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North Korea Missile Capabilities

Hwasŏng-5 (火星-5)

Overview

The general consensus on North Korea's Hwasŏng-5 is that it is an indigenously reverse-engineered and improved version of the Soviet Scud-B (R-17). However, several questions remain about the Hwasŏng-5 program, including when the program was initiated and when North Korea first acquired Scud-Bs to begin a reverse-engineering program. The latter issue is significant because the length of time from the start of the program until successful flight testing and mass production could be a good indication of Pyongyang's success in acquiring foreign technology assistance for the program.

The earliest that North Korea reportedly received any Scud-B missiles is 1972, but this report is unconfirmed.[1] An anonymous North Korean defector claims that the Soviet Union provided 20 Scud-Bs in 1972 in exchange for access to the intelligence equipment on the USS Pueblo captured in 1968. Although there are no other open source reports of this transfer, and the source's credibility is uncertain, the number of missiles and the timing of the reported transfer would support the hypothesis that the Hwasŏng-5 is a reverse-engineered missile produced with little or no outside assistance. However, any covert cooperation during the early 1970s also suggests that Pyongyang could have obtained extensive Soviet and/or Russian assistance from that time, either with or without Moscow's approval.

An alternative hypothesis is that the Hwasŏng-5 was produced with comprehensive Soviet assistance, or even under license, in North Korean factories.[2] There is one report, although unsubstantiated, that Pyongyang received 240 Scud-B missiles from Moscow from 1985 to 1988.[3] This suggests that Pyongyang could have simply provided a "screw-driver plant" and transshipment location for Soviet missiles that were assembled in North Korea. A third possibility is that Pyongyang could have acquired different missile production technologies from various foreign sources, and then incorporated those technologies to produce the Hwasŏng-5 and other missiles.[4] Although of historical impact, these alternative explanations are relevant for current policy issues. For example, even if North Korea now has an independent capacity to produce the Hwasŏng-5, the development path could be similar for current missile systems under development, which would have implications for policies aimed at constraining Pyongyang's missile development program.

It is difficult to determine exactly when and how North Korea acquired the capability to produce the Hwasŏng-5. However, the development timeline appears to be almost impossible to achieve without extensive foreign assistance. Pyongyang has received foreign assistance from several sources, including Russia, China, Egypt, and Iran. Foreign assistance has ranged from Iranian financial support and Chinese technical training in aerospace engineering, to the pro-North Korean General Federation of Korean Residents in Japan (Choch'ongnyŏn) providing Japanese semiconductors. There is also strong evidence that North Korea acquired foreign-made precision machine tools that are needed for missile manufacturing.

The Number Seven Factory, which apparently is also known as the "San'ŭm-dong or San'ŏp-dong Research and Development Center," was almost certainly the producer of the first prototypes that rolled off the line around 1984.[5] The Number Seven Factory, which is subordinate to Second Natural Science Academy, under the National Defense Commission, is responsible for the production and testing of missile prototypes prior to the initiation of production at other plants.

North Korea's first reported flight test of an "indigenously modified Scud" was in April 1982. Hajime Ozu of Japan has reported this test as a failure, but the report has not been substantiated by any other sources.[6] The first confirmed flight tests occurred in April and September 1984 at the Musudan-ri Missile Test Site along the northeast coast.[7] There were reportedly three failures and three successes during the two testing periods, but the distribution of the test results over the two periods is unclear. Nevertheless, the small number of flight tests is very unusual, unless North Korea received substantial foreign assistance and data that could substitute for testing that would be required in any ballistic development program.

Between 1985 and 1987, North Korea began regular factory production of the Hwasŏng-5, probably at either the Man'gyŏngdae Electric Machinery Factory or the No. 125 Factory, or possibly at both facilities, in the Pyongyang area. The Second Economic Committee, under the National Defense Commission, was responsible for production of the Hwasŏng-5, which is said to have reached about 8-12 missiles per month during 1987 and 1988—the period that coincides with the beginning of Hwasŏng-5 exports to Iran.[8] Tehran then re-named the missiles the "Shehab-1." Iran's financial assistance and willingness to purchase the Hwasŏng-5 are thought to be a critical reason that Pyongyang could proceed with the program. For example, the two sides reached a $500 million agreement in 1987 that included the North Korean export of 90-100 Hwasŏng missiles and other military hardware to Iran.

On 10 December 2002, Spanish and US naval ships intercepted the North Korean ship Sŏsan en route to Yemen. The Sŏsan cargo included 15 Scud missiles, conventional warheads, and 85 drums of "inhibited red fuming nitric acid," which is used as an oxidizer for Scud missile fuel. North Korea declared the interception of the Sŏsan an "act of piracy" and has demanded "compensation for the losses and personal trauma experienced by the crew members."

The Yong'aksan Trading Company (龍岳産貿易商社) under the Second Economic Committee's External Economic Bureau handles missile exports, and the Ch'anggwang Credit Bank (創光信用銀行) receives payment from buyers.[9] The foreign exchange earnings from missile exports have enabled Pyongyang to continue or expand its procurement of components and technology from abroad in order to continue the missile development program. Unfortunately, there is no credible open source information about North Korea's internal budget or expenditures on the Hwasŏng-5 or other ballistic missile programs.

While North Korea was establishing its own production lines for the Hwasŏng-5 in the 1980s, Pyongyang was also arranging to provide equipment and technology transfers for the establishment of production facilities abroad. In 1985, Pyongyang and Tehran reached an agreement whereby North Korea would assist Iran with the construction of a Hwasŏng-5 assembly plant.[10] The plant reportedly became operational in 1988.[11] There is also a report of North Korea providing Egypt with assistance to establish a Scud-B production plant in 1987, but this could have been for a facility used in the maintenance of Egypt's Scud-B inventory.[12] It is noteworthy that Hwasŏng-5 deployments in North Korea did not precede exports or the establishment of production plants abroad.

By the mid-1980s, the North Korean Air Force Construction Department under the Ministry of the People's Armed Forces Construction Bureau had broken ground on the construction of Hwasŏng-5 missile bases, including a base in Shin'gye-kun, North Hwanghae Province.[13] The first deployments of the Hwasŏng-5 had occurred by 1988 at the base in Shin'gye-kun. This is the same year that North Korea established a Hwasŏng-5 regiment and began development of the "Hwasŏng-6," or "Scud-C."

North Korea has an "inventory of over 500 Scud missiles of various types," but the distribution of Hwasŏng-5 and Hwasŏng-6 missiles among this 500 is not clear.[14] On 29 April 2002, Lieutenant General Daniel R. Zanini, Commander Eighth United States Army, said that North Korea's missile inventory "approaches 1,000" during a speech at a Korea Institute for Defense Analyses seminar in Seoul.[15] Zanini's statement was widely misquoted in the press as "North Korea possesses 1,000 missiles" or "over 1,000 missiles." However, considering Nodong and possible Paektusan deployments, "approaching 1,000" is a credible rough estimate.

Technical Assessment

The North Korean Hwasŏng-5 is reportedly a "reverse-engineered" version of the Soviet-designed and produced R-17/Scud-B and, as such, shares the technical features of the origin system.[16] This assessment therefore focuses on the Soviet missile because the Hwasŏng-5 performance characteristics and operation would not differ substantially.

Soviet work on the missile began in approximately 1958 under the responsibility of SKB-385, now known as the Makayev Design Bureau State Rocket Center. The Scud-B is usually viewed as the successor to Scud-A (Soviet designator R-11) due to the identical diameter and other very similar dimensions. Unlike the Scud-B, however, the Scud-A had a pressure fed engine driven by two liquid fuelled gas generators, and thus the propulsion systems are quite different. At present, the limited amount of reliable, open-source information does not allow for a thorough history of this missile, including the initial activities and connections to other programs.

The missile in general resembles a typical guided liquid rocket design that is comparable to other missiles. It consists of a main engine, two separate propellant tanks, a separate guidance compartment, and a conical warhead.

The basic construction material is stainless steel plus some air frame structural elements made of aluminum alloy.

The propulsion system is a liquid rocket engine using the storable propellant combination of inhibited red fuming nitric acrid (IRFNA, AK-27I Russian designation) and kerosene (TM-185 Russian designation). AK-27I consists of 73 percent HNO3 and 27 percent N2O4 (plus a small amount of inhibiter).

Ignition is accomplished by a hypergolic start fuel designated Tonka or TG-02 (the former is the WW II German designator while the latter is the Russian designator) filled into the fuel line at the main fuel valve. Tonka consists of 50 percent triethylamine and 50 percent xylidiene. The propellant fed system is a turbo pump driven by a bipropellant gas generator using the main propellants. The start and shut down valves are one shot devices, actuated by pyrotechnic charges. For improving the accuracy the engine is equipped with mechanical controls for correct thrust level and mixture ratio. Tank pressurization is performed by air stored in high-pressure bottles in the missile's tail section, which are heated by the turbine exhaust gases.

The guidance system basically resembles that of the A4/V2 arrangement, however, with some modifications for accuracy improvement. Prior to launch, the missile is orientated such that the trajectory plane hits the target and the guidance systems keeps the missile in this plane. Three body-mounted gyros are used for attitude and lateral acceleration control. A pendulum integration gyro assembly serves for speed control. Thrust vector control is accomplished by four jet vanes.

Warhead weight consists of some 80 percent explosive material, plus structure. The crush or g-sensors in the fusing system are capable of activating the warhead upon impact at a number of different angles. The missile also contains a safety fuse that is part of the Scud's self-destruct system and is independent of the impact fusing system.

The missile is transported and launched by the Soviet MAZ 543 erector and launcher.

This missile was the most successful Soviet guided missile with respect to the number of manufactured units. After initial operational capability in 1962, it was deployed with the Soviet armed forces in large quantities and exported to nearly 30 countries; the overall produced volume between 1960 and the mid-1980s may have exceeded 10,000 units.

There are reports that the North Korean Hwasŏng-5 is actually an improved/longer-range version of the original Scud-B/R-17. Thus, one often sees the designation for the North Korean missile as Scud-Mod B or Scud PiP (product improvement). The origin or even existence of such a missile is rather unclear. In April 1988, Iran's First Deputy Defense Minister Colonel Rahimi stated that, "We have also succeeded in manufacturing missiles with a range of 320km." Given that Iran was then launching "North Korean-made" Scuds against Iraq, it was therefore believed that Pyongyang had actually increased the range of the missile.

Increasing the range of the standard Scud-B to 320km requires an increase in engine burn time of 1.1 seconds, such that the overall burn time is 63.1 seconds. This compares to the overall propellant load of 65.2 seconds; therefore, the propellant reserves are still approximately 2 seconds, which in most cases would be sufficient for mission completion. In addition, the inputs into the counter in the missile's PIGA (which effects engine cut-off) would have to be changed accordingly.

Therefore, it is technically feasible to increase the range without any development work on the Scud-B, such as "improving" the engine's performance. However, CNS has no reliable information--such as a radar track of a flight test--indicating that North Korea, in fact, increased the Scud's range in this manner. Indeed, there are other reasons not to believe the Iranian statement noted above, most simply that the 320-km claim was simply disinformation. There were numerous examples of this type of disinformation during the war (for example, Iraq claimed it had increased the range of the Styx missile when this in fact was not true).

Sources:
[1] Interview with North Korean defector by CNS senior research associate Daniel A. Pinkston, 1 November 2000, Seoul.
[2] Robert H. Schmucker, "3rd World Missile Development—A New Assessment Based on UNSCOM Field Experience and Data Evaluation," paper for the 12th Multinational Conference on Theater Missile Defense, Edinburgh, Scotland, 1-4 June 1999.
[3] SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 1989: World Armaments and Disarmament (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 256.
[4] North Korea has cooperated to exchange missile technology with several countries, including China, Egypt, and Iran.
[5] Interview with Kim Kil Sŏn by CNS senior research associate Daniel A. Pinkston, 10 April 2001, Seoul; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 10.
[6] Hajime Ozu, Missile 2000: Reference Guide to World Missile Systems (Tokyo: Shinkigensha, 2000), p. 95.
[7] Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "New Developments in North Korean Missile Programme," Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, August 1990, pp. 343-345; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "An Analysis of North Korean Ballistic Missile Testing," Jane's Intelligence Review, April 1995, pp. 184-185; Yonhap News Agency, 24 June 1993, in "Defense Ministry: May Nodong-1 Test Successful," FBIS-EAS-93-120, 24 June 1993, p. 19; Yu Yin-taek, Pukan, No. 6, June 1985, pp. 132-141, in "North's Military Reorganization, Mobilization Analyzed," JPRS-KAR-85-070, 31 October 1985, pp. 1-9; Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), pp. 266-267; Yu Yin-taek, Pukan, No. 6, June 1985, pp. 132-141, "North's Military Reorganization, Mobilization Analyzed," JPRS-KAR-85-070, 31 October 1985, pp. 1-9; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic Ambitions Ascendant," Jane's Defence Weekly, 10 April 1993, pp. 20, 22; Lee Jŏng Hun, "FROGesŏ Taepodong Kkaji: Pukhan Missile Game," Shindonga, August 1999, p. 202; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, pp. 10-11.
[8] Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), p. 270; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 11; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK" paper presented at the Research Institute on National Security Affairs (RINSA) International Symposium, National Defense University, Seoul, 1 September 1994, p. 24; "Ballistic Missile Threat Evolves," International Defense Review, Vol. 33, No. 10, 1 October 2000, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://web.lexis-nexis.com; Kim Chun Pŏm, "Pukhan'ŭi Haek-Missile Kisulsujun Ŏddŏn'ga," Joongang Ilbo, 19 March 1992, p. 6, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "New Developments in North Korean Missile Programme," Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, August 1990, pp. 343-345; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 12; Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), p. 270; "Ballistic Missile Threat Evolves," International Defense Review, Vol. 33, No. 10, 1 October 2000, in Lexis-Nexis Acacemic Universe, http://web.lexis-nexis.com.
[9] Lee Kyo Kwan, "[NK Report] Pukhan Missile Such'ul Ŏddŏhke Hana?" Chosun Ilbo, 5 March 2002, www.chosun.com; Yi Kyo-kwan, "How Does North Korea Export Missiles?" Chosun Ilbo, 5 March 2002, in "DPRK Said to Export Body, Main Parts of Missiles Separately," FBIS Document ID KPP20020305000112.
[10] Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic Missiles in the Third World—Iran's Medium-Range Missiles," Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol. 4, No. 4, April 1992, p. 147; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Iran's Missile Development," in William C. Potter and Harlan W. Jencks, eds., The International Missile Bazaar: the New Suppliers' Network (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 53-55.
[11] Andrew Rathmell with contributions by James Bruce and Harold Hough, "Iran's Weapons of Mass Destruction," Jane's Intelligence Review, Special Report No 6, 1995, p. 20; Kenneth Timmerman, "Iran's Ballistic Missile Programs," Mednews, 21 December 1992, pp. 4-5; Tehran Domestic Service, 14 April 1988, in "Radio Phone-In Program with Defense Officials," FBIS-NES-88-073, 15 April 1988, p. 51.
[12] Lee Chae Hak, "Kkorimunŭn Pukhan Scud Such'ul/Shimsangch'anh'ŭn Taechungdong P'anmaesŏl," Joongang Ilbo, 13 July 1991, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.
[13] Interview with North Korean defector Im Yŏng Sŏn by CNS senior research associate Daniel A. Pinkston, 14 December 2001, Seoul.
[14] "Statement of General Thomas A. Schwartz, Commander in Chief United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command & Commander, United States Forces Korea, before the 107th Congress Senate Armed Services Committee, 5 March 2002, p. 8, www.senate.gov; "Advance Questions for Lieutenant General Leon J. LaPorte, USA Nominee for the Position of Commander in Chief, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/Commander, United States Forces Korea," April 2002, www.senate.gov.
[15] "US Commander Warns of NK's Enhanced Missile Capabilities," Korea Times, 30 April 2002, www.koreatimes.co.kr; "North Korea Possesses 1,000 Ballistic Missiles says Zanini," Joongang Ilbo, 1 May 2002, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Yonhap News Agency, 29 April 2002, in "Eighth US Army Commander Reportedly Notes DPRK's 'Big Increase' in Missiles," FBIS Document ID: KPP20020429000092; Yu Yong Wŏn, "[Mi 8 Kunsaryŏnggwan] 'Pukhan, Kosŏngnŭng Missile 1000 Kiboyu'," Chosun Ilbo, 29 April 2002, www.chosun.com; Sŏng Dong Ki, "'Puk Missile 1000 Yŏgae Poyu' Mi 8 Kun SaryOnggwan Palghyŏ," Donga Ilbo, 29 April 2002, www.donga.com; Kim Min Sŏk, "Puk, T'ando Missile 1 Ch'ŏnbal," Joongang Ilbo, 30 April 2002, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.
[16] The question of how North Korea actually developed the Hwasŏng-5 and, hence, the origin of the North Korean missile program, is a controversial one. For a brief alternative explanation to the "reverse-engineering" theory, see Timothy V. McCarthy, "North Korean Ballistic Missile Programs: Soviet and Russian Legacies?" in Michael Barletta, ed., WMD Threats 2001: Critical Choices for the Bush Administration, CNS Occasional Paper No. 6, pp. 9-12, www.nti.org.


Hwasŏng-6 (火星-6)

Overview

The Hwasŏng-6 (Scud-C) has the same external dimensions as the Hwasŏng-5 (Scud-B), but has an extended range of about 600km. The Number Seven Factory, which apparently is also known as the "San'ŭm-dong or San'ŏp-dong Research and Development Center," was almost certainly the producer of the first Hwasŏng-6 prototypes around 1987-1988.[1] The Number Seven Factory, which is subordinate to Second Natural Science Academy, under the National Defense Commission, is responsible for the production and testing of missile prototypes prior to the initiation of production at other plants.

North Korea probably converted either the Man'gyŏngdae Electric Machinery Factory or the No. 125 Factory, or possibly both facilities, to assemble the Hwasŏng-6 when full-scale production began around 1990-1991. These plants, both in the Pyongyang area, probably produced the Hwasŏng-5 (Scud-B). The Second Economic Committee, under the National Defense Commission, is responsible for all ballistic missile production in North Korea.

The development timeline of the Hwasŏng-5 and Hwasŏng-6 appears to be almost impossible to achieve without extensive foreign assistance. Pyongyang has received foreign assistance for its missiles from several sources, including Russia, China, Egypt, and Iran. Foreign assistance has ranged from Iranian financial support and Chinese technical training in aerospace engineering, to the pro-North Korean General Federation of Korean Residents in Japan (Choch'ongnyŏn) providing Japanese semiconductors. There is also strong evidence that North Korea acquired foreign-made precision machine tools that are needed for missile manufacturing.

North Korea's first reported flight test of a "Scud-C" was in May 1986, but this single report is almost certainly erroneous.[2] Pilot production of the Hwasŏng-6 reportedly began in late 1989, which precedes the first credible report of a successful flight test in June 1990.[3] There is one report of a failed flight test sometime between 1990 and August 1992, but this could be a mistaken reference to the Nodong flight test failure in May 1990.[4] Around the time of the first successful flight test in June 1990, North Korea was already starting full-scale production (about four-five missiles per month) and helping Egypt set up a Scud-C production facility outside of Cairo.[5]

As the Hwasŏng-6 began rolling off the production line, North Korea already had bases for their deployment. In the mid-1980s, the North Korean Air Force Construction Department under the Ministry of the People's Armed Forces Construction Bureau had broken ground on the construction of Hwasŏng-5 missile bases, including a base in Shin'gye-kun, North Hwanghae Province.[6] Since the external dimensions, fuel, oxidizer and other components of the Hwasŏng-5 and Hwasŏng-6 are essentially identical, the missiles should be interchangeable at missile bases and launch sites.

The Yong'aksan Trading Company (龍岳産貿易商社) under the Second Economic Committee's External Economic Bureau handles missile exports, and the Ch'anggwang Credit Bank (創光信用銀行) receives payment from buyers.[7] The foreign exchange earnings from missile exports have enabled Pyongyang to continue or expand its procurement of components and technology from abroad for missile development. Unfortunately, there is no credible open source information about North Korea's internal budget or expenditures on the Hwasŏng-6 or other ballistic missiles.

On 10 December 2002, Spanish and US naval ships intercepted the North Korean ship Sŏsan en route to Yemen. The Sŏsan cargo included 15 Scud missiles, conventional warheads, and 85 drums of "inhibited red fuming nitric acid," which is used as an oxidizer for Scud missile fuel.[8] North Korea declared the interception of the Sŏsan an "act of piracy" and has demanded "compensation for the losses and personal trauma experienced by the crew members."[9] It is unclear whether the missiles were Scud-B or Scud-C models.

North Korea has an "inventory of over 500 Scud missiles of various types," but the distribution of Hwasŏng-5 and Hwasŏng-6 missiles among this 500 is not clear.[10] On 29 April 2002, Lieutenant General Daniel R. Zanini, Commander Eighth United States Army, said that North Korea's missile inventory "approaches 1,000" during a speech at a Korea Institute for Defense Analyses seminar in Seoul.[11] Zanini's statement was widely misquoted in the press as "North Korea possesses 1,000 missiles" or "over 1,000 missiles." However, considering Nodong and possible Paektusan deployments, "approaching 1,000" is a credible rough estimate of North Korea's arsenal of ballistic missiles.

Technical Assessment

This missile originates from the Soviet R-17 missile and is designed for maximum performance using the same engine, and probably the guidance system, as the R-17. At present, available data are too limited to properly establish the history of this missile, including its connections to other programs. This holds especially true for the possible relationship between the Soviet Union and North Korea concerning the system.

The missile resembles a typical guided liquid rocket designed for maximum propellant load. It consists of a main engine, one propellant tank with a common bulkhead with an internal fuel line, a separate guidance compartment, and a conical warhead.

The basic construction material is stainless steel plus some air frame structural elements made of aluminum alloy. In this respect, and in terms of dimensions, it does not differ from Hwasŏng-5.

The propulsion system is a liquid rocket engine using the storable propellant combination of inhibited red fuming nitric acrid (IRFNA) and kerosene. Ignition is accomplished by a hypergolic (self-igniting) start fuel designated Tonka--the WW II German designator for this propellant--filled into the fuel line at the main fuel valve. The propellant fed system is a turbo pump driven by a bipropellant gas generator using the main propellants. The start and shut down valves are one shot devices, actuated by pyrotechnic charges. For improving accuracy, the engine is equipped with mechanical controls for the correct thrust level and mixture ratio. Tank pressurization is performed by air stored in high-pressure bottles in the missile's tail section and heated by the turbine exhaust gases.

The guidance system basically resembles that of the A4/V2 arrangement, however, with some modifications for accuracy improvement. Prior to launch, the missile is orientated such that the trajectory plane hits the target and the guidance systems keeps the missile in this plane. Three body-mounted gyros are used for attitude and lateral acceleration control. A pendulum integration gyro assembly serves for speed control. Thrust vector control is accomplished by four jet vanes.

The warhead with approximately 75 percent explosive material is initiated by an impact fuse.

The missile is transported and launched by the Soviet MAZ 543 erector and launcher.

Sources:
[1] Interview with Kim Kil Sŏn by CNS senior research associate Daniel A. Pinkston, 10 April 2001, Seoul; Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), pp. 272-273; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, pp. 14-15; Kyodo News Service, "Asian News; N. Korea Deploys Scuds, May Reach Whole S. Korea in 1992," Japan Economic Newswire, 2 February 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, http://web.lexis-nexis.com; United Press International, "North Korea Builds Own Scud Missiles," 2 February 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, http://web.lexis-nexis.com; Yonhap News Agency, 2 February 1991, in "Information Provided on DPRK Scud Missiles," JPRS-TND-91-003, 25 February 1991, pp. 6-7.
[2] Korean language news articles quoting the South Korean Defense Minister around 24 June 1993 do not include information regarding a Scud-C flight test in 1986. The Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) translation could be in error. See Yonhap News Agency, 24 June 1993, in "Defense Ministry: May Nodong-1 Test Successful," FBIS-EAS-93-120, 24 June 1993, p. 19.
[3] For reports of pilot production of the Scud-C (Hwasŏng-6), see Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic Ambitions Ascendant," Jane's Defence Weekly, 10 April 1993, pp. 20, 22; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 16; Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), p. 273. For reports of the first successful Scud-C flight test, see Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic Ambitions Ascendant," Jane's Defence Weekly, 10 April 1993, pp. 20, 22; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "An Analysis of North Korean Ballistic Missile Testing," Jane's Intelligence Review, April 1995, p. 185; Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), pp. 272-273; Lee Jŏng Hun, "FROGesŏ Taepodong Kkaji: Pukhan Missile Game," Shindonga, August 1999, p. 203; "A Lonely State of Defiance," Jane's Defence Weekly, 8 August 1992, pp. 26-27; "Ballistic Missile Threat Evolves," International Defense Review, Vol. 33, No. 10, 1 October 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, http://web.lexis-nexis.com.
[4] For a report of the possible Scud-C launch failure, see "A Lonely State of Defiance," Jane's Defence Weekly, 8 August 1992, pp. 26-27. For reports of the failed Nodong flight test, see Bill Gertz, "Libya May Buy N. Korean Missiles," Washington Times, 4 June 1991, p. 4; Yonhap News Agency, 24 June 1993, in "Defense Ministry: May Nodong-1 Test Successful," FBIS-EAS-93-120, 24 June 1993, p. 19; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 21; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "An Analysis of North Korean Ballistic Missile Testing," Jane's Intelligence Review, April 1995, p. 186; Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), pp. 280-281; "Pukhan, Sae T'ando Missile Saengsan-Haekt'apchae Kanŭng," Joongang Ilbo, 5 June 1990, www.joins.com; "Pukhan Kaebal T'ando Missile Ch'otshihŏmbalsa--Mijŏngbogigwandŭl Punsŏk," Joongang Ilbo, 6 July 1990, www.joins.com.
[5] Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 16; Steven Emerson, "The Postwar Scud Boom," Wall Street Journal, 10 July 1991, p. A12.
[6] Interview with North Korean defector Im Yŏng Sŏn by CNS senior research associate Daniel A. Pinkston, 14 December 2001, Seoul.
[7] Lee Kyo Kwan, "[NK Report] Pukhan Missile Such'ul Ŏddŏhke Hana?" Chosun Ilbo, 5 March 2002, www.chosun.com; Yi Kyo-kwan, "How Does North Korea Export Missiles?" Chosun Ilbo, 5 March 2002, in "DPRK Said to Export Body, Main Parts of Missiles Separately," FBIS Document ID KPP20020305000112.
[8] Matt Kelley, "Ship Carrying Dozen North Korean Missiles Intercepted in Arabian Sea," Associated Press, 11 December 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, http://web.lexis-nexis.com; "Scud Missile Found on Ship from Yemen," Japan Economic Newswire, 10 December 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, http://web.lexis-nexis.com; Tom Raum, "Ship Carrying Dozen North Korean Missiles Intercepted in Arabian Sea," Associated Press, 10 December 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, http://web.lexis-nexis.com; Yiftah S. Shapir, "North Korean Missiles for Yemen: Is There a Missing Link?" Tel Aviv Notes, 22 December 2002, No. 59, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies; "15 Scud Missiles Found on Ship from N. Korea," Japan Economic Newswire, 11 December 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, http://web.lexis-nexis.com.
[9] "Chosŏn'oemusŏng Taebyŏn'in Mi'gug'ŭi <Sŏsan>Ho Ch'imbŏm'ŭn Haejŏkhaeng'wi," Korean Central News Agency, 13 December 2002, www.kcna.co.jp; Central Broadcasting Station, 13 December 2002, in "North Korea Calls for Apology, Compensation in 'Raiding' of 'Cargo Ship' Incident," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 13 December 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, http://web.lexis-nexis.com.
[10] "Statement of General Thomas A. Schwartz, Commander in Chief United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command & Commander, United States Forces Korea, before the 107th Congress Senate Armed Services Committee, 5 March 2002, p. 8, www.senate.gov; "Advance Questions for Lieutenant General Leon J. LaPorte, USA Nominee for the Position of Commander in Chief, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/Commander, United States Forces Korea," April 2002, www.senate.gov.
[11] "US Commander Warns of NK's Enhanced Missile Capabilities," Korea Times, 30 April 2002, www.koreatimes.co.kr; "North Korea Possesses 1,000 Ballistic Missiles says Zanini," Joongang Ilbo, 1 May 2002, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Yonhap News Agency, 29 April 2002, in "Eighth US Army Commander Reportedly Notes DPRK's 'Big Increase' in Missiles," FBIS Document ID: KPP20020429000092; Yu Yong Wŏn, "[Mi 8 Kunsaryŏnggwan] 'Pukhan, Kosŏngnŭng Missile 1000 Kiboyu'," Chosun Ilbo, 29 April 2002, www.chosun.com; Sŏng Dong Ki, "'Puk Missile 1000 Yŏgae Poyu' Mi 8 Kun SaryOnggwan Palghyŏ," Donga Ilbo, 29 April 2002, www.donga.com; Kim Min Sŏk, "Puk, T'ando Missile 1 Ch'ŏnbal," Joongang Ilbo, 30 April 2002, p. 2, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.


Musudan

Overview

The Musudan is a single stage intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM). It is based on the Russian R-27/SS-N-6 submarine-launched missile. The Musudan is alternately referred to as the Nodong-B, the BM-25, Taepodong-X, and less commonly as the Mirim.[1] Its name comes from the town closest to where it was thought to be developed—Musudan-ni, North Hamyong Province.[2]

Range estimates differ, sometimes dramatically. Israeli intelligence stated the Musudan missile kits North Korea reportedly sold to Iran had a 2,500km range while the U.S. Missile Defense Agency indicated they had a range of 3,200km; other sources put the upper limit at 4,000km.[3] These differences are due in large part to the fact that the missile has never been tested publicly.

As with most of North Korea's missile programs there is uncertainty over exactly when the Musudan program began. The general consensus is the early 1990s, with 1992 being the most probable time. In 1992, a large contract between Korea Yon'gwang Trading Company and V.P. Makeyev Engineering Design Office of Miass, Russia was signed. The agreement stated that Russian engineers would go to the DPRK and assist in the development of the Zyb Space Launch Vehicle (SLV). Zyb is a term used by V.P. Makeyev for the R-27/SS-N-6.[4] Later that year a number of Russian scientists and missile specialists were arrested while attempting to travel to Pyongyang. There are reports that many scientists and missile engineers were already working in the DPRK.[5]

Prototypes for the Mususdan were reportedly developed in 2000.[6] There is some contention over when the Musudan was first deployed. Several reports indicate it was deployed in 2003 after U.S. satellite imagery identified 10 Musudan missiles and associated launchers at two underground missiles bases that were currently under construction.[7] Despite this, the South Korean Ministry of National Defense 2008 white paper lists the Musudan (not by name but as an unnamed IRBM) as being deployed in 2007.[8]

Questions have been raised as to the accuracy of the reporting on the system's deployment because it has yet to be tested. However, one expert has proposed three possible reasons for a deployment without apparent testing: 1) The missiles were only mockups meant to be used for training and deception; 2) that Iran actually ran a surrogate flight test of the missile for North Korea; and 3) that North Korea was confident of the success of the missile because it was designed and produced by Russian scientists or with an extensive consultation of Russian scientists.[9]

A number of sources have claimed that the Musudan was deployed in 2007 after Iran ran surrogate flight tests in January 2006 and May 2007 of the system for North Korea.[10] There is also limited evidence suggesting that North Korea tested the Musudan as part of its July 2006 missile tests. This is supported by the fact that the electronic signals detected from the missiles did not match North Korea's Nodong or Scud missiles and analysis of the flight discounts the likelihood of it being a Scud-ER.[11]

The first public display of the Musudan was a military parade on 25 April 2007. While the pictures of the parade released to the foreign press did not contain an image of the missile, several intelligence sources claimed to have evidence of it.[12]

The predecessor to the Musudan, the Nodong, was designed by North Korea to work as the second stage of the Taepodong-1 and early versions of the Taepodong-2. It appears that the Musudan is being used in the same way. The Musudan system was reportedly used as the second stage of the Unha-2 SLV and might be used in future versions of the Taepodong-2 or 3.[13] The Unha-2 SLV failed to put a satellite in orbit during an April 2009 launch but the failure occurred after the second stage had fired successfully, indicating that the stage reportedly encompassing the Musudan worked.

There is speculation that North Korea may be developing a sea based version of the Musudan. Due to North Korea's weak submarine building capability it is likely that a sea based version of the system would be deployed on a surface ship. Possible ship based launch systems include a deck based erector/launcher, a vertical launch silo, or a vertical stored missile system that is elevated to the deck before firing. [14]

North Korea and Iran have a long history of working together on missile development. In 2005, North Korea sold Iran 18 assembly kits for the Musudan.[15] As North Korea develops longer range missiles they might find it hard to flight test them without drawing international attention. Iran is a much larger country and longer range tests could conceivably be carried out there without drawing as much attention.

Technical Assessment

Due to the secrecy surrounding the North Korean missile program and the lack of public tests of the Musudan it is difficult to provide solid information about technical details of the missile. The Musudan is based on the Soviet R-27/SS-N-6, a submarine launched IRBM. It is 1.5 meters in diameter and 12 meters in length. The diameter matches the R-27/SS-N-6 but the length is different. The R-27/SS-N-6 is 9.65 meters long but without a warhead only 7.1 meters. The Musuadan probably uses the same 1.5 meter diameter engine compartment and propellant tank as the R-27/SS-N-6 with the extra length resulting from the addition of a reentry vehicle and interstage element. It is also possible that the extra length results from a longer propellant tank which would provide the Musudan with the extra range it is believed to have.[16]

Because the Musudan is heavily based on the R-27/SS-N-6 it is possible to assume certain details about the missile. The Musudan likely uses a hypergolic propellant system. Unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine is likely the fuel and either inhibited red fuming nitric acid or nitrogen tetroxide as the oxidizer.[16]

Sources:
[1] Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., "Japan Reveals Name of North Korea's R-27 IRBM," Jane's Defence Weekly, 16 May 2007; Charles P. Vick, "No-Dong B - North Korea." GlobalSecurity.org, 4 December 2007, www.globalsecurity.org.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid; "N.Korea May Have Tested New Longer-Range Missiles." Chosun Ilbo, 18 July 2006, english.chosun.com; David C. Isby, "North Korea Has Deployed Intermediate-range Ballistic Missiles." Jane's Missiles and Rockets, 18 August 2004.
[4] David C. Isby, "North Korea Has Deployed Intermediate-range Ballistic Missiles." Jane's Missiles and Rockets, 18 August 2004; Daniel A. Pinkston, "The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program." Strategic Studies Institute. February 2008, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil.
[5] Ibid; Charles P. Vick, "No-Dong B - North Korea." GlobalSecurity.org, 4 December 2007, www.globalsecurity.org.
[6] Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., "Japan Reveals Name of North Korea's R-27 IRBM," Jane's Defence Weekly, 16 May 2007.
[7] Daniel A. Pinkston, "The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program." Strategic Studies Institute. February 2008, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil.
[8] Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense, "Defense White Paper 2008." Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense, 3 July 2009, www.mnd.go.kr.
[9] Daniel A. Pinkston, "The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program." Strategic Studies Institute. February 2008, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil.
[10] "North Korea Displays Ballistic Missiles During Military Parade, Some For First Time." WMD Insights, June 2007, www.wmdinsights.com; Lewis Page, "New North Korean Missile Tested in Iran." The Register, 16 May 2007, www.theregister.co.uk.
[11] "N.Korea May Have Tested New Longer-Range Missiles." Chosun Ilbo, 18 July 2006, english.chosun.com; Charles P. Vick, "No-Dong B - North Korea." GlobalSecurity.org, 4 December 2007, www.globalsecurity.org.
[12] "North Korea Displays Ballistic Missiles During Military Parade, Some For First Time." WMD Insights, June 2007, www.wmdinsights.com; "N.Korea May Have Tested New Longer-Range Missiles." Chosun Ilbo, 18 July 2006, english.chosun.com; Charles P. Vick, "No-Dong B - North Korea." GlobalSecurity.org, 4 December 2007, www.globalsecurity.org.
[13] Charles P. Vick, "No-Dong B - North Korea." GlobalSecurity.org, 4 December 2007, www.globalsecurity.org; David Wright and Theodore Postol. "A Post-launch Examination of the Unha-2." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 29 June 2009, www.thebulletin.org.
[14] David C. Isby, "North Korea Has Deployed Intermediate-range Ballistic Missiles." Jane's Missiles and Rockets, 18 August 2004.
[15] Alon Ben-David. "Iran Acquires Ballistic Missiles From DPRK." Jane's Defence Weekly, 22 December 2005; Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., "Going Ballistic - North Korea's Advanced Missile Capabilities." Jane's Intelligence Review, 12 March 2009; Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., "Japan Reveals Name of North Korea's R-27 IRBM," Jane's Defence Weekly, 16 May 2007.


Nodong

Overview

The Nodong is a single stage medium range ballistic missile (MRBM) developed by North Korea. Derived from the Soviet Scud missile, the Nodong is more advanced than other Scud derivatives. It has an estimated range of 1,350-1,600km with a payload of approximately 1000 kg.[1] The Nodong can be fired from a Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL) making it a mobile missile.[2] The Nodong is alternately referred to as the Scud D, Scud Mod D, Nodong-A, Nodong-1, and the Rodong.[3]

The Nodong has been tested four times; three of the launches were successful. The most recent tests were in July 2006. North Korea launched two Nodongs as part of its 5 July missile test; both Nodongs performed successfully.[4] A Nodong derivative was used as the first stage of the Taepodong-1 multistage missile when it was tested in 1998 and performed successfully although the missile failed.[5] The Nodong is currently considered a fully functional, deployed missile.

North Korea first deployed the Nodong in 1993 with an initial group of 18 missiles.[6] By 2001, there were various reports that North Korea had deployed between 100-450 Nodongs.[7] In 2008, a Burmese delegation visited a Nodong factory and confirmed that the Nodong was still in production.[8] North Korea is likely continuing to produce Nodongs for either domestic use or for sale abroad. The exact number of Nodong deployed is uncertain, however. As of 2010, the most common estimate is that North Korea has deployed 200 Nodongs.[9]

The Nodong's longer range and greater payload compared to other Scud derivatives was produced by scaling up the Scud engine. It is likely that North Korea received a significant amount of assistance in doing this. There is debate about the amount of assistance received from Soviet and Russian engineers in developing the Nodong; this assistance did not necessarily have the permission of the Soviet or Russian government.[10] Iran is reported to have heavily funded the operation, pledging at least $500 million to jointly developing nuclear and missile capabilities.[11] The Nodong, or Nodong components, have reportedly been sold to several countries including Pakistan, Iran, Syria, and Egypt. Previous reports that Nodong missiles had been sold to Libya turned out to be untrue.[12]

The Nodong is closely related to the Iranian Shehab-3 and the Pakistani Ghauri-II/Hatf-V.[13] These missiles are either complete Nodongs sold to these countries by North Korea, copies, or derivatives of the Nodong produced indigenously.

Development

It is believed that North Korea had two design objectives when developing the Nodong. First, they wanted to design a missile that could deliver a payload of up to 1,500 kg to a range of 1,000-1,500 km. Second, they desired a missile that could be used as a base or stage for a multistage missile, and had the capability to deliver a first-generation nuclear weapon.[14]

The Second Natural Science Academy, formerly the Academy of Defense Sciences, is responsible for the research and development of all weapons systems in North Korea. The Second Natural Science Academy designed and developed the Nodong, at a nearly unprecedented pace. According to South Korea's Ministry of National Defense, North Korea began to develop the Nodong missile in 1988-1989.[15] Despite the short development time, the San'ŭm-dong Research and Development Center likely produced North Korea's first Nodong prototypes by 1989-1990.[16] Limited production of the Nodong began in 1991, prior to the first successful testing of the missile.[17]

The development timeline of the Nodong appears to be impossible to achieve without extensive foreign assistance. Pyongyang has received foreign assistance from several sources, including Russia, China, Egypt, and Iran. Some analysts believe the Nodong is an old Soviet-designed missile that was tested but never deployed by the USSR.[18] The plans for the missile could have been brought to North Korea by Soviet or Russians scientists though not necessarily with the permission of the Soviet or Russian government.[19] This hypothesis has yet to be confirmed, but could explain North Korea's success in exporting the Nodong despite the short development timeline and lack of extensive flight tests.

There is debate over how North Korea developed the Nodong in a conspicuously short amount of time and with very few missile tests. There is some evidence that further tests of the Nodong system (as the Shehab-3 and Ghuari-II) were preformed by Iran and Pakistan and the information learned shared with North Korea.[20]

Nodong missiles are currently produced at the No. 125 Factory in Pyongyang. This factory also reportedly produces Hwasong and Silkworm surface-to-ship missiles. The No. 125 Factory is alternately known as the Pyongyang 125 Factory, the 125th Machine Factory, and the Pyongyang Pig Factory.[21] There is also the possibility that the Man'gyŏngdae Electric Machinery Factory and the No. 125 Factory are the same.[22]

Testing

The Nodong has been tested four times; in 1990, in 1993, and twice in 2006. The 1990 test was unsuccessful but the tests in 1993 and 2006 were successful. In June 1992 there were reports that a Nodong launch was imminent but the launch was either cancelled or failed because no launch was detected. The Nodong has never been tested at its maximum range; its longest range test flight is 805 km.[23]

In May 1990, U.S. satellites detected a Nodong missile on the launch pad at the Musudan-ri Missile Test Site.[24] However, subsequent imagery revealed burn marks that has been interpreted to mean the missile exploded on the pad, probably in the course of a failed flight test. In late May 1993, North Korea conducted its first successful flight test of the Nodong from Musudan-ri; Iranian and Pakistani observers were reportedly present at the test launch.[25]

In July 2006 North Korea conducted a large-scale missile test; it launched seven missiles over the course of July 5. Two Nodongs were tested; they were launched at 4:10 and 8:17 AM local time. The first missile flew 805 km, the second 780 km.[26] The second and sixth tests were Nodongs. The tests were successful and the missiles acted as planned. Some sources reported that the seventh missile fired was also a Nodong but most sources believe it was a Hwasong-6/Scud-C.

Import/Export

North Korea is currently forbidden from importing or exporting missiles, their components, or technology by UN Security Council Resolution 1718. North Korea is widely believed to continue to export the restricted items. North Korea has sold the Nodong to several countries in the Middle East, South Asia, and North Africa.

In the 1980's North Korea successfully reverse engineered the Scud missile; soon after North Korea was producing them for sale abroad. Since then North Korea has become a leading exporter of missiles and related technology.[27] North Korea's exports include missiles, components, materials and technical expertise. North Korea values its ballistic missile exports because they are a crucial source of hard currency that allows North Korea to continue to fund its nuclear and missile programs.[28] Sanctions were imposed by the U.S. on the Changgwang Sinyong Corporation, for involvement in the transfer missiles or components to Pakistan.[29] The Yong'aksan Trading Company under the Second Economic Committee's External Economic Bureau handles missile exports, and the Ch'anggwang Credit Bank receives payment from buyers.[30]

North Korea has sold the Nodong to several countries. Despite early trouble with test flights, North Korea was able to attract foreign buyers for the Nodong system, including Egypt, Iran, Iraq and Pakistan. The Nodong is closely related to the Iranian Shehab-3 and the Pakistani Ghauri-II/Hatf-V.[31] Depending on what version they are these missiles are either Nodongs sold to these countries, copies, or derivatives of the Nodong produced indigenously.

Pakistani officials visited North Korea twice to view the Nodong, once in 1992 and once for the flight test in 1993.[32] North Korea is believed to have provided Pakistan with 5 to 12 Nodong assembly sets between 1994 and 1997. There is evidence that North Korea also sold 12 to 24 complete Nodong missiles to Pakistan in the late 1990s.[33] Pakistan denies that it has imported any Nodongs, and insists that its so-called "Ghuari" missile was indigenously developed and produced. It was later revealed that these sales were part of a deal for Pyongyang to acquire technology and/or materials for a secret uranium enrichment program.[34]

Iran and North Korea have worked together on missile development for many years. Iran has often provided funding for the North Korean missile development program. It is believed that Iran provided $500 million dollars for the joint development of missiles and nuclear technologies in the mid-1990s. There are reports of Iranian officials being present at the 1993 Nodong test and the 1998 Taepodong-1 test.[35]

In early 1992, North Korea and Iran reportedly signed an agreement that probably included Iranian financial support for development of the Nodong, with an option for Tehran to purchase Nodongs at a later date. There are reports that Iran received 150 Nodongs from North Korea though both governments deny this.[36]

Iran's Shehab-3 is based upon the Nodong, and North Korea has provided technology for its development.[37] In December 1994, Iran was reportedly seeking assistance from North Korea to establish an indigenous production capability for the Nodong or "Shehab-3."[38]

In 2003, before the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Iraqi leadership arranged to buy Nodongs from North Korea. Despite providing a $10 million down payment, the missiles were never delivered and North Korea later refused to provide a refund.[39]

Technical Assessment

This Nodong is a derivative of the Soviet Scud missile. The missile resembles a typical guided liquid rocket. It consists of a main engine, two propellant tanks with an internal fuel line, a separate guidance compartment, and a conical warhead.[40]

The Nodong is a scaled up version of the Hwasong-6/Scud-C. The missile is 150% larger than the Hwasong-6, because of this the engines and guidance systems were required to be replaced. These systems are much more advanced than previous systems and probably required technical assistance to build successfully.

Based on what is known about the Nodong, Ghuari and Shehab-3 it is believed that the Nodong is 1.32-1.36 m in diameter and roughly 16.2 m in length with a warhead. It is believed to have a launch weight of 16,500 kg with a payload of 1,000 kg.[41] It is believed to be capable of carrying a warhead containing high-explosives, chemical, or nuclear weapons.

The basic construction material is stainless steel plus probably some air frame structural elements made of aluminum alloy. It is believed that the missile utilizes an inertial guidance system though in the future this could be upgraded to a GPS system which would provide the Nodong with greater accuracy.

The propulsion system is a liquid rocket engine using the storable propellant TM-185, a combination of 20% gasoline and 80% kerosene. The oxidizer is AK-27I, a combination of 27% N2O4 + 73% HNO3 with Iodium inhibitor Nitrogen Tetroxide & Nitric Acid.[42]

Sources:
[1] Charles P. Vick, "No-Dong-A, Ghauri-II, & Shahab-3, Technical Date." GlobalSecurity.org, February 27, 2007, www.globalsecurity.org.
[2] Missile Threat, "Missiles of the World: No-dong 1." Missile Threat, 2007, www.missilethreat.com.
[3] Charles P. Vick, "No-dong-A." GlobalSecurity.org, 20 March 2007, www.globalsecurity.org; Joseph S. Bermudez Jr, "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK." Center For Nonproliferation Studies, 1999, http://cns.miis.edu.
[4] Daniel A. Pinkston, "The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program." Strategic Studies Institute. February 2008, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil.
[5] Charles P. Vick, "Taep'o-dong 1 (TD-1)." GlobalSecurity.org, 20 March 2007, www.globalsecurity.org; Joseph S. Bermudez Jr, "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK." Center For Nonproliferation Studies, 1999, http://cns.miis.edu.
[6] Yi Sang Won, Hankook Ilbo (Seoul), 28 January 1994, p. 5, in "Press Overview of Deployment," JPRS-TND-94-005, 25 February 1994, p. 42; Lee Sang Wŏn, "Patriot Nodong 1 Ho Kyŏkch'u Kanŭnghalkka," Hankook Ilbo, 28 January 1994, p. 6, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.
[7] Charles P. Vick, "No-dong-A." GlobalSecurity.org, 20 March 2007, www.globalsecurity.org; Manuel Manriquez, "Japan's Space Law Revision: the Next Step Toward Re-Militarization?" Nuclear Threat Initiative, January 2008, www.nti.org.
[8] Aung Zaw, "Asia's 'Axis of Evil' Flexes Its Muscles." The Irrawaddy News Magazine, June 23 2009, www.irrawaddy.org.
[9] Blaine Harden, "Japan Set to Fire at N. Korean Missile if Launch Goes Awry." The Washington Post, March 28 2009, www.washingtonpost.com; Missilethreat.com, "Yomiuri Shimbun: New Threat Calls for New Defense Initiative." Missilethreat.com, October 11 2006, www.missilethreat.com.
[10] David Wright, "North Korea's Missile Program." (paper presented at Improving Regional Security and Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula: U.S. Policy Interests and Options, New York, July 17 2009).
[11] Daniel A. Pinkston, "The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program." Strategic Studies Institute. February 2008, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Charles P. Vick, "No-Dong-A, Ghauri-II, & Shahab-3, Technical Date." GlobalSecurity.org, February 27, 2007, www.globalsecurity.org.
[14] Joseph S. Bermudez Jr, "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK." Center For Nonproliferation Studies, 1999, http://cns.miis.edu; Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., "Going Ballistic - North Korea's Advanced Missile Capabilities." Jane's Intelligence Review, 12, March 2009.
[15] Daniel A. Pinkston, "The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program." Strategic Studies Institute. February 2008, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil.
[16] Joseph S. Bermudez Jr, "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK." Center For Nonproliferation Studies, 1999, http://cns.miis.edu.
[17] Daniel A. Pinkston, "The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program." Strategic Studies Institute. February 2008, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil.
[18] David Wright, "North Korea's Missile Program." (paper presented at Improving Regional Security and Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula: U.S. Policy Interests and Options, New York, July 17 2009)
[19] Ibid.
[20] Charles P. Vick, "No-dong-A Flight Tests Record." Globalsecurity.org, September 28 2009, www.globalsecurity.org; Daniel A. Pinkston, "The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program." Strategic Studies Institute. February 2008, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil.
[21] Charles P. Vick, "Chunggye-dong, Hyongje-san, Pyongyang-si." Globalsecurity.org, April 24 2005, www.globalsecurity.org.
[22] Daniel A. Pinkston, "The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program." Strategic Studies Institute. February 2008, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil.
[23] Daniel A. Pinkston, "The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program." Strategic Studies Institute. February 2008, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Joseph S. Bermudez Jr, "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK." Center For Nonproliferation Studies, 1999, http://cns.miis.edu; Bill Gertz, "North Korea as Nuclear Exporter?" Washington Times, June 8, 1994.
[26] Daniel A. Pinkston, "The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program." Strategic Studies Institute. February 2008, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil.
[27] Sharon A. Squassoni, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: Trade Between North Korea and Pakistan." Congressional Research Service, March 11 2004, http://fpc.state.gov.
[28] Central Intelligence Agency, "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July through 31 December 2001." Central Intelligence Agency, January 2003, www.cia.gov.
[29] Sharon A. Squassoni, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: Trade Between North Korea and Pakistan." Congressional Research Service, March 11 2004, http://fpc.state.gov.
[30] Yu Yong Wŏn, "Nodong 1 Ho Missile Puk, 100 Yŏbal Paech'i/Mi, Shimgakhan Uryŏ P'yomyŏng," Chosun Ilbo, 2 March 2001, p. 1, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Yu Yong Wŏn, "Nodong 1 Ho Ch'ugabaech'i/Hubang Chihagiji 3 Kot Kŏnsŏltŭng Puk Missile Pimilchŭnggang Kyesok," Chosun Ilbo, 2 March 2001, p. 3, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Chosun Ilbo, 2 March 2001, in "ROKG Official Cites US Sources: DPRK Deploys 100 Nodong-1 Missiles Since 1998," FBIS Document ID: KPP20010302000010; Kim Min Sŏk, "Kukpang'wi, Pukhan Kunsaryŏk Nollan," Joongang Ilbo, 24 April 2001, p. 8, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.
[31] Charles P. Vick, "No-Dong-A, Ghauri-II, & Shahab-3, Technical Date." GlobalSecurity.org, February 27 2007, www.globalsecurity.org.
[32] Sharon A. Squassoni, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: Trade Between North Korea and Pakistan." Congressional Research Service, March 11 2004, http://fpc.state.gov.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Daniel A. Pinkston, "The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program." Strategic Studies Institute. February 2008, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil.
[36] Missile Threat, "Missiles of the World: No-dong 1." Missile Threat, 2007, www.missilethreat.com.
[37] Charles P. Vick, "No-dong-A." GlobalSecurity.org, 20 March 2007, www.globalsecurity.org; Joseph S. Bermudez Jr, "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK." Center For Nonproliferation Studies, 1999, http://cns.miis.edu.
[38] "Gur: Iran May Be Making Long-Range Missiles," Jerusalem Post, 8 December 1994, p. 12, in Lexis-Nexis, web.lexis-nexis.com; "Iran Denies Missile Cooperation with North Korea," Reuters, 19 February 1995, in Executive News Service, 20 February 1995.
[39] Daniel A. Pinkston, "The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program." Strategic Studies Institute. February 2008, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil.
[40] Charles P. Vick, "No-dong-A." GlobalSecurity.org, 20 March 2007, www.globalsecurity.org.
[41] Charles P. Vick, "No-Dong-A, Ghauri-II, & Shahab-3, Technical Date." GlobalSecurity.org, February 27, 2007, www.globalsecurity.org.
[42] Ibid.


Scud ER

Technical Assessment

This missile originates from the Soviet R-17 missile and seems to be designed according to the Hwasŏng-6/Scud-C principles for maximum performance while maintaining the same engine and basically the same guidance system. At present, there is no reliable, open-source information on the origin and the history of this missile, including the connections to other Soviet-era programs.

The missile resembles a typical guided liquid rocket designed for maximum propellant load. It consists of one main engine, one propellant tank with a common bulkhead with an internal fuel line, a separate guidance compartment, and a conical warhead.

The basic construction material is stainless steel plus some air frame structural elements made of aluminum alloy. It does not differ from the Hwasŏng-5.

The propulsion system is a liquid rocket engine using the storable propellant combination of inhibited red fuming nitric acrid (IRFNA) and kerosene. Ignition is accomplished by a hypergolic (self-igniting) start fuel designated Tonka--the WW II German designator for this propellant--filled into the fuel line at the main fuel valve. The propellant feed system is a turbo pump driven by a bipropellant gas generator using the main propellants. The start and shut down valves are one shot devices, actuated by pyrotechnic charges. For improving the accuracy the engine is equipped with mechanical controls for correct thrust level and mixture ratio. Tank pressurization is performed by air stored in a toroidal high-pressure bottle at the bottom of the missile's warhead section and heated by the turbine exhaust gases.

The guidance system basically resembles that of the A4/V2 arrangement with body-mounted free gyros, however, with the modification of an additional gyro for accuracy improvement. Prior to launch, the missile is orientated such that the trajectory plane hits the target and the guidance systems keeps the missile in this plane. Two of the three body mounted gyros are used for attitude and the third one lateral acceleration control. A pendulum integration gyro assembly serves for speed measurement. The fins are fixed and thrust vector control is accomplished by four jet vanes.

Due to tank lengthening to achieve increases in propellant loads relative to the Hwasŏng-5, the guidance compartment on the "Scud-D" is shifted towards the missile's warhead with the cylindrical section comprising simply a connecting ring.

Unlike the Hwasŏng-5 and Hwasŏng-6, the propellant tank arrangement is changed such that the oxidizer tank is placed on top of the fuel tank, probably due to center of gravity reasons.

No open-source, reliable data on the transporter erector launcher (TEL) type are available; however the use of the Hwasŏng-5 and Hwasŏng-6 Soviet MAZ 543 TEL is very likely.


Taepodong-1

Overview

The Taepodong-1 is a two to three-stage ballistic missile. The Taepodong-1 uses a Nodong as the first stage and a Hwasŏng-5/6 as the second stage.[1] The three-stage Space Launch Vehicle (SLV) version adds a solid third stage in place of a re-entry vehicle. The Taepodong-1 has been launched once, in the three-stage version as an SLV. The North Korean designation for the missile is Paektusan-1. The Taepodong-1 is variously known as the Scud Mod-E, Scud-X, Moksong 1, or Pekdosan 1.[2] The range of the Taepodong-1 is believed to be up to 2,500 km.[3]

The Taepodong-1 was North Korea's first multi-stage missile. It proved that North Korea had developed the technologies required to develop and deploy an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM); for example, multiple-stage separation, stable guidance of multiple-stage rockets, and multiple-fuel systems.[4] The 1998 test of the Taepodong-1 was surprising and caused surrounding countries to reevaluate their understanding of the North Korean missile program and the threat posed by North Korea.[5]

Although the current status of the Taepodong-1 is uncertain, it is likely that it has not been deployed in large numbers if at all. In 2003, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) assessed that there was "no information that Pyongyang intends to deploy the Taepo Dong I (TD-1) as a surface-to-surface missile in North Korea... [there is evidence] that the vehicle was a test bed for multi-stage missile technologies."[6] In line with this assessment, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) noted that:

    "there would be limited military value in deploying the TD-1 because it contributes little to the strategic role already played by the deployed No-dong force, which effectively covers all critical targets in Japan with a warhead capable of delivering a nuclear weapon. In two-stage configuration, the TD-1 can deliver a payload comparable to that carried by the Nodong to a greater range, but the extra distance does not encompass any key targets of significant value to North Korea."[7]

Development

Development of the Taepodong-1 is believed to have begun 1985-1987 at the same time as the Nodong and Taepodong-2.[8] North Korea created the Taepodong-1 by combining two missiles already in the North Korean inventory, the Nodong and the Hwasong 5/6, to create a two-stage missile. The San'ŭm-dong Research and Development Center likely produced North Korea's first Taepodong-1 prototypes around 1994.[9] In March 1994, U.S. intelligence officials acknowledged the existence of the Taepodong-1, and in June of the same year, U.S. reconnaissance satellites detected static engine tests for both the Taepodong-1 and Taepodong-2.[10]

Pyongyang has received foreign assistance for its missile program from several sources, including Russia, China, Egypt, and Iran. The foreign assistance was vital to the creation of the Hwasong 5/6 and Nodong missiles that are used as the stages of the Taepodong-1. Foreign assistance includes Iranian financial support and Chinese technical training in aerospace engineering and missile development.

Testing

North Korea began to construct missile bases capable of launching the Taepodong-1 around 1994. Construction of these bases, including Yŏngjŏ-ri is completed though construction is still ongoing at Chiha-ri, Sangnam-ri, and Yongnim-ŭp.[11]

On 31 August 1998, the first and only flight test of the Taepodong-1 was conducted at the Musudan-ri Missile Test Site. The missile was launched as a three-stage space launch vehicle (SLV), but it failed to place a small satellite, the Kwangmyŏngsŏng-1, into low-earth orbit. The first stage separated 253km east of Musudan-ri, and the second stage fell into the Pacific Ocean about 1,090 km from the launch site, after flying approximately 1,646 km from the launch site.[12] The third stage, which used solid fuel, failed to place the satellite into orbit, but the first and second stages separated successfully and functioned properly. Debris from the launch impacted nearly 4,000km from the launch site according to U.S. forces tracking the test.[13]

Technical Assessment

The two-stage Taepodong-1 resembles a typical two-stage guided liquid rocket. It consists of large first stage, a smaller second stage, probably a separate guidance compartment and a separable warhead or, in the case of the SLV version, a satellite. The three-stage version includes another smaller third stage before the warhead or satellite.

The first stage of the Taepodong-1appears to be a Nodong missile, the second stage is a modified Hwasong 5/6. The first stage likely uses TM-185 (20 percent gasoline, 80 percent kerosene) as a fuel and AK-27 (27 percent N2O4, 73 percent HNO3, and iodium inhibitor) as an oxidizer. The second stage uses unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) as the fuel and red fuming nitric acid (RFNA) as the oxidizer.[14] Little is known about the optional third stage of the missile.

The missile is equipped with a separable warhead or satellite. It is likely that North Korea designed a number of warheads for the Taepodong-1 including HE, cluster, and chemical. Given North Korea's nuclear weapons program the final goal of the system is likely to be the mating of the missile with a nuclear warhead.[15]

Sources:
[1] Daniel A. Pinkston, "The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program." Strategic Studies Institute. February 2008, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil.
[2] Missile Threat, "Missiles of the World: Taep'o-dong 1." Missile Threat, 2007, www.missilethreat.com.
[3] Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK." Center For Nonproliferation Studies, 1999, http://cns.miis.edu.
[4] Yun Duk-min, "North Korean Long-Range Missiles: Development, Deployment, and Proliferation." East Asian Review, Vol. 16, No. 3, Autumn 2004, pp. 17-40, www.ieas.or.kr.
[5] Joseph S. Bermudez Jr, "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK." Center For Nonproliferation Studies, 1999, http://cns.miis.edu; Yun Duk-min, "North Korean Long-Range Missiles: Development, Deployment, and Proliferation." East Asian Review, Vol. 16, No. 3, Autumn 2004, pp. 17-40, www.ieas.or.kr.
[6] L.E. Jacoby, "World Wide Threat Hearing," testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 11 February 2003.
[7] International Institute for Strategic Studies, "North Korea's Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment." International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2004, www.iiss.org.
[8] Daniel A. Pinkston, "The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program." Strategic Studies Institute. February 2008, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Chang Chun Ik, PukhanHaek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), p. 295; Yu Yong Wŏn, "PukTaepodong 1-2 Ho Punsashihŏm/6 WŏlChungsun," ChosunIlbo, 1 July 1994, www.chosun.com.
[11] WMDInsights, "North Korea Missile Exercise Has Political Impacts for South Korea." WMDInsights, September 2006, www.wmdinsights.com.
[12] Joseph S. Bermudez Jr, "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK." Center For Nonproliferation Studies, 1999, http://cns.miis.edu.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Charles P. Vick, "R-11 / SS-1B SCUD-A R-300 9K72 Elbrus / SS-1C SCUD-B." GlobalSecurity.org, 2007, www.globalsecurity.org.
[15] Joseph S. Bermudez Jr, "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK." Center For Nonproliferation Studies, 1999, http://cns.miis.edu.


Taepodong-2/Unha SLV

Overview

The Taepodong-2 (TD-2) missile is a North Korean two to three-stage ballistic missile. The Unha is a space launch vehicle (SLV) variation of the three-stage version of the Taepodong-2. Taepodong-2 is the U.S. designation for the missile; the North Korean designation is Paektusan-2; it is also referred to as the Moksong 2.[1] The TD-2/Unha has been flight tested twice; both tests were not fully successful.

The Taepodong-2/Unha is a significant advance over the Taepodong-1. The Taepodong-2 uses more advanced technology than previous North Korean missiles, such as attitude control thrusters and a structural covering for the third stage. The Taepodong-2 also has a much greater range than the Taepodong-1. There is disagreement over the range of the TD-2/Unha; estimated ranges vary considerably, from 6,000 km to 15,000 km.[2] The most recent estimates, those taking into account information from the April 2009 test, estimate that the two-stage version could have a range of 7,000-7,500 km and the three-stage version a range of 10,000-10,500 km.[3] It should be noted that the TD-2 has not been successfully tested so these estimates are only potential ranges that could be reached once technical problems continuing to plague the systems have been corrected. If these estimates are correct, the two-stage version would be capable of hitting Alaska and Hawaii and the three-stage missile could reach into half of the U.S. mainland.[4] The mass of the TD-2/Unha is almost three times that of the Taepodong-1; the mass of missiles and SLVs are mostly fuel and since a missile's payload is generally proportional to its mass, the TD-2/Unha should have significantly longer range and greater payload capacity than the Taepodong-1.[5]

Development

North Korea began developing the Taepodong-2 between 1987 and 1992.[6] The first reported sighting of the TD-2 occurred in February 1994 when U.S. reconnaissance satellites detected a mock-up of the system at the San'ŭm-dong Research and Development Center.[7] In June of the same year, U.S. reconnaissance satellites detected static engine tests for both the Taepodong-1 and Taepodong-2.[8]

North Korea is believed to have received foreign assistance from Russia, Iran and China during the development of the Taepodong-2.[9] The second stage of the Taepodong-2/Unha was developed with extensive use of Russian scientific expertise though probably not with the authorization of the Russian government.[10]

It is unclear whether North Korea will export the Taepodong-2. The foreign exchange earnings from missile exports previously enabled Pyongyang to continue or expand its procurement of components and technology from abroad in order to continue its missile development program. After the passage of UN Security Council Resolutions 1718, North Korea was banned from importing or exporting missiles or missile components; this has decreased North Korea's ability to export missiles though not prevented it completely. The Proliferation Security Initiative has also helped prevent the export of North Korean missiles and related technology.[11] There is no credible open source information about North Korea's internal budget or expenditures on the Taepodong-2 or other ballistic missiles.

Testing

The Taepodong-2/Unha has been flight tested twice-in 2006 and 2009. On 5 July 2006 North Korea launched a series of seven ballistic missile tests. The fourth test was a Taepodong-2/Unha.[12] The missile failed catastrophically 42 seconds into flight and exploded. It is believed to have experienced a structural failure caused by aerodynamic forces because the missile exploded at the point where speed and air density would produce the maximum aerodynamic force.[13]

In early 2009, North Korea began making plans for a missile test/space launch. North Korea announced this test well in advance and even informed the International Maritime Organization and the International Civil Aviation Organization of its intent to launch a satellite between 4-8 April 2009 and provided coordinates of the areas each stage was expected to fall.[14] This was the first time North Korea provided such information. On 5 April 2009 North Korea launched the Unha-2 from the Musudan-ri launch facility. The launch failed to put a satellite in orbit. It is believed to have failed either because the second and third stages did not separate successfully or because the third stage failed to fire successfully.[15] The first stage fell into the Sea of Japan in the expected zone about 540 km from the launch site, the second and third stages fell into the Pacific Ocean approximately 3,850 km from the launch location.

Technical Assessment

The two-stage Taepodong-2/Unha resembles a typical two-stage guided liquid rocket. It consists of large first stage, a smaller second stage, probably a separate guidance compartment and a separable warhead or, in the case of the Unha, a satellite. The three-stage version includes another smaller third stage before the warhead or satellite.

The first stage of the Taepodong-2 appears to be a cluster of four Nodong missiles in a single missile casing and sharing a fuel tank; the second stage is a modified Musudan IRBM.[16] The first stage likely uses TM-185 (20 percent gasoline, 80 percent kerosene) as a fuel and AK-27 (27 percent N2O4, 73 percent HNO3, and iodium inhibitor) as an oxidizer.[17] The second stage uses unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) as the fuel and nitrogen tetroxide as the oxidizer.[18] The third stage appears to use the small steering motors from the SS-N-6, suggesting the use of liquid fuel.[19]

The missile is equipped with a separable warhead or satellite. At present no information on the warhead is available. However, given North Korea's nuclear weapons program the final goal of the system is likely to be the mating of the Taepodong-2 with a nuclear warhead.

The accuracy of the Taepodong-2 ballistic missile mode is uncertain, and North Korea has not yet demonstrated the capability to produce a re-entry vehicle.[20] Hence, North Korea is likely unable to deliver a warhead accurately to a specific target in the United States or elsewhere within the system's range. It is believed that without significant improvements to North Korea's heat shield technology the Taepodong-2/Unha would have an inaccuracy of 10 km or more.[21] It should be noted that if the missile were mated with a nuclear warhead and aimed at a population center, an inaccuracy of 10 km might be considered an acceptable CEP.[22]

Sources:
[1] Missile Threat, 'Missiles of the World: Taep'o-dong 2.' Missile Threat, 2007, www.missilethreat.com.
[2] Charles P. Vick, 'Taep'o-dong 2 (TD-2), NKSL-X-2.' GlobalSecurity.org, 20 March 2007, www.globalsecurity.org; Missile Threat, 'Missiles of the World: Taep'o-dong 2.' Missile Threat, 2007, www.missilethreat.com.
[3] David Wright and Theodore Postol. 'A Post-launch Examination of the Unha-2.' Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 29 June 2009, www.thebulletin.org.
[4] Federation of American Scientists, 'North Korea's Taepodong and Unha Missiles.' Federation of American Scientists. 2010, www.fas.org.
[5] David Wright, 'North Korea's Missile Program.' (paper presented at Improving Regional Security and Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula: U.S. Policy Interests and Options, New York, July 17 2009)
[6] Daniel A. Pinkston, 'The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program.' Strategic Studies Institute. February 2008, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), p. 295; Yu Yong Wŏn, 'Puk Taepodong 1-2 Ho Punsashihŏm/6 Wŏl Chungsun,' Chosun Ilbo, 1 July 1994, www.chosun.com; Charles P. Vick, 'Taep'o-dong 2 (TD-2), NKSL-X-2.' GlobalSecurity.org, 20 March 2007, www.globalsecurity.org
[9] Daniel A. Pinkston, 'The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program.' Strategic Studies Institute. February 2008, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil.
[10] David Wright and Theodore Postol. 'A Post-launch Examination of the Unha-2.' Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 29 June 2009, www.thebulletin.org.
[11] Dennis Gormley, 'Winning on Ballistic Missiles but Losing on Cruise: The Missile Proliferation Battle.' Arms Control Association, December 2009, www.armscontrol.org.
[12] Daniel A. Pinkston, 'The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program.' Strategic Studies Institute. February 2008, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil.
[13] Federation of American Scientists, 'North Korea's Taepodong and Unha Missiles.' Federation of American Scientists. 2010, www.fas.org.
[14] Kim Myong Chol, 'High five: Messages from North Korea.' Asia Times Online, March 19 2009, www.atimes.com.
[15] David Wright and Theodore Postol. 'A Post-launch Examination of the Unha-2.' Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 29 June 2009, www.thebulletin.org.
[16] Ibid.; Federation of American Scientists, 'North Korea's Taepodong and Unha Missiles.' Federation of American Scientists. 2010, www.fas.org.
[17] Charles P. Vick, ' Taep'o-Dong-2 (TD-2) Design Evolution, Shahab-5, A, B, C/6.' GlobalSecurity.org, 2005, www.globalsecurity.org.
[18] David Wright and Theodore Postol. 'A Post-launch Examination of the Unha-2.' Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 29 June 2009, www.thebulletin.org.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Federation of American Scientists, 'North Korea's Taepodong and Unha Missiles.' Federation of American Scientists. 2010, www.fas.org.
[21] David Wright and Theodore Postol. 'A Post-launch Examination of the Unha-2.' Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 29 June 2009, www.thebulletin.org.
[22] International Institute for Strategic Studies, 'North Korea's Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment.' International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2004, www.iiss.org.

North Korea Missile Capabilities

Name
Alternate
Range
(km)
Payload
(kg)
Inventory Estimate
(Launcher/ Missiles)
Status
Hwasong-5
(火星-5)
Scud-B
300 1000 27 TELs (total)
Over 500 "Scuds" of all types
Deployed
Exported
Hwasong-6
(火星-6)
Scud-C
600 750 27 TELs (total)
Over 500 "Scuds" of all types
Deployed
Exported
Musudan
(also Nodong-B,
the BM-25, Taepodong-X, and Mirim)
2,500-4,000 Unknown Unknown Unknown
Nodong 1,350-1,600 1,000 At least 10 TELs
About 175-200
Deployed
Exported
Scud-ER 700 500 27 TELs (total)
Over 500 "Scuds" of all types
Deployed
Exported
Taepodong-1
Paektusan-1
(白頭山-1)
2,500 700 Unknown Likely not deployed
Taepodong-2
Paektusan-2
(白頭山-2)
2-stage: 7,000-7,500;

3 stage: 10,000-10,500
Unknown Unknown Testing
Possibly deployed

 

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This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, or agents.

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This article describes North Korea's ballistic missile capabilities with an overview of the following: Hwasong-5, Hwasong-6, Musudan, Nodong, Scud-ER, Taepodong-1, and Taepodong-2.

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