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United States Submarine Import and Export Behavior

Imports

The United States does not import submarines.

Exports

The United States does not export nuclear-powered submarines nor does it operate, produce, or export diesel-powered submarines.[1] U.S. shipbuilder Litton Ingalls (now a subsidiary of Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding) built the U.S. Navy's last conventional submarine in 1959. However, if required, the United States does possess sophisticated diesel-electric submarine designs that can be used for future production.[2]

The U.S. Navy has long opposed the export of submarines on the basis of security concerns. In 1992, the U.S. Congress gave its approval for domestic production of conventional submarines after a surge in international sales for diesel-electric vessels.[2] In response, the Navy submitted a report to Congress stating, "Construction of diesel submarines for export in U.S. shipyards would not support the U.S. submarine shipbuilding base and could encourage future development and operation of diesel submarines to the detriment of our own forces."[2] Despite the navy's objections, however, the U.S. government approved the construction of two diesel-electric submarines for Egypt, under a license from the German shipbuilder Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft.[2] Although Litton Ingalls was to receive this contract, it withdrew in June 1997 after the U.S. Navy voiced concerns over serious security breaches.[2,3] Naval representatives did not want export submarines to be produced at the same yard as advanced nuclear submarines due to the risk of inadvertent technology transfer.[3] The U.S. Navy is also concerned about the effect submarine proliferation will have on the ability of its forces to operate in coastal waters around the world.

In 2001, Taiwan became a potential customer for U.S.-made submarines after Congress approved an $18.2 billion arms package that included the construction of eight diesel-electric submarines.[4,5,6,7] The Navy heavily criticized this agreement and approached administration officials to voice their security concerns.[4,6] The U.S. Navy also raised the submarine purchase price to $12 billion dollars, making it financially unattractive to Taiwan.[6] It was this high price, coupled with Chinese opposition, that ultimately led to the exclusion of submarines from the package.[5,7] In January 2010, the Obama administration announced a U.S.-Taiwan arms deal totaling $6.4 billion that did not include any diesel-electric submarines.[7]

Sources:
[1] "Submarine FAQs," Chief of Naval Operations: Submarine Warfare Division, www.navy.mil.
[2] Danielle Revelle and Lora Lumpe, "Third World Submarines," Scientific American, August 1994, p16-21.
[3] "Republic of China Navy: Hai Lung II-class Submarine," Federation of American Scientists, 15 August 1999, www.fas.org.
[4] "Wade Boese, "Bush Approves Major Arms Deal to Taiwan, Defers to Aegis Sale," Arms Control Association, May 2001, www.armscontrol.org.
[5] Edward Cody, "Politics Puts Hold on Taiwan Arms Purchase," Washington Post, 10 October 2004, www.washingtonpost.com.
[6] Megan Scully, "Navy works stall submarine deal with Taiwan," Congress Daily, 6 April 2006.
[7] Michael Ashby and Jeff Abramson, "U.S.-Taiwan Arms Deal Angers China," Arms Control Today, March 2010.

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This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, or agents. Copyright © 2011 by MIIS.

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The submarine proliferation resource collection is designed to highlight global trends in the sale and acquisition of diesel- and nuclear-powered submarines. It is structured on a country-by-country basis, with each country profile consisting of information on capabilities, imports and exports.

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