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Entry into Force of the CTBT: All Roads Lead to Washington A Report from the Fifth Article XIV Conference

Kaegan McGrath

Monterey Institute of International Studies

  • View from the Presiding Officials Area View from the Presiding Officials Area
    Source: CTBTO Public Information
  • H.E. Mr. Jaap RAMAKER, H.E. Mr Bruno STAGNO UGARTE, H.E. Mr. Tibor TÓTH H.E. Mr. Jaap RAMAKER, H.E. Mr Bruno STAGNO UGARTE, H.E. Mr. Tibor TÓTH
    Source: CTBTO Public Information

Introduction

On 17-18 September 2007 in Vienna, just one week from the eleventh anniversary of the opening for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), representatives from 104 CTBT Signatory States convened for the fifth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (Article XIV Conference). Pakistan and Barbados, two states that have not signed the CTBT, also participated in the conference. Of particular note is that Pakistan, which enjoyed observer status, addressed the conference for the first time since 1999. Pakistan is one of 44 Annex II states whose ratification is required before the treaty can enter into force. In addition to Pakistan, six other Annex II states that had yet to ratify the treaty sent representatives to the conference. These states are China, Colombia, Egypt, Indonesia, Israel and the Islamic Republic of Iran; however, Colombia ratified the treaty on 29 January 2008. The United States signed the treaty in 1996, but has not ratified and has not attended an Article XIV Conference since 1999. Two other non-signatory Annex II states not in attendance at the conference were India and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).

The Article XIV Conference serves to provide signatory states with a forum from which to discuss ways to facilitate the treaty's entry into force. Political progress on achieving entry into force has been stalled for the last several years due mainly to the opposition to the CTBT from the United States. President Bush made it clear upon coming into office that he would not seek to ratify the treaty. Without the U.S. ratification, the remaining Annex II states have little incentive to push forward with their own ratifications. Although all signatory states attending the conference expressed universal support for the objectives of the CTBT, a myriad of issues threaten the treaty's entry into force. These matters include, inter-alia, budgetary constraints at the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (Commission), the development of new nuclear warheads and delivery systems, the proliferation of missile defense systems, and the perceived weakening of the international nonproliferation regime.

These issues notwithstanding, the conference adopted a consensus document explicating the importance of the treaty and the necessity to bring into full legal standing the ban on nuclear test explosions.[1] However, prospects for achieving the treaty's entry into force will diminish unless China and the United States ratify the CTBT, which will in turn increase the pressure on the remaining Annex II states to follow suit. As China seems content to delay ratification until after the United States makes the first move, it is unlikely that any substantial political progress will occur before the next Article XIV Conference in 2009.

Background

Presently, 178 states in total have signed the treaty, while 144 of those have deposited their instruments of ratification to the United Nations. Out of the 44 states on the Annex 2 list, 35 have already ratified the treaty, meaning that another nine states' ratifications are required before the treaty enters into force. Six of these states have already signed the treaty: China, Egypt, Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Israel and the United States. The three remaining Annex II states—the DPRK, India and Pakistan—have to date declined to sign the treaty.

Although prospects for entry into force in the near future remain uncertain, there has been notable technical progress made with respect to the international verification regime since the last Article XIV Conference in New York in September 2005. The Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) installed an additional 39 International Monitoring System (IMS) stations, and certified 80 IMS facilities, including nine radionuclide laboratories, since the last Article XIV Conference. As of 21 February 2008, there were 225 fully certified facilities transmitting data to the International Data Centre (IDC) in Vienna.[2] With accession of Montenegro and ratification from The Republic of Moldova in the last two years, every European state has signed and ratified the treaty.[3] Though in recent years there has been relatively little progress on convincing the remaining Annex II states unwilling to ratify the treaty to reconsider their positions, Vietnam ratified the treaty on 10 March 2006[4], and in January 2008, Colombia became the 35th Annex 2 state to ratify the CTBT[5].

Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force
of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

Article XIV of the CTBT states that should the treaty not enter into force after three years from the anniversary of its opening for signature, a majority of ratifying states shall convene a Conference of States that have already ratified the treaty. The Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, or Article XIV Conference, shall "decide by consensus what measures consistent with international law may be undertaken to accelerate the ratification process" in order to promote entry into force of the treaty.[6] This year the fifth Article XIV Conference took place on 17-18 September 2007 at the Hofburg, Vienna, Austria.

The conference opened with a message from United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG) Ban Ki-moon, delivered by the United Nations High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Sergio Duarte, calling on states that have yet to sign and/or ratify the treaty to do so with haste. According to the UNSG, the eleventh anniversary of the CTBT's opening for signature is not "a time for celebration, but for a re-dedication to the noble work that lies ahead in achieving the treaty's entry into force," the UNSG said. Describing the treaty as a major instrument in the area of nonproliferation and disarmament, Ban Ki-moon's message explained that the treaty would push humanity closer to the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons from the earth. The message went on to posit that the treaty's ratification would ensure that the 9 October 2006 nuclear test by the DPRK is the last recorded in history.[7]

Presiding over the Conference to Facilitate the Entry into Force of the CTBT were the Foreign Ministers of Costa Rica and Austria, H.E. Bruno Stagno Ugarte and H.E. Dr. Ursula Plassnik. Both highlighted the universal nature of the CTBT. In her opening remarks, Dr. Plassnik stated, "This shared Presidency by two CTBT member states representing two different geographic regions symbolizes the global support for the treaty."[8] Minister Stagno Ugarte further explained, "The arguments around the CTBT are not a North-South or an East-West issue. There is really no geographic divide."[9]

With 178 signatory states and 144 ratifying states, it is clear that the treaty enjoys global support. Moreover, there is not one particular region that remains opposed to the treaty. Annex II states yet to ratify the treaty comprise countries from nearly every region of the world, which ironically illustrates the non-discriminatory nature of the treaty. Each of the Annex 2 non-ratifying states has indigenous domestically oriented reasons for holding out, instead of resistance to a perceived discriminatory international structure as commonly expressed by groups such as the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) and the Group of 77, both established to promote cooperation between developing nations on a broad range of issues.[10]

Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization Tiber Tóth outlined the improvements made in all four of the monitoring technologies, noting the considerable advances in radionuclide particulates and noble gas detection as well as atmospheric transport modeling.[11] These technologies combine to monitor for the "smoking gun" evidence of a nuclear test.[12] While over half of the IMS monitoring stations have been certified, Mr. Tóth cautioned that having "crossed in the last two years the 50% certification barrier also means that the glass in those technologies is still half empty."[13] Moreover, installing and certifying many of the remaining stations pose technical, financial and political challenges. Don Phillips, Chief, IMS Installation and Certification Group, notes that "10-20 % of the stations remaining to be built will not be constructed until the politics and dynamics of the treaty change and we start moving towards entry into force." Pakistan, a representative of which addressed the conference, has an infrasound station as well as a primary seismic station within its borders. However, there is a delay with the completion and certification of the remaining stations intended for Pakistan and India for purely political reasons.[14]

While addressing the conference, Mr. Bruno Stagno Ugarte remarked that, "none of the ten remaining Annex II states has voiced any objection in principle against ratification...Chinese officials have confirmed support for the CTBT while deliberations over its ratification were ongoing...India has pledged not to delay entry into force and Pakistan would follow."[15] Some observers are heartened, albeit with cautious optimism, that recent developments on the Korean Peninsula might offer some hope to those engaged with securing the signature and ratification from the DPRK. If a diplomatic solution to the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula is attained through the Six-Party Talks, there will be little standing in the way of DPRK ratification.[16] To be sure, there still exist a myriad of regional and international issues that require resolution before this goal is reached. These complex matters range from security assurances, WMD proliferation, bilateral relations between the DPRK and Japan, the DPRK and South Korea, and of course the DPRKs willingness to completely dismantle its nuclear programs and relinquish all nuclear materials and technology.[17]

The International Nonproliferation Regime

After proving that the IMS possesses the capability to monitor the earth for low yield nuclear test explosions, "the CTBT today constitutes a key element in the global nonproliferation and disarmament architecture," stated Dr. Ursula Plassnik. "Together, they [CTBT and NPT] form the pillars of the United Nations nuclear nonproliferation machinery," Plassnik continued. Assessing the state of the nonproliferation regime, Dr. Plassnik acknowledged the "lack of confidence in the multi-lateral nonproliferation and disarmament machinery." In order to remedy this situation, Dr. Plassnik argued for the creation of a new political vision coupled with an international partnership to inspire confidence in multilateral arms control.[18]

Addressing the conference on the first day's afternoon session, Mr. Tiber Tóth noted the increased global interest in nuclear energy due to environmental concerns as well as growing energy demands throughout the world. It is becoming more difficult to delineate between activities permitted under the nonproliferation regime and those prohibited activities that allow NNWS to develop the technology to build nuclear weapons, argued Mr. Tóth. "The CTBT provides, thus, this last and clearly visible barrier between the peaceful legitimate use and the misuse of nuclear energy. This legal line needs to be drawn firmly and irrevocably."[19]

In his capacity as Special Representative, Ambassador Jaap Ramaker travels the world meeting with non-signatory states for consultations aimed at promoting the treaty's entry into force. Addressing the 2007 Article XIV Conference, Ambassador Ramaker referenced the 2007 Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference to exhort the continued importance of the CTBT. Ambassador Ramaker commented on two of the incidents that highlight the topicality of the CTBT, the nuclear test by the DPRK and the prospective nuclear cooperation deal between the United States and India. In light of these serious challenges to the nonproliferation regime, a legally binding CTBT is of dire importance to maintain the regime's credibility, argued Ambassador Ramaker.[20]

It is clear to most that hopes for the treaty rest squarely on the shoulders of the United States. "The key to accelerate the process remains the leadership role the United States would be ready to assume," said Minister Stagno Ugarte. As the United States played a critical role in achieving the initial conclusion of the CTBT, many feel that without the U.S. at the helm of renewed ratification efforts, the remaining Annex 2 states will postpone serious ratification considerations. Although the Senate voted 51-48 against CTBT ratification in 1999 mainly along party lines (only four Republican Senators voted in favor of ratification), there is reason for cautious optimism that some Republicans may be inclined to reconsider.

Ambassador Ramaker also recalled the oft-cited article in the Wall Street Journal on 4 January 2007 calling for a world free of nuclear weapons. A bipartisan group of national security experts wrote the article: former Secretaries of State, Henry Kissinger and George Shultz on the Republican side, as well as former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn and former Defense Secretary William Perry on the Democratic side. In the article, the authors call for the initiation of a "bipartisan process with the Senate, including understandings to increase confidence and provide for periodic review, to achieve ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, taking advantage of recent technical advances, and working to secure ratification by other keystates. "[21] This endorsement by Republican foreign policy heavyweights Henry Kissinger and George Shultz may provide current Republican Senators originally opposed to the treaty with enough incentive to reconsider their positions.

The statement delivered by Dato' Mohd. Arshad M. Hussain, Permanent Representative of Malaysia to the CTBTO, on behalf of NAM, referred to the "special responsibility" of the NWS to ensure the entry into force of the CTBT, as they have made the commitments to do so at the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences. Mr. Hussain also commented, "One nuclear weapon State has taken the position not to proceed with the ratification of the treaty," and is therefore "undermining this important instrument against nuclear testing." Many others at the conference echoed this unambiguous reference to the United States. Mr. Hussain continued, "NAM is seriously concerned by the decision of a nuclear weapon State to reduce the time necessary to resume nuclear testing to 18 months as a setback to the 2000 NPT Review Conference." The minister's statement also criticized the U.S. Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW), saying that the modernization of the U.S. nuclear infrastructure as "part of its nuclear deterrent force...goes against the spirit and letter of the CTBT." Mr. Hussain also pointed out that the prospect of resuming nuclear testing is not only in contravention of the CTBT, but also with Article VI of the NPT.[22]

Criticism of the recent U.S. national security strategy also surfaced during the statement given by Ambassador Tang Guoqiang, Head of the Chinese Delegation. The Chinese Ambassador said, "The development of new types of nuclear weapons and the accelerated deployment of the missile defense systems have brought negative effects on the global strategic balance."
Ambassador Guoqiang also called for the promotion of nuclear disarmament and urged NWS not to develop new types of nuclear weapons, "lower the status of nuclear weapons in the national security strategy, and unconditionally undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons."[23]

The Chinese Ambassador also asserted that the practices of excessive exception and "double standards based on the one-time or one-case need" would not protect the principles of the international arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation regime.[24] This reference to double standards based on a "one-time" need is likely aimed at the U.S.-Indian nuclear deal, which would allow nuclear commerce between the two countries without India acceding to the NPT. Beijing is clearly concerned with India's improving strategic connections with Washington.[25]

At the conclusion of his statement, Ambassador Guoqing reiterated China's support for the "purpose and goal of the treaty and observes the commitment of the moratorium on nuclear testing."[26] Special Representative Jaap Ramaker expressed his appreciation for China's continued support for the CTBT. Although it has not yet ratified the treaty, China has established an agency to oversee the preparations for the CTBT and is currently involved in building and improving 11 IMS monitoring stations and a Radionuclide Laboratory on Chinese territory.[27]

The statement by Mr. Park In-kook, Deputy Minister for International Organizations and Global Issues speaking for the Republic of Korea, gave a somber assessment of the state of affairs with regard to the CTBT as well as the international nonproliferation regime. Mr. In-kook warned that the "continuing stalemate in bringing the CTBT into force might debilitate our commitment to the treaty, and lead to cascades of further unraveling of the nuclear non-proliferation regimes." The revelation of an extensive nuclear black market and the possibility of fissile materials and nuclear weapons "falling into the wrong hands" is one example of how proliferation threats are on the rise, "while existing mechanisms for dealing with these threats are under severe stress," he continued. Nonetheless, the Minister displayed a sense of optimism when addressing the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula. Mr. In-kook stated, "Once the Six-Party Talks achieve denuclearization and succeed in incorporating the DPRK into the global community, this experience will serve as a valuable lesson in dealing with other current and future global security challenges." Furthermore, Mr. In-kook fully expected the DPRK to participate in the CTBT, which would generate real "momentum for the long-awaited entry into force of the treaty."[28]

After associating himself with the statement from NAM, Indonesian Ambassador Triyono Wibowo reaffirmed Indonesia's support for the objectives of the CTBT as well as the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Ambassador Wibowo remarked that the intention of the treaty is to "stop the qualitative development of nuclear weapons that would pave the way towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons."[29] Although Indonesia signed the treaty in 1996, it has yet to ratify. Indonesia is an Annex 2 state, and as such, its ratification is required for the treaty to enter into force. With Colombia's ratification in January 2008, Indonesia is now the only Annex II state whose motives for not ratifying remain unclear. The other Annex II states that have not yet ratified the treaty either posses nuclear weapons, are suspected of possessing nuclear weapons programs, or are opposed to the treaty due to concerns over their nuclear armed neighbors.

During the first Preparatory Committee Meeting for the NPT from 30 April to 11 May 2007 in Vienna, Indonesia referenced the unanimous decision of the International Court of Justice declaring that there is an international legal obligation to negotiate complete nuclear disarmament, and called on the NWS to exercise leadership in this area.[30] In this regard, Ambassador Wibowo stated at the conference, "Early ratification by nuclear weapon states would pave the way and encourage the remaining countries listed in Annex 2 of the CTBT."[31] One might infer from this message that Indonesia will hold out its ratification until at least the United States decides to do so, as China, the only other NWS yet to ratify the treaty, appears unwilling to make the first move.

Ambassador Soltanieh, Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations, asserted that the United States has prevented progress towards nuclear disarmament by insisting "on the need to invest in the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) and thus modernizing its nuclear infrastructure as part of its nuclear deterrent force." The ambassador continued, "They have even argued that delays on RRW would raise the prospect of having to return to underground nuclear testing, which is a clear violation of the spirit and letter of the CTBT." The Iranian Ambassador also decried the defiance of NWS to live up to their disarmament obligations under Article XI of the NPT, and referred to the 1995 NPT Review Conference where once again the NNWS showed their "commitments and optimism" to achieve this end. However, the NNWS are "still waiting for the positive response from the other side," said Ambassador Soltanieh.[32]

Echoing the condemnation expressed by a majority of the NAM countries over the apparent confirmation by Israel of its possession of nuclear weapons, Ambassador Soltanieh called the silence of the western countries on this issue a "clear example of the double standard policy by the West towards nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation."[33] During the negotiations of the CTBT, Iran was adamantly opposed to the inclusion of Israel in the Middle East and South Asian (MESA) regional grouping along with Iran and Arab countries.[34] The situation has persisted and to this day, Iran's objection to the grouping prevents MESA from performing many CTBT related functions, such as electing members to chair CTBT Preparatory Committee meetings.

Dr. Itshak Lederman, Senior Director for CTBT Affairs and Special Projects, Israel Atomic Energy Commission, delivered Israel's statement to the conference on the afternoon of the second day. At the outset of the statement, Israel, an Annex 2 state that has signed but not ratified the treaty, reiterated its "unequivocal support" for the treaty. Dr. Lederman stated, "Israel considers the prohibition of nuclear testing as pivotal to global nuclear non-proliferation regimes." The minister also expressed concern that around the world and especially in the Middle East, "repeated instances of non-compliance and violations of treaty obligations" illustrate the critical norm that the CTBT embodies.[35] This was certainly a reference to Iran's refusal to halt its domestic uranium enrichment programs and disclose information about its past nuclear activities.

After stating that Pakistan is "not opposed to the objectives and purposes of the treaty," Ambassador Shahbaz, the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the International Organizations in Vienna, noted that Pakistan was not the first to introduce nuclear weapons in South Asia. Ambassador Shahbaz asserted that Pakistan's nuclear tests in 1998 aimed only at restoring the balance of power in the region. Shahbaz also mentioned that increased cooperative dialogue between India and Pakistan has resulted in an improved security environment in South Asia. Ambassador Shahbaz further stated that ensuring strategic stability in South Asia requires "ending discriminatory practices like giving or denying access to civilian nuclear technology selectively in order to gain national strategic objectives." According to Shahbaz, these practices detract "from the credibility and legitimacy of the global non-proliferation regime."[36] In July of 2007, Pakistani officials claimed the U.S.-India nuclear deal would "enable India to produce significant quantities of fissile material and nuclear weapons from unsafeguarded nuclear reactors."[37]

Civil and Scientific Applications of the IMS

One aspect of the CTBT that received significant attention was the potential civil and scientific applications for IMS stations and related monitoring technology. Dr. Ursula Plassnik mentioned the possibility that IMS stations could provide critical information for studying the effects of global climate change. With the IMS working together with the United Nations Platform for Space-based Information on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (SPIDER), "we could also benefit from early detection of and thus early warning on earthquakes and tsunamis," Dr. Plassnik said.[38]

Indonesia, hardest hit in the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2005, faced a devastating rebuilding cost of over US$5 billion after the powerful tidal waves destroyed much of the coast on the Island of Sumatra.[39] Therefore, the civil and scientific applications of the IMS are particularly important for Indonesia, specifically for early warning systems for earthquakes and tsunamis. Indonesia's Ambassador Wilbowo expressed support for the "continued work of the IMS and IDC in transmitting data and releasing the automatic event list," which contains information on earthquakes. The installation of Indonesia's primary seismic stations has been completed, and Indonesia now hosts six auxiliary seismological stations. With continued assistance from the PTS, Indonesia believes that "the contribution of the CTBTO through the utilization of its scientific and civil capability will be very pivotal and timely in responding to the concern of the international community on the major threat and devastating impact of tsunami."[40] The civil and scientific applications of the IMS, particularly with regard to tsunami detection, strengthen the case for Indonesia's ratification.

Although most of the statements delivered at the conference commended the continued progress on completing the IMS and voiced full support for the systems' potential civil and scientific applications, Argentina was one of a few states to present a reality check on the optimism surrounding these benefits. Argentina's Ambassador Mr. Eugenio Maria Curia remarked that though buildup of the IMS has been impressive, the civil and scientific benefits of the IMS alone do not justify the cost and magnitude of such a system.[41] In this view, only the treaty's entry into force will fully justify the enormous capital spent on the system. With nine remaining Annex II states that must ratify the treaty, Argentina, as well as other countries, fears that continued delays will prompt member states to reconsider the value of paying for a system that may never be required.

Conclusion

The absence of support from the United States remains the most significant challenge to the treaty's viability. Should the United States cease funding the commission or continue to oppose the objectives of the treaty, the CTBT may well go the way of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Therefore, it is critical that proponents of the treaty in the United States develop a comprehensive strategy for not only securing U.S. ratification of the treaty, but also addressing other outstanding nonproliferation issues in parallel to the CTBT.

There seems to be an emerging window of opportunity for the CTBT within the political context of the United States, which will in turn raise the prospects for securing ratification from the remaining Annex II states. However, member states have become frustrated with the lack of political progress over the course of the last several years, and unless prospects for the treaty's entry into force improve, states may question the practicality of financially and politically supporting the commission and the CTBT. The treaty will not enter into force before the next Article XIV Conference, and if there is perceived to be no momentum towards achieving entry into force by then, the CTBT may wither and fade into oblivion.

Therefore, the commission must continue with the successful establishment of the verification regime, including the construction and certification of IMS facilities as well as finalizing guidelines for on-site inspections. In addition, the commission must focus on building a legion of CTBT supporters within the policy-making apparatus in the United States government, reinforced by scientific and technical experts with the ability to provide compelling evidence of the merits of the treaty. Although U.S. ratification does not guarantee all other Annex II states will follow suit, the perceived likelihood of such an event coming into the next Article XIV Conference in 2009 will create enormous momentum for the treaty's entry into force.

Related Reading

  • David Hafemeister, "Effective CTBT verification: the evidence accumulates," Verification Yearbook 2004, Verification Research, Training and Information Centre, 2004, www.vertic.org.
  • Keith Hansen, "CTBT: Forecasting the Future," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Volume 61, Number 2 March/April 2005, http://thebulletin.metapress.com.
  • Rebecca Johnson, "Beyond Article XIV: Strategies to Save the CTBT," Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue No. 73, October - November 2003, www.acronym.org.uk.
  • Daryl Kimball, "Keeping Test Ban Hopes Alive: The 2005 CTBT Entry-into-force Conference," Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue No. 81, Winter 2005, www.acronym.org.uk.
  • Kaegan McGrath, Stephanie Bobiak and Jean du Preez, "The Future of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly," CNS Feature Story, March 7, 2008, http://cns.miis.edu.
  • Jonathan Medalia, "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: Issues and Arguments," CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, February 28, 2008, http://fas.org.

Sources:

[1] The Article XIV Conference adopted by consensus a Final Declaration and eleven measures to promote the entry into force of the CTBT. These measures include supporting bilateral, regional and multilateral initiatives to promote ratification, as well as coordinating with non-governmental organizations and other elements of civil society to raise awareness of the treaty. Full text, www.ctbto.org.
[2] Background Document by the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization Prepared for the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT, Official Background Paper, Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, Vienna 2007, www.ctbto.org.
[3] "The Republic of Moldova ratifies the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: All States in Europe Party to the Treaty", CTBTO Press Release, Vienna, Austria, 19 January 2007, www.ctbto.org.
[4] "Viet Nam becomes the thirty-fourth Annex 2 State to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty", CTBTO Press Release, Vienna, Austria, 13 March 2006, www.ctbto.org.
[5] "Colombia ratifies the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty - only nine more countries need to ratify the Treaty to take effect", CTBTO Press Release, Vienna, Austria, 30 January 2008, www.ctbto.org.
[6] The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, Full Text, www.ctbto.org.
[7] CTBT moves world closer to being free of nuclear weapons, says UN Secretary-General, CTBTO, Press Release, Vienna, Austria, 17 September 2007, www.ctbto.org.
[8] H.E. Dr Ursula Plassnik, Federal Minister for International and European Affairs, Austria, statement to the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, 17 September 2007, www.ctbto.org.
[9] H.E. Mr Bruno Stagno Ugarte, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Costa Rica, statement to the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, 17 September 2007, www.ctbto.org
[10] "Non-Aligned Movement: History and Present Status," Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of South Africa, December 2006, www.dfa.gov.za.
[11] H.E. Mr Tibor Tóth, Executive Secretary, CTBTO, Address by the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization at the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, 17 September 2007, www.ctbto.org.
[12] Owen Price, "Was the North Korean Test a Hoax?", International Security Program, Project on Nuclear Issues October 11, 2006, www.csis.org.
[13] H.E. Mr Tibor Tóth, Executive Secretary, CTBTO, Address by the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization at the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, 17 September 2007, www.ctbto.org.
[14] Interview with Don Phillips, Edited Interview Conducted by Adrea Mach on 30 August 2007, Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
[15] H.E. Mr Bruno Stagno Ugarte, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Costa Rica, statement to the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, 17 September 2007, www.ctbto.org.
[16] Report of Ambassador Jaap Ramaker, Special Representative to promote the ratification process of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, Vienna, 17-18 September 2007, www.ctbto.org.
[17]Dong Myung Kim, "North Korea's Nuclear Issues and the Implications for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime," delivered at the 57th Pugwash Annual Conference Prospects for Disarmament, Dialogue and cooperation: Stability in the Mediterranean Region, Bari, Italy, 21-26 October 2007.
[18] H.E. Dr Ursula Plassnik, Federal Minister for International and European Affairs, Austria, statement to the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, 17 September 2007, www.ctbto.org.
[19] H.E. Mr Tibor Tóth, Executive Secretary, CTBTO, Address by the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization at the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, 17 September 2007, www.ctbto.org.
[20] Report of Jaap Ramaker, Special Representative to promote the ratification process of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, Vienna, 17-18 September 2007, www.ctbto.org.
[21] Ibid.
[22] H.E. Dato'Mohd. Arshad M. Hussain, Permanent Representative of Malaysia to the CTBTO on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), statement to the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, 17 September 2007, www.ctbto.org.
[23] Tang Guoqiang, Head of the Chinese Delegation, statement to the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, 18 September 2007, www.ctbto.org.
[24] Tang Guoqiang, Head of the Chinese Delegation, statement to the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, 18 September 2007, www.ctbto.org.
[25] Sharad Joshi, "Nuclear Proliferation and South Asia: Recent Trends," Issue Brief, Nuclear Threat Initiative, August 2007, www.nti.org.
[26] Tang Guoqiang, Head of the Chinese Delegation, statement to the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, 18 September 2007, www.ctbto.org.
[27] Report of Jaap Ramaker, Special Representative to promote the ratification process of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, Vienna, 17-18 September 2007.
[28] H.E. Mr In-kook Park, Deputy Minister for International Organizations and Global Issues, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, statement to the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, 18 September 2007, www.ctbto.org.
[29] H.E. Mr Triyono Wibowo, Permanent Representative for Indonesia to the United Nations, statement to the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, 18 September 2007, www.ctbto.org.
[30] Rebecca Johnson, "Back from the Brink? The 2007 NPT PrepCom Report," Disarmament Diplomacy, The ACRONYM Institute, Issue No. 85, Summer 2007, www.acronym.org.uk.
[31] Ibid.
[32] H.E. Mr Ali-Asghar Soltanieh, Permanent Representative for the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations, statement to the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, 18 September 2007, www.ctbto.org.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Keith A. Hansen, The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: An Insider's Perspective, Stanford University Press, 2006, p. 40.
[35] Dr Itshak Lederman, Senior Director for CTBT Affairs and Special Projects Israel Atomic Energy Commission, statement to the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, 18 September 2007, www.ctbto.org.
[36] H.E. Mr Shahbaz, Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the International Organizations in Vienna, statement to the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, 18 September 2007, www.ctbto.org.
[37] "Pakistan expresses concern at US, India civilian nuclear deal," The Associated Press, in the International Herald Tribune, 2 August 2007, www.iht.com.
[38] H.E. Dr Ursula Plassnik, Federal Minister for International and European Affairs, Austria, statement to the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, 17 September 2007, www.ctbto.org.
[39] "One year after the tsunami," Opinion, The International Herald Tribune, December 29, 2005.
[40] H.E. Mr Triyono Wibowo, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations, statement to the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, 18 September 2007, www.ctbto.org.
[41] H.E. Mr Eugenio Maria Curia, Permanent Representative for Argentina to the United Nations, statement to the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, 18 September 2007, www.ctbto.org.

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This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, or agents.

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Kaegan McGrath discusses the outcome of the fifth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

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