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East Asia and the Pacific 1540 Reporting

1540 Introduction Page: UNSCR 1540 Resource Collection

Region Overview

The East Asia and Pacific region is comprised of numerous countries possessing a wide range of capabilities and facing very different nonproliferation and terrorism challenges. For the purposes of this overview, the region has been divided into three categories.

The East Asia and the Pacific Region

  1. Northeast Asia: China, Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea [DPRK]JapanMongolia, Republic of Korea [ROK]
  2. Southeast Asia: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic [Laos], Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Vietnam
  3. South Pacific: Australia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, New Zealand, Palau, Papua-New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu

NBC Capabilities and Technological Status

A number of states in Northeast Asia currently possess nuclear capabilities. Most prominently, these include the advanced military and civilian capabilities of China, the only country in the region recognized as a nuclear weapon state (NWS) under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); the extensive civil nuclear fuel cycle capabilities of Japan and South Korea; and the small nuclear arsenal the DPRK has established in defiance of the international community. After withdrawing from the NPT in 2003, North Korea conducted nuclear tests on 9 October 2006 and 25 May 2009. [1] [2] [3] In response, the United Nations Security Council strengthened and expanded the scope of existing sanctions against the DPRK.

Six research reactors currently operate in Southeast Asia: Australia (1), Indonesia (2), Malaysia (1), Thailand (1), and Vietnam (1). [4] One Multipurpose Research Reactor is planned for construction in Vietnam. [5] Countries in the sub-region do not have any enrichment or reprocessing facilities. Components essential for nuclear weapons programs can, however, be produced in the region, as demonstrated by the A.Q. Khan network’s employment of a Malaysian company to manufacture centrifuge equipment to enrich uranium. [6] In the South Pacific, only Australia has demonstrated advanced expertise in nuclear technology and, with the world’s largest natural uranium deposits, is a major exporter of uranium ore.

Most of the challenges involving chemical and biological weapons in the East Asia and Pacific region are associated with the possible misuse or transfer of dual-use technologies. For example, Japan maintains one of the world’s leading chemical industries and a growing biotechnology sector. However, North Korea is suspected of possessing active chemical and biological weapons programs. South Korea historically had a chemical weapons program. In 1997, South Korea declared its possession of chemical weapons (CW), and by 2008 had completed destruction of its stockpile under the CWC. [7] Japan does not have either chemical or biological weapons programs, but historically had sophisticated CW and BW programs during World War II, and abandoned an estimated 700,000 CW munitions on Chinese territory. [8] In 2007, Tokyo and Beijing requested a five-year extension from the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) for completion of the cleanup still underway on these abandoned chemical weapons. However, since they failed to meet the 2012 deadline as well, the deadline has again been extended. Through further negotiations, Japan and China agreed to complete the destruction of these abandoned chemical weapons already excavated by the end of 2016, and the destruction of those still buried in Haerbaling by the end of 2022. [9]

While there are no known CW or BW programs in Southeast Asia, the sub-region is experiencing a wave of industrialization as many countries invest heavily in manufacturing and new technologies. As a result, dual-use capabilities for producing materials and technologies relevant to the pursuit of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs have increased.

A few key states in the region possess significant missile and/or space launch capabilities. The technical and tacit knowledge gained from civilian space launch programs is inherently dual-use. The Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) is a civilian entity with a demonstrated technical capacity to put satellites into orbit and carry cargo to the International Space Station. [10] China possesses a significant missile program, including approximately 140 land-based ballistic missiles equipped to deliver nuclear warheads. [11] Five of the six missile platforms in use are mobile for increased survivability. Due to technical problems, China does not currently possess an active submarine-launched ballistic missile capability (SLBM). [12] Despite sanctions in place to prevent the country from importing advanced technology, North Korea continues to pursue an active ballistic missile program. Following two failed attempts in April 2009 and April 2012, the DPRK appears to have successfully put an object into orbit on 12 December 2012. [13] In response to this provocation, undertaken in violation of existing sanctions, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 2087 on 22 January 2013. [14] Based on a South Korean analysis of debris of the Unha-3, the space launcher version of the three-stage Taepodong-2, the missile is estimated to have a 6,200 mile range. [15] The DPRK has a history of proliferating missile and nuclear-related technology and know-how to countries including Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Pakistan and Myanmar. [16] South Korea launched its first satellite-bearing rocket into space in January 2013. [17]

Internal Security and Terrorist Threats

Countries in the Northeast Asia sub-region currently face relatively few significant threats from non-state actors, including both terrorist and separatist organizations. China does, however, face some militant separatist activity in its western Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region. [18] In Japan, the religious cult Aum Shinrikyo attempted six biological attacks and twelve chemical attacks between 1990 and 1995. The deadliest of these attacks was the sarin chemical attack on the Tokyo subway system, which killed 12 people and injured 1,039 people on 20 March 1995. [19]

Terrorist and insurgent activity is common in Southeast Asia with groups operating in at least five of the region’s nine countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines and Thailand). Some countries in the region face terrorist groups with Islamic fundamentalist political orientations, of which the Indonesia-based Jemaah Islamiyah is the most active. [20] There are also several militant separatist movements comprised of mostly ethnic or religious minorities engaged in armed operations and controlling parts of the territories of some states in the region. These activities tend to exacerbate the problem of already porous borders. In the Philippines and especially in the southern island of Mindanao, the government is currently working to quell several violent insurgent groups, including the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), Abu Sayyaf, the Rajah Sulaiman Movement, and elements of Jemaah Islamiyah. [21] Jemaah Islamiya and Abu Sayyaf have been designated terrorist groups by the United States Department of State. [22] Due to the heavy concentration of these radical and separatist groups in Mindanao, government control over this area has weakened, leaving it more vulnerable to smuggling and illicit activity. There are also insurgent groups in southern Thailand and to a lesser extent in Indonesia and Malaysia.

The countries of the South Pacific sub-region face almost no threat from terrorist or insurgent operations except for suspected terrorist cell activity in Australia. Relations among neighboring countries in the region are friendly. The major security challenge for the small island states of the South Pacific is the lack of capacity to patrol and protect their territorial waters and exclusive economic zones.

Illicit Trafficking

Over 90% of global commerce is transported through the maritime shipping network via cargo containers. [23] Because the major economies in East Asia and the Pacific region are export-oriented and hungry for both energy resources and other raw materials, the sea-lanes in the region are the busiest in the world. Measured in the industry standard of twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs), the volume of global shipping was 580 million TEUs in 2011; of that total volume, 275 million TEUs (47%) departed from, was stored at, or terminated in an Asian port. [24] Twenty seven of the top 50 container ports, as measured by volume, are located in 12 different countries in the Asia Pacific region (Australia, China, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam). [25] Transshipped cargo presents the most significant challenge for preventing proliferation of dual-use technologies and NBC-related materials in the region. Compared to gate traffic, the shorter dwell times, lack of shipping data, and space constraints associated with transshipped cargo allow smugglers to circumvent the traditional export and border controls at chokepoints into and out of a port. 

International Treaties and Agreements

Participation in the major arms control and disarmament-related treaties within the East Asia and Pacific region is high. Almost all the states in the region are parties to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The only exception is the DPRK, which acceded to the NPT in 1985 but subsequently withdrew in 2003, and has not signed the CWC. Myanmar has signed but not ratified the CWC. Six of the small Pacific island states have not signed the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has been signed and ratified by the majority of states in the Asia Pacific region. However, China and North Korea, whose ratifications are required for CTBT entry-into-force, have not yet ratified. Indonesia formally ratified the CTBT in February 2012. [26]

Most eligible states participate in one of the two Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs) established in the region, the Southeast Asia NWFZ (SEANWFZ) established by the Treaty of Bangkok, or the South Pacific NWFZ (SPNWFZ) established by the Treaty of Rarotonga. In Southeast Asia, only Timor-Leste is not a member of the SEANWFZ. In the South Pacific, Palau, Micronesia and the Marshall Islands are not members of the SPNWFZ. Also in the region, Mongolia has a unique nuclear-weapon-free status, which it unilaterally established, but which is internationally recognized. [27]

Conversely, treaty participation is relatively low for the nuclear materials protection and terrorism-related conventions. Of the 30 countries in the region that are included in this Resource Collection, sixteen countries are state parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM). [28] Of these sixteen countries to the CPPNM, eight countries are contracting states to the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM (Australia, China, Fiji, Japan, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Nauru, and Vietnam), [29] The amendment will enter into force when two-thirds of the state parties have deposited their instruments of ratification, acceptance, or approval with the depository. [30]. Twenty three more countries need to do so in order for the amendment to enter into force. [31] The amendment extends the physical protection standards from the original document to nuclear facilities and materials in the domestic setting. It is significant that both Japan and South Korea recently ratified the Amendments, as these two countries are leading users of civil nuclear technology in the region with advanced nuclear technology. The two countries' ratification could contribute to a growth in support for the Amendment.

Further, only Japan, South Korea, China, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Australia are state parties to both the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management (JC) and the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS), while Singapore is a party only to the CNS. The Philippines has signed both the JC and CNS but has not yet ratified these conventions. In general, the participating states are those with the most advanced NBC capabilities, while those that have elected not to participate do not possess relevant facilities or materials to protect.

UNSCR 1540 Implementation

The East Asia and Pacific region has relatively high levels of reporting to the 1540 Committee: of the 30 countries within the region, 28 submitted reports. [32] The two countries that have not reported are the DPRK and Timor-Leste. However, Timor-Leste was accepted as a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 2005, and has since participated in regional fora related to UNSCR 1540 implementation. [33] Because Taiwan is not a member of the United Nations, it is unable to participate actively in the nonproliferation regime in an official capacity or to engage directly with the 1540 Committee. Taiwan has therefore not submitted a report to the 1540 Committee.

Export Controls and Related Measures

Although China promulgated a comprehensive set of export controls in 2002, Beijing has continued to struggle with bridging the gap between legislation and enforcement. China is a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Zangger Committee, and Beijing has made efforts to regularly update its export regulations and control lists to meet international standards. Despite these efforts, smugglers routinely bypass border controls, and the United States and other international actors continue to accuse Chinese state-owned enterprises of transferring NBC and missile-related related dual-use materials to countries of concern, particularly Iran and North Korea.

Although Japan is a party to all of the relevant export control regimes, a number of Japanese companies have exported controlled dual-use technologies without a license. For example, international inspectors found Japanese components at nuclear-related facilities in North Korea and Libya. [34] These cases demonstrate that even a technologically advanced state with strong export control legislation and enforcement mechanisms can face 1540-related implementation challenges.

Generally weak export and border controls in Southeast Asia are rooted in a lack of sufficient technical and financial resources, as well as an overall impression that many measures would hinder trade. The clear exception to the weak controls in the region is the case of Singapore, which relies on its role as a major transshipment port for much of its economic strength.

Regional Outreach

Four countries in Southeast Asia (Cambodia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam) have requested assistance from the 1540 Committee specifically related to the drafting of legislation and the development of effective measures to physically protect facilities and monitor border traffic. [35] There have also been other efforts to combat the spread of NBC and missile-related technologies by states in the region. Malaysia passed the Strategic Trade Act in 2010, outlawing the transit of NBC-related material through Malaysian territory and authorizing the appointment of a strategic trade controller. [36] Six ASEAN countries (Brunei, Cambodia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam) have engaged in some level of participation with the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) since its inception in 2003. Vietnam is the most recent country to have joined the PSI (2014). However, only Singapore is an active participant. [37] Four countries in Southeast Asia (Malaysia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Thailand) have ports under the Container Security Initiative (CSI). The CSI allows U.S. officials from Customs and Border Protection, working with host government officials, to examine high-risk maritime cargo at foreign seaports before they are loaded on vessels destined for the United States. [38] Both of the above-mentioned initiatives enable some indirect capacity-building opportunities.

The 1540 Committee has undertaken numerous outreach efforts in the East Asia and Pacific region, as have other international organizations and member states, including Australia, New Zealand, Japan, the United States, and the European Union. The 1540 Committee has convened workshops in Rakitje (Croatia, 2014), Vienna (Austria, 2014), and Phuket (Thailand, 2014). [39] Organizations such as the IAEA, the OPCW, and the ARF have also organized similar events in the region. Assisting countries have focused outreach on Southeast Asia and the South Pacific, where limited implementation of 1540 stems to a large degree from insufficient financial and technical resources. Cambodia, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Mongolia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam have all requested assistance. [40] New Zealand has focused heavily on assisting Pacific Island countries (PIC) with fulfilling their 1540 reporting obligations. New Zealand also “provides targeted, practical assistance” for problems that are sometimes “overlooked by countries that are not familiar with the challenges facing small island states.” [41]

Comprised of twenty-seven states, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) represents the most comprehensive regional organization in the East Asia and Pacific region with a focus on security issues. In the past five years, the ARF has taken up the cause of UNSCR 1540 and hosted a range of relevant workshops and regularly scheduled Inter-Sessional Meetings (ISMs). The ARF has hosted two workshops on "Implementation of UNSCR 1540." The first workshop was held in San Francisco in February 2007. The second was held in Bangkok in May 2013 and co-facilitated by the government of Thailand and the U.S. Department of State's Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) Program. [42] Additionally, with the aim of advancing Asian-Pacific capacity to deter illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials, the ARF and the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) have hosted two workshops on "Nonproliferation Nuclear Forensics" in Bangkok, in December 2011 and September 2013. The ARF hosted a workshop in Manila on "Countering Illicit Trafficking of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Materials" from November 20-21 of 2013. [43]

The ARF has completed its first cycle of four regularly scheduled ISMs on Nonproliferation and Disarmament (NPD) and begun the second cycle. The first four meetings were held in Beijing (China, July 2009); Singapore (July 2010); Las Vegas (U.S., February 2011); and Sydney (Australia, March 2012). In June 2013, the Philippines hosted the fifth ISM on NPD. The sixth ISM on NPD was hosted on July 8-9th, 2014 in Tokyo. [44]

While the ARF lacks institutionalized enforcement structures, verification mechanisms and official sanctions, its informal consultative approach seems to be cultivating a consensus toward capacity-building in the region. The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) Study Group on Countering the Proliferation of WMD in the Asia-Pacific, initiated in 2004, represents an important and parallel Track II approach to the ARF. The group has convened seventeen meetings on the subject and produced a Handbook on Preventing the Proliferation of WMD in the Asia Pacific. [45] The seventeenth meeting was held in Manila back-to-back with the fifth ARF ISM on NPD and attended by many of the same officials.

Since 2001, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) has increased activities related to counterterrorism and secure trade. [46] To that end, APEC established the Secure Trade in the APEC Region (STAR) Initiative in 2002 and the Counter-Terrorism Task Force (CTTF) in 2003. [47] These primarily endeavor to prevent non-state actors from disrupting the supply chains of member economies. While these activities are not explicitly linked to the implementation of UNSCR 1540, since the adoption of the resolution a number of APEC countries have mentioned the resolution in their Counter-Terrorism Action Plans (CTAPs). [48] This project was developed by the CTTF as a tool for tracking the progress of member economies in implementing counterterrorism and secure trade related measures and for identifying capacity building needs. [49] Unlike the ARF, APEC has the advantage of established links to key stakeholders in the private sector, which could be leveraged in order to reach industry and improve awareness of strategic trade controls. [50]  In October 2014, the government of the Republic of Korea, in cooperation with the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) hosted a regional workshop on "Promoting Full Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004): Sharing Effective Practices, Revitalizing Assistance, and Developing Future Strategy." The workshop was attended by the 1540 Committee Chair and three 1540 Committee members, as well as three 1540 experts. [51] Furthermore, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs hosted the Eleventh Asian Senior-level Talks on Non-Proliferation (ASTOP-XI) in Tokyo, to exchange views on topics such as regional nonproliferation issues (including the implementation of UNSCR 1540, strengthening of strategic trade controls, and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). [52] 

Regional Progress and Challenges
Although initiatives in East Asia and the Pacific have increased in recent years and regional organizations have begun to take a more proactive approach to 1540 implementation, overall progress in the region—particularly in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific—remains a challenge.  The 1540 Committee, along with leading assistance providers such as the United States, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and the European Union, will continue to support efforts to institutionalize 1540-related policies and activities. However, limited political will from regional states and organizations remains a key factor slowing the effective implementation of the resolution.

Many countries in the region continue to view export controls with suspicion, seeing them as a threat to economic progress. In order to deal with these concerns, 1540 supporters in the international community can emphasize how improving the management of sensitive materials can help promote economic development. For many of the countries in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific, improvements in port security and border controls can have an overarching positive effect on national economic and security needs. As countries in the region become more capable of manufacturing and trading high-technology commodities, their ability to control dual-use materials—both from the import and export sides—will increase in importance. Major trading partners already consider a state’s ability to abide by international standards in relation to strategic trade management when deciding whether a destination country is a safe trade partner. Ports in the region will also need to be seen as capable of combating illicit trafficking and transshipment if they are to grow and be seen by global partners as secure.

Improved implementation of UNSCR 1540 in East Asia and the Pacific is essential to international nonproliferation efforts and activities related to stopping the flow of WMD-related materials. Most states’ nonproliferation-related trade controls systems are in need of much improvement. Cooperation at the international and regional level is critical to pushing forward these improvements.

2014 Nuclear Security Summit

Efforts to minimize nuclear weapons-usable material at civil facilities through the Nuclear Security Summit Process contributed to enhanced nuclear security in the region. At the March 2014 Nuclear Security Summit in the Hague, Japan formalized an agreement with the United States to transport both HEU and weapons-grade plutonium to the United States and fully convert it into less sensitive forms. [53] In addition, of 53 participating countries, 35 countries pledged to translate international guidelines on the protection of nuclear materials into national legislation. Of these 35 countries, six countries are from the Asia Pacific region, including Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the Philippines, South Korea, and Vietnam. [54]

However, the summit failed to meet the declared deadline for securing all vulnerable nuclear material in four years, as stated in the first summit communique in 2010. The next summit is scheduled to be hosted by the United States in 2016. [55]

[1] The CTBTO Preparatory Commission, “Next Phase in the Analysis of the Announced DPRK Nuclear Test,” 19 September 2012, www.ctbto.org.
[2] United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874, 12 June 2009, www.un.org.
[3] The CTBTO Preparatory Commission, "Update on CTBTO Findings Related to the Announced Nuclear Test, by North Korea" 15 February 2013, www.ctbto.org.
[4] IAEA Research Reactor Database, International Atomic Energy Agency, 19 September 2012, www.nucleus.iaea.org.
[5] “Prospects for Nuclear Security Partnership In Southeast Asia,” James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Center for Energy and Security Studies, and the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, May 2012, www.nonproliferation.org.
[6] Stephanie Lieggi and Richard Sabatini, “Malaysia’s Export Control Law: A Step Forward, but How Big?” Nuclear Threat Initiative, 10 May 2010, www.nti.org.
[7] Chris Schneidmiller, "South Korea Completes Chemical Weapons Disposal," Global Security Newswire, 17 October 2008, www.nti.org.
[8] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Budget for the Destruction of Abandoned Chemical Weapons in China,” 24 December 1999, www.mofa.go.jp.
[9] OPCW "Conference of State Parties," 27 March 2013, www.opcw.org.
[10] Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), “Missions,” www.jaxa.jp.
[11] Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris, “Chinese Nuclear Forces 2011,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 2011, pp. 81-87.
[12] Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris, “Chinese Nuclear Forces 2011,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 2011, pp. 81-87.
[13] “North Korea’s Missile Program,” BBC News, 12 December 2012, www.bbc.co.uk.
[14] United Nations Security Council, Resolution 2087, 22 January 2013, www.un.org.
[15] “North Korea rocket ‘has 10,000km range’,” BBC News, 23 December 2012, www.bbc.co.uk.
[16] Greg Gerardi and James Plotts, “An Annotated Chronology of DPRK Missile Trade and Developments,” Nonproliferation Review, Fall 1994, www.nonproliferation.org;  Esther Pan, "Nonproliferation: The Pakistan Network," Backgrounder, Council on Foreign Relations, February 2004, http://cfr.org; Nobuyuki Aoki, "ミャンマーが北朝鮮の支援でスカッド・ミサイル製造「仮想敵国」は米国 [Myanmar produces Scud Missile with support of North Korea, imaginary enemy is the U.S.]," Sankei Shinbun, 6 March 2011, http://sankei.jp.msn.com.
[17] South Korea launches satellite into orbit," The Los Angeles Times, 30 January 2013, www.latimes.com.
[18] “Xinjiang: China Jails 20 for Terrorism and Separatism,” BBC, 2 August 2012, http://news.bbc.co.uk.
[19] Holly Fletcher, “Aum Shinrikyo,” Council on Foreign Relations, 19 June 2012, www.cfr.org.
[20] “Profile: Jemaah Islamiah,” BBC, 2 February 2012, http://news.bbc.co.uk.
[21] “The Philippines: Local politics in the Sulu Archipelago and the Peace Process,” International Crisis Group, 15 May 2012, www.crisisgroup.org.
[22] “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” United States Department of State Bureau of Counterterrorism, 27 January 2012, www.state.gov.
[23] “Megaports Initiative 2010,” National Nuclear Safety Administration, September 2010, http://nnsa.energy.gov.
[24] “Top 50 World Container Ports,” World Shipping Council, www.worldshipping.org.
[25] “Top 50 World Container Ports,” World Shipping Council, www.worldshipping.org.
[26] “Status of Signature and Ratification,” CTBTO Preparatory Commission, 9 April 2012, www.ctbto.org.
[27] “Mongolia Accepted as Nuke- Free Zone,” Global Security Newswire, 18 September 2012, www.nti.org.
[28] 1540 Committee, “National Reports,” United Nations, www.un.org.
[29] "Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material," International Atomic Energy Agency, www.iaea.org.
The following are state parties to the CPPNM: Australia, Cambodia, China, Fiji, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Lao P.D.R., Marshall Islands, Mongolia, Nauru, New Zealand, Palau, Philippines, Tonga, and Vietnam.
[30] "Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material," International Atomic Energy Agency, www.iaea.org.
[31] "Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material," International Atomic Energy Agency, www.iaea.org.
[32] “ASEAN Regional Forum,” Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 10 April 2012, www.nonproliferation.org.
[33] Masako Toki and Stephanie Lieggi, “Japan’s Struggle to Limit Illegal Dual-Use Exports,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September 2008, http://thebulletin.org.
[34] 1540 Committee, “Summary Requests for Assistance from Member States,” United Nations, www.un.org.
[35] Stephanie Lieggi, “Trade Controls in Southeast Asia: Taking a Regional Approach,” WorldECR, Issue 13, June 2012.
[36] Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, “Proliferation Security Initiative Participants,” U.S. Department of State, 2 August 2012.
[37] “Container Security Initiative Ports,” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, www.dhs.gov.
[38] 1540 Committee, “Event List and Related Documents,” United Nations, www.un.org.
[39] 1540 Committee, “Summary Requests for Assistance from Member States,” United Nations, www.un.org.
[40] Tanya Ogilvie-White, “Facilitating Implementation of Resolution 1540 in South-East Asia and the South Pacific” in Lawrence Scheinman, ed., Implementing Resolution 1540: The Role of Regional Organizations, UNIDIR, 2008.
[41] “List of ARF Track I Activities (By Subject),” ASEAN Regional Forum, http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org.
[42] “List of ARF Track I Activities (By Subject),” ASEAN Regional Forum, http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org; NNSA, "Workshop Focuses on Combating Illicit Nuclear Trafficking in the Asia Pacific," 22 October 2013, www.nnsa.energy.gov.
[43] “List of ARF Track I Activities (By Subject),” ASEAN Regional Forum, http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org.
[44] “Handbook on Preventing the Proliferation of WMD in the Asia Pacific,” Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific WMD Study Group, 1 December 2010, www.cscap.org.
[45] Stephanie Lieggi, “Trade Controls in Southeast Asia: Taking a Regional Approach,” WorldECR, Issue 13, June 2012.
[46] “Counter-Terrorism Task Force,” APEC, www.apec.org.
[47] Stephanie Lieggi, “Trade Controls in Southeast Asia: Taking a Regional Approach,” WorldECR, Issue 13, June 2012.
[48] “Counter-Terrorism Task Force,” APEC, www.apec.org.
[49] Stephanie Lieggi, “Trade Controls in Southeast Asia: Taking a Regional Approach,” WorldECR, Issue 13, June 2012.
[50] "Outcomes from the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit," CSIS, www.csis.org.
[51] "Event List and Related Documents," UNSCR 1540 Committee, www.un.org.
[52] "The Eleventh Asian Senior-level Talks on Non-proliferation (ASTOP-XI)," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, www.mofa.go.jp.
[53] "Joint Statement by the Leaders of Japan and the United States on Contributions to Global Minimization of Nuclear Material," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, www.mofa.go.jp.
[54] "Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation," Nuclear Security Summit, www.nss2014.com.
[55] "Outcomes from the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit," Center for Strategic and International Studies, http://csis.org.

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This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, or agents.


This report is part of a collection examining implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, which requires all states to implement measures aimed at preventing non-state actors from acquiring NBC weapons, related materials, and their means of delivery. It details implementation efforts in East Asia and the Pacific to-date.

the Terrorism Threat

WMD terrorism is a threat to global security. In 2010 testimony, the U.S. director of national intelligence said that dozens of identified domestic and international terrorists and terrorist groups have expressed intent to obtain and use WMD in future acts of terrorism.