Civilian HEU: Russia

Overview

Russia has the largest overall HEU stockpile in the world, and is believed to have the world's second largest stocks of civilian HEU, after the United States. [1] Figures are not publically available, but the Institute for Science and International Security estimates that Russia's civil-use HEU holdings are approximately 15-20 tons. [2] Overall Russian HEU stocks are likely somewhere between 617 and 679 tons (MT). [3] Unlike France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, Russia does not declare its HEU holdings in its annual IAEA report on plutonium stocks, (INFCIRC/549).

Russia operates 32 research reactors, pulsed reactors, fast critical assemblies, steady state reactors, and critical assemblies using highly enriched uranium (HEU), comprising over 40 percent of all HEU-fueled civilian reactors, [4] as well as five HEU-fueled icebreakers. [5] Individual Russian institutes and organizations participate in international programs to replace HEU with low enriched uranium (LEU) in Soviet-supplied research reactors abroad, develop alternative fuels, and repatriate fresh and spent HEU fuel from third countries. Although Russia does not have an official policy on HEU reduction, its actions suggest that it is aware of the proliferation risks associated with HEU and is attempting to balance these against HEU's commercial value. [6]

HEU Production, Use, and Commerce

Production and Use

The Soviet government halted the production of highly enriched uranium in 1988. However, Russia announced in 2012 that it would resume HEU production at the Electrochemical Plant in Zelenogorsk (EKhZ). This facility operates one centrifuge cascade that produces HEU to meet the needs of research reactors, fast reactors, and icebreakers; [7] the exact enrichment level is uncertain. [8] Russia also operates three other uranium enrichment plants, all of which produce LEU. Russia uses its HEU stockpiles that have been declared in excess of its military requirements, blended down to LEU, for civil uses. [9] In keeping with its efforts to close the nuclear fuel cycle, it is Russia's policy to reprocess spent nuclear fuel. [10]

Domestically, Russia uses HEU in its research reactors, test reactors, fast reactors, pulsed reactors, critical assemblies and icebreakers. Russia has over forty percent of the world's HEU-fueled civil reactors. These include fourteen critical assemblies, twelve steady state reactors, three pulsed reactors, two fast critical reactors, and two fast reactors. [11]

Russia is the only country in the world that uses HEU for civilian marine propulsion, and has a marine HEU stockpile of 20 metric tons of fresh HEU and 10 metric tons of irradiated HEU. [12] Under Project 22220, two new icebreakers are under construction in St. Petersburg. According to Rosatom director general Sergey Kiriyenko, the first new icebreaker is expected to be completed by 2017. [13]

Russia also uses civilian HEU in the production of medical isotopes. Domestic demand for the medical isotope Mo-99 is met by production at the HEU-fueled VVR-T research reactor at the Karpov Institute of Physical Chemistry, which also uses HEU targets. [14]

Commerce

At the same time that U.S. export limitations under the Schumer Amendment of 1992 constricted the global supply of HEU (See U.S. HEU), [15] Russia seized the market and exported HEU to France, Germany, the Netherlands, China, and Indonesia. [16] Three shipments totaling 620 kg of HEU were delivered to fuel three French research reactors from 1996 to 2004. [17] Russia also delivered 300 kg of HEU (93%) following a 1998 agreement with Germany. [18] In September 2013, Russia's Rosatom and the French Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique publicized a deal that will see Rosatom supply HEU fuel for the initial loading of the Jules Horowitz Reactor at the Cadarache Center. [19] The amount negotiated was not disclosed in this initial announcement.

Russia's TVEL ceased the export of HEU-based fuel assemblies after developing new LEU-based fuels for research reactors in 2013. [20] However, in 2014 Russian policy changed to allow HEU to be owned by entities other than the Russian government. This development now enables Rosatom to export HEU to fuel research reactors in other countries without a separate bilateral treaty, or in conjunction with the export of HEU-based fuel assemblies. [21] While this change has made it easier for Russia to export HEU fuel, the supply of HEU to other countries may only proceed if it does not conflict with domestic regulations and Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines.

Efforts to Reduce or Eliminate Civilian HEU

Russia does not have an official policy on HEU reduction; however, it has engaged with the United States and other international partners in some HEU reduction efforts since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Excess HEU from Russian weapons has been blended down to LEU within the framework of the Megatons to Megawatts program (also known as the HEU-LEU program), operated under the Cooperative Threat Reduction program (CTR). However, Civil HEU minimization efforts have encountered economic challenges. Although Russia has recognized the proliferation implications of HEU in numerous official statements, it continues to weigh this against the commercial benefits of civil HEU use, including revenues from isotope production and HEU fuel export for foreign research reactors. Overall, Russia has focused less on the conversion of reactors inside of Russia, and more on the conversion of Soviet and Russian-supplied reactors.

Successful foreign conversion efforts include the Czech Republic, [22] Libya, [23] Vietnam, [24] Uzbekistan, Hungary, Bulgaria, [25] Poland, Kazakhstan, [26] and the Czech Republic. [27]

In 1993, the U.S. Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program approached Russian scientists to cooperate on the development of high-density LEU fuels to make the conversion of Soviet-built reactors possible, and invited scientists to participate in annual RERTR conferences. According to an NNSA report in 2014, a high-density LEU fuel type for IRT-type reactors was successfully developed as a result of these collaborations. [28] In February 2010, three Russian reactors were verified as shut down but not yet converted: the PhS-4, PhS-5, and STRELA. In 2011 and 2012 the BR-10, the MR Reactor, TIBR, and RF-GS had been shut down and are also awaiting conversion. [29]

Russia's historic hesitancy to convert its domestic reactors to use HEU fuel appeared to be linked to the cost of reactor conversion, the lack of an overarching plan for the future of Russia's research reactor fleet, and the possibility that HEU has technical advantages over LEU. However, at a July 2009 summit with President Obama in Moscow, President Medvedev made a commitment to conduct feasibility studies into the conversion of reactors in Russia. This suggested that Moscow would move to convert its reactors after the completion of the feasibility studies, as LEU fuel for the types of reactors being studied had already been developed to convert Soviet-supplied reactors abroad. In December 2010, U.S. Deputy Energy Secretary Daniel Poneman and Rosatom Director General Sergei Kiriyenko signed an official agreement to conduct feasibility studies on six Russian research reactors. [30] In keeping with this evolution of policy, representatives of Rosatom in 2012 indicated that the time had come for Russia to focus on converting its domestic reactors. [31] Russia officially announced in 2012 a domestic plan to convert Russian research reactors to LEU, and also initiated a feasibility study for the conversion of the WWR-TS reactor at Karpov Institute. [32] By July 2013, all six feasibility studies were completed, and Rosatom and the Department of Energy were in negotiations for a possible expansion of the cooperation agreement under the Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program in the Russian Federation (MNEPR). [33]

Of the six reactors studied, the ARGUS reactor was converted to LEU use by July 2014. [34] However, no decision to convert the remaining five domestic research reactors has yet been reached. Currently, activities beyond the scope of those agreed to before the fall of 2014 have been put on hold. [35] Russia, unlike other countries involved in HEU conversion work, has expressed interest in funding these conversions. [36] This likely reflects Moscow's desire for an independent policy vis-à-vis the United States in nuclear matters. [37]

Russia still relies on HEU to produce medical isotopes. When the High Level Group on the Security of Supply of Medical Isotopes met in July 2012, the Russian delegation stated that Russia would switch its targets to LEU in its medical isotope manufacturing process by 2018; however, this declaration was not an official Russian position statement, and did not exclude the possible use of HEU as a reactor fuel. [38] Nevertheless, two other officials have since repeated this position, and in November 2012, Rosatom indicated in a presentation in Moscow before the G8 that the conversion of the Karpov reactor to LEU fuel was a priority. Representatives have suggested as recently as 2014 that the conversion could be accomplished through a pilot program in 2016. [39] The status of these efforts remains unclear.

Since 2002, Russia has been consolidating fresh and spent Soviet-origin HEU fuel from foreign countries under the Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return Program (RRRFR). Furthering this effort, in February 2005, during a U.S.-Russian meeting in Bratislava, Moscow committed to the removal of Soviet-origin fresh and spent HEU fuel from research reactors outside Russia. [40] Through the RRRFR program, about 2,700 kg of nuclear fuel is expected to be removed by 2020. [41]

Within Russia itself, progress has been slower. Only one Russian site has been reportedly cleaned out of all HEU materials. With the assistance of the U.S. Department of Energy's Material Consolidation and Conversion program, all HEU (65 kg U-235 contained in 181 kg of uranium), was consolidated from the Krylov Shipbuilding Research Institute to the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Atomic Reactors (NIIAR) in Dimitrovgrad by March 2006. [42] The Krylov site has one research reactor that uses 10% LEU, and had three critical assemblies that were shut down as unneeded in the 1990s. However, the HEU for the facilities remained onsite until 2005-2006. In 2006, the NNSA in cooperation with Rosatom successfully removed the remaining HEU from the Krylov site and consolidated it in a more secure site, the Research Institute of Atomic Reactors in Dimitrovgrad. [43] Other facilities have been shut down as well, though in some cases the HEU fuel has remained on-site. [44]

In addition to bilateral HEU reduction efforts, Russia has been involved in other multilateral forums aimed at decreasing proliferation risks associated with HEU. These included the first three Nuclear Security Summits; however, Russia did not attend the fourth and final 2016 summit. [45]

HEU-to-LEU domestic reactor conversion has been a recent, slow, and uncertain process in Russia. The combination of high financial costs of HEU to LEU conversion, the perceived advantages offered by the use of HEU for some advanced research projects, and concerns over losing a potential technological edge vis-à-vis other countries (despite the lack of current plans to employ HEU in any future reactor projects), all contribute to the current Russian policy. It is telling that Moscow envisioned a business opportunity in expanding its HEU-based production of medical isotopes (and invested funds in a processing facility based on this assumption), despite an emerging global norm to move away from using HEU for this purpose. [46] The announcement of another Franco-Russian HEU export deal will likely reaffirm Russian beliefs in the commercial value of HEU. [47] Russia's decision to open a new civilian HEU production line is similarly damaging for the global norm against HEU use. Nevertheless, representatives of Rosatom in 2012 indicated that the time had come for Russia to focus on converting its domestic reactors. [48]

An additional challenge in gaining Russia's support for this norm has been Moscow's perception that the threat of terrorists acquiring HEU for the purpose of fabricating an improvised nuclear device is not very high. [49] Nevertheless, some consolidation of HEU materials has occurred within Russia, in part with the assistance of the U.S. Department of Energy. The threat posed by HEU has also been reduced by bolstering the security systems of icebreakers, some reactors, and some fuel cycle facilities. Interviews with Russian officials suggest that the U.S. decision to seriously pursue domestic reactor conversion, and the ability to show that conversion could be carried out without causing a loss in reactor performance has had an impact on the Russian perspective. [50]

Sources:
[1] International Panel on Fissile Materials, "Increasing Transparency of Nuclear-warhead and Fissile-material Stocks as a Step toward Disarmament," April 24, 2013, p. 8, www.fissilematerials.org.
[2] "Civil HEU Watch: Tracking Inventories of Civil Highly Enriched Uranium," David Albright and Serena Kelleher-Vergantini, October 7, 2015.
[3] The International Panel on Fissile Materials estimates Russia's total HEU to be between 650 and 679 tons. "Global Fissile Materials Report 2015: Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material Stockpile and Production," Eight Annual Report of the International Panel on Fissile Materials, 2015, www.fissilematerials.org. The U.S. Government Accountability Office cites Russia total HEU to be approximately 617 tons. "Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE Made Progress to Secure Vulnerable Nuclear Materials Worldwide, but Opportunities Exist to Improve Its Effort," United States Government Accountability Office, Report to Congressional Requesters, September 2015.
[4] "Reducing the Use of Highly Enriched Uranium in Civilian Research Reactors," Committee on the Current Status of and Progress Toward Eliminating Highly Enriched Uranium Use in Fuel for Civilian Research and Test Reactors, The National Academies Press, January 28, 2016.
[5] Rosatom's website appears to be unfortunately outdated in regards to Russian icebreaker status, listing six icebreakers and one transport ship as still active: Rosatom, "Nuclear Icebreakers," 2008-2012, www.rosatomflot.ru. In reality, it appears only five icebreakers are still operating, with the transport ship removed from the registry and in the process of being scrapped: Oleg Nekhai, "Russia to Build Three New-Generation Ice-Breakers for Northern Sea Route," The Voice of Russia, August 25, 2013, www.voiceofrussia.com. Atle Staalesen, "No Future for Nuclear-powered Container Ship,"Barents Observer, October 24, 2012, www.barentsobserver.com. For further discussion of phasing out civil HEU in Russia, see: Matthew Bunn, Securing the Bomb 2008 (Cambridge, Mass. and Washington, DC: Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School and the Nuclear Threat Initiative), November 18, 2008, www.nti.org; Elena Sokova, "Phasing Out Civilian HEU in Russia: Opportunities and Challenges," Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 15.2, July 2008; Pavel Podvig, Consolidating Fissile Materials in Russia's Nuclear Complex, International Panel on Fissile Materials research report, May 2009, www.fissilematerials.org; "Research Reactors," database, International Atomic Energy Agency. https://nucleus.iaea.org.
[6] William Potter and Cristina Hansell, eds. The Global Politics of Combating Nuclear Terrorism: A Supply-Side Approach (New York: Routledge, 2010), p. 101
[7] Pavel Podvig, "Russia Launches HEU Production Line," International Panel on Fissile Materials, October 29, 2012, www.fissilematerials.org; Pavel Podvig, "Russia is Set to Produce New Highly-Enriched Uranium," International Panel on Fissile Materials, June 1, 2012, www.fissilematerials.org; International Panel on Fissile Materials, "Increasing Transparency of Nuclear-warhead and Fissile-material Stocks as a Step toward Disarmament," April 24, 2013, p. 8, www.fissilematerials.org.
[8] "Countries: Russia," International Panel on Fissile Materials, January 12, 2016, www.fissilematerials.org.
[9] Pavel Podvig, "History of Highly Enriched Uranium Production in Russia," Science and Global Security, 19, 2011, www.scienceandglobalsecurity.org.
[10] "Processing of Used Nuclear Fuel," World Nuclear Association, updated November 2015, www.world-nuclear.org.
[11] "Reducing the Use of Highly Enriched Uranium in Civilian Research Reactors," Committee on the Current Status of and Progress Toward Eliminating Highly Enriched Uranium Use in Fuel for Civilian Research and Test Reactors, The National Academies Press, January 28, 2016.
[12] International Panel on Fissile Materials, "Increasing Transparency of Nuclear-warhead and Fissile-material Stocks as a Step toward Disarmament," April 24, 2013, p. 8, www.fissilematerials.org.
[13] "Russia's Baltic Shipyard starts building first serial project 22220 icebreaker," TASS, May 26, 2015, http://tass.ru/en.
[14] Kendra Vessels, "HEU for Isotope Production in Canada and Russia: Expansion or Phaseout?" University of Texas at Austin, April 20, 2011, p. 3, www.heuphaseout.org.
[15] Elena Sokova, "Phasing out Civilian HEU in Russia," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 15, No. 2, July 2008, p. 222.
[16] Pavel Podvig, "Supply of Russian HEU to Western Europe," International Panel on Fissile Materials, July 27, 2010, www.fissilematerials.org.
[17] Pavel Podvig, "Supply of Russian HEU to Western Europe," International Panel on Fissile Materials, July 27, 2010, www.fissilematerials.org.
[18] Elena Sokova, "Phasing out Civilian HEU in Russia," The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 15, No. 2, July 2008, p. 222.
[19] Pavel Podvig, "Russia to Supply HEU Fuel for French Research Reactor," International Panel on Fissile Material, September 18, 2013, www.fissilematerials.org.
[20] "TVEL zavershaet ispytaniya yadernogo topliva dlya nauchnogo reaktora Pol'shi," RIA Novosti, as reprinted by Rosatom, July 3, 2014, www.rosatom.ru.
[21] "Russia to supply HEU to research reactors abroad," IPFM Blog, January 30, 2014, www.fissilematerials.org/blog; "Sokrachshen Perechen' yadernyx materialov, kotorye mofut naxodit'sya isklyuchitel'no v federal'noj sobstvennosti," Kodeks, www.kodeks.ru.
[22] The first conversion of a Soviet-supplied reactor was completed in October 2005. The VR-1 ("Sparrow") reactor in the Czech Republic received new 19.7% enriched IRT-4M fuel, which was licensed in November 2004 from Russia's Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrates Plant. Radek Skoda, "Highly Enriched Uranium Minimization in the Czech Republic," Nuclear Energy Review, 2006, pp. 59-60, www.touchnuclear.com.
[23] Russia supplied Libya's IRT-1 reactor with LEU fuel in December 2005. Conversions of Libya's critical facility and its 10 MW reactor were completed in January 2006 and October 2006, respectively.
[24] The Soviet-supplied reactor at Vietnam's Dalat Nuclear Research Institute was converted in September 2007. [25] Pavel Podvig, "Spent HEU Fuel Removed from Uzbekistan," International Panel on Fissile Materials, November 1, 2012, www.fissilematerials.org. In 2008, conversions of the VVR-SM research reactor at the Institute of Nuclear Physics in Uzbekistan and the WWR-M reactor at the Kiev Institute of Nuclear Research took place. The Budapest research reactor in Hungary, the VVR-SM reactor in Uzbekistan, and Bulgaria's IRT-2000 research reactor in Sofia were converted in 2009.
[26] National Nuclear Security Administration, "NNSA Helps Poland Convert Reactor, Remove Highly Enriched Uranium," NNSA Press Release, September 25, 2012, http://nnsa.energy.gov; "The Critical Assembly," National Nuclear Center of the Republic of Kazakhstan, www.nnc.kz; National Nuclear Security Administration, "GTRI: Reducing Nuclear Threats," NNSA Fact Sheet, April 12, 2013, http://nnsa.energy.gov; Jordi Roglans, “GRTI Reactor Conversion Program Scope and Status,” Presentation, National Academy of Sciences, October 23, 2014, http://dels.nas.edu.
[27] National Nuclear Security Administration, "US Removes Last Remaining HEU from Czech Republic, Sets Nonproliferation Milestone," NNSA Press Release, April 5, 2013, http://nnsa.energy.gov.
[28] Jordi Roglans, "GRTI Reactor Conversion Program Scope and Status," Presentation, National Academy of Sciences, October 23, 2014, http://dels.nas.edu; Jordi Roglans, "NNSA's Russian Reactor Conversion Program: Historical Overview, Major Accomplishments, Current Status," Presentation, National Academy of Sciences, Status and Progress on Eliminating HEU Use in Fuel for Civilian Research and Test Reactors, April 16, 2015, http://nas-sites.org.
[29] "Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE Made Progress to Secure Vulnerable Nuclear Materials Worldwide, but Opportunities Exist to Improve Its Effort," United States Government Accountability Office, Report to Congressional Requesters, September 2015.
[30] The six reactors covered by the agreement are: the IR-8 reactor at the Kurchatov Institute (pool reactor, 8-80 MWT and 90 percent HEU); OR at the Kurchatov Institute (36 percent HEU); ARGUS at the Kurchatov Institute (homogenous reactor 20 KWT and 90 percent HEU); IRT-MEPhI at the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute (pool reactor 2.5 MWT and 90 percent HEU); RT-T at the Tomsk Polytechnical Institute (pool reactor 6 MWT and 90 percent HEU); MIR.M1 at the Research Institute of Atomic Reactors (pool reactor 100 MWT and 90 percent HEU). Christopher Landers, "Global Threat Reduction Initiative: Furthering HEU Minimization through Conversions," RERTR 32nd Annual Meeting, October 11, 2010.
[31] N.V. Arkhangelskij, "Sovremennoe sostoyanie i perspektivy rabot po sokrashcheniiu ispol'zovaniya VOU v rossiysix issledovatel'skix reaktorov," Mezhdunarodnaya konferentsiya, "Global'noe partnerstvo 'gruppy vos'mi.' otsenka itogov i perspektivy dal'neishego sotrudnichestva v oblasti yqdernoj radiatsionnoj bezopasnosti," Moscow, November 22, 2012, www.atomicexpert.com.
[32] Paris Staples, "Progress towards Eliminating Use of Highly Enriched Uranium in Medical Isotope Production and Research and Test Reactor Fuel and Repatriation of Excess HEU," presented at the Nuclear Radiation Studies Board Meeting, June 4, 2013, p. 9, http://dels-old.nas.edu.
[33] Pavel Podvig, "Progress in the US-Russian Reactor Conversion Program," International Panel on Fissile Material, June 28, 2013, www.fissilematerials.org; Jordi Roglans, "NNSA's Russian Reactor Conversion Program: Historical Overview, Major Accomplishments, Current Status," Presentation, National Academy of Sciences, Status and Progress on Eliminating HEU Use in Fuel for Civilian Research and Test Reactors, April 16, 2015. http://nas-sites.org.
[34] Paris Staples, "Progress towards Eliminating Use of Highly Enriched Uranium in Medical Isotope Production and Research and Test Reactor Fuel and Repatriation of Excess HEU," presented at the Nuclear Radiation Studies Board Meeting, June 4, 2013, p. 9, http://dels-old.nas.edu.
[35] Jordi Roglans, "NNSA's Russian Reactor Conversion Program: Historical Overview, Major Accomplishments, Current Status," Presentation, National Academy of Sciences, Status and Progress on Eliminating HEU Use in Fuel for Civilian Research and Test Reactors, April 16, 2015, http://nas-sites.org.
[36] "Breakout of GTRI Reactor Conversion Expansion," information provided at RERTR-2009, Beijing, October 2009; Alan J. Kuperman, "Global HEU Phase-Out: Prospects and Challenges," in Nuclear Terrorism and Global Security: the Challenge of Phasing out Highly Enriched Uranium, Alan J. Kuperman, ed., (New York: Routledge, 2013), fn. 10 p. 25.
[37] Douglas P. Guarino, "U.S. Official: Most DOE Nuclear Security Work in Russia Will Continue," Global Security Newswire, June 20, 2013, www.nti.org; Douglas P. Guarino, "New U.S.-Russian Security Deal Greatly Scales Back Scope, Experts Say," Global Security Newswire, June 18, 2013, www.nti.org.
[38] Douglas P. Guarino, "Suggestion Russia May Limit HEU Use Prompts Cautious U.S. Response," Global Security Newswire, August 17, 2012, www.nti.org.
[39] N.V. Arkhangelskij, "Sovremennoe sostoyanie i perspektivy rabot po sokrashcheniiu ispol'zovaniya VOU v rossiysix issledovatel'skix reaktorov," Mezhdunarodnaya konferentsiya, "Global'noe partnerstvo 'gruppy vos'mi.' otsenka itogov i perspektivy dal'neishego sotrudnichestva v oblasti yqdernoj radiatsionnoj bezopasnosti," Moscow, November 22, 2012, http://atomicexpert.com; "Gruppa vysokogo urovnya OECR obsuudila voprosy obespecheniya besperevoynyx postavok Mo-99" Press release, Izotop, January 30, 2014, www.isotop.ru; Douglas P. Guarino, "Improved Confidence in Russian Vow to Limit HEU May Stall Import Ban," Global Security Newswire, January 29, 2013, www.nti.org.
[40] "Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return Program,” Fact Sheets: 21st Century Science and Technology, Idaho National Laboratory, www4vip.inl.gov.
[41] Anton Khlopkov, "Russia’s Nuclear Security Policy: Priorities and Potential Areas for Cooperation," Policy Analysis Brief, The Stanley Foundation, May 2015, www.stanleyfoundation.org.
[42] V. Struyev, S. Kosmin, and I. Guriyev, "Changing the Status of the Krylov Shipbuilding Research Institute to an LEU Facility by Removing HEU from the Site," unpublished; National Nuclear Security Administration, "NNSA Works With Russia to Remove Nuclear Material from Research Institute," NNSA Press Release, July 13, 2006, http://nnsa.energy.gov.
[43] "NNSA Works with Russia to Remove Nuclear Material from Research Institute," National Nuclear Security Administration Press Release, July 13, 2006, www.nnsa.energy.gov.
[44] For a table of operational and shut down HEU facilities, including notation of the status of HEU materials located on-site, see Appendix A in Pavel Podvig's, Consolidating Fissile Materials in Russia's Nuclear Complex.
[45] "Russia told U.S. it will not attend 2016 nuclear security summit," Reuters, November 5, 2014, www.reuters.com; "Past and Current Civilian HEU Reduction Efforts," Nuclear Threat Initiative, January 31, 2014, www.nti.org; Elena Sokova. "Phasing Out Civilian HEU in Russia: Opportunities and Challenges," The Global Politics of Combating Nuclear Terrorism: A Supply-Side Approach, edited by William Potter and Cristina Hansell. (New York: Routledge, 2010), pp. 102.
[46] Alan J. Kuperman, et al. Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Project to Vladimir Putin. Letter, February 3, 2014, http://sites.utexas.edu, (accessed January 7, 2016).
[47] This mirrors analysis regarding a previous HEU shipment deal with France; see: Alan J. Kuperman, Paul L. Leventhal, "RERTR End-Game: a Win-Win Framework," a paper presented at the International Meeting on Reduced Enrichment for Research Reactors and Test Reactors (RERTR) Program, Jackson Hole, Wyoming, October 5-10, 1997, www.nci.org.
[48] N.V. Arkhangelskij, "Sovremennoe sostoyanie i perspektivy rabot po sokrashcheniiu ispol'zovaniya VOU v rossiysix issledovatel'skix reaktorov," Mezhdunarodnaya konferentsiya, "Global'noe partnerstvo 'gruppy vos'mi.' otsenka itogov i perspektivy dal'neishego sotrudnichestva v oblasti yqdernoj radiatsionnoj bezopasnosti," Moscow, November 22, 2012, www.atomicexpert.com.
[49] For example, see "Terroristicheskiye organizatsii ne mogut sozdat atomnoy bomby, zayavil ministr Rossiy po atomnoy energii" (Terrorist organizations are not capable of building an atomic bomb, says Russian Minister of Atomic Energy), ITAR-TASS, May 19, 2003; Also see: Cristina Hansell, "Nuclear Terrorism Threats and Responses," in Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015: Proceedings of a Russian-U.S. Workshop, Ashot Sarkisov and Rose Gottemoeller, eds., (Washington: National Academies Press, 2009), pp. 153-162.
[50] Braden Civins, "Conversion Aversion: The Sources of Russian Reluctance to Conversion of HEU-fueled Research Reactors," University of Texas at Austin, April 2011, www.heuphaseout.org.

April 26, 2016
Table of Contents:
About

The article is part of a collection examining civilian HEU reduction and elimination efforts. It details current Russian HEU policies, progress reducing and eliminating the civil use of HEU in Russia, and remaining challenges.

Countries

This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, or agents. Copyright 2016.