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The European Union and the Arms Ban on China

Lora Saalman

Monterey Institute of International Studies

Jing-dong Yuan

Monterey Institute of International Studies

Chinese President Hu Jintoa with French President Jacques Chirac in Evian, France at the G8 summit. Chinese President Hu Jintoa with French President Jacques Chirac in Evian, France at the G8 summit.
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The recent European Union debates on whether to lift a 15-year ban on arms sales to China have dissipated but the controversy is far from over. At issue are three critical questions: First, whether the continued arms ban is sustainable and indeed compatible with an emerging strategic partnership between the European Union and China. Second, how to assess human rights progress in China and whether or not a sustained arms ban would advance that objective. Third, what would be the security implications of lifting the arms ban? This issue brief seeks to address some of these issues.

Background

The June 1989 Tiananmen Incident remains a pivotal event that has a lingering affect on China's key foreign relationships even today. The United States and its Western allies, including member states of the European Union, imposed sanctions on China right away. These included immediate suspension of high-level exchanges and arms embargoes on China. In February 1990, the United States issued Public Law 101-246 suspending licenses for the export of any defense items on the U.S. Munitions List, unless specifically designed for use in civil products.[1] The law specifically barred the export of U.S.-origin satellites for launch on Chinese vehicles and covered a broad range of items, including non-lethal military equipment such as radars and lethal equipment such as missiles. The European Union agreed to an "interruption by the member states of the community of military cooperation and an embargo on trade in arms with China."[2]

In contrast, the EU embargo was couched in a political declaration that lacked codification under a legally-binding substructure and did not specify the embargo's duration or verification measures. Many have argued that the generality of this clause allows for individual interpretation and inconsistent enforcement.[3] In spite of differences of scope and duration in U.S. and EU arms embargos, both have permitted selected military sales and transfers since the imposition of their respective arms bans either to fulfill earlier contractual obligations or under specific waiver provisions. Several EU members have also made new, albeit non-lethal defense sales to China.

Transfers since 1989

Since 1990, the United States has "delivered or licensed for export" to China approximately $350 million in Munitions List equipment and allowed exports of commercial satellites under presidential waivers. [4] Among the items transferred were deliveries of two modified F-8 fuselages, four avionics kits and related equipment under the Peace Pearl F-8 fighter jet modernization; four MK 46 Mod 2 torpedoes, including spares and related test and maintenance equipment; twp artillery locating AN/TPQ-37 radars and components of a large-caliber artillery plant. The United States has also approved export licenses for Munitions List items including satellites, encryption devices for civilian applications or satellites.[5]

Among the EU members, France, Italy and the United Kingdom have engaged in military (though non-lethal) transfers to China since the issuance of the EU ban. In most cases, these were fulfillment of pre-embargo agreements and included French Croatale ship-to-air missiles and launcher for China's Luhu destroyers; Italian Apside air-to-air missile, and the United Kingdom's avionics for F-7M fighter.[6] Since 1990, France has reportedly agreed to and delivered the Castor-2B naval fire control radar, TAVITAC naval combat automation system, Sea Tiger naval surveillance radar, AS-365N Dauphin-2 helicopter, and SA-321 Super Frelon helicopter.[7] There are also allegations that France may have given China access to classified data on the Lafayette frigate. China has also reportedly begun development of the DHF-4, which will carry 52 transponders with the assistance of the French satellite company Alcatel, which will provide the communications payload for this satellite.[8] China was also one of the first countries to receive 2.5m resolution images from the French SPOT commercial imaging satellites.[9] The No. 886 Class Underway Replenishment Similan ships, launched in 2003, are equipped with French-designed engines.[10] France's defense sales to China between 1993 and 2002 are estimated to have exceeded $122 million.[11]

Among the other EU members, Italy reportedly delivered to China a radar for F-TM and F-7MP fighters and electronic countermeasures for A-SM aircraft.[12] In 1992, China's National Remote Sensing Center reportedly concluded an $8 million contract with Italy's Telespazio Co. to build a satellite imaging processing center to train photo interpreters.[13]Germany reportedly has sold China diesel marine propulsion systems for the Chinese Song-class submarine. [14]Germany's Daimler Benz Aerospace, now DASA, also reportedly co-developed with China the DHF-3 communication satellite, which possesses 24 transponders. There have also been allegations that Germany may have been the source of a Patriot missile believed to be in China's possession.[15] The United Kingdom has reportedly supplied China Racal/Thales Skymaster airborne early warning radars and Spey jet engines for the Chinese JH-7 fighter bombers, while the University of Surry has cooperated with China in micro-satellite technology that could be used in anti-satellite weapons.[16] Since 1990, the United Kingdom has also agreed to but has not yet delivered the search-water airborne early warning radar.[17] During the 1990s, the British government issued a statement on the issue of arms sales stating that the EU ban would only cover lethal weapons, such as "machine guns and ammunition, jets, helicopters for military use, warships, and vehicles for military purposes."[18]According to Britain's interpretation of the embargo, it would not extend to exports of non-lethal items such as "avionics and radars."[19] In the fall of 2003, the European Union revised its scientific security rules permitting China's space program access to Europe's space science research.[20]

1989 Code of Conduct

To some observers the fact that the trade, while constrained, has continued in the decade following the issuance of the arms ban indicates that its removal may be merely symbolic. Additionally, the imposition of the 1989 Code of Conduct (COC) on European weapons exports in 1989 has further bolstered arguments that military transfers will not exceed limits already covered by the ban. The COC obliges the 15 (now 25 after the recent expansion) EU members to consult with one another before signing an arms contract and in principle requires that refused sales must be declared to all member states.[21] However, the code remains a non-binding agreement that some might argue has already been violated on numerous occasions. As observed by Roger Cliff and Evan S. Medeiros, EU member violations of Maastricht Treaty provisions on fiscal responsibility call into question the enforceability of such an honor code.[22]

Advocates of Lifting the Ban

France, Germany, and Spain have made the case that the ban should be lifted without placing conditions upon its removal. The proposal for lifting the arms ban has been partially driven by economic considerations. France and Germany, in particular, have engaged in deficit spending that exceeds amounts allowed to EU members and have experienced a "near stagnant growth rate" since the late 1990s.[23] Increasing trade with China at all levels is an important part of European efforts to stimulate economic growth. In arguing for a lifting of the ban, French Foreign Minister, Dominique de Villepin stated "Our feeling is that the embargo is out of date as relations between Europe and China improve...[Beijing is] a privileged partner and a responsible one."[24] At the same time, Germany has suffered from a greater degree of domestic debate and opposition given the Germany-Taiwan friendship group and Green Party's objections to perceived ongoing human rights abuses in China.[25] The United Kingdom has shown an interest in reconsidering the ban with the British Minister of State, International Trade and Investment, Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean, stating, "ministers are currently considering the United Kingdom's position." [26] Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt has also commented "I indicated...that we should lift the embargo" but added that China would first have to ratify the UN's International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.[27]

Opponents to Lifting the Ban

For those European states demonstrating reservations over lifting the ban, the Netherlands, Finland, Belgium, Portugal and Sweden have voiced concerns over lifting the ban without significant improvements in China's human rights.[28] In spite of these concerns, the Netherlands and Denmark in January 2004 demonstrated a willingness to agree to lift of the weapons embargo if it represented the will of the majority.[29] In fact, in January 2004, Prime Minister Balkenende of the Netherlands said that it would be detrimental for "political and diplomatic relations and for the Netherlands' upcoming EU presidency" if the Netherlands were to be the only country in support of maintaining the arms embargo. [30] Several non-EU members have demonstrated an interest in maintaining the EU arms ban on China. Russia, for one, may benefit from continued EU's arms embargo since it has served as China's primary source of China's military equipment since the imposition of the 1989 ban. In 2002, Russia accounted for approximately $2.1 billion of China's total arms purchases.[31] Increased competition from EU states and resultant lowered prices and diminished sales could place a strain on the already taxed Russian economic and military structure.[32]

Yet, by far, the most vociferous opponent has been the United States. In response to proposals for lifting the EU arms ban, U.S. State Department spokesman, Richard Boucher, stated "We believe that the U.S. and European prohibitions on arms sales are complementary, were imposed for the same reasons, specifically serious human-rights abuses, and that those reasons remain valid today."[33] While much of the European rhetoric regarding the ban tends to focus on the economic implications, Washington is more concerned with the strategic implications of the lifting of the arms embargoes. China has demonstrated a particular interest in systems that could be used against U.S. forces in a potential conflict over the Taiwan Strait.[34] Joint naval exercises carried out by France and China on the eve of Taiwan's 20 March 2004 presidential election did little to assuage concerns that military transfers between the two countries would not destabilize cross-strait relations.[35] The Taiwan Relations Act further places pressure on the United States to intervene in the event of a crisis "to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people of Taiwan."[36]

In the case of the Taiwan Strait, China's acquisitions of advanced radars, fighter jets, and command and control systems would greatly complicate any U.S. intervention if a conflict were to erupt over Taiwan. Concerns over Taiwan dominated the rationale behind the considerable pressure placed by the United States on the Czech Republic to prevent the delivery to China of six Vera radar systems, equipped with a range of 450-500 km and the ability to monitor several dozen vessels and aircraft simultaneously.[37] The transfer would have offered China the technology necessary to identify and locate U.S. stealth bombers.[38] Were the ban to be lifted, Richard Fisher suggests that among the systems of interest to the People's Liberation Army (PLA) would be the French Rafale, which is reputedly "one of the most advanced Western 5th-generation fighter/attack aircraft now entering service."[39] Also of interest to China, the French M88 engine would reportedly aid in "updating the PLA's engine sector and provide an advanced small engine for new PLA fighter and trainer designs."[40]

U.S. concerns over the overarching implications of a militarily ascendant China also extend beyond Taiwan to commitments in Japan and Korea. If relations between these two states and China were to worsen, arms transfers could play a major role in placing each and the United States at a strategic disadvantage. Additionally, the question of proliferation of technology and equipment to third states plagues these potential military transfers. China's ongoing ties to Pakistan, Iran, Burma, and North Korea among other states could have serious implications for the strategic balance in South Asia, the Middle East, and East Asia. There is also an economic component as mentioned by John Tkacik of the Heritage Foundation who states, "The Chinese imply that, if the EU lifts the sanctions, China will direct big-ticket civilian purchases, including aircraft, power stations, and urban mass transit away from U.S. vendors and to EU firms. This is in addition to big-ticket weapons purchases that would be directed away from the Russian Federation to EU defense contractors."[41]

China's Interests in Lifting the Ban

While the United States has issued some of the most vocal arguments against the ban, China has some of the strongest vested interests in seeing the ban lifted.[42] The first of these relates to political symbolism. The EU's lifting of the arms embargo would be indicative of its recognition of China's legitimacy as a major power in the international system. No longer marginalized and relegated to lists of embargoed states that include Myanmar, Zimbabwe, and the Sudan, China could regain access to a degree of the diplomatic legitimacy lost in 1989. Together with an emergent EU-China strategic partnership, the removal of the arms ban would erode the suspected U.S. efforts to contain China, whether or not Washington states this publicly.

Secondly, the possibility of arms trade between the European Union and China could be a major boost to Chinese military modernization programs and the need to diversify suppliers. While providing access to "soft" but often technologically inferior equipment, over-reliance on Russia has placed China in a position of bargaining weakness. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and other European countries could provide components and technologies that would enhance the PLA's command and control capabilities.[43]Competition brought into China's military import market could further allow China greater bargaining leverage vis-à-vis Russia and the Middle East. Finally, China could also have the means to place greater economic and strategic leverage on the United States, which would face pressure from its own arms contractors to lessen constraints on its own U.S. military exports to China.[44]

While the lifting of the arms ban could potentially and, in certain cases, greatly assist China's defense modernization programs, difficulties remain that could complicate China's ability to fully benefit from such a strategic and economic shift. While significant military improvements and advancements have occurred, China remains at a disadvantage for integration of these various military systems largely due to continued inadequacies in training and maintenance of the systems.[45] A report issued in 2004 to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission describes the PLA's ability during the 1990s to absorb imported equipment and technology as "mixed to poor."[46] Integrating these western weapons systems within an arsenal and production facility largely dominated by Soviet and Russian armaments could prove to be a time consuming and in some cases incomplete process. However, not all analysts view China as deficient in the arena of integration, on 6 February 2004, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Lawless commented "China's ability to acquire, integrate and thereby multiply its force posture has really increased dramatically. What the European Union has to offer now may make a lot more sense in the context of where China needs to go than it ever has in the past."[47]

In terms of the nature of transfers, exports from EU members are also not expected to reach the scale or lethality of exports from Russia and Israel.[48] Whether legally binding or not, the existence of the COC still places a degree of constraint over the types and capabilities of equipment transferred. As stated by Robert Karniol, Asia Pacific editor of Jane's Defense Weekly, "The Chinese understand that Western military equipment comes with significant strings attached, and those strings include the risk of sanctions that can cut off your supply of spare parts. There is Chinese interest in a range of European military products that fulfill niche requirements, but I doubt lifting the embargo will have a broad impact on force modernization in China."[49] Yet, according to Richard Fisher of the Center of Security Policy at the Jamestown Foundation, given the dual-use technology already supplied to China by British, French, Italian and German firms "the groundwork is there for immediately launching into direct military sales in almost every sphere if the embargo is lifted."[50]

Recent Developments

During a recent interview on Hong Kong television, Phoenix Satellite TV staff commentator Ma Tingsheng discussed China's probable interest in other military items should the EU arms ban be lifted, including the Spanish light aircraft carrier, a British 20,000 ton aircraft carrier, the French 50,000 ton aircraft carrier "Charles de Gaulle," radar, early warning aircraft, as well as C4I2 command, control, communications, computer, intelligence and information management systems.[51] These transfers would have a major effect on China's overall military modernization program that boasts a defense budget of an estimated $65 billion with an estimated annual increase exceeding 10-17%.[52] As stated by Tai Ming Cheung, a London-based defense analyst, "The embargo was imposed for human rights reasons but today it has more to do with the strategic environment."[53]

Beyond the strategic environment, one of the most significant issues thus far has been timing. A repeal of the ban was originally anticipated to occur during spring of 2004, and yet has not been forthcoming. On 18 December 2003, the motion for repeal of the EU arms embargo suffered a resounding defeat in Parliament with 373 votes in favor and 32 against and 29 abstentions on a resolution maintaining the ban.[54]The resolution noted that China's human rights record "remains unsatisfactory" and that the "violations of fundamental human rights continue as does torture, abuse and arbitrary detentions."[55] The European Summit from 25-26 March 2004 illustrated another delay as heightened sensitivities surrounding the Taiwanese elections and referendum again stalled European discussions and consensus.[56] The close proximity of the anticipated 4 April decision to the 4 June 2004 commemoration of the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident also pushed back the timetable.[57] The fact that the repeal could not be concluded prior to the 1 May 2004 entry of 10 new Eastern European and in some cases pro-U.S. states into the European Union served as one of the greatest blows to a quick resolution on the arms ban.[58] While some view the realization of the removal of the ban as only a matter of time, disagreements among EU member states, U.S. objections, technology proliferation concerns, and human rights issues, all have contributed to a delay and some might argue indefinite postponement of the repeal.

Conclusion

While the EU debates on lifting the arms ban on China have temporarily been put on hold for the time being, the issue itself is far from being resolved. China will continue to exert pressure on the European Union to lift the ban so as to fully promote the EU-China partnership and may indeed use economic incentives, including a growing market for defense items and technology, as leverage. Key EU players, France and Germany in particular will want to revisit the issue and seek the opportunity to lift the ban. Even the United Kingdom, the U.S.' closest ally, may also back the Franco-German bid to lift the embargo. This may reflect the reality that the EU's beleaguered arms industry is attracted to China's untapped defense market that is so far almost exclusively monopolized by Russian arms manufacturers. For instance, since 1999, China has signed more than $11 billion worth of arms import agreements; in 2002 alone, Chinese purchases of foreign weapon systems were valued at $3.6 billion.[59] In all likelihood, the ban introduced 15 years ago may be in name only, with some EU member states already re-interpreting or bypassing it in non-lethal military transactions. Clearly, continuing to link the lifting of the ban to progress in China's human rights improvement will be increasingly difficult to sustain and indeed may become an irritation as the EU begins to implement its comprehensive strategic partnership with China.

The underlying premise of the debates on whether to lift the arms ban on China has been strategic, relating more to the implications for regional and in particular cross-Strait security and stability. Such worries are warranted so far as China's intentions and capabilities to make use of prospective arms imports as a result of the EU's lifting of the embargo pose serious threats to U.S. strategic interests and undermine its obligations toward Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act. However, such concerns are likely to be mitigated as continued and targeted U.S. pressure (as in the case of the Czech Vera radar), compliance with the Wassenaar Arrangement and the EU Code of Conduct, and supplier states' own judicious judgments in deciding the types of armament and defense technologies for transfers will prevent sales of direct lethal military significance. China's own capabilities to absorb imported equipment and technologies and integrate them into its own existing order of battle would also suggest that the transformation effect will take years, if not decades, to materialize.

Lora Saalman is a graduate of the Monterey Institute of International Studies. Her research focuses on China's ethnic issues and Central Asia. Dr. Jing-dong Yuan is Research Director for the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies and a Visiting Associate Professor of International Policy Studies.

Resources

  • "Military Imports From the United States and the European Union Since the 1989 Embargoes," Report to the Chairman, Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Senate, General Accounting Office, GAO/NSIAD-98-176, 16 June 1998.
  • Frank Ching, "Changing Dynamics in EU-China Arms Relations," China Brief, The Jamestown Foundation, 19 February 2004.
  • John J. Tkacik, Jr., "Washington Must Head Off European Arms Sales to China," No. 1739, Backgrounder, Heritage Foundation, 18 March 2004.
  • Richard D. Fisher, "The Impact of Foreign Weapons and Technology on the Modernization of the People's Liberation Army," A Report for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, www.uscc.gov, January 2004.

Sources:

[1] "Military Imports From the United States and the European Union Since the 1989 Embargoes," Report to the Chairman, Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Senate, General Accounting Office, GAO/NSIAD-98-176, 16 June 1998, p. 5.
[2] Frank Ching, "Changing Dynamics in EU-China Arms Relations," China Brief, The Jamestown Foundation, 19 February 2004.
[3] "Military Imports From the United States and the European Union Since the 1989 Embargoes," Report to the Chairman, Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Senate, General Accounting Office, GAO/NSIAD-98-176, 16 June 1998, p. 9.
[4] Ibid, p. 5.
[5] Ibid, pp. 5-8.
[6] "Military Imports From the United States and the European Union Since the 1989 Embargoes," Report to the Chairman, Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Senate, General Accounting Office, GAO/NSIAD-98-176, 16 June 1998, pp. 16, 17.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Richard D. Fisher, "The Impact of Foreign Weapons and Technology on the Modernization of the People's Liberation Army," A Report for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, www.uscc.gov, January 2004.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid.
[11] John J. Tkacik, Jr., "Washington Must Head Off European Arms Sales to China," No. 1739, Backgrounder, Heritage Foundation,, 18 March 2004, p. 4.
[12] "Military Imports From the United States and the European Union Since the 1989 Embargoes," Report to the Chairman, Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Senate, General Accounting Office, GAO/NSIAD-98-176, 16 June 1998, p. 4.
[13] Richard D. Fisher, "The Impact of Foreign Weapons and Technology on the Modernization of the People's Liberation Army," A Report for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, www.uscc.gov, January 2004.
[14] John J. Tkacik, Jr., "Washington Must Head Off European Arms Sales to China," No. 1739, Backgrounder, Heritage Foundation,, 18 March 2004, p. 4.
[15] Richard D. Fisher, "The Impact of Foreign Weapons and Technology on the Modernization of the People's Liberation Army," A Report for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, www.uscc.gov, January 2004.
[16] John J. Tkacik, Jr., "Washington Must Head Off European Arms Sales to China," No. 1739, Backgrounder, Heritage Foundation,, 18 March 2004, p. 4.
[17] "Military Imports From the United States and the European Union Since the 1989 Embargoes," Report to the Chairman, Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Senate, General Accounting Office, GAO/NSIAD-98-176, 16 June 1998, p. 17.
[18] "EU Considers Lifting 14-Year-Old Ban on Arms Sales to China," People's Daily Online,, 19 December 2003.
[19] "Finnish Reporter Reports on EU Weapons Exports to China," Helsinki Helsingin Sanomat, via FBIS EUP20040406000002, 4 April 2004.
[20] John J. Tkacik, Jr., "Washington Must Head Off European Arms Sales to China," No. 1739, Backgrounder, Heritage Foundation,, 18 March 2004, p. 4.
[21] "Paris Report Examines EU Differences Over Lifting of Arms Embargo on China," Le Figaro, via FBIS EUP20040127000041, 27 January 2004.
[22] Roger Cliff and Evan S. Medeiros, "Keep the Ban on Arms for China," International Herald Tribune,, 22 March 2004.
[23] Adam Wolfe, "France and Germany Move to Resume Arms Sales to China," Power and Interest News Report,, 11 February 2004.
[24] Ibid.
[25] "German Greens Criticize Government Arms Eexport Report, Urge Restrictive Exports," Berliner Zeitung via FBIS EUP20040312000008, 12 March 2004.; "CNA: Germany Urged Not to Support Easing of Arms Sales Ban to China," Taipei Central News Agency via FBIS CPP20040408000105, 8 April 2004.
[26] John J. Tkacik, Jr., "Washington Must Head Off European Arms Sales to China," No. 1739, Backgrounder, Heritage Foundation,, 18 March 2004, p. 2.
[27] "Chinese Premier Confident of End to EU Arms Ban," Channel News Asia via LexisNexis, 5 May 2004.
[28] "Paris Report Examines EU Differences Over Lifting of Arms Embargo on China," Le Figaro, via FBIS EUP20040127000041, 27 January 2004.; John J. Tkacik, Jr., "Washington Must Head Off European Arms Sales to China," No. 1739, Backgrounder, Heritage Foundation,, 18 March 2004, p. 3.
[29] Frank Ching, "Changing Dynamics in EU-China Arms Relations," China Brief, The Jamestown Foundation, 19 February 2004.
[30] "Netherlands Government Support Lifting of EU Arms Embargo Against China," NRC Handelsblad via FBIS EUP20040202000185, 31 January 2004.
[31] Patrick Goodenough, "EU Plan to Drop Ban on Arms Sales to China Raises Alarm," Cybercast News Service.com, 19 March 2004.
[32] "Lifting of EU Embargo on Arms Exports to China to Cause Friction between Russia, EU," Agentstvo voyennykh novostey via FBIS CEP20040127000218, 27 January 2004.
[33] Philip P. Pan, "U.S. Pressing EU to Uphold Arms Embargo Against China," Washington Post via Taiwan Security Research Online, 31 January 2004.
[34] Roger Cliff and Evan S. Medeiros, "Keep the Ban on Arms for China," International Herald Tribune,, 22 March 2004.
[35] Patrick Goodenough, "EU Plan to Drop Ban on Arms Sales to China Raises Alarm," Cybercast News Service.com, 19 March 2004.
[36] "Congressional findings and declaration of policy," Taiwan Relations Act, 22 U.S. Code 48, Section 3301(b)(6), http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov, 7 January 2003.
[37] "Czech Government Uses EU Embargo to Defend Revocation of Radar Export to China," Prague Mlada Fronta Dnes via FBIS, 6 May 2004.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Richard D. Fisher, "The Impact of Foreign Weapons and Technology on the Modernization of the People's Liberation Army," A Report for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, www.uscc.gov, January 2004.
[40] Ibid.
[41] John J. Tkacik, Jr., "Washington Must Head Off European Arms Sales to China," No. 1739, Backgrounder, Heritage Foundation,, 18 March 2004, p. 2.
[42] Nan Bei, "Oumeng heshi jiejin duihua junshou (When Will the EU Lift the Arms Ban on China)?" Renminwang (www.people.com.cn), 18 February 2004, www.people.com.cn.
[43] Richard A. Bitzinger, "A Prisoner's Dilemma: The EU's China Arms Embargo," China Brief, Vol. IV, Issue 13 (June 2004), p.2.
[44] "Ta Kung Pao Column on EU Plan to Lift Arms Embargo Against China," Ta Kung Pao via FBIS CPP20040129000021, 29 January 2004.
[45] "Military Imports From the United States and the European Union Since the 1989 Embargoes," Report to the Chairman, Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Senate, General Accounting Office, GAO/NSIAD-98-176, 16 June 1998, p. 11.
[46] Richard D. Fisher, "New PLA Threats To Taiwan Emerging From Access To Foreign Technology," The Impact of Foreign Weapons and Technology on the Modernization of the People's Liberation Army, A Report for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, www.uscc.gov, January 2004.
[47] John J. Tkacik, Jr., "Washington Must Head Off European Arms Sales to China," No. 1739, Backgrounder, Heritage Foundation,, 18 March 2004, p. 3.
[48] "GAO on U.S. and Euro Military Exports to China," General Accounting Office, 16 June 1998.
[49] Philip P. Pan, "U.S. Pressing EU to Uphold Arms Embargo Against China," Washington Post via Taiwan Security Research Online, 31 January 2004.
[50] Ibid.
[51] "HK Phoenix TV Discusses Possible Lifting of EU Arms Ban on PRC," Feng Huang Wei Shih Chung Wen Tai via FBIS CPP20040426000073, 23 April 2004.
[52] John J. Tkacik, Jr., "Washington Must Head Off European Arms Sales to China," No. 1739, Backgrounder, Heritage Foundation,, 18 March 2004, p. 4.; "Chinese President's Visit to France May Boost Lifting EU Embargo on Arms Exports to China," Agentstvo voyennykh novostey via FBIS CEP20040127000219, 27 January 2004.
[53] Tim Luard, "EU Tackles China Arms Ban," BBC News Online, 25 March 2004.
[54] "Taiwan Foreign Ministry Press Release Thanks EU for Limiting China Arms Sales," Taipei Ministry of Foreign Affairs via FBIS CPP20031222000219, 18 December 2003.
[55] Frank Ching, "Changing Dynamics in EU-China Arms Relations," China Brief, The Jamestown Foundation, 19 February 2004.
[56] "CAN: Taiwan Election Prevents Quick E.U. Removal of Arms Embargo on China," Taipei Central News Agency via FBIS CPP20040312000143, 12 March 2004.
[57] "AFP: Rights Group Says Lifting of China Arms Embargo Sends ‘Wrong Message,'" Hong Kong AFP via FBIS CPP20040414000179, 14 April 2004.
[58] Adam Wolfe, "France and Germany Move to Resume Arms Sales to China," Power and Interest News Report,, 11 February 2004.
[59] Bitzinger, "A Prisoner's Dilemma," p.2.

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This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, or agents.

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In this 2004 article, Lora Saalman and Jing-dong Yuan discuss the implications of lifting the European Union's 15-year ban on arms sales to China.

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