever possible. In December 2006, 268 kg of Russian-origin HEU fresh fuel at the former East German nuclear facility at Rossendorf, near Dresden, was repatriated under the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI). [10] Approval for storing the Soviet-origin irradiated HEU from the Rossendorf research reactor at the Ahaus Intermediate Fuel Storage Facility was granted in 2004. The reactor was decommissioned in 1991. [11] During the 2011 fiscal year, the GTRI is set to repatriate additional Soviet-origin material from East Germany. [12]

Irradiated fuel from German reactors is currently stored in several locations: Germany's Federal Storage Site in Hanau; Cadarache, France; Dounreay, Scotland; and at German and European research centers and universities. All of the German HEU is the property of the European Union. [13]

CONVERSION AND SHUTDOWN OF HEU-FUELED REACTORS AND REACTOR PROJECTS

Germany is working with France and the United States on the development of an LEU fuel for its FRM-II reactor. Germany has successfully converted two other research reactors, the BER-II and the FRG-I, from HEU to LEU fuel. [14] It chose to shut down, rather than convert, its other six HEU-fueled facilities.

Reactors Shut Down and Converted
Germany has been actively shuttering and converting domestic HEU-fueled facilities, in cooperation with the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program. Six HEU-fueled facilities have been shut down since 1985: Rossendorfer Forschungs-Reaktor (Rossendorf Research Reactor, RFR) in 1991; Forschungsreaktor Geesthacht-II (Geesthacht Research Reactor II) FRG-II in 1993; Forschungsreaktor und Messreaktor Braunschweig (Braunschweig Research and Measuring Reactor, FMRB) in 1995; Forschungsreaktor München (Munich Research Reactor, FRM) in 2000; and the Zittauer Lehr und Forschungsreaktor (Zittau Training and Research Reactor of the University of Applied Sciences in Zittau/Goerlitz, ZLFR) critical assembly in 2005. Most recently, on 2 May 2006, the Forschungsreaktor Jülich II (Research Reactor Juelich II, or FRJ-II, also known as DIDO), a heavy water reactor at the Jülich research center, was decommissioned. [15]

Two reactors, the FRG-I and the BER-II, were converted in 1991 and 2000, respectively. The 5 MW FRG-I reactor in Geesthacht, Schleswig-Holstein, was the first German reactor converted from HEU to LEU. With the support of the RERTR program, the FRG-I was converted in February 1991 from 93% HEU to LEU fuel. Together with the change in fuel elements, the reactor core was reduced to increase neutron flux. All spent HEU fuel elements were shipped back to the United States. [16] In August 1997, after using up the available HEU fuel, the Hahn-Meitner-Institut in Berlin began converting the Berliner Experimentier-Reaktor II (Berlin Experimental Reactor II, BER-II) research reactor from HEU to LEU fuel, which took 2.5 years to complete. As is commonly the case, the conversion was gradual. The reactor used HEU and LEU fuel elements together for a time. Ultimately, one column of fuel elements was removed completely, and beryllium reflectors were substituted to improve flux. [17]

High Temperature Reactor Projects Ended
Until the late 1980s, Germany had a large quantity of HEU fuel dedicated to high temperature reactor projects at Jülich. The THTR-300 Thorium-Hochtemperaturreaktor operated between 1983 and 1989, while its predecessor, the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Versuchs-Reaktor (AVR), was an experimental pebble bed reactor that operated between 1967 and 1988. Germany no longer pursues these projects, and has designated space at the Ahaus storage facility for this fuel. [18] According to Albright and Kramer, approximately 380 kg of irradiated fuel from the THTR was in storage as of 2003. [19]

The FRM-II Reactor
There has been a great deal of political controversy in Germany over the use of HEU in the FRM-II reactor since it was first proposed 20 years ago. The FRM-II was initiated concurrently with U.S. plans to construct the HEU-fueled Advanced Neutron Source (ANS). Moreover, the FRM-II designers made use of RERTR research (beginning in the late 1970s), on high-density uranium fuels, when they developed a dense silicide fuel for the FRM-II. Unlike the high-density LEU fuels being developed under RERTR, however, this fuel used HEU. [20]

In the early 1990s, however, there was little appreciation of the risks associated with HEU fuel. Indeed, proponents of the FRM-II argued that because spent HEU fuel contains less plutonium than spent LEU fuel, it would pose fewer risks (in fact, the quantity of plutonium is very small at all levels of enrichment). The claim of HEU's "reduced side effects" was repeated officially by the government: "The Federal Government has on numerous occasions explained that the use of HEU in the FRM-II project is highly recommended because of the specific scientific objectives involved, on grounds of cost, and in particular because of the comparatively limited effects on the environment and the smaller plutonium yield." [21]

When reduction of civil HEU use became a U.S. nonproliferation policy focus under the Clinton administration, the United States spent great diplomatic energy to convince Germany to redesign the FRM-II core. [22] It is reported that Washington considered offering Berlin participation in the ANS, which was cancelled in 1995, and co-development of a spallation source. [23] Moreover, because of restrictions placed by the Schumer Amendment on U.S. exports of HEU, Germany had to seek alternative sources of HEU fuel (received from Russia). In addition to U.S. pressure on Germany not to reprocess plutonium, international protesters' objections to the construction of any reactor (using low or high enriched uranium), began to take their toll. Diplomatic arguments against an HEU-fueled reactor soon were viewed as interference in domestic affairs, and reactor supporters effectively denounced the anti-nuclear campaign as anti-German. [24] A calm discussion of the pros and cons of various fuel types became impossible not long thereafter.

Although the German government mandated an expert commission to consider LEU use in the FRM-II, by the time of the study (in February-June 1999), a redesign would have required expensive reconstruction. The commission was not given enough time to recalculate and study the contradicting claims made by Munich Technical University and U.S. Department of Energy scientists regarding what redesigning for LEU use would mean in terms of cost, the effect on experimental capabilities, and other top user concerns. [25] Ultimately, the FRM-II was not redesigned for LEU use. In fact, construction based on the original design had already commenced in 1996. This design would make conversion to lower enrichment levels difficult. However, conversion of the reactor to fuel using a maximum of 50 percent enrichment by 31 December 2010 was made a condition for operation.

Given the facility's compact core, development of a new type of very high density fuel would be necessary if the Munich Technical University wished to employ LEU. German scientists have been cooperating with scientists in France, the United States, and elsewhere in research and development of new fuel since before the 2001 requirement to lower enrichment. The 2010 conversion time frame meant, however, that Germany could not wait for the qualification of new very high density fuels that were under development for the conversion of high flux reactors in the United States. The FRM-II was allowed to start up using HEU, and went critical in 2004.

After a 2010 announcement by the Minister-President of Bavaria, the deadline for the conversion of the FRM-II to 50% (or less) enriched fuel was extended to 2018 because of fuel unavailability. Because of this extension, the commitment of the FRM-II operator to the conversion of the reactor to MEU has been questioned. Some analysts have also pointed out that the current supply of HEU fuel for the reactor is set to run out by 2016. [26]

In 2009, the Munich Technical University, in cooperation with the Belgian Institut National des Radioéléments (IRE), completed a feasibility study dealing with the possible use of the FRM-II reactor for the irradiation of IRE's uranium targets for the production of medical isotopes, including Mo-99. The production is set to start in 2014. However, many important details, including the level of enrichment of the targets, remain unclear. [27]

POLICY ISSUES

Germany, a non-nuclear weapon state, has been a strong supporter of the international nonproliferation regime as well as efforts to control fissile material and, more recently, to control enrichment technologies. Berlin has long been an advocate of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), which would halt production of nuclear material for weaponization purposes. In a working paper submitted at the 2008 Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference, Germany argued that an FMCT was the "next logical step for disarmament and nonproliferation." The working paper set out an incremental approach to the treaty's adoption and pushed for creation of a Fissile Material Control Initiative alongside the FMCT.[28]

Berlin has also been an active participant in discussions to multilateralize the control of the nuclear fuel cycle with a view to prevent misuse of enrichment technologies for military purposes. The German proposal, dubbed the Multilateral Enrichment Sanctuary Project (MESP), suggests "construction of an IAEA-supervised, commercially-administered uranium enrichment plant on international property," which would provide low enriched uranium for nuclear reactors. [29]

Germany has periodically taken actions that support HEU minimization, such as the aforementioned 1993 parliamentary resolution to avoid the use of HEU "as far as technologically possible," as well as multiple reactor shutdowns and conversions. Yet, the construction of the HEU-fueled FRM-II reactor undermined Germany's ability to promote HEU minimization in other countries. Moreover, the German delegation did not support language that would have banned civilian use of HEU at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference because it conflicted with the FRM-II project. Although in a position paper that was leaked to the press in 1999 Germany's Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer opposed the use of HEU, there has been no meaningful public discussion of the HEU issue since. [30]

Berlin has not issued public statements regarding HEU use in the past five years. German diplomats did express support for a Norwegian-led initiative to reduce the use of HEU in the civilian nuclear sector at the 2005 NPT Review Conference. [31] Germany is likely to support further efforts to consolidate the minimization of civil HEU, as long as these measures do not preclude the operation of the FRM-II.

Sources:
[1] "Die Kernanlagenbetreiber sollten angehalten warden, soweit technisch moeglich, auf den Gebrauch von hochangereichertem Uran (HEU) in Forschungsreaktoren zu verzichten." (The operators of nuclear facilities should be urged, so far as technically possible, to forego the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in research reactors.) Deutscher Bundestag - 12. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 12/5116, June 15, 1993, translated by Alex Bollfrass.
[2] Wolfgang Liebert, "New German Research Reactor Using Highly-Enriched Uranium (HEU) Raises Concern," International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation Briefing Paper No. 6, 1998, www.inesap.org.
[3] Kenny Dayman, "FRM-II in Germany," University of Texas at Austin, 2011, www.heuphaseout.org.
[4] David Albright and Kimberly Kramer, "Civil HEU Watch: Tracking Inventories of Civil Highly Enriched Uranium," in Global Stocks of Nuclear Explosive Materials, Institute for Science and International Security, Chapter III, www.isis-online.org.
[5] "Communication Received from Germany Concerning Its Policies Regarding the Management of Plutonium," INFCIRC/549/Add.2/8, May 9, 2005; INFCIRC/549/Add.2/9, September 4, 2006; INFCIRC/549/Add.2/10, August 20, 2007; INFCIRC/549/Add.2/11, July 18, 2008; INFCIRC/549/Add.2/12, September 15, 2009.
[6] Urenco, "Urananreicherung" (Uranium enrichment), www.urenco.com, Jülich Research Centre, www.fz-juelich.de.
[7] Ministry for the Environment, Nature Protection, and Reactor Safety, "Bundesaufsichtliche Zustimmung unter Massgaben: Stellungnahme des Bundesumweltministeriums zum Bescheidentwurf der 3. Teilgenehmigung des Forschungsreaktors München II" (Federal approval under practical standards: Position of the Environmental Ministry on the draft decision regarding the third partial license for FRM-II), April 15, 2003, www.bmu.de.
[8] Kenny Dayman, "FRM-II in Germany," University of Texas at Austin, 2011, www.heuphaseout.org. Liebert estimated that the FRM-2 would use 40 kg of HEU annually. Wolfgang Liebert, "New German Research Reactor Using Highly-Enriched Uranium (HEU) Raises Concern," International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation Briefing Paper No. 6, 1998, www.inesap.org.
[9] International Panel on Fissile Materials, Global Fissile Materials Report 2010, 2010, p. 141, www.fissilematerials.org.
[10] "Almost 600 Pounds of Highly Enriched Uranium Returned to Russia," NNSA Factsheet, December 18, 2006, http://nnsa.energy.gov.
[11] www.bfs.de, updated 10/06.10.2005, says that on 3/30/2004, the Ministry for Radiation Protection issued the third change authorization. With it, not only irradiated fuel elements from power reactors, but also fuel elements from the research reactor Rossendorf can be stored in 18 containers of type CASTOR MTR-2 (SN 01 GP bis SN 18 GP).
[12] "The Russian-Origin Material Remove program in FY 2011 will return to Russia and dispose of an additional 340 kilograms of Russian-origin HEU fuel from facilities located in the former East Germany, Serbia, Ukraine, and Belarus. This will bring the cumulative total to 1,720 kilograms of HEU removed." See text of NNSA budget request for FY2011, p. 442, http://nnsa.energy.gov.
[13] For more information on storage of spent nuclear fuel in Germany, please see the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety's report entitled, "Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management," May 2009, www.bmu.de.
[14] Ole Reistad and Styrkaar Hustveit, "HEU Fuel Cycle Inventories and Progress on Global Minimization," The Nonproliferation Review, July 2008, 15/2, http://cns.miis.edu.
[15] Ole Reistad and Styrkaar Hustveit, "HEU Fuel Cycle Inventories and Progress on Global Minimization," The Nonproliferation Review, July 2008, 15/2, http://cns.miis.edu.
[16] Wilfried Krull and Wolfgang Jager, "Status and Perspectives of FRG-1 after Conversion to LEU," paper presented at RERTR 1996, October 6-11, 1996, Seoul, Korea, www.rertr.anl.gov, as cited in Cristina Chuen, "German Policy Regarding the Possible Elimination of HEU in the Civilian Nuclear Sector," unpublished manuscript, March 2006.
[17] Karin Haas, Christian-Herbert Fischer, and Herbert Krohn, "HEU/LEU-Conversion of BER II successfully finished," RERTR Conference Paper, October 1-6, 2000, www.rertr.anl.gov, as cited in Chuen, "German Policy."
[18] "Center interim storage facilities," Bündesamt fur Strahlenschutz, updated March 13, 2008, www.bfs.de.
[19] David Albright and Kimberly Kramer, "Civil HEU Watch: Tracking Inventories of Civil Highly Enriched Uranium," in Global Stocks of Nuclear Explosive Materials, Institute for Science and International Security, Chapter III, www.isis-online.org. See p. 11, footnote u.
[20] For a discussion of the challenges this poses for conversion, see: Alexander Glaser, "Neutronics Calculations Relevant to the Conversion of Research Reactors to Low-Enriched Fuel," Ph.D. diss., Technical University Darmstadt, February 2005, http://tuprints.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de.
[21] German Federal Parliament, "Antwort auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Probst, Altmann, Haefner, Hermenau, Kiper, Koester-Lossack, Schoenberger und der Fraktion BUNDNIS 90/Die GRUNEN" (Reply to Parliamentary Question), Document 13/600, reply to question 26, as cited in Annette Schaper, "German Policy Regarding the Possible Elimination of HEU in the Civilian Nuclear Sector," unpublished manuscript, September 2006.
[22] Anya Loukianova and Cristina Hansell, "Leveraging U.S. Policy for a Global Commitment to HEU Elimination," The Nonproliferation Review, July 2008, 15/2, pp. 159-183.
[23] Mark Hibbs and Elaine Hiruo, "U.S. May Offer Germany ANS Share in Bid To Kill HEU-Fueled Reactor," Nucleonics Week, July 28, 1994.
[24] As discussed by Annette Schaper, much of the rhetoric was counterproductive. For example, warning that Germany "should not be surprised if other states in the United Nations view it with suspicion and alarm." Nuclear Control Institute, "German Claims of American NPT Violation Debunked, Proposed German Reactor Is Real Violator, Says NCI," www.nci.org, as discussed in Annette Schaper, "HEU Policy in Germany," unpublished manuscript, May 2008.
[25] The work of the commission, assembled by the Ministry of Education and Research under the chairmanship of State Secretary Wolf-Michael Catenhusen, is discussed in Schaper, "German Policy," September 2006. Dr. Schaper was one of the six experts on the commission. Argonne National Laboratory scientists first presented their study of a redesign at the annual RERTR meeting in 1995. See: Sai-Chi Mo, Nelson A. Hanan and James E. Matos, "Comparison of the FRM-II HEU Design with an Alternative LEU Design," RERTR, September 18-21, 1994, Paris, France, www.rertr.anl.gov.
[26] Kenny Dayman, "FRM-II in Germany," University of Texas at Austin, 2011, www.heuphaseout.org.
[27] For a discussion of the use of the reactor in Mo-99 production, see H. Gerstenberg, C. Muller, I. Neuhaus, A. Rohrmoser, "U-Target Irradiation at FMR II Aiming the Production of Mo-99—A Feasibility Study," paper presented at the RRMF 2010 conference, 21-25 March 2010, Marrakech, Morocco, www.euronuclear.org. The paper indicates that, despite the successful completion of the study, the project would face financial, technical, and bureaucratic hurdles.
[28] "Creating a New Momentum for a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)," working paper submitted by Germany, Preparatory Commission for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Geneva, April 28-May 9, 2008, www.reachingcriticalwill.org.
[29] "Germany Outlines Multiparty Approach to Nuclear Fuel Cycle," IAEA Staff Report, February 18, 2008, www.iaea.org.
[30] The paper reportedly argued that the use of HEU would be "inappropriate ... in view of the goals of [Germany's] nonproliferation policy" and noted that in 1978, in connection with the INFCE and RERTR, Germany pledged that "it would wherever possible convert research reactors fueled with HEU to LEU." Mark Hibbs, "German Foreign Minister Fischer Weighs in against FRM-2 HEU Use," NuclearFuel, September 20, 1999, p. 3.
[31] Communication with William Potter, May 2005.