Regional Overview

Russia, the Northern Caucasus, and Central Asia comprise an area that unites Eastern Europe, the Near East, and Asia through trade routes and the shared legacy of the Soviet Union. The confluence of factors that connects interests in the region also presents challenges in securing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and materials.

NBC Status - Weapons and Technical Capabilities

Russia possesses the most advanced nuclear, biological, and chemical technologies regionally, and faces both significant Soviet NBC legacy weapons challenges, and ongoing security risks stemming from its active dual-use industries.

Currently Russia's nuclear weapons complement is estimated at around 2,400 strategic warheads, with an additional 2,000 tactical warheads in central storage. [1] Russia is reducing its strategic nuclear weapons arsenal in accordance with the New START treaty. While its nonstrategic (tactical) nuclear weapons are not covered under any arms control agreement, Russia is believed to have eliminated a large portion of its tactical stockpile, and the remaining weapons are kept at central storage sites. Among the Central Asian and Caucasus states, Kazakhstan was the only country to inherit functioning nuclear warheads and delivery systems from the Soviet Union. In total, 1,410 warheads were initially in the possession of the Kazakh government. [2] Thanks to initiatives such as the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program, all of the strategic weapons within Kazakhstan were repatriated to Russia. [3] Engaged in the complete nuclear fuel cycle, Russia is a major civil nuclear supplier, and therefore also faces large-scale dual-use challenges relating particularly to fissile materials security and export controls.

In 1992, Russia acknowledged that it had inherited an offensive biological weapons program from the USSR and committed to dismantling it in accordance with the BTWC, but it is unknown what Russia has destroyed and what it has converted for dual-use biodefense purposes. [4] The extent of some of Russia's biological research programs, especially those with defense tie-ins, remains largely unknown. The United States and the United Kingdom gained limited insight into the scope of Russia's biological defense programs through inspections at the Institute of Immunology in Lyubchany, the All Scientific Research Institute for Applied Microbiology in Obolensk, the Vector laboratory complex near Novosibirsk, and the Institute for Ultra-Pure Biological Preparations in Leningrad. [5] However, Russia has since resisted greater transparency concerning its biological defense programs, while demonstrating limited interest in the less securitized dimensions of the issue such as disease surveillance. [6] Meanwhile, relative to the nuclear sector, experts suggest that personnel and materials from legacy biological facilities are in less secure areas, are not subject to the same level of scrutiny as nuclear resources, and are not subject to standardized procedures for management. [7]

By contrast, progress on chemical weapons issues has remained fairly steady. Russia inherited the Soviet Union's stockpile of chemical weapons and bulk agents. In accordance with its Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) obligations, Russia has eliminated 60% of its stockpile and anticipates complete elimination by the end of 2015. [8]

Russia's military and defense-related export industry is valued in the billions based on revenue statistics from within the last decade. Missiles comprise a significant share of Russia's arms export market. [9] Russia joined the Missile Technologies Control Regime (MTCR) in 1995. While the MTCR provided a foundation for control of missiles and associated technologies, it remains a regime comprised of non-binding obligations without verification standards. Russia's engagement in UNSCR 1540 has helped to reinforce the MTCR, as the resolution provides transparency and reporting guidelines for missile technologies.

Internal Security and Terrorist Threats

External threats, including terrorism, intrastate conflict, and internal security challenges arising from criminal groups, pose a risk to the security and integrity of nuclear, chemical, and biological facilities in Russia and Central Asia. Terrorism, in the form of radical extremism from Chechen separatists or Al Qaeda (AQ) affiliates, poses one of the most severe and persistent threats. [10] Immediately following the events of 11 September 2001, documents recovered from AQ safe houses in Kabul by allied forces reflected the group's extensive research into NBC weapons. [11] However, despite the evidence of interest in the development of such technologies, presence of actual NBC materials or proof of plans for unconventional arms in development is scant. [12]

Conventional small arms and explosives are widely employed by Chechen insurgents, who are considered regional leaders in the field of improvised explosive device (IED) technology. Despite their use of traditional means and tactics, Chechen forces have consistently expressed the desire to obtain, build, and utilize nonconventional devices against selected targets, and have innovated in terms of incorporating hazardous materials in their ordnance. [13]

The theft or sale of nuclear materials is a regional concern, and according to analysis provided by the IAEA and the academic community, the exchange or trafficking of these materials is generally supply-driven by opportunists whose primary motive is profit. [14] Some involved in this trade have criminal backgrounds, but many simply have access to the material and a desire for personal financial gain. [15]

Of additional concern in Russia and Central Asia is the possible illicit trafficking of biological and chemical agents. Separatist conflicts contribute to national instability in the region and to challenges in maintaining control of borders. The longstanding conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan is representative, and poses a threat to regional security by contributing to corruption and violence in the area. Therefore, the United States is working with area authorities to improve safety and security. Legacy facilities from the Soviet biological weapons programs in Azerbaijan, namely the Central Reference Library in Baku, have recently undergone upgrades to reinforce biosecurity in the area and facilitate research partnerships with the United States. [16]

Other areas, however, have not had the benefit of this kind of support. Separatism in Georgia created a space for exploitation of regional nuclear security challenges. During battles with Abkhazian militia forces in the 1990s, Georgia withdrew from the city of Sukhumi before facilities containing highly enriched uranium (HEU) could be secured. Neither international authorities nor outside monitors gained access to these facilities for verification for years, and some estimate that 1-2 kg of HEU is unaccounted for as a result of this event. [17] As a consequence of this loss, the United States collaborated with local authorities in Georgia and partners in both Russia and the United Kingdom to remove remaining stocks of HEU in an operation known as "Project Auburn Endeavor." [18]

Illicit Trafficking

Illicit nuclear materials have been interdicted on numerous occasions in Russia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. If seizures are an accurate indication, most material on the nuclear black market has been of FSU or Eastern European origin. [19] The region's porous borders, government instability, and endemic corruption provide fertile ground for trafficking of WMD materials. This may be partly due to heavy drug trafficking, which provides a smuggling infrastructure useful for other items. Central Asia's extensive smuggling network arises from the two major smuggling routes that pass from Afghanistan through Eurasia to Western Europe - the "Northern route" and the "Balkan route." [20] Though an explicit connection between the drug trade and WMD material trafficking is not immediately apparent, two of the major consequences of the drug trade are the criminalization of state structures and the normalization of smuggling practices.

While facilitating freer trade of goods across borders, the creation of a customs union and common economic space between Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia has also provided opportunities for criminal trafficking activities. The Deputy Head of Russia's border service has asserted that 43% of smuggled goods in Russia first enter through Kazakhstan. Border post removals between Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia allow for the smuggled and pirated goods flowing into Kazakhstan from China to disperse more easily throughout Europe via Russia. [21]

The main WMD material trafficking routes in the region flow north-south from Russia through the Caucasus toward Iran, east-west from Central Asia through the Caucasus and out through Turkey or over the Black Sea, and west-east entering the Caucasus from Turkey and continuing to Central Asia. Trafficking takes place in all of the countries in the region, but the critical points along the primary trafficking routes are Tajikistan, Turkmenistan (particularly Caspian ports), and Georgia. [22]

1540 Implementation

Export Controls

Russia has well-established and extensive strategic trade control legislation and regulation. Russian implementation of UNSCR 1540 ranks above average in NTI's Nuclear Materials Security Index. However, there are ongoing implementation challenges stemming from a weak export control culture and underdeveloped internal compliance programs. While most states have a single body to license the export of both military and dual-use goods, at the heart of Russia's export control system are two agencies: the Federal Service for Technical and Export Control (FSTEC) licenses the export of dual-use items, and the Federal Service on Military-Technical Cooperation (FSMTC) authorizes transfers of other defense items. Russia's FSTEC maintains six lists of dual-use items to be regulated.

Several states in the region, including Kazakhstan, which also ranks above average in implementation of UNSCR 1540, created control lists modeled on the lists of the European Union and Russia. Other states, such as Georgia, adopted the established control lists of multilateral export control regimes such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Under the provisions of the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, member states should require IAEA Additional Protocol safeguards agreements as a condition for nuclear supply.

In 2012, Georgia and Armenia ratified the 2005 Amended CPPNM and passed nuclear security and safety related regulations, enabling them to strengthen the physical protection of radioactive materials. Azerbaijan reinforced its system to prevent illicit trafficking of nuclear materials by creating a national registry of all radioactive sources. Kazakhstan also made significant progress in physical security by upgrading physical protection at the former nuclear test site in Semipalatinsk, converting a research reactor to use of LEU fuels and relocating the equivalent of several weapons' worth of spent nuclear fuel to a more secure facility. [23] Russia continues to convert excess military HEU to LEU, and to cooperate with the United States in converting research reactors from HEU to LEU fuel. [24]

Regional Outreach

Most countries in the region began receiving external assistance in export and border controls and physical protection of materials and facilities prior to the adoption of UNSCR 1540 in 2004, and this assistance has facilitated the implementation of the resolution in recent years.

Russia offers general legal and implementation assistance with export controls to countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Eurasian Economic Community (EEC). [25] This aid began with the Agreement of 1992, and in 2004 the EEC adopted control lists and implementation measures congruent with the Agreement on a Single System for Export Control by Member States. [26] Armenia in particular has sought assistance in physical protection, detection systems, and training in order to comply with UNSCR 1540. In 2009, Russia committed to support the development of physical protection measures for Armenia's nuclear power reactor, and training of site personnel through the IAEA's Technical Cooperation program. [27] The latter was accomplished in 2010, but it is unclear whether the physical protection upgrades have taken place yet. [28] Azerbaijan requested several forms of assistance in detection systems, border controls, checkpoints, and other equipment in 2007. Uzbekistan requested personnel training assistance in 2004.

All states in the region have received assistance through the U.S. Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) Program, and other programs designed to aid states in securing borders and countering illicit trafficking. Most states have installed radiation detection equipment at a number of checkpoints, though it is unclear whether the use and maintenance of the equipment will be domestically sustainable for all of the countries in question. The five Central Asian states receive assistance from the U.S. Department of Energy to enhance their capacity to effectively implement export controls through commodity identification, end-user, and licensing training, and other workshops in the region. [29] The U.S. Department of Energy's Second Line of Defense (SLD), managed by the National Nuclear Security Administration, works collaboratively with foreign partners to equip border crossings, airports, and seaports with radiation detection equipment. In particular, the SLD Core Program installs radiation detection equipment at borders, airports, and strategic feeder ports in the former Soviet states. [30]

The European Union established its Border Management Programme in Central Asia (BOMCA) in 2003 with the mission of improving border management and security in Central Asia without impeding trade. The idea for the BOMCA arose from one of the Central Asia Border Security Initiative (CABSI) meetings, which serve as opportunities for Central Asia, the EU, and Russia to meet once a year to discuss and develop border management programs and opportunities for cooperation. [31] The BOMCA accomplishes its goals through implementation of Integrated Border Management (IBM) practices and regional cooperation, including institutional development, capacity building, and personnel training. [32] Specific upcoming plans include renovating three border outposts in Tajikistan, providing equipment to several border outposts and detachments in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, institutional reform in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, improving motivation and working conditions for border crossing officers, and strengthening counter-drug capacities. [33]

Regional Organizational Work on 1540

The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) has held a number of activities directly related to 1540 compliance and regional cooperation for securing NBC facilities in the region, and for combatting NBC terrorism, including meetings on counterterrorism legislation and other ways of implementing UNSCR 1540 in the CIS. The Russian Federation Federal Security Service has held occasional meetings for heads of special services, security agencies, and law enforcement organizations to discuss combatting terrorism, maintaining a list of suspect groups and individuals, and preventing terrorist access to NBC materials. Additionally, Vienna, Austria and Dushanbe, Tajikistan have each hosted similar workshops, where participants covered physical protection, export controls, means of combatting trafficking, and legal issues related to nuclear security.[34] All of these activities took place between 2008 and 2012.

Additionally, the Regional Counter-Terrorism Structure (RCTS) of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is a permanent body of the SCO based in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. The RCTS facilitates many counterterrorism activities in the region, including conferences, workshops, and other sharing of best practices, as well as development of joint policies and agreements on counterterrorism strategy. [35]

Several regional 1540 workshops have been devoted exclusively to the issues facing the countries of Central Asia. Others have been more general in scope, and were hosted in the Caucasus or outside of the region but attended by representatives from the region. For example, in 2008 Ashbagat, Turkmenistan hosted a workshop on criminal law aspects of countering nuclear, chemical, and biological terrorism; in 2009, Tashkent, Uzbekistan hosted a workshop on implementation of UNSCR 1540, and Ashgabat hosted a workshop for Central Asian countries on nonproliferation and international legal cooperation against NBC terrorism; and in 2011, Baku, Azerbaijan hosted a workshop on UNSCR 1540 implementation for several of the countries in the region. Most of these workshops were organized or co-organized by national governments, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime/Terrorism Prevention Branch (UNODC/TPB), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the United Nations Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the U.S. Department of State, and/or the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS). [36]

Regional Progress and Challenges

The collapse of the Soviet Union ushered in today's era of international cooperation to address the systemic challenges of WMD security. Perhaps no region in the world is more representative of both the accomplishments and difficulties in securing nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and materials. Since 1992 the United States alone has spent more than $8 billion on security upgrades, weapons scientist employment programs, border and export controls, and weapons destruction. Unlike some more nebulous foreign assistance programs, the results across the region have been measurable and dramatic. In a ranking of the 32 countries in the world with weapons-usable nuclear materials, Kazakhstan and Russia both received the highest ratings in on-site physical protection and nuclear materials security legislation, and matched the United States in their records of UNSCR 1540 implementation. Even poor and autocratic Uzbekistan was ranked above average on control and accounting procedures and on-site physical protection. [37]

Even more indicative of progress has been the degree to which all of the countries in these regions have cooperated with each other and the world community to secure materials and prevent them from falling into the hands of terrorists. Russia, for example, is the principal supplier of portal monitoring equipment in the region, and Kazakhstan formally addressed the issues of WMD trafficking and terrorism during its 2010 Chairmanship in Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Additionally, all of the region's countries remain active participants in UNSCR 1540 activities, and Russia is a member of the group of nations that have made formal offers of UNSCR 1540 implementation assistance.

Despite this progress, however, these regions face broader security challenges that will continue to work against any near-term resolution of WMD security concerns. Chief among these are the territorial and separatist disputes in the Caucasus, the active terrorist threat, tribal and ethnic conflicts, and poor governance. Threat reduction and security assistance programs under UNSCR 1540 will therefore continue to play a vital role in preventing WMD trafficking. In particular, an active program of border management assistance should be added to existing site and materials security programs. This would not only help to ensure a more integrated approach to WMD trafficking issues, but would also aid the states in question with slowing the growth of other forms of illicit trafficking and mitigating the transnational terrorism threat.

Sources:
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[2] Simon Limage, "U.S.-Kazakh Nonproliferation Cooperation," U.S. Department of State, 16 October 2012, www.state.gov.
[3] Paul F. Walker, "Nunn-Lugar at 15: No Time to Relax Global Threat Reduction Efforts," Arms Control Today, 36, May 2006, www.armscontrol.org.
[4] Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, "2012 Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments," U.S. Department of State, www.state.gov.
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[6] Lela Bakanidze, Paata Imnadze, and Dana Perkins, "Biosafety and biosecurity as essential pillars of international health security and cross-cutting elements of biological nonproliferation," BMC Public Health, 10, 2001, 7; Milton Leitenberg and Raymond Zilinskas, "The soviet bioweapons program: A history," Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2012, 706.
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[8] Rosa Magasumova, "Россия уничтожила 60,4 процента запасов химического оружия" [Russia destroyed 60.4 percent of its chemical weapons stockpiles], ITAR-TASS, 21 March 2012, www.itar-tass.com; "РФ уничтожила более 60% химического оружия" [Russian Federation destroyed over 60% of its chemical weapons], Kommersant Novosti Online, 22 March 2012, www.kommersant.ru.
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[11] Edward Epstein, "Dozens of al Qaeda Weapons Sites Discovered; US Fears Terrorists May have been Creating Biological, Chemical, and Nuclear Weapons," The San Francisco Chronicle, 2001 p. A11
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[28] International Atomic Energy Agency "Technical Cooperation Report for 2010," Report by the Director General, GC(55)/INF/2, July 2011, www.iaea.org.
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[32] "Border Management Programme in Central Asia (BOMCA)," European Union Border Management Programme in Central Asia, 20 June 2012, www.bomca.eu.
[33] Wuria Karadaghy, "Progress Report: Phase 8," European Union Border Management Programme in Central Asia, 17 July 2012.
[34] "Event List and Related Documents," The 1540 Committee, www.un.org; Statement by H.E. Mr. Thomas Mayr-Harting, Permanent Representative of Austria to the United Nations, Irkutsk, 23-25 June 2009, www.bmeia.gv.at/en.
[35] "RCTS," Official Website of the SCO Summit 2012, 28 April 2012, www.scosummit2012.org.
[36] "Event List and Related Documents," The 1540 Committee, www.un.org.
[37] "NTI Nuclear Materials Security Index, Building a Framework for Assurance, Accountability, and Action," (Washington DC: Nuclear Threat Initiative, January 2012).