Russia operates over fifty research reactors, pulsed reactors and critical assemblies using highly enriched uranium (HEU), as well as nine HEU-fueled icebreakers.[1] Moscow also holds the world's largest stocks of civilian HEU. Individual Russian institutes and organizations participate in international programs to replace HEU with LEU in Soviet-supplied research reactors abroad, develop alternative fuels, and repatriate fresh and spent HEU fuel from third countries. Russia had taken no significant steps towards reducing the domestic use of HEU until 2010, when it announced the shutdown of several reactors, and agreed to a joint study with Washington into the feasibility of converting six Russian research reactors from HEU to LEU-based reactor fuels.[2]

In February 2005, U.S. President George Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin held a summit in Bratislava, Slovakia, at which a new initiative was launched to improve the security of nuclear weapons and fissile material. Moscow committed to removing Soviet-origin fresh and spent HEU fuel from research reactors outside Russia, but Washington was unable to convince it to initiate the conversion of its domestic research reactors.[3] Russia's historic hesitancy appeared to be linked to the potential cost of reactor conversion, and the lack of an overarching plan for the future of Russia's research reactor fleet. In addition, Russian officials seemed to believe that the threat of terrorists acquiring HEU for the purpose of fabricating an improvised nuclear device was not very high. Some Russian researchers also argue that HEU fuel provides advantages—an argument that was often voiced by reactor operators in other countries 30 years ago, but has lost support as the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program has progressed.

During a July 2009 summit with President Obama in Moscow, President Medvedev made a commitment to conduct feasibility studies into the conversion of reactors in Russia. The joint statement issued by Presidents Obama and Medvedev read: "we note the importance of HEU minimization in civilian applications and support such efforts to the maximum extent possible, where feasible."[5] This suggested that Moscow would move forward to convert its reactors after the completion of the feasibility studies, as LEU fuel for the types of reactors being studied has already been developed to convert Soviet-supplied reactors abroad. [In February 2010, the NNSA verified the shutdown of three reactors—the PhS-4, the PhS-5, and the STRELA.] A December 2010 meeting between U.S. Deputy Energy Secretary Daniel Poneman and Rosatom Director General Sergei Kiriyenko led them to sign an official agreement to conduct feasibility studies on six Russian research reactors.

The six reactors believed to be covered by the agreement in question are:

• The IR-8 reactor at the Kurchatov Institute (pool reactor, 8-80 MWT and 90 percent HEU);
• OR at the Kurchatov Institute (36 percent HEU);
• Argus at the Kurchatov Institute (homogenous reactor 20 KWT and 90 percent HEU);
• IRT at the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute (pool reactor 2.5 MWT and 90 percent HEU);
• IRT-T at the Tomsk Polytechnical Institute (pool reactor 6 MWT and 90 percent HEU);
• MIR.M1 at the Research Institute of Atomic Reactors (pool reactor 100 MWT and 90 percent HEU).[6]

As of May 2011, there were 71 Russian nuclear facilities listed as within the scope of the newly expanded Global Threat Reduction Initiative, including eight pulsed reactors, 15 icebreakers, and 21 critical assemblies, as well as several reactors that have already been shut down (under the current logic espoused by the program, countries should take credit for minimizing HEU use through shutdown, as well as conversion, of reactors).[7]

OVERVIEW

Russia holds the largest stock of HEU in the world. The International Panel on Fissile Materials estimates the current total stock to be approximately 770 metric tons (MT).[8] The majority of Russian HEU is in the military stockpile, either in weapons or in reserve holdings, though the Soviet government ceased production of HEU for weapons in 1989.[9] Military use of HEU also includes fueling nuclear submarines.

Russia still uses HEU for civilian applications, including the fueling of research and test reactors, critical assemblies, fast reactors, and icebreakers, as well as for the production of medical isotopes. However, according to Pavel Podvig, "only one of Russia's three production facilities is today licensed to produce HEU," and "it is not clear if it is producing HEU at all."[10] Russia's overall civilian HEU holdings are estimated to be around 20 metric tons (although this number is highly uncertain), accounting for more than half of the world's civilian HEU.[11] There are no publicly available official figures that give the amount of HEU produced for civilian purposes, or the level of current civilian HEU stocks.[12]

Like Washington, Moscow has declared large quantities of former military HEU no longer needed for defense programs. The excess HEU from Russian weapons is being blended down to LEU within the framework of the "Megatons to Megawatts" program (also known as the HEU-LEU program). A program initiated by a U.S.-Russian agreement in 1993, Megatons to Megawatts plans to downblend 500 metric tons of weapons HEU by 2013. The resulting LEU is shipped to the United States to be used in LEU fuel for commercial nuclear power generation. Since the amount of HEU that is actually excess to military needs is likely far greater than the amount that has officially been declared excess to date, there have been various calls to speed up and/or extend the blenddown program, which is not expected to continue after 2013. One effort spearheaded by the Nuclear Threat Initiative involves a detailed study of the Russian nuclear complex to determine the options for speeding up the U.S.-Russian HEU-LEU program, and what costs various scenarios entail.

HEU Commerce
To date, Russia has exported HEU to France, Germany, the Netherlands and China.[13] It exported HEU to France for the fabrication of fuel rods for Germany's FRM-2 reactor and to China for the start-up of the CARR reactor. Some bulk HEU exports were made, including 228 kg to France in 1998. In addition, Russia has shipped 36 percent enriched fuel to the Maria research reactor in Poland, and repatriated 90% enriched HEU fuel from this reactor back to Russia.[14] Russia does not currently have a policy that restricts the supply of HEU to foreign countries but, like all nuclear exports, these only go ahead in the event that they do not conflict with domestic regulations and Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines. Furthermore, Russia has been actively repatriating fresh and irradiated HEU fuel that was exported to foreign research reactors during the Soviet era.

Radioisotope Production
At present, Russia's domestic demand for the medical isotope Mo-99 is met by production at the VVR-T research reactor at the Karpov Institute of Physical Chemistry. This HEU-powered facility uses HEU targets for the production of Mo-99. [15] In September 2010, Russia's Isotope Company concluded an agreement with Canada's MDS Nordion for the supply of medical isotope Mo-99 for Canada.The Isotope joint stock company, authorized by Rosatom to control isotope production in 2009, would use the three reactors at the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Atomic Reactors (NIIAR) in Dimitrovgrad to produce Mo-99, which Nordion would purify and further process for use in isotopes. These three reactors are the SM, RBT-6, and the RBT-10, along with a processing facility. Having started up production in January 2011, Isotope intends to increase production later this year, and to gain the status of a global supplier in 2012. [16] The Isotope-Nordion venture hopes to eventually capture up to "20% of global Mo-99 demand to back up Nordion's long-term requirements." [17]

One of the challenging aspects of the project has been the fact that Isotope's Mo-99 production is set to utilize RIAR-designed HEU targets. Russian officials have suggested that conversion to LEU is possible, but would be unlikely for several years. [18] Though the details of the supply agreement are confidential, some have noted that it "provides for the parties to address LEU conversion of the ... production facilities. The timing and approach of conversion are currently under discussion for finalization." [19] In February 2011 testimony to Congress, the NNSA's Parrish Staples indicated that U.S. officials intend to raise the HEU issue at a high level with their Russian counterparts at Rosatom "to ensure that their actions are consistent with their Presidential-level commitments ... made at the April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit to minimize and, where possible, eliminate the use of HEU in civilian activities." [20]

In addition, MDS Nordion signed a framework agreement with the Kurchatov Institute to produce LEU-based Mo-99 using the Argus Liquid Homogenous Reactor (LHR), which the Russian government recently approved for conversion. This venture would achieve commercial production within 3-5 years, and may seek to capture up to 5-10% of the global Mo-99 supply if the United States Congress passes legislation restricting HEU-based isotope production and supporting LEU-based production.[21]

Conversion and Shutdown of HEU-Fueled Reactors and Reactor Projects
Like the United States, the Soviet Union became concerned about the possible misuse of HEU in civilian installations abroad in the late 1970s, and initiated a program to remove very highly enriched (80%) uranium and replace it with 36% enriched fuel at reactors outside of Russia. However, due to funding difficulties the program ended in the mid-1980s. Then, in 1993, the U.S. RERTR program approached Russian scientists to cooperate on the development of high-density LEU fuels to make the conversion of Soviet-built reactors possible, and invited scientists to participate in annual RERTR conferences. In September 1994, representatives of the U.S. Department of Energy and the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy signed a protocol of intent on cooperation in the development of higher-density 19.75% enriched uranium fuels, and on the demonstration of the feasibility of and conversion to LEU fuel of specific reactors. Concrete work in this area began in 1996.

In February 2005, Russia committed to converting all Soviet-supplied research reactors abroad under the Bratislava Initiative, described above. [22] The Bratislava Initiative has been implemented through a joint Rosatom-U.S. Department of Energy action plan for the conversion of reactors in third countries that was approved in September 2007.

The first conversion of a Soviet-supplied reactor was finally completed in October 2005. The VR-1 ("Sparrow") reactor in the Czech Republic received new 19.7% enriched IRT-4M fuel, which was licensed in November 2004 from Russia's Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrates Plant. Its old IRT-3M HEU fuel was repatriated to Russia by the Russian company Sosny in operations that also involved the cooperation of the U.S. Department of Energy, the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Czech State Office for Nuclear Safety, and various subcontractors. [23] Russia also supplied Libya's IRT-1 reactor with LEU fuel in December 2005. Conversions of Libya's critical facility and its 10 MW reactor were completed in January 2006 and October 2006, respectively. The Soviet-supplied reactor at Vietnam's Dalat Nuclear Research Institute was converted in September 2007. In 2008, conversions of the VVR-SM research reactor at the Institute of Nuclear Physics in Uzbekistan and the WWR-M reactor at the Kiev Institute of Nuclear Research took place. Furthermore, in 2009 the Budapest research reactor in Hungary, and Bulgaria's IRT-2000 research reactor in Sofia were also converted.[24] The conversion of several other Soviet-supplied facilities, the Maria in Poland, the REZ in the Czech Republic, the WWR-K reactor and critical assembly in Kazakhstan, the Yalina critical assembly in Belarus, and the Foton in Uzbekistan are expected to take place within the next three years. [25]

Russian scientists have been working on the development of the higher-density LEU fuels needed to convert other research reactors under a Russian federal program called the "National Technology Base," as well as a contract between the Bochvar All-Russian Scientific Research Institute for Inorganic Materials (VNIINM) and Argonne National Laboratory. The United States is helping to fund fuel development, including pre-reactor, reactor and post-reactor studies in test assemblies, while Russia is paying for materials, equipment, facilities, etc. Some of the other Russian organizations engaged in these activities include: TVEL, the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Atomic Reactors (NIIAR), the Institute of Reactor Materials (IRM) and the St. Petersburg Nuclear Physics Institute (PIYaF).[26]

Under the plan with Argonne, the Russian organizations are working on the development and licensing of high density uranium-molybdenum (U-Mo) dispersion and monolithic fuel along with the development of manufacturing methods, fuel fabrication, chemical and physical tests of fuel and blanket compatibility, and LEU fuel radiation tests of both pin-type and tubular fuel elements. Conversion of reactors in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and the Czech Republic requires the higher density U-Mo fuel. Development of this fuel is ongoing.[27]

The U.S.-Russian RERTR program also became involved in HEU fuel removal activities, under which Russia takes back Soviet-supplied fresh and spent fuel from reactor operators if the operators agree to convert to LEU.

Within Russia itself, progress has been slower. Only one site has been reportedly cleaned out of all HEU materials: with the assistance of the U.S. Department of Energy's Material Consolidation and Conversion program, all HEU (65 kg U-235 contained in 181 kg of uranium), was consolidated from the Krylov Shipbuilding Research Institute to the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Atomic Reactors (NIIAR) in Dimitrovgrad by March 2006.[28] The Krylov site has one research reactor that uses 10% LEU, and had three critical assemblies that were shut down as unneeded in the 1990s. However, the HEU materials for the facilities remained onsite until 2005-2006.

Other facilities have been shut down as well, though in some cases the HEU fuel has remained on-site. For a table of operational and shut down HEU facilities, including notation of the status of HEU materials located on-site, see Appendix A in Pavel Podvig, Consolidating Fissile Materials in Russia's Nuclear Complex. Many of these facilities are now included in the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, since its scope expanded in fall 2009.

As of May 2011, however, Russia had made no declaration of reduced HEU usage or consolidated stockpiles, nor had it committed to converting any of its domestic HEU-fueled reactors. Nevertheless, GTRI officials believe that as qualified fuel for the conversion of these reactors becomes available, the feasibility studies will indicate conversion is warranted, and they expect Moscow to initiate conversion activities after the feasibility studies are completed.[29]

HEU Fuel Removals
Since 2002, Russia has been consolidating fresh and spent Soviet-origin HEU fuel from foreign countries under the Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return Program (RRRFR). A table listing these shipments can be found in the Past and Current Efforts to Reduce Civilian HEU Use file.

A formal agreement regarding fuel removal was concluded between the U.S. and Russian governments and signed in May 2004. The Agreement covers major activities related to providing assistance to return Soviet-origin nuclear fuel from 13 countries to Russia. As of July 2011, fresh (unused) HEU fuel had already been removed from Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania, Libya, the Czech Republic, Uzbekistan, Latvia, Vietnam, Germany and Kazakhstan. Fresh HEU fuel located at three sites in Ukraine has also been removed in accordance with a 2010 Nuclear Security Summit commitment. [30]

Spent fuel has already been removed from research reactors in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Latvia, and Uzbekistan. The irradiated fuel is reprocessed at the Mayak Production Association.

POLICY ISSUES

Although Russia has acted to reduce the use of HEU in Soviet-built reactors abroad, and to repatriate Soviet-origin HEU, it has not committed to converting its civilian research reactors and other elements of its civilian nuclear industry to low-enriched uranium (LEU). Russia also does not have an overarching policy regarding HEU reduction or elimination in the domestic civilian sector. Among the main reasons for this lack of a policy are the apparent high short-term financial costs of converting to LEU, the perceived advantages offered by the use of HEU for some advanced research projects, the fear of losing a potential technological edge vis-à-vis other countries (despite the lack of current plans to employ HEU in any future reactor projects), and other economic, social, and political factors.

Toward this end, facility operators may be concerned that the conversion effort could negatively impact personnel salaries, could be riddled with bureaucratic and regulatory obstacles, or could ultimately lead to a shutdown of the facility.[31] It is telling that Moscow also sees a business opportunity in expanding its HEU-based production of medical isotopes despite the fact that, at least until the production is converted to LEU, the Russian-Canadian joint venture goes against the emerging norm on civilian HEU phase-out.

An additional challenge in gaining Russia's support for this norm is Moscow's perception that the threat of terrorists acquiring HEU for the purpose of fabricating an improvised nuclear device is not very high. [32] Other nuclear and radiological terrorism scenarios, particularly an attack on a nuclear facility or the detonation of a "dirty" bomb using radioactive materials, are viewed as much more likely. Nevertheless, some consolidation of HEU materials has occurred within Russia, in part with the assistance of the U.S. Department of Energy's Material Consolidation and Conversion program. The threat posed by HEU has also been reduced by upgrading security at icebreakers, some reactors, and some fuel cycle facilities. In addition, interviews with some Russian officials suggest that the U.S. decision to seriously pursue domestic reactor conversion, and the ability to show that conversion could be carried out without a loss of reactor performance, may have had an impact on the Russian perspective.[33]

Russia committed to conducting feasibility studies into the conversion of six research reactors in order to realize the presidential commitment made in July 2009. U.S. officials indicate that four of these studies have been completed, but Russia has yet to announce any  conversion plans for these facilities. [34] U.S. officials had hoped that Russia would make some commitments to this effect at the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit, but Russia did not do so, continuing to link eventual conversion to economic feasibility. [35]

Sources:
[1] For further discussion of phasing out civil HEU in Russia, see Matthew Bunn, Securing the Bomb 2008, (Cambridge, Mass. and Washington, DC: Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School and the Nuclear Threat Initiative), 18 November 2008, www.nti.org; Elena Sokova, "Phasing Out Civilian HEU in Russia: Opportunities and Challenges," Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 15.2, July 2008; Pavel Podvig, Consolidating Fissile Materials in Russia's Nuclear Complex, International Panel on Fissile Materials research report, May 2009, www.fissilematerials.org.
[2] Thomas Young, Cole Harvey and Ferenc Dalnoki-Veress, "It's Not Just New-START: Two other U.S.-Russian Nuclear Agreements Boost U.S.-Russian Reset," CNS Feature Story, 21 December 2010, cns.miis.edu.
[3] See Anya Loukianova and Cristina Hansell, "Leveraging U.S. Policy for a Global Commitment to HEU Elimination," Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 15.2, July 2008, p. 168.
[4] On Russian threat perceptions, see Cristina Hansell, "Nuclear Terrorism Threats and Responses," in Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian-U.S. Workshop, Ashot Sarkisov and Rose Gottemoeller, eds. (Washington: National Academies Press, 2009), pp. 153-162.
[5] "Joint Statement by President Barack Obama of the United States of America and President Dmitry Medvedev of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Cooperation," 6 July 2009, www.whitehouse.gov.
[6] Christopher Landers, "Global Threat Reduction Initiative: Furthering HEU Minimization Through Conversions," RERTR 32nd Annual Meeting, 11 October 2010.
[7] "Breakout of GTRI Reactor Conversion Expansion," information provided at RERTR-2009, Beijing, October 2009.
[8] "Global Fissile Material Report 2010," International Panel on Fissile Materials, 2010, www.fissilematerials.org, p. 58.
[9] Thomas Cochran, Robert S. Norris, Oleg Bukharin, Making the Russian Bomb: From Stalin to Yeltsin (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), p. 52.
[10] Pavel Podvig, "Consolidating Fissile Materials in Russia's Nuclear Complex," International Panel on Fissile Materials, www.fissilematerials.org, May 2009, p. 7.
[11] "Global Fissile Material Report 2010," International Panel on Fissile Materials, 2010, www.fissilematerials.org, p. 12.
[12] Historically, the Soviet Union did not differentiate between military and civilian stocks; Russia has not published official data on its total HEU stocks.
[13] Elena Sokova, "Phasing out Civilian HEU in Russia," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 15, No. 2, July 2008, p. 222.
[14] Elena Sokova, "Phasing out Civilian HEU in Russia," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 15, No. 2, July 2008, p. 222.
[15] Kendra Vessels, "HEU for Isotope Production in Canada and Russia: Expansion or Phaseout?" University of Texas at Austin, April 20, 2011, www.heuphaseout.org, p. 3.
[16] Kendra Vessels, "HEU for Isotope Production in Canada and Russia: Expansion or Phaseout?" University of Texas at Austin, April 20, 2011, www.heuphaseout.org, p. 8-10.
[17] See CORAR's Roy Brown answers for the record in GPO, "American Medical Isotopes Production Act," hearing before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the U.S. Senate, February 1, 2011, p. 26.
[18] Miles Pomper, "Meeting the Mark: Ensuring LEU Use for Medical Isotope Production," paper presented at the INMM annual meeting, July 20, 2011, Palm Desert, California. Pomper observes that Russian officials have noted that the consideration of conversion will only begin after the 20% market share is captured. In remarks at a March 2011 event in the Russian Embassy in Washington, DC, Rosatom Director General Sergei Kiriyenko said Russia supported the idea of moving to LEU production, but that Moscow's first priority was ensuring a sufficient supply of isotopes to patients.
[19] See CORAR's Roy Brown answers for the record in GPO, "American Medical Isotopes Production Act," hearing before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the U.S. Senate, February 1, 2011, p. 26.
[20] See GTRI's Parrish Staples answers for the record in GPO, "American Medical Isotopes Production Act," hearing before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the U.S. Senate, February 1, 2011.
[21] See CORAR's Roy Brown answers for the record in GPO, "American Medical Isotopes Production Act," hearing before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the U.S. Senate, February 1, 2011, p. 26.
[22] See Anya Loukianova and Cristina Hansell, "Leveraging U.S. Policy for a Global Commitment to HEU Elimination," Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 15.2, July 2008, p. 168.
[23] Radek Skoda, "Highly Enriched Uranium Minimization in the Czech Republic," Nuclear Energy Review, 2006, pp. 59-60, www.touchnuclear.com.
[24] "GTRI: Reducing Nuclear Threats," National Nuclear Security Administration, February 1, 2011, nnsa.energy.gov.
[25] Christopher Landers, "Global Threat Reduction Initiative: Furthering HEU Minimization Through Conversions," RERTR 32nd Annual Meeting, 11 October 2010.
[26] I. Kamenskikh and Y. Busurin, "Status and Perspective of International Efforts of HEU Minimization Program: Russian View," RERTR-2008, Washington, 5-9 October 2008.
[27] I. Kamenskikh and Y. Busurin, "Status and Perspective of International Efforts of HEU Minimization Program: Russian View," RERTR-2008, Washington, 5-9 October 2008.
[28] V. Struyev, S. Kosmin and I. Guriyev, "Changing the Status of the Krylov Shipbuilding Research Institute to an LEU Facility by Removing HEU from the Site," unpublished; "NNSA Works With Russia To Remove Nuclear Material from Research Institute," NNSA Press Release, 13 July 2006, http://nnsa.energy.gov.
[29] CNS interviews with GTRI officials during RERTR-2009, Beijing, China, November 2009.
[30] "NNSA Achieves Milestone in Removal of HEU from Ukraine," National Nuclear Security Administration, 31 December 2010, http://nnsa.energy.gov.
[31] Braden Civins, "Conversion Aversion: The Sources of Russian Reluctance to Conversion of HEU-fueled Research Reactors," University of Texas at Austin, April 2011, www.heuphaseout.org.
[32] For example, see "Terroristicheskiye organizatsii ne mogut sozdat atomnoy bomby, zayavil ministr Rossiy po atomnoy energii" (Terrorist organizations are not capable of building an atomic bomb, says Russian Minister of Atomic Energy), ITAR-TASS, 19 May 2003; also, see Cristina Hansell, "Nuclear Terrorism Threats and Responses," in Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian-U.S. Workshop, Ashot Sarkisov and Rose Gottemoeller, eds. (Washington: National Academies Press, 2009), pp. 153-162.
[33] Braden Civins, "Conversion Aversion: The Sources of Russian Reluctance to Conversion of HEU-fueled Research Reactors," University of Texas at Austin, April 2011, www.heuphaseout.org.
[34] Miles Pomper and Meghan Warren, "Progress Since the 2010 Washington Nuclear Security Summit: Successes, Shortcomings, and Options for the Future," conference paper prepared for the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Symposium, 23 March 2012.
[35] The Seoul Nuclear Security Summit Preparatory Secretariat, "Highlights of Achievements and Commitments by Participating States as stated in National Progress Reports and National Statements," 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit, www.thenuclearsecuritysummit.org.