Fact Sheet

Nuclear Disarmament Israel

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Nuclear Disarmament Israel

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Arsenal and Missile Types

Non NPT State with Nuclear Weapons

Arsenal Size

  • Estimated arsenal: Approximately 90 nuclear weapons. As Israel does not officially acknowledge its possession of nuclear weapons, stockpile estimates are based on those provided by the U.S. Intelligence Community and approximations from experts.

Capabilities and Developments

Key Delivery Systems

  • Aircraft: F-16 Falcons and F-15 Eagles capable of nuclear weapons delivery. Both have a range of 2,500 km. Israel has purchased 20 F-35A Lightnings to replace older F-16s and has purchased over 200 F-16s in total since 1998. Approximately 30 of Israel’s nuclear weapons are believed to be air-deliverable gravity bombs. The Israeli military has gradually been phasing out F-16s with the newer F-35I and has purchased at least 50 from the US government since 2021. The U.S government has upgraded their F-35s to have nuclear capabilities, however it is unknown if Israel has undergone the same upgrade.
  • Land-based missiles: Approximately 100 Jericho-I (500km range) and Jericho-II (1,500km) land- and rail-mobile missiles. Experts believe the Jericho-III missile, with a range of between 4,800km and 6,500km, and a payload of 1,000-1,300 kg, entered service in 2011. Around 50 of Israel’s nuclear weapons are believed to be deployed with land-based missiles.
  • Sea-based cruise missiles/submarines: Israel possesses three Dolphin I-class submarines and two Dolphin II-class submarines. The Dolphin II-class submarines are capable of launching cruise missiles.

Military Fissile Material Stockpiles

  • Weapons grade plutonium: Approximately 0.98 tons
  • Highly enriched uranium: Approximately 0.3 tons

Commitments and Policies

Disarmament and Commitments to Reduce Arsenal Size

  • Not a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

Future Commitments

  • Israel asserts that states in the Middle East must establish peaceful relations before negotiations on a Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone can begin.
  • Israel has resisted several international calls for a Middle East WMD Free Zone in the Middle East, including those emanating from the 1995, 2005, and 2010 NPT Review Conferences. The draft final document at the 2015 NPT Review Conference called on the UN Secretary General to convene a Conference on the Establishment of a Middle East WMD Free Zone by 2016. The document was blocked by the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada. Indefinite postponement of the Conference means that Israel does not have to declare its nuclear capabilities.
  • Strongly opposes a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) on the basis that an FMCT would undermine its policy of “nuclear opacity,” and that it would not safeguard against regional nuclear proliferation. Prime Minister Netanyahu continues to assert that Israel will never sign the FMCT.

Policies

Nuclear Testing

  • No confirmed nuclear weapon tests, but suspected of conducting atmospheric test in cooperation with South Africa in 1979
  • Party to PTBT (bans testing in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater)
  • Signed the CTBT in 1996, but has not ratified the treaty. Israel is the only non-NPT nuclear possessing state to sign the CTBT.

Use of Nuclear Weapons

  • Maintains a policy of “nuclear opacity” where it neither confirms nor denies possession of nuclear weapons.
  • Since 1963, Israel has pledged to “not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons in the Middle East.” This is frequently interpreted to mean that Israel will not test or publicly declare the existence of its nuclear weapons.
  • Israel is not a signatory to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), and joined all other nuclear possessing states in boycotting its negotiation in the UN General Assembly.

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Glossary

Nuclear weapon
Nuclear weapon: A device that releases nuclear energy in an explosive manner as the result of nuclear chain reactions involving fission, or fission and fusion, of atomic nuclei. Such weapons are also sometimes referred to as atomic bombs (a fission-based weapon); or boosted fission weapons (a fission-based weapon deriving a slightly higher yield from a small fusion reaction); or hydrogen bombs/thermonuclear weapons (a weapon deriving a significant portion of its energy from fusion reactions).
Cruise missile
An unmanned self-propelled guided vehicle that sustains flight through aerodynamic lift for most of its flight path. There are subsonic and supersonic cruise missiles currently deployed in conventional and nuclear arsenals, while conventional hypersonic cruise missiles are currently in development. These can be launched from the air, submarines, or the ground. Although they carry smaller payloads, travel at slower speeds, and cover lesser ranges than ballistic missiles, cruise missiles can be programmed to travel along customized flight paths and to evade missile defense systems.
Weapons-grade material
Weapons-grade material: Refers to the nuclear materials that are most suitable for the manufacture of nuclear weapons, e.g., uranium (U) enriched to 90 percent U-235 or plutonium (Pu) that is primarily composed of Pu-239 and contains less than 7% Pu-240. Crude nuclear weapons (i.e., improvised nuclear devices), could be fabricated from lower-grade materials.
Highly enriched uranium (HEU)
Highly enriched uranium (HEU): Refers to uranium with a concentration of more than 20% of the isotope U-235. Achieved via the process of enrichment. See entry for enriched uranium.
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
The NPT: Signed in 1968, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the most widely adhered-to international security agreement. The “three pillars” of the NPT are nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Article VI of the NPT commits states possessing nuclear weapons to negotiate in good faith toward halting the arms race and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The Treaty stipulates that non-nuclear-weapon states will not seek to acquire nuclear weapons, and will accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on their nuclear activities, while nuclear weapon states commit not to transfer nuclear weapons to other states. All states have a right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and should assist one another in its development. The NPT provides for conferences of member states to review treaty implementation at five-year intervals. Initially of a 25-year duration, the NPT was extended indefinitely in 1995. For additional information, see the NPT.
Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons as well as Other Weapons of Mass Destruction
Middle East NWFZ: The concept of an NWFZ in the Middle East was first introduced by Iran and Egypt in 1974. In April 1990, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak proposed the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of all types of weapons of mass destruction. In the "Resolution on the Middle East" adopted at the 1995 NPT Review Conference, the concept of a Middle East Zone Free of WMD was endorsed by all NPT state parties. The resolution calls on all regional states to join the NPT, place their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, and work towards the establishment of a Middle East WMD-free zone. At the 2010 NPT Review Conference, in light of the minimal progress made since 1995, Arab states pushed for tangible steps toward the WMD-free zone. The result was a resolution calling for a meeting on the establishment of a Middle East WMD-free zone in 2012, to be attended by all states of the region. The meeting was subsequently postponed due to the parties' failure to convene in 2012.
Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT)
The Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty us currently under discussion in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to end the production of weapons-usable fissile material (highly enriched uranium and plutonium) for nuclear weapons. For additional information, see the FMCT.
Proliferation (of weapons of mass destruction)
The spread of biological, chemical, and/or nuclear weapons, and their delivery systems. Horizontal proliferation refers to the spread of WMD to states that have not previously possessed them. Vertical proliferation refers to an increase in the quantity or capabilities of existing WMD arsenals within a state.
Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT)
The PTBT: Also known as the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water prohibits nuclear weapons tests "or any other nuclear explosion" in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. While the treaty does not ban tests underground, it does prohibit nuclear explosions in this environment if they cause "radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control" the explosions were conducted. The treaty is of unlimited duration. For additional information, see the PTBT.
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)
The CTBT: Opened for signature in 1996 at the UN General Assembly, the CTBT prohibits all nuclear testing if it enters into force. The treaty establishes the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) to ensure the implementation of its provisions and verify compliance through a global monitoring system upon entry into force. Pending the treaty’s entry into force, the Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO is charged with establishing the International Monitoring System (IMS) and promoting treaty ratifications. CTBT entry into force is contingent on ratification by 44 Annex II states. For additional information, see the CTBT.
Ratification
Ratification: The implementation of the formal process established by a country to legally bind its government to a treaty, such as approval by a parliament. In the United States, treaty ratification requires approval by the president after he or she has received the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate. Following ratification, a country submits the requisite legal instrument to the treaty’s depository governments Procedures to ratify a treaty follow its signature.

See entries for Entry into force and Signature.

Sources

  1. Merav Datan, “Israel: Still Assuring Destruction Forever,” Reaching Critical Will, 2015, www.reachingcriticalwill.org.
  2. Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “Israeli Nuclear Forces, 2014,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 70, No. 6 (2014), pp. 97-115, www.thebulletin.org.
  3. SIPRI, “SIPRI Yearbook 2013: Armaments, Disarmament and National Security,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2013, www.sipri.org.
  4. Duncan Lenox, ed. “Jericho 1/2/3/ (YA-1/YA-3/YA-4),” Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems (Offensive Weapons), Issue 50, (Surrey: Jane’s Information Group, September 2012).
  5. “Submarines and Submarine-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM): Israel Profile,” Arms Control Association, www.armscontrol.org.
  6. Stephen D. Bryen, “Israel’s Strategic Fight Over New Submarines,” Defense News, 14 November 2016, www.defensenews.com.
  7. Gareth Evans and Yoriko Kawaguchi, “Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policy Makers,” Report of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, November 2009, pp. 20, www.icnnd.org.
  8. International Panel on Fissile Materials, “Global Fissile Material Report 2022,” July 29, 2022, https://fissilematerials.org.
  9. “Global Fissile Material Report 2013,” International Panel on Fissile Materials, January 2014, www.fissilematerials.org.
  10. Dr. Paul Chorev, Director General of the Israel Atomic Energy Commission, Statement at the 53rd General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, September 2009, www.iaea.org.
  11. Kelsey Davenport, “WMD-Free Middle East Proposal at a Glance,” Arms Control Association, June 2015, www.armscontrol.org.
  12. Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, “Rough Seas Ahead: Issues for the 2015 NPT Review Conference,” Arms Control Today, April 2014, www.armscontrol.org.
  13. WMD-Free Middle East Proposal at a Glance, Fact Sheets and Briefs, Arms Control Association, June 2015, www.armscontrol.org.
  14. “Israel,” Banning the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons: Country Perspectives on the Challenges to a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty, Global Fissile Material Report 2008, www.fissilematerials.org.
  15. Aluf Benn, “The Struggle to Keep Nuclear Capabilities Secret,” Ha’aretz, 14 September 1999, cited in Avner Cohen’s, The Worst Kept Secret: Israel’s Bargain with the Bomb (New York: Colombia University Press, 2010), p. 233.
  16. Avner Cohen and William Burr, “Israel Crosses the Threshold,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 62(3), May 2006, pp. 22-30, www.thebulletin.org.
  17. “Israel,” Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, last updated 18 November 2010, www.nonproliferation.org.
  18. Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats, (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), pp. 259.
  19. Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East: In the Shadow of Iran, (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008), pp. 119-140; Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).
  20. Michael Krepon, “An Introduction to Non-introduction,” Arms Control Wonk, 24 July 2009, www.armscontrolwonk.com.
  21. Henry A. Kissinger, “Israeli Nuclear Program,” Memorandum to the President, The White House, declassified 23 August 2007, www.nixon.archives.gov; Avner Cohen and William Burr, “Israel Crosses the Threshold,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 62(3), May 2006, pp. 22-30, www.thebulletin.org.
  22. International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, “Positions on the Treaty,” Accessed 12 December 2018, www.icanw.org.
  23. “Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance,” Arms Control Association, January 2022, www.armscontrol.org.
  24. Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “Nuclear Notebook: Israeli nuclear weapons, 2022,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 17, 2022, https://thebulletin.org.
  25. Mark Fitzpatrick, “Israel’s ballistic-missile programme: an overview,” International Institute for Strategic Studies, August 25, 2021, www.iiss.org.
  26. Sajjad Safaei, “Is a renewed JCPOA a threat to Israel?” Middle East Institute, August 26, 2022, www.mei.edu.

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