The U.S.-India nuclear deal, which became the NSG-India nuclear deal, was supposed to bring India into the international nonproliferation "mainstream" and to consummate U.S.-Indian partnership.  Therefore one might ask what more remains to be done in this area between the two states?  What are the problems to be solved?  What would motivate the U.S. and/or India to do more?

Thanks to the NSG-India deal, India already has been exempted from rules barring nuclear cooperation with it.  India and the U.S. may not complete the necessary governmental and business arrangements necessary for nuclear trade between them, but India already has gained nuclear cooperation with Russia, France and perhaps others.  This would seem to limit India’s motivations to "do more" to get more.  What else does it want?

One answer could be that India feels that the international acceptance of its nuclear status is not wholehearted.  India could want more complete recognition as the nuclear equal to the five recognized nuclear-weapon states.

Another answer could be that India shares the U.S. and broader international interest in strengthening the nonproliferation regime.  Pakistan is a particular concern for obvious reasons.  Further U.S.-India cooperation could help motivate Islamabad – by positive inducements or negative pressure – to take greater care to ensure that know-how, material or equipment does not flow from Pakistan to non-state actors or states that threaten international order.  More broadly, states and industries that wish to see a global expansion of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes understand that proliferation (or nuclear accidents or terrorism) would create political backlash that could jeopardize the industry’s growth.  Therefore India, the U.S. and others have interests in buttressing the nonproliferation system.

The U.S. has a third interest, which India says it shares: to help create a nuclear-weapon-free world.  Indeed, India could say that it has promoted this goal longer and more genuinely than the U.S. has.  Further cooperation between the two could be important to this end.

This paper explores how each of these objectives might be achieved. 
This paper was written as a part of an effort by the Working Group on an Expanded Nonproliferation System. The group was jointly established by CSIS and the Nuclear Threat Initiative to bring about more complete participation by India in the nonproliferation system, and it included experts in international nuclear affairs and in foreign policy from both India and the United States. The group advocated for Indian membership in export control groups.