According to official testimony, Libya spent hundreds of millions of dollars on its nuclear program since the 1990s. After Colonel Qadhdhafi's public disclosure of Libya's secret nuclear weapons program in December 2003, IAEA inspections confirmed that nuclear equipment had been transferred to Libya via the "Khan network." It is estimated that over 30 companies in 12 countries around the world may have been involved in the network. The majority of these network affiliates disguised transactions by selling commercial equipment for water treatment and oil drilling in conjunction with transfers of nuclear technology. The dual-use nature of much of the equipment often meant that many firms were unaware of their contribution to Libya's nuclear program. Currently, half a dozen "workshops" have been identified as having manufactured centrifuge components for the Khan network. However, there are many other links in the network that require further investigation. For example, uncertainties still exist as to the source of particular components, such as the maraging steel needed for manufacturing rotors for the P-2 gas centrifuges.

What are Gas Centrifuges and How Do They Work?

Natural uranium contains less than 1% of U-235, a fissile isotope. For uranium to be utilized in peaceful or military nuclear applications it needs to be enriched to various degrees, i.e., the concentration of U-235 isotopes needs to be increased. Low enriched uranium (3-5%), known as LEU, is often used to power nuclear power reactors. Light water nuclear reactors currently generate more than 16% of the of the world's electricity. Highly enriched uranium (HEU) >20% has both military and civilian applications. HEU can be used in the construction of nuclear explosive devices such as warheads that can be fitted to various missiles, and aerial bombs that can be carried and deployed by fighter planes. There are various methods to enrich uranium, one of which is through gas centrifuges.

Gas centrifuges are the machines needed to enrich uranium. Uranium hexafluoride (UF6) is a uranium gas that is fed into gas centrifuges and spun at extremely high speeds to produce enriched uranium. At room temperature, UF6 is a solid white material. At higher temperatures, UF6 evaporates into a very corrosive gas, and can be used in uranium enrichment. This method of enrichment results in the separation of the U-238 isotope from the U-235 isotope. The slightly lighter U-235 isotope clusters near the center of the centrifuge, while the heavier U-238 isotope is drawn to the walls and bottom of the centrifuge to form depleted uranium. During this process, both enriched and depleted uranium gas streams are removed from the centrifuge by small scooped pipes. This process is repeated many times through a series of connected centrifuges. Over time, the ratio of lighter U-235 to heavier U-238 increases, indicating that the uranium is being enriched to a higher percentage. Because the enrichment output of a single gas centrifuge is insufficient to obtain significant uranium enrichment, several hundred or even thousands of gas centrifuges are connected together in what is known as a cascade. A cascade is the basic building block of a gas centrifuge enrichment facility. This allows UF6 to pass through a successive number of centrifuges in various cascades and gradually this process leads to increased enrichment of the U-235 to the desired enrichment level.

The performance of each centrifuge and its ability to enrich uranium is affected by a number of technical considerations. In general, gas centrifuge enrichment output can be enhanced with an increase in the length of the rotor and an increase in its spinning speed. It is desirable to operate these sophisticated machines at a lower temperature, although not to the point when UF6 gas may become condensed. The maximum safe speed of centrifuge operation is greatly limited by the rotor's ability to attenuate harmonic flexural vibrations and the rotor material's tensile strength. Accordingly, manufacturers of gas centrifuges continuously experiment with different materials to manufacture a longer, lighter, and stronger rotor that will allow faster rotation speed, thereby increasing the enrichment output of a gas centrifuge. Currently, different gas centrifuge rotor designs are made of a variety of materials. The rotors of basic gas centrifuges are made of aluminum alloy; while more advanced designs utilize lighter but stronger materials such as maraging steel, titanium, or carbon fiber. Rotors made of lighter and stronger materials can spin at higher speeds, thus increasing the enrichment output of a gas centrifuge. Basic aluminum gas centrifuges such as the P-1 spin at speeds lower than 400 m/second, while the more popular P-2 that contains a maraging steel rotor can spin at speeds up to 500 m/second. The most advanced gas centrifuges currently in possession of western powers contain carbon fiber rotors whose speed can exceed 600 m/second. These latest gas centrifuges technologies are believed to be beyond the technical capability of most proliferators such as Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran, and are only limited to Urenco and other western firms.

Urenco is a global leader in the field of gas centrifuge enrichment. Following the treaty of Almelo in the 1970s, Urenco was established as a nuclear technology consortium developed from a joint British, German, and Dutch initiative. L-1 is the designation for an old European gas centrifuge design also known as the G-1 or P-1. L-2, also known as G-2 or P-2, is a more advanced gas centrifuge design that uses rotors made of maraging steel as opposed to the L-1's aluminum rotors. It has been alleged that while working at Urenco, Abdul Qadeer Khan, the so-called father of the Pakistani nuclear bomb program, stole blueprints for the L-1 and L-2 centrifuge designs in the 1970s. Some assert that Pakistan built its enrichment process by duplicating these designs, which came to be known as P-1 and P-2. It is these Pakistani versions of Urenco's L-1 and L-2 gas centrifuge designs that AQ Khan and his nuclear black market ring supplied to Libya.

P-1 and P-2 gas centrifuges are made of approximately 100 components that can be broken down into the following categories: ring magnets, non-corrosive pipes & valves, end-cap and baffle, power supply, vacuum pumps, and maraging steel or aluminum. The manufacture of gas centrifuge components is a formidable technical challenge that must meet very specific technical guidelines. In addition to the strict design specifications of gas centrifuge components, rotors, pipes, valves, baffles, scoops, and vacuum pumps that come in contact with UF6 are required to be lined with or made of corrosion resistant materials due to the highly corrosive character of UF6 gas.

Origins of Gas Centrifuges

Although actual application of gas centrifuge enrichment began in the 1950s and 1960s, the origin of this method can be traced back to WWII in Germany. A central figure in the development of the gas centrifuge is Dr. Gernot Zippe. A physicist, Dr. Zippe was born and raised in Austria, and in the 1930s he attended the University of Vienna. During WWII, he served as a flight instructor and researcher in the German Luftwaffe. Following the end of the war, Dr. Zippe was kidnapped and held prisoner in a special Soviet camp on the Black Sea where he was ordered to devise a uranium enrichment method. While at this camp, Dr. Zippe worked with other German POWs with scientific backgrounds including Max Steenbeck, a fellow physicist and former director of the German company Siemens.

During the years following WWII, the Soviets were very eager to catch up with American nuclear achievements and expected Dr. Zippe and his colleagues to develop an enrichment method that would enable the Soviets to extract sufficient amounts of highly enriched uranium to build their own nuclear arsenal. Eventually, Dr. Zippe and his team were able to invent the Zippe-Type gas centrifuge, the predecessor for modern L-1 and L-2 gas centrifuges manufactured by Urenco and other nuclear firms. Following the completion of his project, Dr. Zippe was released by the Soviets and made his way to the United States where he worked in the late 1950s and early 1960s to replicate his designs. Zippe eventually created superior gas centrifuge designs that were made from more advanced maraging steel, thus allowing the rotors to spin at higher speeds. Eventually, Dr. Zippe returned to Europe and continued work on improving gas centrifuge designs. Today, all modern gas centrifuges designs made in Europe, the United States, and other countries are influenced by Gernot Zippe's original design. This method of uranium enrichment has become very popular due to the various advantages it possesses over other enrichment methods. It is used by various nuclear capable states to produce LEU and HEU for peaceful purposes, such as generating electricity, or military purposes, such as nuclear warhead assembly. When asked recently about the destructive potential of the technology that he invented, Dr. Zippe remained philosophical, and stated, "with a kitchen knife you can peel a potato or kill your neighbor ... it's up to governments to use the centrifuge for the benefit of mankind."[1]

Advantages of Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Technology

As compared to older uranium enrichment technology, such as gaseous diffusion, a very effective enrichment method that the U.S. enrichment industry has relied upon for more than 50 years, the gas centrifuge enrichment method boasts the following significant advantages:

1. Gas centrifuge enrichment separates U-235 isotopes more efficiently.
2. To achieve 4-5% uranium enrichment, gas centrifuge enrichment requires significantly fewer stages for enrichment, while gaseous diffusion enrichment requires UF6 to pass through more than 1000 stages.
3. Gas centrifuge enrichment on average consumes up to 90% less energy and electricity. This dramatically reduced the costs of enrichment, since a gas centrifuge facility can operate on approximately 10% of the required electricity needed for an equivalent sized gaseous diffusion enrichment facility.
4. Gas centrifuge facilities are easier to hide since they do not require the easily identifiable cooling and electrical systems that are necessary for gaseous diffusion facilities.
5. Gas centrifuge enrichment technology is very reliable. A modern gas centrifuge in good working condition can operate for more than a decade without maintenance.
6. The modular nature of gas centrifuge cascades allows for more flexible deployment and easier increases in capacity. More gas centrifuges can be added in various increments as demand for enrichment increases.

How Many Centrifuges are Needed to Produce Highly Enriched Uranium?

As it relates to military purposes, which was Libya's actual end goal, a single gas centrifuge can annually produce 30 grams of HEU. To annually produce 20-25 kilograms of HEU, the requisite amount for nuclear warhead assembly, it is necessary to run six tons of UF6 gas in 750-1000 gas centrifuges. Hence, to produce one kilogram of HEU requires processing 176 kilograms of UF6 gas. On average, each centrifuge would spin at 400 m/sec and would be about 1.5 meters long. The size of a typical enrichment facility that is capable of producing this amount of HEU per year is usually 600 square meters. From a nonproliferation standpoint, this is one of the pitfalls of the gas centrifuge enrichment method; a medium-sized warehouse or building can house a sufficient number of gas centrifuge cascades to produce one or more nuclear warheads per year. This makes uncovering enrichment facilities of potential proliferators more difficult. Unlike gaseous diffusion enrichment facilities, or even nuclear reactors that can produce plutonium, a typical gas centrifuge enrichment facility would not require the cooling or electrical systems that are readily visible in other types of enrichment facilities. Hence, it is not surprising that like other nuclear proliferators, Libya chose to pursue a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment method for its covert nuclear weapons program. The assumption was that such enrichment facilities when erected and operational would be difficult to identify. Another possibility is that the Libyans simply pursued the enrichment method that was available to them at the time. By opting to acquire nuclear enrichment capability from Pakistani nuclear scientists who possessed extensive experience with gas centrifuges, it is likely that by default Libya was encouraged to pursue this enrichment route which was most familiar to AQ Khan and his associates.

Where Did Libya Acquire its Gas Centrifuge Components?

One cannot overemphasize the importance of Pakistan in Libya's nuclear gas centrifuge components acquisition. Pakistan has played a central role in Libya's development of nuclear technology over the past decades. Not only did Libya partially finance Pakistan's initial efforts to develop nuclear weapons during the 1970s, but it also turned to the Khan network 20 years later to develop its own indigenous nuclear capability. Khan Research Laboratories played a central role in facilitating nuclear transfers to Libya and provided some key equipment to the country beginning in the mid-1990s. Reports indicate that Libya not only received centrifuge components from Pakistan, but also partly enriched uranium. In February 2001, Pakistan allegedly sent Libya a shipment that included 1.7 tons of UF6 gas, which the country could use to produce HEU. The cargo was reportedly delivered by way of a Pakistani airliner. In 2001 and 2002, Khan sent Libya all the components necessary to manufacture complete gas centrifuges.

Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) - Pakistan

Khan Research Laboratories is Pakistan's main nuclear establishment and was charged with leading Pakistan's efforts to acquire a nuclear weapon beginning in the 1970s, under the leadership of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan. AQ Khan is a metallurgist and electrical engineer who worked for the Pakistani nuclear establishment and was a key figure in developing Pakistan's first nuclear weapon. In his quest for nuclear technology, Khan established a worldwide network of nuclear suppliers specializing in technical design, manufacturing, and sales. He used his resources at KRL, as well as his contacts abroad, to turn a personal profit by facilitating transfers of nuclear technology to clients around the world.

During the 1990s, Libya's efforts to procure gas centrifuge technology found a willing supplier through Khan and his affiliates at KRL. In 1997, Libyan intelligence agents allegedly contacted Khan to inquire about available nuclear technology. Specifically, the Libyans wanted gas centrifuge technology and machinery to be able to produce centrifuges indigenously. The final agreement was a $100 million contract for centrifuge components and an "off the shelf" centrifuge manufacturing plant. The eventual transfers were coordinated through a series of meetings between Khan and Libyan representatives Mohamad Matuq Mohamad and Karim in Istanbul, Casablanca, and Dubai between 1997 and 2002. Dubai in particular became an important base of operations for Khan and his network due to a multitude of available transportation networks as well as lax business regulations which allowed him to establish shell companies to facilitate separate transactions.

Libya purchased mostly centrifuge components from the Khan network, although there were some transfers of completed centrifuges, and even an attempt to purchase an entire gas centrifuge production facility as well as weapons designs. In 1997, Libya purchased tens of pre-assembled P-1 centrifuges from KRL, which had reportedly been decommissioned from Pakistan's own centrifuge program. Shortly thereafter, Libya purchased components for more than one hundred additional P-1 centrifuges. Libya also attempted to procure the more advanced P-2 centrifuge. Two P-2 centrifuges and parts for several more were reportedly sent to Libya as demonstrator models in September 2000, although one of the P-2s proved unsuitable for enrichment using UF6 gas. Even so, Libya placed an order for 10,000 P-2 centrifuges shortly after receiving the demonstrator models. Since each centrifuge contains around 100 components, the order required approximately one million components. The eventual goal was to create a cascade of 10,000 centrifuges to produce HEU for use in a nuclear weapon. Had this plan came to fruition, Libya would have been able to enrich enough uranium to manufacture 10 nuclear warheads per year.

The sophisticated gas centrifuge manufacturing facility that Libya attempted to acquire was code-named Machine Shop 1001, and was intended to manufacture components in Libya and build additional centrifuges after the initial shipments had been delivered. The original purchase plan from the Khan network included detailed designs for the centrifuge plant, as well as electronic and electrical equipment, 20 tons of UF6, and feed and withdrawal equipment for uranium. Most of the equipment for Machine Shop 1001 including furnaces, machine tools, and other equipment came from different European countries, particularly from or through Italy and Spain. The majority of this equipment was sent through Dubai on the way to Libya. Acquisition of equipment for Machine Shop 1001 involved other alleged Khan nuclear black market associates, including British citizen Peter Griffin, former owner of Gulf Technical Industries (GTI) in Dubai, and German citizen Gotthard Lerch, former employee of Leybold Heraeus, a German vacuum technology manufacturer.

The Khan network also allegedly provided Libya with a nuclear weapon warhead design and weapon assembly instructions. Much of this information was reportedly design information that Pakistan received from China in the early 1980s. The design was allegedly for a 10-kiloton warhead with a mass of 500 kilograms that would not have fit on Libya's SCUD missiles, but could have been delivered through other means. In what appeared to be a shrewd business overture, Khan reportedly provided this design information as a "deal sweetener" at the outset of business relations with Qadhdhafi. It has been estimated that if the nuclear black market network had not been discovered, Libya could have produced HEU from its fleet of fully-operational gas centrifuges in four or five years.

In addition to KRL's facilitation and coordination of the entire black market network that provided Libya with various components for its nuclear program, KRL directly provided Libya with the following fully-assembled centrifuges, centrifuge parts, nuclear components, and other materials relevant for nuclear weapons production:

• 1.7 tons of UF6 gas.
• 92 assembled P-1 gas centrifuges.
• Parts for additional 128 P-1 gas centrifuges.
• Two P-2 gas centrifuges.
• Additional parts for several P-2 gas centrifuges.
• A design for a nuclear warhead assembly.

As it related to gas centrifuge components and equipment, KRL provided Libya with all the necessary P-1 and P-2 components, including ring magnets, non-corrosive pipes & valves, end-cap and baffle, power supply, vacuum pumps, aluminum or maraging steel, and flow-forming equipment. These initial tens of P-1 and P-2 gas centrifuges provided to Libya by KRL were intended to acquaint the Libyan nuclear scientists with the gas centrifuge technology and operations for experimentation and research until Libya's full order of thousands of P-2 gas centrifuges and tons of UF6 gas could be delivered from Khan's nuclear black market ring. Once Libya received thousands of gas centrifuges it would have likely started enriching uranium.

SMB Computers - Dubai

SMB Computers was originally established as a family company in 1980 and grew to incorporate computer and information technology. It is one of Buhary Sayed Abu Tahir's most well-known companies. BSA Tahir is a Sri Lankan businessman who first met AQ Khan in the 1980s, when he received a contract to sell air conditioning equipment to KRL. Tahir was eventually integrated into Khan's nuclear network and was introduced to affiliates in various countries who supplied centrifuge components for Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. Tahir aided Khan in obtaining materials for Pakistan's own nuclear efforts, and later coordinated transactions to Iran and Libya.

The centrifuge transfers to Libya were largely coordinated by Tahir through affiliates in Malaysia and shell companies in Dubai. Tahir was often called Khan's right-hand man for his close relationship with Khan and his oversight on many of the network's key transactions. He maintained links with European middlemen to acquire subcomponents and provide financing, many of whom operated out of Germany, Turkey, the UK, and Switzerland. He also accompanied Khan on a series of meetings in Istanbul, Casablanca, and Dubai in 2001 and 2002 to coordinate centrifuge transfers to Libya. In accordance with Libya's order, he arranged for the manufacture of centrifuge components at a plant in Malaysia and facilitated the transfer of centrifuge parts and blueprints of nuclear-related technology to Libya. He also arranged to transfer electrical components for Machine Shop 1001. Most of these transfers were routed through numerous Dubai businesses, which Tahir had established specifically to act as front companies until all transactions were completed. Gas centrifuge components that were produced at SCOPE or acquired from other companies were sometimes assembled and placed in containers in SMB warehouses. These containers were typically labeled as "used machinery" and sold through SMB Computers to Libya.

Scomi Precision Engineering (SCOPE) - Malaysia

Scomi Precision Engineering (SCOPE) is a subsidiary of a petroleum services company called Scomi Group BHD. The SCOPE factory is located 95 miles from Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in a town called Shah Alam. The plant typically produces components for automobile parts, as well as equipment for petroleum and gas companies. In late 2001, BSA Tahir allegedly commissioned the SCOPE factory to manufacture centrifuge components for delivery to Libya. Tahir had attempted to have the components produced in South Africa, but the firm chosen for the job did not have access to the specialized metal required for production. After this setback, Tahir used his contacts in Malaysia to arrange for the parts to be produced at the SCOPE factory. The work done for Libya was part of a one-time contract worth $13 million.

SCOPE manufactured an array of aluminum components for the P-2 centrifuges including casings, end-caps, and baffles. A total of 25,000 aluminum centrifuge parts were manufactured for Libya, utilizing 14 different designs. These parts comprised up to 15 percent of the total components that the network planned to provide to Libya. Finished products were typically sent from the Malaysian facility to Dubai with a false end-user certificate where they were received by Tahir's affiliates, repackaged, and sent on to Libya. There is no evidence of deliveries directly from SCOPE to Libyan affiliates. SCOPE purchased some of its raw materials from companies outside of Malaysia. Some of the materials used to manufacture 300 metric tons of aluminum tubing were purchased from Bikar Mettale Asia, a Singapore subsidiary of the German company Bikar Mettale. This tubing was sent through Dubai in four shipments between December 2002 and August 2003. There is no evidence to suggest that either SCOPE or Bikar Mettale Asia knew that these aluminum components were to be used in the manufacture of gas centrifuges components that were destined for Libya.

On October 4, 2003, Italian authorities seized a shipment of containers bound for Libya from the vessel BBC China. Five containers that were confiscated were labeled with the SCOPE emblem and contained thousands of centrifuge components that had been manufactured at SCOPE and sent by Tahir from Aryash Trading Company in Dubai. Although these components were identified as having been directed for use in Libya's nuclear program, they were not sufficient to construct even one complete centrifuge. The shipment did not contain certain vital components, such as centrifuge rotors. As a result of investigations after the seizure, Tahir was arrested in May 2004 in Kuala Lumpur and has since provided investigators with useful information regarding the extent of Khan's dealings with Libya.

Swiss national Urs Tinner worked as a consultant to BSA Tahir and helped set up SCOPE's Malaysian facility in Shah Alam in December 2001. Urs acted as a full-time technical assistant to SCOPE beginning in April 2002, and helped to program machinery to manufacture centrifuge components. He also controlled much of the centrifuge design information for the Khan network. SCOPE employees reported that Urs was always careful to guard sensitive design information against unwanted inquiry. He allegedly erased files from his computer at SCOPE after each transaction. When he left SCOPE in October 2003, he took with him personal files from the company's computer system. SCOPE representatives stated that they did manufacture the parts ordered by Tahir, but they believed they were to be used in the oil and gas industries in Dubai, and were unaware of their final destination. It is widely believed that Tahir and Urs Tinner never disclosed the nature of the orders, and Tinner was careful to safeguard component designs after each order was completed. Approximately 4,000 casings for L-2 gas centrifuges were manufactured by SCOPE and shipped to Libya via Dubai. Although not as technologically advanced as other components sold to Libya by other companies, these casings are vital to the assembly and safe operation of gas centrifuges and assembled cascades. A single centrifuge casing can enclose one or numerous rotors (depending on the centrifuge design), and is needed in maintaining a vacuum to facilitate the flawless operation of these rotors. More so, the casing's secondary role is to contain the exceedingly fast spinning components in case of a centrifuge malfunction. If not contained, shrapnel from one centrifuge breakdown can destroy adjacent centrifuges and in essence start a harmful chain reaction within a cascade.

"D" & Hanbando Balance Inc. - South Korea

In February 2004, South Korean government officials decided to file suit against a small South Korean trading firm identified as "D" for violation of the country's export control laws by shipping four balancing machines to Libya in June 2002 without government permission. Balancing machines are dual-use items and are critical in the design and manufacture of gas centrifuge rotors. As the rotor spins at high speeds, it experiences flexural vibrations that, if not contained, can cause early failure of the centrifuge's bearing and suspension system. By using precision balancing, the balancing machines are used to balance the rotor to minimize its vibrations. This reduces the rotor amplitude to a manageable level and enhances the operation of the gas centrifuge. It is alleged that the firm "D" purchased these balancing machines from Hanbando Balance Inc. for $190,000 each, with the intent of selling these machines to Libya. Hanbando Balance Inc. is one of South Korea's most prominent manufacturers of balancing technology; it was founded in 1974 in Ansan, approximately 20-25 kilometers southwest of Seoul. Currently this company designs and manufactures an array of horizontal, vertical, and semi-automatic balancing machines for various industrial purposes, including the auto industry. Just like Bikar Mettale Asia and SCOPE, there is no evidence to suggest that Hanbando Balance Inc. knew that its products were destined to Libya to be used in a covert nuclear program. These companies most likely sold their products to middlemen and other firms for what they believed were legitimate industrial purposes.

As of February 2004, the South Korean government feared that other domestic companies might have violated its export control laws and have been involved in the export of dual-use technology and "strategic materials" to Middle Eastern proliferators. As stated by Yi Hui Pom, South Korea's minister of Commerce, Industry, and Energy: "I am afraid more South Korean companies will likely be discovered to have exported strategic materials without government permission as the IAEA is closely reviewing the results of nuclear inspections of Libya, and Iran has expressed willingness to accept nuclear inspections."[2] It remains to be seen if additional South Korean manufacturers and trading firms were involved in Libya's nuclear acquisition.

CETEC & Traco - Switzerland

CETEC is a company that specializes in vacuum technology and was established by mechanical engineer Frederick Tinner following his dismissal from Vakuum-Apparate-Technik (VAT), another Swiss vacuum technology company. Frederick Tinner is the father of Urs Tinner, BSA Tahir's assistant, and the private consultant who worked at SCOPE. According to documents and VAT company officials, while working for VAT, Frederick Tinner was in charge of exports. At the time, VAT was identified by the Swiss Defense Department as involved in shipping possible nuclear related items to Pakistan and Iraq. Mr. Tinner had reportedly been working with Khan since the 1980s, and was instrumental in supplying components to the secret centrifuge programs of both Pakistan and Iraq. In recent years, he procured non-corrosive safety valves for centrifuges from manufacturing companies in Europe and shipped them to Libya via Dubai. Mr. Tinner was implicated as an affiliate of the Khan network after Tahir's arrest in Malaysia in May 2004. The Tinner family has since been identified as having supplied a large portion of Libya's nuclear technology via the network. More so, the Libya chapter is not CETEC's first involvement in nuclear technology proliferation to a rogue regime aspiring for nuclear technology. It is reported that in 1989, CETEC also attempted to provide Iraq's nuclear enrichment program with valves that are UF6 resistant; however, the shipment was seized in Jordan.

Traco is another Swiss firm that is owned by Marco Tinner and is responsible for the export of flow forming equipment that is necessary for the manufacture and production of gas centrifuge components. Marco Tinner, the brother of Urs Tinner and the son of Friedrich Tinner, allegedly coordinated with Urs in providing key cutting and grinding machines to Malaysia that were used in the production of centrifuge components for Libya. Traco was instrumental in importing much of this flow forming equipment from the United Kingdom and France and later exporting these machines to Malaysia to assist in the production of Libyan centrifuge components at the SCOPE factory. In addition, Urs Tinner modified some of these machines to produce the parts required for Libya's nuclear program.

Trade Fin Engineering - South Africa

Despite South Africa's strict anti-proliferation laws, a number of middlemen working with the Khan network have allegedly found refuge in several of the country's obscure engineering and manufacturing firms. South Africa's sophisticated civilian nuclear program and its strong steel industry have allowed for relatively easy access to technologies that may otherwise be difficult to obtain. Many of the centrifuge components that were destined for Libya were manufactured in South Africa. Trade Fin Engineering is a manufacturing firm in the South African town of Vanderbiljpark started by Johan Andries Muller Meyer who worked on South Africa's nuclear program during the 1980s. After leaving the government, Mr. Meyer acted as a middleman in the Khan network and played a crucial role in facilitating nuclear technology transfers to Libya. Specifically, Trade Fin attempted to supply Libya with gas centrifuge feed and piping systems, vacuum pumps, and a flow forming machine used to produce steel rotor tubes for uranium enrichment. In addition, Trade Fin also unsuccessfully attempted to manufacture maraging steel rotors for Libya's prospective P-2 centrifuges. The feed and piping system parts made by Trade Fin were designed specifically to control entry and withdrawal of uranium hexafluoride gas into cascades of centrifuges during the enrichment process. Trade Fin typically imported the equipment from firms in Europe and tailored them to fit Libya's specific requirements. The finished parts were planned to be sent to other middlemen who would facilitate the transfer to Libya.

Mr. Meyer worked with German national Gerhard Wisser to coordinate the manufacture of parts for the facility in South Africa. Wisser was in contact with BSA Tahir, who provided design plans that Meyer used in his Trade Fin plant. Meyer also allegedly received subcomponents and other materials that were prepaid and sent from sources outside South Africa. Meyer began work on the facility in early 2000, and by May 2003, he had constructed a two-story apparatus made of stainless steel. The system was tested, dismantled, and packaged into 11, 40-foot shipping containers. Meyer allegedly received direct payments from BSA Tahir, but it is unclear whether the two ever met in person. He also reportedly received a payment from Libya after the full system had been packaged and readied for delivery. This was allegedly the first time that Meyer was aware of Libya's role in the project.

The BBC China seizure in October 2003 led officials to Trade Fin as a potential network affiliate. On September 1, 2004, South African police officials searched the Trade Fin facilities near Vanderbiljpark where they found the 11 containers of centrifuge equipment and related literature. Police transferred the 11 containers to South Africa's nuclear research center at Pelindaba for inspection by South African police and the IAEA. It is estimated that the 200 tons of equipment for the plant was worth around $33 million. During the raid, authorities also discovered various equipment designs that had been sent from KRL. Meyer was arrested on September 2, 2004 and charged with violating the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act and the Nuclear Energy Act. Specifically, he was charged with importing and exporting a flow forming lathe that can be used to produce centrifuge components, as well as equipment for a gas centrifuge plant. He admitted in an official statement that he knew the parts were to be used for a manufacturing plant, but he was unaware that the final destination was Libya. Charges were later dropped against Meyer in exchange for cooperation in the ongoing investigations into the Khan network.

Krisch Engineering - South Africa

Krisch Engineering is another South African firm located in the Johannesburg suburb of Randburg that specializes in repairing leak detectors and vacuum pumps. Gerhard Wisser is the owner of Krisch and was involved in South Africa's nuclear weapons program during the 1980s. During this time, he used his engineering firm to import important nuclear-related equipment without detection. Krisch Engineering is alleged to have attempted to provide Libya with vacuum pumps and other gas centrifuge related components and technology. In 1999, Wisser met Tahir at a dinner in Dubai. Tahir allegedly asked Wisser if Krisch Engineering would be able to produce piping systems for a refinery in the United Arab Emirates. Tahir said he would obtain the necessary design information and send them to Wisser in South Africa. Although Krisch Engineering no longer specialized in piping systems, Wisser was offered $1 million to find a third party to complete the deal. He later received the payment in three installments and deposited the money into bank accounts in Zurich, Dubai, and Liechtenstein.

A few weeks after the initial meeting in Dubai, Wisser contacted Johan Meyer, who was an acquaintance from the South African nuclear program. Meyer agreed to have Trade Fin manufacture the piping that Tahir requested. Wisser later claimed that Meyer was never introduced to Tahir, and was never told that the piping system would eventually be sent to Libya. After the seizure of the BBC China in October 2003, Wisser grew wary of the ongoing police investigations in South Africa. He encouraged Meyer to destroy the centrifuge equipment which was packaged in 11 shipping containers in Trade Fin warehouses and still waiting to be delivered. He also encouraged Meyer to destroy all related documentation.

On August 25, 2004, Wisser was charged in Germany with violating arms control legislation. Shortly after being released on bail, he moved back to South Africa where he was implicated in Meyer's arrest in September 2004. He was subsequently arrested on charges of agreeing to provide Libya with nuclear technology beginning in 2001. Wisser has since provided police forces with useful information regarding his involvement with Tahir and Meyer. He maintains that he was unaware of the Libyan deal and believed that the parts were meant for a water purification plant in an unnamed country.

ETI Elektroteknik & EKA - Turkey

Two electronic workshops in Turkey allegedly constructed power supply components and ring magnets for P-2 centrifuges for the Libyan nuclear program. These Turkish electronic components were more sophisticated than the metal gas centrifuge components that were manufactured in Malaysia by SCOPE. The workshops typically obtained subcomponents from businesses in Europe, assembled them, and then shipped completed components to Dubai with false end-user certificates to be repackaged and sent to Libya. ETI Elektroteknik is a Turkish electronics company alleged to supply Libya with aluminum and power supply equipment. ETI's director is Gunas Jireh, a Turkish national and a former employee of Siemens of Germany who was hired by Khan to provide Libya with centrifuge dynamos/motors and aluminum castings. After the raid on the BBC China in October 2003, Khan's right hand man BSA Tahir admitted to authorities that a consignment of centrifuge components supplied by Jireh was on board the ship and had been successfully delivered to Libya. There are also reports that a shipment of components made in Turkey was sent to Libya as late as March 2004.

Elektronik Kontrol Aletleri (EKA) is another Turkish electronics company that was implicated in the nuclear black market. It reportedly sold power supply equipment to Libya's covert nuclear program, namely electrical cabinets and frequency converters that regulate power supply to cascades of gas centrifuges during the enrichment process. Selim Alguadis, the president of EKA, is a Turkish engineer who has reportedly been in contact with Khan since the 1980s. He allegedly supplied electrical cabinets and voltage-regulator equipment to the Libyan nuclear program through EKA. These frequency converters are among the key components in the operation of gas centrifuges. The output from these machines is fed to the centrifuge motor and in essence can determine the speed and enrichment output of the centrifuge. Alguadis allegedly facilitated a shipment of this equipment through Dubai just two weeks after the BBC China seizure. Representatives from EKA contend that Alguadis had never knowingly shipped equipment to Libya. BSA Tahir also informed Malaysian police that a shipment of equipment from Alguadis which has been on the BBC China had also been successfully delivered to Libya, just like the equipment from Gunas Jireh.

Libya's Revelations and Consequences

Libya's decision to disarm its WMD programs on December 19, 2003, exposed the nuclear black market scheme emanating from Pakistan and precipitated its dismantlement. Libya's admissions to the IAEA about where they were able to procure their materials, equipment, and designs were the most definitive exposé of AQ Khan's role in the vast nuclear black market network. While the role of Pakistan in supplying nuclear fissile material enrichment technologies to North Korea and Iran was revealed and discussed prior to Libya's decision to unilaterally disarm, Tripoli's revelations put Khan and his black market associates on center stage. These revelations began when Saif Qadhadafi, the son of the Libyan president, publicly admitted in an interview with the London Sunday Times that Libya paid "millions of pounds" for nuclear technology from Pakistan. He said, "We dealt with an underground network of middle men and secret workshops... This piece from here, that piece from there."[3] Shortly after these revelations emerged, Pakistan's nuclear black market ring became the center of extensive global media and official inquiries. These revelations made by Libya to the IAEA and the U.S. government forced Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf to admit his country's role in the nuclear black market despite years of denials. In addition, President Musharraf had to fire AQ Khan, a national hero in Pakistan, from his post as scientific advisor and place him under informal house arrest. On February 5, 2004, Khan publicly admitted and apologized for his role in the nuclear black market telling his countrymen on national television that, "I take full responsibility for my actions and seek your pardon."[4]

It is unclear as to whether the Musharraf government was fully aware of Khan's dealings, but it is possible that access to Khan would implicate Musharraf's government in the process. It can be argued that Pakistan can still provide vital information on the extent of the Khan network by allowing the IAEA full access to Khan, who remains under house arrest in Pakistan. Furthermore, uncovering the remaining links of the vast network that supplied Libya with nuclear technology may have implications for future investigations of current states of concern, such as Iran and North Korea. Equally alarming to Pakistan's premier nuclear scientist's centrality in the nuclear black market with or without the knowledge of the various past Pakistani governments, is the current Pakistani government's utter refusal to allow UN experts to question AQ Khan. While Musharraf may not be complicit in Khan's activities in the past, especially prior to his ascendancy to the top office, his refusal in light of recent revelations from Libya and Iran to allow the IAEA to interrogate Khan is surely obstructing international efforts to uncover and neutralize the entire nuclear black market network.

However, one must take into account other factors that are also at play. The Pakistani government is currently a key ally of the West in the war against al-Qai'da, despite considerable dissatisfaction from the various religious elements within Pakistani society. As stated by Michael Scheuer, the former head of the CIA's Bin Laden Unit:

I think Pakistan is--from our viewpoint...the single most important ally we have in the war on terrorism, and I personally, after having worked on it for the better part of two decades, would have never thought [President Pervez] Musharraf would have delivered as much as he has. Its one thing for him to help us by arresting--or helping to arrest [al-Qai'da operatives] Khalid Sheik Mohammed or Abu Zubaidah in the cities. It's something quite different to send military into the border areas. I would have bet he wouldn't have done that. And I think Musharraf has helped us about the extent he can, without really causing instability in Pakistan, or pushing Pakistan toward a civil war. I think there are some people in Washington who realize that. The last time Musharraf was here, there wasn't the usual chorus of, 'Why can't you do more for us?' But I think both Pakistani stability and Musharraf are kind of one step ahead of the locomotive.[5]

This close cooperation with the United States is not popular among significant sections of the Pakistani society, while AQ Khan is widely considered a national hero to most Pakistanis. At this point, it is likely that President Musharraf cannot afford to further humiliate one of Pakistan's most popular public figure by allowing the IAEA or western intelligence officials to interview Khan and risk a domestic backlash against his government. It is equally plausible that this is the reason why the United States and other western powers have not assertively demanded access to AQ Khan to uncover the other hidden links within the nuclear black market for fear of threatening Musharraf's position within Pakistan. Finally, it may also be the case that the various investigations and interviews by Asian, African, and European security services of Tahir, Meyer, Wisser, and others have yielded sufficient exposure of the Khan nuclear black market ring, which reduces the need to interview AQ Khan personally. Either way, it does not seem likely that Pakistani President Musharraf will take any further action on Khan in the near future, in addition to his removal from government work and indefinite house arrest. Although it is likely that the United States will continue to push Pakistan specifically for information on Khan's nuclear trade with Iran, to ascertain if Iran like Libya was also provided with nuclear warhead designs, or other nuclear assistance that is specific to military applications. Such revelations from Pakistan can have significant effect on the ongoing negotiations and investigations into Iran's nuclear program.

Disclaimer: Information for this article was taken from open press sources and unclassified government documents and is presented on an as-reported basis. The Center for Nonproliferation Studies cannot vouch for the accuracy or veracity of these reports.

Resources

• "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya - Report by the Director General," IAEA, February 20, 2004, www.isis-online.org
• David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, "Libya's Gas Centrifuge Procurement: Much Remains Undiscovered," ISIS, March 1, 2004, www.isis-online.org
• David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, "Uncovering the Nuclear Black Market: Working Toward Closing Gaps in the International Nonproliferation Regime," ISIS, July 2, 2004, www.isis-online.org
• Bill Powell and Tim McGirk, "The Man Who Sold the Bomb," Time Magazine, February 14, 2005.
• Bill Gertz, "Libyan Sincerity on Arms in Doubt," Washington Times, September 9, 2004.
• Dafna Linzer and Craig Timberg, "S. African's Arrest Seen as Key to Nuclear Black Market," Washington Post, September 4, 2004.
• Stephen Fidler and Mark Huband, "Turks and South Africans 'Helped Libya's Secret Nuclear Arms Project,'" Financial Times, June 10, 2004.
• Frederick Lamy, "Export controls violations and illicit trafficking by Swiss companies and individuals in the case of A.Q. network," Geneva Centre for Security Policy, August, 19, 2004, www.pircenter.org
• Stephen Fidler and John Reed, "Nuclear Trade Smugglers Home in on Loopholes in South Africa," Financial Times, September 14, 2004.
• Chaim Brawn and Christopher Chyba, "Proliferation Rings: New Challenges to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime," International Security, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Fall 2004).
• "South Africa; Nuclear-Linked Components Exposed," Africa News, September 8, 2004.
• "In Depth Nuclear Fuel Cycle," BBC, October 7, 2004.
• "Enrichment Material Seized," Dawn, September 8, 2004.
• "RSA: State Said Concerned Over Illicit Transfer of Nuclear Dual-Use Technology," Johannesburg SAPA PR, September 7, 2004.
• "RSA: Officials Confirm Equipment Seized at Plant Could be Used in WMD Production," Johannesburg SAPA, September 7, 2004.
• Paul Kerr, "IAEA: Questions Remain About Libya," Arms Control Today, July/August 2004.
• "RSA: Acquitted WMD Suspect Reportedly to Turn State Witness, Receive Immunity," Johannesburg This Day, September 9, 2004.
• "RSA: State Drops Charges Against Man Arrested Under Laws Governing Making WMD," Johannesburg SAFM Radio, September 8, 2004.
• Jack Boureston and Lindsay Fritz, Nuclear Black Market, Jane's Intelligence Review, January 2005 (to be published).
• "IAEA Chief Interviewed on Stance on Israel, Iran, Libya, Related Topics," Al-Sharq al-Awsat, October 2, 2004.
• "AFP: Malaysia Says Nuclear Middleman Reveals Iran, Libya Deals," AFP, February 20, 2004.
• William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, "As Nuclear Secrets Emerge in Khan Inquiry, More are Suspected," The New York Times, December 26, 2004.
• "Press Release by Inspector General of Police in Relation to Investigation on the Alleged Production of Components for Libya's Uranium Enrichment Programme," Polis Diraja Malaysia, February 20, 2004, www.rmp.gov.my
• Douglas Frantz and William C. Rempel, "New Find in a Nuclear Network," Los Angeles Times, November 28, 2004.
• "South African Nuclear Trafficking Investigation Continues," NIS Export Control Observer, October 2004, p. 19-20.
• "Statement of David Albright - International Smuggling Networks: Weapons of Mass Destruction Counterproliferation Initiatives," Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, June 23, 2004, www.hsgac.senate.gov.
• "Khan Nuke Network Spread Across Globe," United Press International, October 13, 2004
• Esther Pan, "Nonproliferation: The Pakistan Network," Council on Foreign Relations, February 12, 2004, www.cfr.org
• Sammy Salama, "Was Libyan WMD Disarmament a Significant Success to Nonproliferation?" Nuclear Threat Initiative, September, 2004, www.nti.org
• Shi-Chin Lin, "The AQ Khan Revelations and Subsequent Changes to Pakistan Export Controls," Nuclear Threat Initiative, October 2004, www.nti.org
• Alan Sipress and Ellen Nakashima, "Malaysia Arrests Nuclear Network Suspect: Sri Lankan Accused of Helping Pakistani Sell Arms Components to Libya, Iran," Washington Post, May 29, 2004.
• "Pakistan Sold Nuclear Materials to Iran, Libya: Alleged Middleman Gives Details of Deal to Malaysian Police," The Associated Press, February 20, 2004.
• Bonner, Raymond and Craig S. Smith, "Pakistani Said to Have Given Libya Uranium," New York Times, February 21, 2004.
• "Winning or Losing? An Inside Look at the War on Terrorism," Council on Foreign Relations, February 3, 2005, www.cfr.org.
• "Zippe-type centrifuge," Dictionary of Technology, www.explore-technology.com
• William J. Broad, "Who Invented the Centrifuge? And What the Heck Is a Centrifuge?" New York Times, March 23, 2004.
• "The Zippe Type - The Poor Man's Bomb," BBC, May 19, 2004.
• "Centrifuges," Urenco, www.urenco.com
• "What is Urenco?" ISIS, www.isis-online.org
• "What is a Gas Centrifuge?" ISIS, www.isis-online.org
• "Centrifuge Technology" USEC Inc, www.usec.com
• Pat Upson, "Centrifuge Technology: the Future for Enrichment," World Nuclear Association, Annual Symposium 2001, www.world-nuclear.org
• "Back to the Future: American Centrifuge," Nuclear Engineering International, September 2003, www.usec.com
• "Gas Centrifuge Uranium Enrichment," Global Security, www.globalsecurity.org
• David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, "Unraveling the AQ Khan and Future Proliferation Networks," Washington Quarterly, Spring 2005.
• "Company," Hanbando Balance Inc, www.hbi.co.kr.
• Yu Kyong Su, "Muyogopkye, chollyangmulcha such'ul 'Bisang'," Yonhap, February 11, 2004.
• Shim Song Kun, "Focus: Chollyangmulcha Such'ult'ongje Kanghwabang'an," Wolgan'gongjakkigye, www.komma.org
• "No nuclear material transferred: Musharraf sees useful meeting in India." Dawn, March 16, 2005.
• "S. Korean Firm Accused of Exporting WMD-Related Equipment to Libya," Yonhap, February 11, 2004.
• Kim Song-chin, "Seoul Toughens Up on Illegal Shipments of 'Strategic Goods'," Korea Times, February 12, 2004.
• Center for Nonproliferation Studies, interview with anonymous South Korean government official, February 27, 2005.
• Huma Aamir Malik, "Malaysia Still Quizzing Khan's Deputy for N-Proliferation," Arab News, February 18, 2005.
• "US wants to crush 'tentacles' of Khan nuclear network: Rice," AFP, March 17, 2005.
• "Pakistan denies centrifuge report," BBC, March 14, 2005.
• William Broad and David Sanger, "Pakistani's Black Market May Sell Nuclear Secrets," New York Times, March 21, 2005.

Sources:

[1] "The Zippe Type - The Poor Man's Bomb." BBC, May 19, 2004, www.bbc.co.uk.
[2] "S. Korean Firm Accused of Exporting WMD-Related Equipment to Libya." Yonhap (Seoul), February 11, 2004, in FBIS Document KPP20040211000104.
[3] "Libya Purchased Nuclear Weapons Plans From Pakistan, Qadhafi's Son Says." Global Security Newswire, January 5, 2004, www.nti.org.
[4] "I Seek Your Pardon." Guardian, February 5, 2004, www.guardian.co.uk.
[5] "Winning or Losing? An Inside Look at the War on Terrorism," Council on Foreign Relations, February 3, 2005, www.cfr.or.