Regional Overview

Occupying an area just over 18 million square kilometers (approximately 11,300,000 square miles), this sub-region is comprised of 10 countries, all of which are former communist states. While all 10 countries have submitted UNSCR 1540 reports, several of the states' reports do not sufficiently address the requirements of the resolution. Nevertheless, all countries in the region are party to the NPT, CTBT, CWC, BTWC, CPPNM, and TFC.

NBC Capabilities

The states in this sub-region vary greatly in their nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons capabilities. Three states possessed nuclear weapons after the demise of the Soviet Union. The Russian Federation remains a nuclear weapon state, with the largest nuclear weapons stockpile in the world. Ukraine and Belarus returned their nuclear weapons to Russia by 1996 and joined the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states. The Balkan states never possessed nuclear weapon capabilities.

The Russian Federation maintains a substantial nuclear power program and exports its civil nuclear technology and know-how to many countries, including Iran, India, and China. Ukraine also maintains a significant nuclear industry including multiple power plants, small stockpiles of highly enriched uranium (HEU), and indigenous uranium reserves. However, at the April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit President Yanukovych announced that Ukraine would remove its entire HEU inventory prior to the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul, South Korea.[1] In a significant step towards fulfilling this pledge, a total of 50 kilograms of HEU fresh fuel was removed from Ukraine in December 2010 (with NNSA assistance).[2] In 2012 at the Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul, Ukraine announced that it had completed the removal of all of its HEU stockpile, and developed a new plan on nuclear security assistance in cooperation with the IAEA.[3] Belarus also possesses an HEU stockpile and has several institutes that conduct civilian nuclear research. Although Belarus was not invited to the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, Minsk did announce in December 2010 that it planned, like Ukraine, to eliminate its remaining stocks of HEU prior to the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit.[4] However, Belarus suspended the agreement  in response to U.S. sanctions against Belarusian state owned enterprises. [5] The Vinca Institute of Nuclear Sciences in Serbia for many years held both fresh and spent HEU fuel, with minimum security and safety provisions. Fresh HEU fuel was repatriated in 2002 and, after years of planning and coordination, the entire stock of spent fuel (2.5 metric tons) was removed and sent to Russia in November 2010.[6] The research reactor at Vinca is decommissioned and awaits dismantlement.[7] In 2002, approximately 50 kg of HEU was removed from Vinca and transported to Russia in a joint operation by Serbia, the United States, the IAEA and other partners. The final shipment took place in December 2010. [8] As of July 2012, Serbian dismantlement of the research reactor is ongoing. [9]

Russia has the most advanced biological capabilities in the region. While the Soviet BW program dates back to the 1920s, the Soviet government established a number of biological research institutes in the 1950s and 1960s. Ostensibly utilized for civilian biological research programs, some of these institutes, such as Obolensk, Stepnogorsk (in Kazakhstan) and VECTOR in Koltsovo, were actively involved in offensive BW-related research, development, and testing. The bioweapons program was further expanded in the 1970s-80s, and the Soviet Union successfully weaponized causative agents of anthrax, plague, smallpox, and other agents. In 1992, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian President Boris Yeltsin officially acknowledged violations of the BTWC and banned further offensive BW work in Russia. Although most former BW facilities continue to work on civilian research, some of these facilities have not participated in any collaborative projects (many of which are funded by the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency) and have not granted foreign access to the sites. Russia's State Research Centre of Virology and Biotechnology, or VECTOR, is one of only two facilities in the world that officially retains samples of the smallpox virus.[10] Additional samples are held at the Center for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta, United States.

Although the Russian Federation renounced chemical weapons under the CWC, it still has a substantial number of CW to be destroyed, and maintains a significant chemical industry including facilities operating with CWC Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals. Russia had initially planned to destroy its entire chemical weapons stockpile by April 2012, but this deadline will not be met and the new anticipated date for completion is 2015.[11] Yugoslavia possessed a CW program but never progressed to the production of an actual arsenal. A chemical weapons production facility was located in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but the production equipment was moved to Serbia in 1992. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia took joint responsibility for this facility in their declarations when joining CWC. Bosnia ratified CWC in 1997, and by 2004, the chemical weapons production facility was dismantled. Serbia acceded to CWC in 2000 and declared one small-scale production facility. The CW production equipment, stored in Krusevac, was subsequently dismantled in 2003.[12] Serbia maintains a defensive chemical program and actively cooperates with OPCW in organizing international training on response to chemical attacks and incidents. Albanian's premier for most of the Cold War, Mehmet Shehu, ordered the development of a domestic chemical weapons capacity. [13] Albania was the first country to complete the destruction of its chemical weapons, eliminating in total 16,678 kilograms of chemical warfare agent, in July 2007, pursuant to the CWC.[14]

Nuclear Security

Russia continues to pose the greatest regional challenge in the area of nuclear security. In addition to the country's nuclear weapons infrastructure, Russia is also home to approximately half of the world's nuclear research reactors, almost all of which use HEU-based reactor fuel. Although significant security upgrades have been carried out at nuclear research centers, such as Moscow's Kurchatov Institute (which has Russia's largest number of research reactors), the international community - and the United States in particular - wishes to expedite the process of converting Russian research reactors to run on LEU-based fuels.

Ukraine and Belarus have taken important steps towards the enhancement of nuclear security by agreeing to the repatriation of their respective stocks of HEU fuel, as mentioned previously. There have also been significant security upgrades at those facilities that house the HEU fuel, such as the Sosny Science and Technology Center in Belarus and the Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology, Kiev Institute of Nuclear Research and Sevastopol Institute of Nuclear Energy and Industry in Ukraine.

Orphaned radiological sources are an additional cause for concern in the region. Despite significant international assistance in recent years, there remain a number of countries that face challenges in identifying and protecting radiological sources. One obstacle is assessing exactly how many radiological devices were produced during the Soviet era and where they are currently located. The Soviet Union's so-called "Gamma Kolos" project - an experiment measuring the effects of radiation on crops - resulted in an undetermined number of radiological devices containing cesium-137 being distributed across former Soviet states, including Moldova. [15] The location and storage of orphaned radiological devices will continue to be a challenge but countries such as Ukraine and Moldova are receiving assistance from the United States agencies through the Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative (NSOI) and other programs in order to mitigate this threat.[16] In order to strengthen security and accountancy measures for nuclear and radioactive material, the United States and Moldova signed a Joint Action Plan on Combating Smuggling of Nuclear and Radioactive Material on July 19, 2011. [17]

The nuclear security challenge was successfully addressed in Serbia through cooperative efforts of the country itself, the IAEA, EU, United States, Russia, and non-government contributors such as the NTI. Fresh 80%-enriched HEU fuel and 2.5 tons of spent nuclear fuel were repatriated to Russia in 2002 and 2010, respectively, and new waste storage and processing facilities were built at Vinca to secure a large number of radioactive sources collected and stored on site for over four decades.[18]

Border Controls

Although border security standards have improved in recent years as a result of U.S. and international assistance, many problems still exist. Radiation detection devices have been installed at a large number of border crossings, but there is still progress to be made with information sharing, as well as education on WMD-related materials, trafficking techniques and patterns. Of particular concern is the ease with which heroin is transferred from Afghanistan to the Russian Federation, which creates the possibility of radiological materials being smuggled through the same routes and networks.

The region is on a transit route for illicit trafficking from South and Southeast Asia to Western Europe, and is therefore of concern as a transshipment point. Russia's long land and sea borders pose additional difficulties for the enforcement of export controls and the prevention of illicit trafficking in WMD-related materials and equipment. Instability on Russia's southern borders (North Caucasus) and tensions with Georgia following the 2008 war — as well as the subsequent declarations of independence by South Ossetia and Abkhazia - have raised additional concerns over border control.

Border control problems in the Balkan states can be attributed to a lack of resources and conflicts during the 1990s. Kosovo formally declared independence from Serbia in February 2008, but as of 2011, the NATO-led KFOR assistance force continues to provide security to the province under the remit of UN Security Council Resolution 1244.[19] Although Kosovo's own security force was launched in January 2009, with NATO and the EU providing formation and training assistance,[20] the security situation is not yet deemed satisfactory for the complete withdrawal of KFOR. Serbia and Montenegro are members of the EU's Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe.

There are also border-related security problems in Moldova, primarily due to the ongoing dispute over the breakaway republic of Transdnistria, which has made it difficult for the Moldovan government to ensure adequate border control at all of the country's entry and exit points. Moldova has also been the location for cases of nuclear trafficking. In August 2010, for instance, the U.S. government provided technical assistance to Moldova after a uranium smuggling ring was broken up in the capital, Chisinau. In this case nearly two kilograms of uranium were smuggled into the country for potential sale. In 2011, Albania acceded to the CNS. Moldova and Montenegro acceded to the JC in 2010.

Internal Security and Terrorist Threats

Several states in the region (including the Russian Federation, Serbia, and Moldova) are experiencing unrest or violence from separatist movements. Areas of lawlessness in Kosovo and in separatist enclaves like the Transdnistria region in Moldova highlight the need to increase commitments to preventing illicit trafficking in the region, while recent terrorist attacks in both Moscow and the troubled North Caucasus republics of Dagestan and Ingushetia have exemplified Russia's ongoing problems. Corruption is endemic and hampers attempts to prevent illicit trafficking. Although economic improvements have increased stability in countries such as Albania, Moldova, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine, effects of the global economic downturn create additional challenges, which, when coupled with corruption, have made it more difficult to enforce export controls and border security, increasing the risk of proliferation activities.

International Treaties and Agreements

Treaty membership in the region is 100% for the NPT, CTBT, CWC, BTWC, TFC, and CPPNM. Additionally, all nations have submitted UNSCR 1540 reports. Belarus, Ukraine, and the Russian Federation, which possess the largest nuclear, chemical and biological capabilities, are also members of the JC, CNS, and NTC. The Additional Protocol to the IAEA's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement has entered into force for all states in the region with the exception of Belarus, where ratification is still pending. While Serbia, Macedonia, Moldova, and Croatia have ratified the NTC, other Balkan states (including Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro) have not yet done so.

Regional Adherence to Nonproliferation Instruments and Organizations

Regional Organizations and Cooperation

Several programs have been introduced to deal with issues related to smuggling and border security. Organizations such as the Eurasian Economic Community (EURASEC) have been established to harmonize export control mechanisms and enhance information sharing between states, though little tangible progress has been achieved. Established in December 1991, the Commonwealth of Independent States cooperates on the basis of forming common economic practices on the principles of free movement of goods, services, workers and capital, as wells as money and credit, tax, price, customs and foreign economic policies. The European Union Stability Pact, implemented in the Balkan states, focuses on several issues including democracy, economics, and security. Within the security sector, several programs exist to ameliorate border issues and smuggling concerns. For example, the Ohrid Process on Border Security and Management features a partnership between the European Union, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Stability Pact Initiative against Organized Crime (SPOC). Collaboration between these organizations has helped implement concrete measures such as infrastructure improvements and training for border guards. The SPOC board meets twice a year and consists of Southeast European states, EU-member states, major nongovernmental organizations, and major donor countries. The board discusses national and regional initiatives concerning capacity building, raising awareness, and legislative reforms. The SPOC board is also involved in policy advocacy.

Another important program in the region is the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Launched by the United States and Russia in the summer of 2006, the Global Initiative was designed to be an international partnership to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. The goals of the Global Initiative include: improving accounting, control, and physical protection of nuclear and radiological materials; improving the security of nuclear facilities; detecting and suppressing illicit trafficking activities, as well as other activities related to terrorist acquisition of nuclear materials; responding to and mitigating the consequences of terrorist attacks; ensuring cooperation in the development of technical means to combat nuclear terrorism; ensuring that law enforcement takes all possible measures to deny safe haven to terrorists; and strengthening national legal frameworks to ensure the effective prosecution and punishment of terrorists and terrorist facilitators. States, participating on a voluntary basis, work through the Global Initiative to achieve these goals within the region, especially within former Soviet states that have the greatest proliferation risks. Currently, there are 85 partners. [21]

Russia is also a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), one of the activities of which is to promote cooperation in combating terrorism within Russia, China and Central Asian states. A permanent Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure was established in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, in 2002 after member states signed the "Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism" in June 2001. As a result, SCO members seek to cooperate through the exchange of information, development of joint legal frameworks, and the provision of practical assistance.[22]

Regional cooperation and partnerships with the European Union and the United States are vital to ensure the proliferation concerns in this region are addressed. The European Union Stability Pact has provided assistance to Eastern European countries in several areas, including improving infrastructure, securing materials, providing training, and increasing information sharing between states to combat terrorism. The assistance from wealthier Western nations allows Eastern Europe to overcome economic issues in implementing these nonproliferation initiatives. The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program is a partnership between the United States and former Soviet states to reduce the threat from WMD and related materials, technologies and expertise, including providing for the safe destruction of Soviet era WMD, associated delivery systems and related infrastructure. The U.S. Department of Energy's Second Line of Defense (SLD), managed by the National Nuclear Security Administration, works collaboratively with foreign partners to equip border crossings, airports and seaports with radiation detection equipment. In particular, the SLD Core Program installs radiation detection equipment at borders, airports, and strategic feeder ports in the former Soviet Union states. The G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, which was established in 2002, has also helped to coordinate assistance from other G8 member states. The Global Partnership was originally established as a ten-year effort but member states' leaders agreed to extend the partnership beyond 2012.[23]

1540-Related Regional Activities

• Regional Workshop on the Implementation of UNSCR 1540 for the Baltic Region Co-organized OSCE and UNODA, Vilnius, Lithuania, June 5-6, 2012
• Supporting the Arms Trade Treaty Negotiations through Regional Discussions and Expertise Sharing, Regional Seminar for Countries in the Wider Europe, 18-20 April 2012
• The 11th International Export Control Conference, Governments of the United States of America and Ukraine and EU, Kiev, Ukraine, June 8-10, 2010.
• Thematic Meeting of experts of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) on Implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 1540, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and the CIS Executive Council, December 15-16, 2009, Moscow, Russian Federation.
• OPCW Regional Sensitization Workshop for Customs and Border Authorities in Eastern Europe on technical aspects of the Transfer Regime, Grodno, Belarus, May 6-8, 2009.
• Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of the Commonwealth of Independent States (IPA-CIS) - Joint Committee meeting on amending the model counter-terrorism legislation of the CIS, October 22-23, 2008, St. Petersburg, Russian Federation.
• INTERPOL - 34th Annual European Regional Conference, Vilnius, Lithuania, May 28-30, 2008.
• IAEA - Physical Protection of Radioactive Sources, Kiev, Ukraine May 19-23, 2008
• OPCW - Sixth Regional Meeting of National Authorities of States Parties in Eastern Europe, Minsk, Belarus, June 6-8, 2007
• OPCW - Subregional Workshop for Customs Authorities in South-Eastern Europe on Technical Aspects of the Transfers Regime, Dubrovnik, Croatia, 14-15 April 2007
• OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation, Vienna, Austria; July 2005

References

1540 National Reports

• 1540 Committee, National Reports, New York: United Nations Organization, www.un.org.

1540 Matrices

• 1540 Committee, List of Matrices of Member States, as Approved by the 1540 Committee, New York: United Nations Organization, www.un.org.

National Legislation

• 1540 Committee, List of Legislative Documents by submitting UN Member States, New York: United Nations Organization, www.un.org.

Offers/Requests for Assistance

• 1540 Committee, Requests for Assistance, New York: United Nations Organization, www.un.org.
• 1540 Committee, Assistance from Member States, New York: United Nations Organization, www.un.org.

Treaty Participation

• The International Organizations and Nonproliferation Program, The Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes, Monterey: James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, http://cns.miis.edu.
• "Convention on Nuclear Safety," International Conventions & Agreements, Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, www.iaea.org.
• "Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material," International Conventions & Agreements, Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, www.iaea.org.
• "Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management," International Conventions & Agreements, Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, www.iaea.org.
• "Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements," New York: United Nations Organization, http://disarmament.un.org.
• United Nations Treaty Collection, "Extract from the Report of the Secretary-General on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism (DOC. A/62/160)," New York: United Nations Organization, http://untreaty.un.org.

Information on 1540-related Regional Activities

• 1540 Committee, Chairperson's Statements and Outreach Activities, New York: United Nations Organization, www.un.org.
• "IAEA Meetings and Conferences," Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, www-pub.iaea.org.
• "Calendar of Events," The Hague: Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, www.opcw.org.
• "Regional Conferences," Lyon: The International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), www.interpol.int.

General Information

• BBC Monitoring, Country Profiles, London: British Broadcasting Corporation, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk.
• "The 2008 World Factbook," Washington, D.C.: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, June 19, 2008. www.cia.gov.
• "Background Notes," Washington, D.C.: U.S. State Department, www.state.gov.

Information on NBC Capabilities

• "Country Profiles," Washington, D.C.: Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
• "Country Briefings," London: World Nuclear Association, www.world-nuclear.org.
• "Country Nuclear Power Profiles," Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 2003, www-pub.iaea.org.
• "Nuclear Research Reactors in the World," Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, www.iaea.or.at.
• "The Model Nuclear Inventory: Accountability is Democracy, Transparency is Security," New York: Reaching Critical Will, 2007, www.reachingcriticalwill.org.
• David Albright and Kimberly Kramer, "Civil HEU Watch: Tacking Inventories of Civil Highly Enriched Uranium," Washington, D.C.: Institute for Science and International Security, August 2005, www.isis-online.org.
• "Civil Plutonium Produced in Power Reactors," Global Stocks of Nuclear Explosive Materials, Washington, D.C.: Institute for Science and International Security, 2005, p. 3, www.isis-online.org.

Information Pertaining to Terrorism

• UN Action to Counter Terrorism, Reports by the UN Secretary General, www.un.org.
• Office of the Secretary of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2007, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, April 30, 2008, www.state.gov.

Sources:
[1] "Joint Statement by President Obama, Ukraine President Yanukovych," The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 12 April 2010, www.america.gov.
[2] "NNSA removes 50KGs of Fresh HEU from Ukraine," National Nuclear Security Administration Press Release, December 2010, http://nnsa.energy.gov.
[3] "The Seoul Nuclear Security Summit Preparatory Secretariat: Highlights of Achievements and Commitments by Participating States as Stated in National Progress Reports and National Statements," 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit, 27 March 2012, www.thenuclearsecuritysummit.org
[4] William Potter, "Belarus Agrees to Remove All HEU," CNS Feature Story, 1 December 2010, http://cns.miis.edu.
[5] Michael Schwirtz, "Belarus Suspends Pact to Give Up Enriched Uranium," New York Times, 19 August 2011, www.nytimes.com
[6] "IAEA Coordinates Nuclear Fuel Removal from Serbia," IAEA press release, December 22, 2010, www.iaea.org.
[7] Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, "Cleaning up Serbia's Nuclear Legacy," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September 2, 2008, www.thebulletin.org.
[8] "Q&A: Fuel Repatriation Project from Vinca Institute," IAEA, 22 December 2012, www.iaea.org; "Serbia to Return Used Fuel to Russia," World Nuclear News, 11 June 2009, www.world-nuclear-news.org
[9] "Serbia," Energy Community, 2012, www.energy-community.org.
[10] Praveen Swami, "Fears of bioterrorism led superpowers to retain smallpox virus," The Telegraph, 18 January 2011. www.telegraph.co.uk.
[11] Chris Schneidmiller, "Russia to Miss Chemical Weapons Disposal Deadline," Global Security Newswire, 30 June 2010, http://gsn.nti.org.
[12] Yugoslavia: Chemical Overview, NTI, www.nti.org.
[13] "Albania Conducted Domestic Chemical Weapons Production Program, Former Army Officer Claims," Global Security Newswire, 13 January 2005, www.nti.org
[14] "Albania Completes Destruction of Deadly Chemical Weapons," Embassy of the United States in Albania, 17 August 2007, http://tirana.usembassy.gov; "Albania the First Country to Destroy All Its Chemical Weapons," Organization for the Prohibition for Chemical Weapons, 12 July 2007, www.opcw.org
[15] Andrew J. Grotto, "Defusing the Threat of Radiological Weapons: Integrating Prevention with Detection and Response," Center for American Progress, July 2005, www.americanprogress.org, p. 5.
[16] "Moldova: bilateral partners engaged," Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative, www.nsoi-state.net.
[17] "U.S. Moldova Agree on Joint Measures to Combat Nuclear Smuggling and Enhance Nuclear Security," Nuclear Threat Initiative, 25 April 2012, www.nti.org
[18] Radojica Pesic, "Nuclear Facilities in Serbia: Current Status and Updates," Public Presentation, September 27, 2010, www.mas.bg.ac.rs.
[19] "NATO's role in Kosovo," North Atlantic Treaty Organization, www.nato.int.
[20] "US Helps Moldova Smash Uranium Smuggling Ring," VOA News, 25 August 2010, www.voanews.com.
[21] Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, "The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism," distributed by U.S. Department of State, www.state.gov.
[22] "Eurasia: Uphold Human Rights in Combating Terrorism," 14 June 2006, Human Rights Watch, www.hrw.org.
[23] Office of Spokesman, "G8 Leaders Agree to Extend Global Partnership Beyond 2012," distributed by the U.S. Department of State, 3 June 2011, www.state.gov.