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Middle East and North Africa 1540 Reporting

Regional Overview


The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is the nodal point of three continents-Europe, Africa and Asia-and for the purposes of this overview the region includes Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Yemen. MENA is a critical region for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540, as nearly one-third of these states either possess some type of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons (NBC) capability, or are suspected of having related research programs. The region also served as an operational hub in A.Q. Khan's illicit nuclear trafficking network, and several states continue to provide financial and logistical support to actors engaged in illicit trafficking and terrorist activities.

NBC Capabilities
While no state in MENA has declared possession of nuclear weapons, Israel, maintaining a policy of nuclear opacity, is widely recognized as possessing a sizeable nuclear arsenal. Iran has a growing centrifuge-based uranium enrichment program, and the IAEA reported in November 2011 that between 1998 and 2003 Iran established "a comprehensive program to develop all the key technologies for an implosion-type nuclear weapon for its ballistic missiles." [1] Some of these activities continued after 2003, and according to the IAEA, "may still be ongoing," although publicized estimates by the U.S. intelligence community suggest that Iran has not made the decision to build a nuclear weapon. [2] Iran agreed to a detailed set of conditions, effectively freezing most of its nuclear work for six months in exchange for sanctions relief from the United States under the Joint Plan of Action; both parties hope to reach a permanent agreement in this time frame and de-escalate the crisis over Iran's nuclear program. [3] Other states in the region have previously demonstrated an interest in developing nuclear weapons, notably Iraq, Libya, and Syria. However, both Iraq and Libya renounced their nuclear ambitions, and the subsequent dismantlement of their respective programs was verified by the international community. [4] Syria faces unresolved allegations that it illicitly tried to build a plutonium production reactor at Al-Kibar (aka Dair Alzour), a site destroyed by the Israeli Air Force in September 2007. [5] In addition to the above-mentioned activities, a number of states in the region possess or plan to acquire significant civilian nuclear infrastructures. Algeria and Egypt possess two of the most advanced nuclear science programs in the region. [6]

Several states in the Middle East possess or are suspected of possessing chemical weapons. Following the use of chemical weapons in Syria, Bashar al-Assad's government agreed to dismantle its chemical weapons arsenal. [7] Syria's extensive chemical weapons arsenal is slated for destruction by 2014, as per the U.S.-Russia-Syria agreement and the entry into force on 14 October 2013 of Syria's Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) ratification. [8] While their programs are no longer operational, Libya and Iraq are both known to have had chemical weapons and have been associated with their deployment and use. U.S. officials accused Libya of using Iranian-supplied chemical weapons against its southern neighbor Chad in 1987; however, the attack resulted in no Chadian casualties. [9] Having renounced all WMD in 2003, Libya under Muammar Gaddafi had "set a target date of December 2013 for complete destruction of its most potent chemical weapons." [10] However, the 2011 revolution against the Colonel resulted in the suspension of the destruction process. Moreover, rebels discovered and publicized caches of chemical weapons that had not been reported to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) at sites in Sabhā and Sokna. [11] The National Transitional Council is cooperating with the OPCW to resume the destruction of Libya's chemical arsenal. [12] Iraq's extensive use of chemical weapons in the Iraq-Iraq War from 1980 to 1988 is well documented, including its massive bombing campaign employing mustard gas, sarin, and tabun against the Kurdish town of Halabja in 1988, which caused the deaths of up to 5,000 civilians. [13] Following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in April 2003, the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), charged with locating chemical weapons and other WMD, was unable to find any WMD stockpiles or evidence that Iraq had restarted its chemical weapons program subsequent to 1991. [14] There is evidence to suggest that Egyptian forces employed bombs and artillery filled with phosgene and mustard against Royalist troops and civilians in their intervention in the North Yemen Civil War in the late 1960s. [15] Allegations of additional weapons work surfaced in 1992, and Egypt remains a holdout state to the CWC. [16] Iran and Israel have been accused of possessing chemical weapons, although open source evidence on the current status of their respective programs is inconclusive.

Little reliable open source information exists regarding biological weapons in the Middle East, with the exception of the dismantled Iraqi program. Egypt, Syria, Iran, and Israel have all been accused of having initiated biological weapons programs at some point; the respective NTI country profile pages provide a summary of these claims. Until 1995, Iraq persistently denied having operated an offensive biological weapons (BW) program. However, following the 1995 defection and testimony of the former director of Iraqi military industries, Husayn Kamil, Iraqi officials admitted to operating an offensive BW program from 1985 to 1991. During this period, the program engaged in the production, weaponization, and open-air testing of biological and toxin agents including anthrax, botulinum toxin, aflatoxin, and ricin. [17] Iraq at that point declared it had terminated its BW program and unilaterally destroyed bulk biological agents and munitions in 1991. Inspection activities undertaken by the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) from 1991 to 1998, by the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) from 2002 to 2003, and by the ISG in the aftermath of the Iraq War in 2003, uncovered no information "which contradicted Iraq's claims of the destruction of bulk BW agent and weapons in 1991." [18]

Internal Security and Terrorist Threats
States across the Middle East and North Africa face significant internal security and terrorist threats. More than thirty percent of the foreign terrorist organizations recognized by the U.S. State Department operate in the Middle East; as of December 2013, the count is 20 out of 53. [19] Of these groups, Al-Qaeda is frequently cited as having a stated interest in acquiring Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Weapons (CBRN). [20]

Furthermore, since the onset of the 2011 Arab Spring, there has been widespread instability in the region, with political protests, revolutions and, in several cases, escalation of violence taking place in Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, Bahrain, Libya, Syria, and other states. Both surviving and newly formed governments continue to struggle to maintain political control and civil order, with negative implications for internal security, border control, and enforcement of export control and anti-terrorism measures. Terrorist and militant groups might attempt to use the ongoing political instability to expand their activities. Of particular concern is the potential vulnerability of Syrian chemical weapons facilities amidst the ongoing civil war there, "particularly since many of its suspected facilities are located near current or recent sites of unrest." [21]

Illicit Trafficking
Illicit trafficking remains a significant problem in the MENA region. It is exceptionally border-dense, and home to seven of the world's top fifty maritime container ports; moreover, most states have underdeveloped judicial and law enforcement institutions, and thus lack robust export control and border security systems. [22] Terrorist organizations and other transnational criminal networks take advantage of porous borders and poorly regulated financial institutions across the Middle East to engage in activities such as illicit finance, drug trafficking, and transport of dual-use items.

Dubai has served as a key transshipment point for nuclear materials and dual-use goods and technologies in the region. [23] The A.Q. Khan network, and subsequently Iran, both utilized Dubai for the transshipment of dual-use goods and technologies, and the former also shipped large quantities of uranium hexafluoride to Libya via Dubai from 2000 to 2001. [24] Nuclear trafficking notwithstanding, terrorist and transnational criminal organizations have engaged in the transport of other forms of contraband across key transit points in Morocco, Libya, Lebanon, the Iran-Afghanistan border, the Iran-Iraq border, and the Suez Canal in Egypt. [25] In addition to illicit trafficking, maritime piracy also presents a substantial security issue in the region. Pirates mainly operate in the Gulf of Aden. One of the most vital maritime trade routes in the world, it provided passage for upwards of seventeen thousand ships in 2011 en route to and from the Suez Canal. [26] Although the majority of pirates operate out of Somalia, weak institutions in Yemen, on the opposite side of the Gulf of Aden, make that country another potential base for piracy. [27]

International Treaties and Agreements
Participation in the major arms control and disarmament treaties within the Middle East is fairly high. All states in the region, with the exception of Israel, are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). Egypt remains outside the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and Israel has signed but not ratified the latter. [28] Egypt continues to tie its non-accession to the CWC to Israel's failure to become a party to the NPT. [29] The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) suffers from more limited adherence; Saudi Arabia and Syria are non-signatories, while Egypt, Iran, Israel, and Yemen have signed but not ratified the treaty. [30]

Some Middle Eastern states, including Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia, participate in the African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone established under the Treaty of Pelindaba, which entered into force in July 2009. The Resolution on the Middle East from the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference calls for the establishment of a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone (MEWMDFZ), a prospect supported by all states in the region, but with varying pre-conditions. One outcome of the 2010 NPT Review Conference was a call for a 2012 meeting to promote the zone's establishment; however, a number of factors have cast doubt on whether such a meeting will take place at all, and it did not occur as scheduled in 2012. [31] The prolonged deadlock over the MEWMDFZ prompted the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to propose a Gulf WMDFZ in December 2005, which would include its six members as well as Iran, Iraq, and Yemen. Their hope is that a WMDFZ in the Gulf region can facilitate progress towards a region-wide zone by starting with a sub-regional approach. [32] A number of factors, chiefly Iran's ongoing nuclear activities, are likely to inhibit the realization of this initiative.

With respect to nuclear materials safety and security conventions, regional adherence is fairly low. Only Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates are parties to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management (JC). [33] Roughly half of Middle Eastern states are either non-parties or have yet to ratify the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS). Regional participation in the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) fares better, with only Egypt, Iran, Iraq, and Syria remaining outside the Convention.

1540 Implementation


All Middle Eastern states submitted an initial report to the 1540 Committee within a year of the resolution's passage, satisfying their initial reporting requirements. Although 41 reports, including first and additional reports, have been submitted to date, they vary dramatically in terms of quality and comprehensiveness. Many reports were merely diplomatic statements supporting the spirit of the resolution, and did not serve to build any confidence that implementation and enforcement were taking place. Lars Olberg of Sandia Laboratories assessed that "Middle Eastern countries have had a poor start when it comes to the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540. Their general reporting behavior is significantly behind that of countries in other regions." [34] Furthermore, while a number of states submitted fairly comprehensive reports, states' engagement with the reporting process is not necessarily reflective of their commitment to timely and effective implementation of the resolution. Some states, such as the UAE and Jordan, have sought to institute concrete legislation geared towards 1540 objectives; however, when compared with other states in the region, these states are more the exception than the norm.

Export Controls and Related Measures
Both the UAE and Jordan have demonstrated positive engagement with 1540 objectives. The UAE has passed a number of laws since the adoption of Resolution 1540 aiming to secure and account for WMD-related materials and technologies, as well as to control and penalize their export, re-export, transit, and transshipment. [35] Similarly, the Jordanian government has instituted an anti-terrorism law, a new law on nuclear safety and security, and a national product control list, and taken efforts to strengthen customs controls along its borders to regulate WMD-sensitive trade. [36] However, both countries are relatively new to the concept of strategic trade controls and lack the necessary expertise, and possibly the financial resources, to institute an effective system. The UAE has closed numerous domestic and international companies involved in illicit finance and illegal dual-use exports, and interdicted several vessels suspected of carrying illicit goods to Iran. [37] Despite these successes, however, the country lacks the capacity to comprehensively implement its ambitious export-control system. [38] Indeed, two years after the passage of key laws relating to countering illicit trafficking and brokering controlled items, their enforcement body had not been staffed, and key regulations had not been implemented. [39] This variation in enforcement and implementation, as one expert argued, is "as much a result of limited capacity as limited political will." [40] In Jordan, the strategic trade control system does not explicitly regulate transshipment, brokering, and financing of proliferation-sensitive materials and activities. In addition, while Jordanian law prescribes criminal penalties for the transport of WMD-related materials "in the execution of terrorist acts," the penal code does not impose such penalties for more general offenses involving dual-use items. [41]

In contrast to the UAE and Jordan, Saudi Arabia possesses only a crude legal framework with respect to key trade controls such as control lists, transfer and re-transfer regulations, and "catch-all" mechanisms. One notable improvement includes the adoption of the 2007 Arms and Ammunitions Regulations stipulating the establishment of a national licensing authority to regulate proliferation-sensitive imports. [42] Despite a poor implementation record at the national level thus far, Saudi Arabia has demonstrated an increased willingness to improve its compliance with 1540 objectives in recent years, primarily in a regional context. Through participation in regional workshops and activities within the League of Arab States (LAS) and the GCC, Saudi Arabia has begun to assume an active leadership role with respect to 1540 implementation. Notably, the Kingdom hosted and organized, in cooperation with the 1540 Committee and the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), a December 2010 "Regional Workshop on UNSC Resolution 1540" in Riyadh. [43] The event was attended by delegates from Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE, and by the Secretary General of the GCC, as well as the 1540 Committee Chairman, two 1540 Committee members, and two 1540 experts. In 2012, the Kingdom offered half a million dollars to "support activities that promote the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004)." [44] Saudi Arabia has remained active in hosting events intended to promote 1540 work; out of 18 events explicitly related to the region from 2008 to 2013 attended by 1540 experts, 7 were organized or hosted by Saudi Arabia. [45]

Egypt was initially critical of the Security Council's adoption of Resolution 1540, raising concerns that the Council's role was moving closer to that of a legislator. [46] Despite these initial concerns, Egypt has begun to positively contribute to 1540 objectives. Like Saudi Arabia, Egypt has tended to view implementation of 1540 in a regional context, stating its commitment to regional promotion of 1540 implementation through the LAS, as well as hosting an October 2009 seminar organized by the Arab League and attended by representatives of the 1540 Committee and various ministerial officials from 17 Arab states. [47] Despite these positive developments, Egypt's implementation of 1540 at the national level remains limited, particularly given the current state of unrest in the country. Two positive developments, however, were the 2006 adoption of a national system of accounting and security of nuclear material, and a 2010 comprehensive nuclear law that includes provisions relating to "nuclear security, criminalization of sabotage, and illicit trafficking." [48] Yet many critical aspects remain unaddressed, as Egypt has yet to institute a strategic trade control system.

Algeria's engagement with 1540 implementation is among the most comprehensive in the region. This is significant given the confluence in Algeria of well-developed nuclear and chemical industries with the presence of known trafficking and terrorist activities on Algerian soil. As noted in Lars Olberg's 2008 study of 1540 implementation in the Middle East, Algeria's first report to the 1540 Committee, featured the most measures taken when compared with reports from other states in the region. [49] Olberg further observes that "this high number of measures shows that Algeria's legal system contained major gaps in regard to non-state actor proliferation, and that Algeria had a very good understanding of how these gaps had to be closed." [50] This understanding can likely be traced to Algeria's experience serving as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council during the resolution's negotiation, and as an initial member of the 1540 Committee. Algeria submitted another national report in April 2008, which was even more comprehensive than its previous reports. In particular, this report details additional measures related to improving the physical security of sensitive materials via strengthened electronic surveillance systems; amending the customs code to better combat smuggling, money laundering, and financing of terrorism; and establishing effective border controls via the creation of several new border surveillance posts, and the employment of air assets to combat illicit trafficking of all weapon types along Algeria's vast southern borders. [51] While these are significant developments, key gaps remain with respect to adopting export legislation related to end-user and transshipment controls. [52] This is a common deficit within the region, and thus should not detract from the comparatively good reporting and implementation behavior exhibited by Algeria.

Reports submitted by Iran and Syria to the 1540 Committee surprised some observers with their level of detail and apparent support for the resolution. [53] Both reports submitted by Iran addressed each of the 1540 operational paragraphs, and included details on CWC implementation. [54] Syria's reports, while not as comprehensive as Iran's, referenced several measures already taken or planned. [55] However, these reports were submitted prior to the ongoing civil war, which has undoubtedly negatively affected 1540 compliance.

As noted in Olberg's study, Israel differs from other states in the region by virtue of its relatively high levels of economic development, larger trade volumes both within and outside the region, and unique security situation. [56] These factors "contribute to the fact Israel had a comprehensive legal regulatory body in force long before the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1540." [57] Thus, Israel has not felt a need to adopt many new measures in response to Resolution 1540, since it had already sought to achieve these objectives prior to the resolution's passage. Israel's second report in 2012 detailed the adoption of one new measure, "the development of a computerized system to build profiles for identifying cargo/shipments suspected of violating customs laws and regulations, including those concerning WMD." [58] Israel has taken additional measures since its initial 2004 report, which include the establishment of the Defense Export Control Directorate within the Ministry of Defense in July 2006 responsible for, inter alia, granting export licenses and industry outreach; the formation of the U.S.-Israel Defense Export Control Working Group in April 2007; and the entrance into force of both new dual-use export control legislation in January 2007 and the Defense Export Control Law in December 2007. [59] Figuring prominently across Israel's 1540 Matrix, the 2007 Defense Export Control Law includes provisions establishing: Wassenaar Arrangement- and MTCR-based control lists; licensing requirements for transit, transshipment, re-transfer, and brokering activities; and enhanced criminal penalties. [60]

Regional Outreach
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the League of Arab States (LAS) are two regional organizations that have taken steps to promote 1540 implementation among their member states. Both organizations have demonstrated an increased capacity and willingness to address nonproliferation challenges, and specifically 1540-related issues, in recent years. However, a number of obstacles continue to impede both organizations' effective engagement with 1540 implementation.

Gulf Cooperation Council:
Founded in 1981 as a regional economic and defense organization, the GCC is composed of six member states: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. The scope of the organization's activities includes member state coordination in the areas of the economy, finance, trade, customs, import, export, transportation, legislation, administration, and scientific and technical progress in industry. [61] All these activities are relevant to Resolution 1540 objectives. Institutionally, the GCC's three main bodies, the Supreme Council, the Ministerial Council, and the Secretariat General, have the capacity to actively engage with 1540 implementation, as the Charter stipulates they may establish sub-agencies as necessary. [62] Given the overlap between the Gulf Cooperation Council and the League of Arab States, there have been suggestions of dual-hat appointments, for example a regional 1540 coordinator, to avoid overlap and confusion. [63] To date, however, the GCC has not nominated a 1540 coordinator, identified a focal point to lead on 1540-related issues, or established a specialized committee devoted to addressing nonproliferation issues.

Nonetheless, in recent years the GCC has demonstrated an interest in 1540 objectives, although often indirectly. A growing interest in developing joint nuclear energy programs and the ongoing threat of terrorism have motivated the GCC to strengthen the nonproliferation and counter-terrorism capabilities of its members. In an effort to coordinate counter-terrorism efforts, GCC member states signed the Counter-Terrorism Agreement in May 2005 aimed at "boosting coordination among security agencies and better exchange of intelligence information." [64] Moreover, the GCC established a Permanent Anti-Terrorism Committee in 2006 and called for the establishment of a "World Counter Terrorism Center" in 2009 to better coordinate regional and global counter-terrorism efforts. [65] Over the past several years, the GCC has shown increased interest in developing a joint civil nuclear program, as well as promoting the establishment of a Gulf WMD Free Zone. [66] With these goals in mind, the organization has fostered partnerships with the EU and the IAEA to facilitate the improvement of nuclear safety and security. [67]

While its interest in 1540 has increased, the GCC does have capacity limitations specific to facilitating 1540 implementation among its member states, particularly with regard to the more technical dimensions of a comprehensive export control system. To remedy this deficit, the GCC has participated in two major events with the 1540 Committee, hosted by Qatar in 2009, and by Saudi Arabia in 2010. [68] These workshops focused on matching offers of assistance with the needs of individual GCC member states, developing a more substantive role for the GCC in fostering regional implementation of 1540, and facilitating open dialogue for information and experience sharing. The GCC has also been an active participant at counter-terrorism events listed by the 1540 Committee. [69] Most recently, a talk on border control coordination which promoted 1540 objectives at the GCC level was hosted by the Philippines in 2013, and was attended by all GCC member states apart from the United Arab Emirates, as well as by other MENA and non-MENA states. [70] Information sharing among GCC member states should prove useful, as some members such as the UAE have comparatively more experience with 1540-related issues, should they decide to play this role.

The League of Arab States:
Formed in 1945, the LAS currently comprises twenty-two states and four observers, and focuses on a broad range of economic and security issues. The institutional mandate of the LAS is sufficient to enable the organization to facilitate cooperation on 1540 implementation. [71] However, the Arab League's interest in 1540 implementation seems primarily geared towards issues relating to counter-terrorism and combatting (via field enforcement) illicit trade, while 1540 objectives such as legal/regulatory development of strategic trade controls, national control lists, and nuclear security generally receive less attention. The LAS began to address 1540 in the summer of 2007, when its Group of Experts on Counterterrorism requested that LAS member states report on 1540 implementation and other UN counter-terrorism instruments. [72] To increase 1540 reporting and compliance, the LAS hosted five regional conferences or workshops since late 2008. [73] This impetus has come in large part from the increased efforts of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, two states that have long held considerable sway over the LAS. [74]

Despite these increased efforts, some experts argue that the increased attention paid to 1540 implementation within the LAS is largely rhetorical rather than substantive. [75] A number of other priorities continue to top the agenda at Arab League summits, potentially limiting the Arab League's readiness to address 1540 objectives. [76] Compounding this issue is the fact that the LAS lacks the funds to meet its budgetary needs, likely ensuring only top priorities will be adequately funded. [77] Furthermore, a number of infrastructural deficits hamper the Arab League's capacity to effectively allocate funding, and to comprehensively address 1540 objectives. Few member states have experience with strategic trade controls, and thus the LAS lacks the knowledge base from which to provide members with 1540-related assistance absent extra-regional assistance. Moreover, various ministries in each individual member state address specific aspects of 1540 implementation, which leads to redundancy, decreased efficiency, and "internal and external confusion," especially as "coordination among these bodies is often lacking." [78] The head of the Arab League's Department of Legal Affairs, Radwan ben Khadra, indicated his department "was considering the establishment of an office to specifically coordinate 1540-related implementation activities among its membership," but such a body has not yet been established. [79]

Regional Progress and Challenges
Given the ongoing political instability throughout the MENA region, 1540's current and near-term implementation is likely to be low on the lists of many countries' priorities. However, recent 1540-related assistance activity suggests that at least some states in the region continue to devote attention to the resolution. For example, in 2012 alone, the U.S. Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) Program sponsored strategic trade control development training for multiple states in the region, including Jordan, Oman, and Yemen. [80] The German government also engaged with Yemen in spring 2012 to discuss possible counterterrorism assistance, and the UAE has shared its advancements in comprehensive strategic trade control development through participation in conferences sponsored by EXBS, the EU, and Japan's Center for Information on Security Trade Controls (CISTEC). [81] The degree to which such capacity-building efforts will translate into actual implementation remains to be seen, but the willingness of regional actors to engage with these programs highlights continued support for the resolution.

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[35] Aaron Dunne, "Strategic Trade Controls in the United Arab Emirates: Key Considerations for the European Union," EU Non-Proliferation Consortium Papers, No. 12, March 2012, www.nonproliferation.eu; "Policy of the United Arab Emirates on the Evaluation and Potential Development of Peaceful Nuclear Energy," Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation, 20 April 2008, http://enec.gov.ae; "Committee for Goods and Materials Subject to Import and Export Control," Presentation for the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, www.exportcontrol.org; Kareem Shaheen, "UAE begins review of anti-terrorism law," The National, 28 November 2010, www.thenational.ae.
[36] "Jordan ratifies anti-terrorism law," China Daily, 27 August 2006, www.chinadaily.com.cn; "Nulcear Safety and Security and Radiation Protection Law No. 43 of 2007," Jordan Nuclear Regulatory Commission, www.jnrc.gov.jo; Emmad Nosaeir, "Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance in Jordan Customs," 8th International Export Control Conference, 2007, p.4, www.exportcontrol.org.
[37] Johan Bergenas, "A Piece of the Global Puzzle," The Stimson Center, December 2010, p. 24.
[38] Brian Finlay et al., "Beyond Boundaries in the Middle East: Leveraging Nonproliferation Assistance to Address Security/Development Needs With Resolution 1540," The Stimson Center and the Stanley Foundation, September 2010, p. 19.
[39] Brian Finlay et al., "Beyond Boundaries in the Middle East: Leveraging Nonproliferation Assistance to Address Security/Development Needs With Resolution 1540," The Stimson Center and the Stanley Foundation, September 2010, p. 19.
[40] Brian Finlay et al., "Beyond Boundaries in the Middle East: Leveraging Nonproliferation Assistance to Address Security/Development Needs With Resolution 1540," The Stimson Center and the Stanley Foundation, September 2010, p. 19.
[41] "Summary of Legislation of Jordan Related to Terrorism," United Nations Treaty Collection, 28 January 2002, p. 305-6, www.untreaty.un.org.
[42] "Saudi Arabia," Matrix as Approved by the 1540 Committee on 24 November 2010, www.un.org.
[43] "Even List and Related Documents," United Nations Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1540, www.un.org.
[44] Nicolas Kasprzyk, "The Role of International, Regional, and Sub-regional Organizations," presentation given at the Workshop on UN Security Council Resolution 1540, Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, January 14-15, 2013, www.un.org.
[45] 1540 Committee, United Nations, "Event List and Related Documents," Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1540 (2004), www.un.org.
[46] Johan Bergenas, "A Piece of the Global Puzzle," The Stimson Center, December 2010, p. 14.
[47] UN Security Council, "Risks to Non-Proliferation Regime Challenge Resolution 1540 to Ensure States Enact Domestic Controls Over Weapons of Mass Destruction Spread to Non-State Actors," UN document SC/9757, 1 October 2009, www.un.org; Johan Bergenas, "A Piece of the Global Puzzle," The Stimson Center, December 2010, p. 25; "Even List and Related Documents," United Nations Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1540, www.un.org.
[48] Permanent Mission of the Arab Republic of Egypt to the UN, "Note Verbale Dated 28 February 2008 from the Permanent Mission of Egypt to the United Nations Addressed to the Chairman of the Committee," Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1540 (2004), S/AC.44/2007/7, 28 February 2008, p. 2; Michelle Cann, Kelsey Davenport and Margaret Blaza, "The Nuclear Security Summit: Assessment of National Commitments," Arms Control Association, 20 March 2012, p. 18, www.armscontrol.org.
[49] Lars Olberg, "The Implementation of Resolution 1540 in the Middle East," Sandia Report SAND2007-7938, Sandia National Laboratories, February 2008, p. 12.
[50] Lars Olberg, "The Implementation of Resolution 1540 in the Middle East," Sandia Report SAND2007-7938, Sandia National Laboratories, February 2008, p. 12.
[51] Permanent Mission of Algeria to the UN, "Note Verbale Dated 30 April 2008 from the Permanent Mission of Algeria to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Committee," Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1540 (2004), S/AC.44/2007/1, 30 April 2008, p. 12-15.
[52] Lars Olberg, "The Implementation of Resolution 1540 in the Middle East," Sandia Report SAND2007-7938, Sandia National Laboratories, February 2008, p. 31.
[53] Lars Olberg, "The Implementation of Resolution 1540 in the Middle East," Sandia Report SAND2007-7938, Sandia National Laboratories, February 2008, p. 13.
[54] Lars Olberg, "The Implementation of Resolution 1540 in the Middle East," Sandia Report SAND2007-7938, Sandia National Laboratories, February 2008, p. 18; Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the UN, "Note Verbale Dated 28 February 2005 from the Permanent Mission of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Committee," Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1540 (2004), S/AC.44/2004/(02)/105, 28 February 2005.
[55] Lars Olberg, "The Implementation of Resolution 1540 in the Middle East," Sandia Report SAND2007-7938, Sandia National Laboratories, February 2008, p. 12; "National Reports," Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1540 (2004), www.un.org.
[56] Lars Olberg, "The Implementation of Resolution 1540 in the Middle East," Sandia Report SAND2007-7938, Sandia National Laboratories, February 2008, p. 17.
[57] Lars Olberg, "The Implementation of Resolution 1540 in the Middle East," Sandia Report SAND2007-7938, Sandia National Laboratories, February 2008, p. 17.
[58] Permanent Representative of Israel to the UN, "Note Verbale Dated 22 November 2004 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations Addressed to the Chairman of the Committee," Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1540 (2004), S/AC.44/2004/(02)/84, 22 November 2004, p. 5; Lars Olberg, "The Implementation of Resolution 1540 in the Middle East," Sandia Report SAND2007-7938, Sandia National Laboratories, February 2008, p. 17.
[59] Eli Pincu, "Israeli Defense Export Control," presentation for US-Israel High Technology Forum, 9 September 2008, www.ndia.org.
[60] Eli Pincu, "Israeli Defense Export Control," presentation for US-Israel High Technology Forum, 9 September 2008, www.ndia.org; Office of the General Counsel, "Defense Export Control Law, 5766-2007," Israeli Ministry of Defense, October 2007, www.exportctrl.mod.gov.il.
[61] "The Charter," Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, 25 May 1981, www.gcc-sg.org; "Foundations and Objectives," Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, 25 May 1981, www.gcc-sg.org; Johan Bergenas, "A Piece of the Global Puzzle," The Stimson Center, December 2010, p. 23.
[62] "The Charter," Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, 25 May 1981, www.gcc-sg.org.
[63] Fadiya Al-Zaabi, "GCC Countries Sign Landmark Counterterrorism Agreement," Arab News, 5 May 2004, www.arabnews.com.
[64] Johan Bergenas, "A Piece of the Global Puzzle: The Role of the Gulf Cooperation Council and the League of Arab States in Implementing Resolution 1540," Stimson Center Report (Washington: Henry L. Stimson Center, December 2010), p. 27, www.stimson.org.
[65] Secretariat General, "The GCC Process and Achievement," Gulf Cooperation Council, 4th Ed., 2009, p. 35; Secretariat General, "The Final Communiqué of the 30th Session of the Supreme Council of the GCC," Gulf Cooperation Council, December 2009, www.gcc-sg.org.
[66] Ghazanfar Ali Khan, "Upheaval in Regions Tops Agenda of GCC Summit," Arab News, 9 May 2011, www.arabnews.com; Nicole Stracke, "Nuclear Non-Proliferation from a Gulf Perspective," FES Briefing Paper 3, April 2008, p. 4, www.library.fes.de.
[67] "Joint Communiqué: 20th EU-GCC Joint Council and Ministerial Meeting," Council of the European Union, 14 June 2010, p. 2, www.consilium.europa.eu.
[68] "Events List and Related Documents," United Nations Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1540, www.un.org.
[69] 1540 Committee, United Nations, "Event List and Related Documents," Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1540 (2004), www.un.org.
[70] United Nations, "Regional Workshop: Effective Border Control Coordination for Asia Pacific and Middle East Countries," United Nations Information Note, www.un.org.
[71] Lars Olberg, "The Implementation of Resolution 1540 in the Middle East," Sandia Report SAND2007-7938, Sandia National Laboratories, February 2008, p. 27.
[72] Lars Olberg, "The Implementation of Resolution 1540 in the Middle East," Sandia Report SAND2007-7938, Sandia National Laboratories, February 2008, p. 27.
[73] 1540 Committee, United Nations, "Event List and Related Documents," Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1540 (2004), www.un.org.
[74] Johan Bergenas, "A Piece of the Global Puzzle," The Stimson Center, December 2010, p. 25.
[75] "European Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons and Explosive Remnants of War," UNIDIR, June 2006, p. 62; "Background Paper for Workshop on the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in North Africa," Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, 25 May 2010, p. 12-13.
[76] "Arab League Summit Failure," Cephas Library, 24 March 2005 www.cephas-library.com; "Arab Summit Issues Decisions," MidEast Web, 29 March 2007, www.mideastweb.org; "Backgrounder: Damascus Declaration for the 20th Arab Summit," Xinhua News Agency, 31 March 2008, www.news.xinhuanet.com; "Doha Declaration: Statement issues at the conclusion of the 21st Arab summit," Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, 30 March 2009, www.saudiembassy.net; "Paper Publishes Text of Arab Summit's Sirte Declaration," Al-Hayah Online, 30 March 2010, www.biyokulule.com; "Declaration of Baghdad," The Arab Summit Conference, 29 March 2012, www.europarl.europa.eu.
[77] In 2008, the LAS faced a $22 million deficit, or about 60% of its annual budget and most of its member states have not paid annual contributions; "Arab League summit to Discuss Dire Financial Straits," The Jerusalem Post, 17 March 2008, www.jpost.com.
[78] Lars Olberg, "The Implementation of Resolution 1540 in the Middle East," Sandia Report SAND2007-7938, Sandia National Laboratories, February 2008, p. 29-30.
[79] Johan Bergenas, "A Piece of the Global Puzzle," The Stimson Center, December 2010, p. 25.
[80] CNS experts' discussions throughout 2012 with government officials and NGO practitioners directly involved in these or similar training programs in the Middle East.
[81] "Yemen, Germany discuss counterterrorism cooperation," Yemen News Agency (SABA), April 21, 2012, www.sabanews.net; the UAE had representation at the 13th International Export Control Conference, May 7-9, 2012 in Portoroz, Slovenia, and UAE officials presented on the strategic trade control implementation in the Emirates at CISTEC's 18th Asian Export Control Seminar, February 15-17, 2011 in Tokyo, Japan.

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This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, or agents.

About

This report is part of a collection examining implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, which requires all states to implement measures aimed at preventing non-state actors from acquiring NBC weapons, related materials, and their means of delivery. It details implementation efforts in the Middle East to-date.

Understanding
the Terrorism Threat

WMD terrorism is a threat to global security. In 2010 testimony, the U.S. director of national intelligence said that dozens of identified domestic and international terrorists and terrorist groups have expressed intent to obtain and use WMD in future acts of terrorism.