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Middle East and North Africa 1540 Reporting

1540 Introduction Page: UNSCR 1540 Resource Collection



Region Overview

 


The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is the nodal point of three continents-Europe, Africa and Asia. It is critical to the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540, as nearly one-third of the countries in the region either possess some type of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons (NBC) capability, or are suspected of having related research programs. The region also served as an operational hub in A.Q. Khan's illicit nuclear trafficking network, and several states continue to provide financial and logistical support to actors engaged in illicit trafficking and terrorist activities.

States across the Middle East and North Africa face significant internal security and terrorist threats. More than thirty percent of the foreign terrorist organizations recognized by the U.S. State Department operate in the Middle East. [1] Of these groups, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is the most recently cited organization attempting to obtain and use Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Weapons (CBRN). [2] [3]

Furthermore, since the onset of the 2011 Arab Spring, there has been widespread instability in the region, with political protests, revolutions and, in several cases, escalation of violence taking place in Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, Bahrain, Libya, Syria, and other states. Both surviving and newly formed governments continue to struggle to maintain political control and civil order, with negative implications for internal security, border control, and enforcement of export controls and anti-terrorism measures. Terrorist and militant groups might attempt to use the ongoing political instability to expand their activities.

For more detailed information on this region's NBC and delivery system capabilities, see the relevant country profiles.

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WMD-Related Illicit Trafficking

Illicit trafficking remains a significant problem in the MENA region. It is exceptionally border-dense, and home to seven of the world's top fifty maritime container ports; moreover, most states have underdeveloped judicial and law enforcement institutions and thus lack robust export control and border security systems. [4] Terrorist organizations and other transnational criminal networks take advantage of porous borders and poorly regulated financial institutions across the Middle East to engage in activities such as illicit financing, drug trafficking, and transport of dual-use items.

Dubai has served as a key transshipment point for nuclear materials, as well as dual-use goods and technologies in the region. [5] The A.Q. Khan Network, and subsequently Iran, both utilized Dubai for the transshipment of dual-use goods and technologies, and the former also shipped large quantities of uranium hexafluoride to Libya via Dubai from 2000 to 2001. [6] Nuclear trafficking notwithstanding, terrorist and transnational criminal organizations have engaged in the transport of other forms of contraband across key transit points in Morocco, Libya, Lebanon, the Iran-Afghanistan border, the Iran-Iraq border, and the Suez Canal in Egypt. [7] In addition to illicit trafficking, maritime piracy also presents a substantial security concern in the region. Pirates mainly operate in the Gulf of Aden. One of the most vital maritime trade routes in the world, it provided passage for upwards of seventeen thousand ships in 2011 en route to and from the Suez Canal. [8] Although the majority of pirates operate out of Somalia, chaos in Yemen, on the opposite side of the Gulf of Aden, makes that country another potential base for piracy. [9]

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1540 Implementation

All Middle Eastern states submitted an initial report to the 1540 Committee within a year of the resolution's passage, satisfying their initial reporting requirements. Although 41 reports, including first and additional reports, have been submitted to date, they vary dramatically in terms of quality and comprehensiveness. Many reports were merely diplomatic statements supporting the spirit of the resolution, and did not serve to build any confidence that implementation and enforcement were taking place. Lars Olberg of Sandia Laboratories assessed that "Middle Eastern countries have had a poor start when it comes to the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540. Their general reporting behavior is significantly behind that of countries in other regions." [10] Furthermore, while a number of states submitted fairly comprehensive reports, states' engagement with the reporting process is not necessarily reflective of their commitment to timely and effective implementation of the resolution. Some states, such as the UAE and Jordan, have sought to institute concrete legislation geared towards 1540 objectives; however, when compared with other states in the region, these states are more the exception than the norm.

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Export Controls and Related Measures
Both the UAE and Jordan have demonstrated positive engagement with 1540 objectives. The UAE has passed a number of laws since the adoption of Resolution 1540 aiming to secure and account for WMD-related materials and technologies, as well as to control and penalize their export, re-export, transit, and transshipment. [11] Similarly, the Jordanian government has instituted an anti-terrorism law, a new law on nuclear safety and security, and a national product control list, and taken efforts to strengthen customs controls along its borders to regulate WMD-sensitive trade. [12] However, both countries are relatively new to the concept of strategic trade controls and lack the necessary expertise, and possibly the financial resources, to institute an effective system. The UAE has closed numerous domestic and international companies involved in illicit finance and illegal dual-use exports, and interdicted several vessels suspected of carrying illicit goods to Iran. [13] Despite these successes, however, the country lacks the capacity to comprehensively implement its ambitious export-control system. [14] Indeed, two years after the passage of key laws relating to countering illicit trafficking and brokering controlled items, its enforcement body had not been staffed, and key regulations had not been implemented. [15] This variation in enforcement and implementation, as one expert argued, is "as much a result of limited capacity as limited political will." [16] In Jordan, the strategic trade control system does not explicitly regulate transshipment, brokering, and financing of proliferation-sensitive materials and activities. In addition, while Jordanian law prescribes criminal penalties for the transport of WMD-related materials "in the execution of terrorist acts," the penal code does not impose such penalties for more general offenses involving dual-use items. [17]

In contrast to the UAE and Jordan, Saudi Arabia possesses only a crude legal framework with respect to key trade controls such as control lists, transfer and re-transfer regulations, and "catch-all" mechanisms. One notable improvement includes the adoption of the 2007 Arms and Ammunitions Regulations stipulating the establishment of a national licensing authority to regulate proliferation-sensitive imports. [18] Despite a poor implementation record at the national level so far, Saudi Arabia has demonstrated an increased willingness to improve its compliance with 1540 objectives in recent years, primarily in a regional context. Through participation in regional workshops and activities within the League of Arab States (LAS) and the GCC, Saudi Arabia has begun to assume an active leadership role with respect to 1540 implementation. Notably, the Kingdom hosted and organized, in cooperation with the 1540 Committee and the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), a December 2010 "Regional Workshop on UNSC Resolution 1540" in Riyadh. [19] The event was attended by delegates from Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE, and by the Secretary General of the GCC, as well as the 1540 Committee Chairman, two 1540 Committee members, and two 1540 experts. In 2012, the Kingdom offered half a million dollars to "support activities that promote the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004)." [20]

Egypt was initially critical of the Security Council's adoption of Resolution 1540, raising concerns that the Council's role was moving closer to that of a legislator. [21] Despite these initial concerns, Egypt has begun to positively contribute to 1540 objectives. Like Saudi Arabia, Egypt has tended to view implementation of 1540 in a regional context, stating its commitment to regional promotion of 1540 implementation through the LAS, as well as hosting an October 2009 seminar organized by the Arab League and attended by representatives of the 1540 Committee and various ministerial officials from 17 Arab states. [22] Despite these positive developments, Egypt's implementation of 1540 at the national level remains limited, particularly given the current state of unrest in the country. Two positive developments, however, were the 2006 adoption of a national system of accounting and security of nuclear material, and a 2010 comprehensive nuclear law that includes provisions relating to "nuclear security, criminalization of sabotage, and illicit trafficking." [23] Yet many critical aspects remain unaddressed, as Egypt has yet to institute a strategic trade control system.

Algeria's engagement with 1540 implementation is among the most comprehensive in the region. This is significant given the confluence in Algeria of well-developed nuclear and chemical industries with the presence of known trafficking and terrorist activities on Algerian soil. As noted in Lars Olberg's 2008 study of 1540 implementation in the Middle East, Algeria's first report to the 1540 Committee featured the most measures taken when compared with reports from other states in the region. [24] Olberg further observes that, "this high number of measures shows that Algeria's legal system contained major gaps in regard to non-state actor proliferation, and that Algeria had a very good understanding of how these gaps had to be closed." [25] This understanding can likely be traced to Algeria's experience serving as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council during the resolution's negotiation, and as an initial member of the 1540 Committee. Algeria submitted another national report in April 2008, which was even more comprehensive than its previous reports. In particular, this report details additional measures related to improving the physical security of sensitive materials via strengthened electronic surveillance systems; amending the customs code to better combat smuggling, money laundering, and financing of terrorism; and establishing effective border controls via the creation of several new border surveillance posts, and the employment of air assets to combat illicit trafficking of all weapon types along Algeria's vast southern borders. [26] While these are significant developments, key gaps remain with respect to adopting export legislation related to end-user and transshipment controls. [27] This is a common deficit within the region, and thus should not detract from the comparatively good reporting and implementation behavior exhibited by Algeria.

Reports submitted by Iran and Syria to the 1540 Committee surprised some observers with their level of detail and apparent support for the resolution. [28] Both reports submitted by Iran addressed each of the 1540 operational paragraphs, and included details on CWC implementation. [29] Syria's reports, while not as comprehensive as Iran's, referenced several measures already taken or planned. [30] However, these reports were submitted prior to the ongoing civil war, which has undoubtedly negatively affected 1540 compliance.

Post-Saddam Iraq has also demonstrated a higher level of positive engagement with implementing Resolution 1540, though its efforts are greatly hampered by the fact the central government controls only some of the country's territory, with large swathes contested or controlled by ISIS. Iraq implemented the National Monitoring Authority Non-Proliferation Act No. 48 (2012). This act is designed to "prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and regulate the transfer, import and export of dual-use items." [31] Iraq created the Iraqi National Monitoring Authority (INMA) in 2012 to make sure that the country's non-proliferation actions were "in accordance with non-proliferation conventions, treaties and resolutions." [32] In addition, Iraq developed a National Control List, which aligns with the dual-use technology lists of international organizations such as the Wassenaar Arrangement, Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the Australia Group. Finally, Iraq is in the process of creating an action-plan to expand its implementation of Resolution 1540, and INMA is developing awareness programs for Iraqi citizens, especially those working in industries with dual-use technology. [33]

As noted in Olberg's study, Israel differs from other states in the region by virtue of its relatively high levels of economic development, larger trade volumes both within and outside the region, and unique security situation. [34] These factors "contribute to the fact Israel had a comprehensive legal regulatory body in force long before the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1540." [35] Therefore, Israel has not felt the need to adopt many new measures in response to Resolution 1540. Israel's second report in 2012 detailed the adoption of one new measure, "the development of a computerized system to build profiles for identifying cargo/shipments suspected of violating customs laws and regulations, including those concerning WMD." [36] Israel has taken additional measures since its initial 2004 report, which include the establishment of the Defense Export Control Directorate within the Ministry of Defense in July 2006 responsible for, inter alia, granting export licenses and industry outreach; the formation of the U.S.-Israel Defense Export Control Working Group in April 2007; and the entrance into force of both new dual-use export control legislation in January 2007 and the Defense Export Control Law in December 2007. [37] Figuring prominently across Israel's 1540 Matrix, the 2007 Defense Export Control Law includes provisions establishing Wassenaar Arrangement- and MTCR-based control lists; licensing requirements for transit, transshipment, re-transfer, and brokering activities; and enhanced criminal penalties. [38]

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Regional Cooperation
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the League of Arab States (LAS) are two regional organizations that have taken steps to promote 1540 implementation among their member states. Both organizations have demonstrated an increased capacity and willingness to address nonproliferation challenges, and specifically 1540-related issues, in recent years. However, a number of obstacles continue to impede both organizations' effective engagement with 1540 implementation.

Institutionally, the GCC's three main bodies, the Supreme Council, the Ministerial Council, and the Secretariat General, have the capacity to actively engage with 1540 implementation, as the Charter stipulates they may establish sub-agencies as necessary. [39] To date, however, the GCC has not nominated a 1540 coordinator, identified a focal point to lead on 1540-related issues, or established a specialized committee devoted to addressing nonproliferation issues. [40] Nonetheless, in recent years the GCC has demonstrated an interest in 1540 objectives, although often indirectly. In an effort to coordinate counter-terrorism efforts, GCC member states signed the Counter-Terrorism Agreement in May 2005 aimed at "boosting coordination among security agencies and better exchange of intelligence information." [41] Moreover, the GCC established a Permanent Anti-Terrorism Committee in 2006 and called for the establishment of a "World Counter Terrorism Center" in 2009 to better coordinate regional and global counter-terrorism efforts. [42] Over the past several years, the GCC has shown increased interest in developing a joint civil nuclear program, as well as promoting the establishment of a Gulf WMD Free Zone. [43] With these goals in mind, the organization has fostered partnerships with the EU and the IAEA to facilitate the improvement of nuclear safety and security. [44] While its interest in 1540 has increased, the GCC has capacity limitations specific to facilitating 1540 implementation among its member states, particularly with regard to the more technical dimensions of a comprehensive export control system.

The Arab League's interest in 1540 implementation seems primarily geared towards issues relating to counter-terrorism and combatting (via field enforcement) illicit trade, while 1540 objectives such as legal/regulatory development of strategic trade controls, national control lists, and nuclear security generally receive less attention. The LAS began to address 1540 in the summer of 2007, when its Group of Experts on Counterterrorism requested that LAS member states report on 1540 implementation and other UN counter-terrorism instruments. [45] On 23 December 2013, the LAS submitted to the UN 1540 Committee a report detailing "relevant experience, lessons learned, and effective practices," and measures taken by the LAS to prevent the proliferation of CBRN materials to non-state actors. [46] A number of infrastructural deficits hamper the Arab League's capacity to effectively allocate limited funding, and to comprehensively address 1540 objectives. [47] Few member states have experience with strategic trade controls, and thus the LAS lacks the knowledge base from which to provide members with 1540-related assistance absent extra-regional assistance.

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Regional Implementation Challenges

Given the ongoing political instability throughout the MENA region, 1540's current and near-term implementation is likely to be low on the lists of many countries' priorities. However, 1540-related assistance in the last few years suggests that at least some states in the region continue to devote attention to the resolution. In 2012 alone, the U.S. Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) Program sponsored strategic trade control development training for multiple states in the region, including Jordan, Oman, and Yemen. [48] The German government also engaged with Yemen in spring 2012 to discuss possible counterterrorism assistance, and the UAE has shared its advancements in comprehensive strategic trade control development through participation in conferences sponsored by EXBS, the EU, and Japan's Center for Information on Security Trade Controls (CISTEC). [49] For example, Iraq in 2014 set up bilateral CBRN cooperation programs with the United States, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Norway, the Netherlands, and the European Union. [50] The degree to which such capacity-building efforts will translate into actual implementation remains to be seen, but the willingness of regional actors to engage with these programs highlights continued support for the resolution.

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Sources:
[1] Bureau of Counterterrorism, "Foreign Terrorist Organizations," U.S. Department of State, 22, 2015, www.state.gov.
[2] Brendan Nicholson, "Islamic State Bid for Chemical Weapons," The Australian, June 6, 2015, www.theaustralian.com.au.
[3] Alexander Frank, "ISIS and Failed States in the Middle East-an Emerging CBRN Threat," CBRNe.Portal, March 31, 2015, www.cbrneportal.com.
[4] "Top 50 World Container Ports," World Shipping Council, www.worldshipping.org; Brian Finlay, Johan Bergenas and Veronica Tessler, "Beyond Boundaries in the Middle East: Leveraging Nonproliferation Assistance to Address Security/Development Needs with Resolution 1540," The Stimson Center and the Stanley Foundation, September 2010, p. 17.
[5] Brian Finlay et al., "Beyond Boundaries in the Middle East: Leveraging Nonproliferation Assistance to Address Security/Development Needs With Resolution 1540," The Stimson Center and the Stanley Foundation, September 2010, pp. 16-17.
[6] Brian Finlay et al., "Beyond Boundaries in the Middle East: Leveraging Nonproliferation Assistance to Address Security/Development Needs With Resolution 1540," The Stimson Center and the Stanley Foundation, September 2010, p. 19; "A.Q. Khan and Onward Proliferation from Pakistan," in IISS Strategic Dossier, Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the rise of proliferation networks - A net assessment, May 2, 2007, p. 78.
[7] Brian Finlay et al., "Beyond Boundaries in the Middle East: Leveraging Nonproliferation Assistance to Address Security/Development Needs with Resolution 1540," The Stimson Center and the Stanley Foundation, September 2010, pp. 16-20; Jean du Preez and Dominique Dye, "Implementing Resolution 1540 in Africa: balancing competing priorities," in Lawrence Scheinman, ed., Implementing Resolution 1540: The Role of Regional Organizations, UNIDIR, 2008.
[8] "World Oil Transit Chokepoints," U.S. Energy Information Administration, August 22, 2012, www.eia.gov.
[9] Peter Shaw-Smith, "Yemen's Descent into Chaos Fuels Piracy Fears," The Financial Times, September 26, 2011, www.ft.com; Kelly McEvers, "In Anti-Piracy Fight, Yemen May Be Part of Problem," NPR, May 8, 2009, www.npr.org.
[10] Lars Olberg, "The Implementation of Resolution 1540 in the Middle East," Sandia Report SAND2007-7938, Sandia National Laboratories, February 2008, p. 28.
[11] Aaron Dunne, "Strategic Trade Controls in the United Arab Emirates: Key Considerations for the European Union," EU Non-Proliferation Consortium Papers, No. 12, March 2012, www.nonproliferation.eu; "Policy of the United Arab Emirates on the Evaluation and Potential Development of Peaceful Nuclear Energy," Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation, April 20, 2008, http://enec.gov.ae; "Committee for Goods and Materials Subject to Import and Export Control," Presentation for the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, www.exportcontrol.org; Kareem Shaheen, "UAE begins review of anti-terrorism law," The National, November 28, 2010, www.thenational.ae.
[12] "Jordan ratifies anti-terrorism law," China Daily, August 27, 2006, www.chinadaily.com.cn; "Nulcear Safety and Security and Radiation Protection Law No. 43 of 2007," Jordan Nuclear Regulatory Commission, www.jnrc.gov.jo; Emmad Nosaeir, "Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance in Jordan Customs," 8th International Export Control Conference, 2007, p.4, www.exportcontrol.org.
[13] Johan Bergenas, "A Piece of the Global Puzzle," The Stimson Center, December 2010, p. 24.
[14] Brian Finlay et al., "Beyond Boundaries in the Middle East: Leveraging Nonproliferation Assistance to Address Security/Development Needs With Resolution 1540," The Stimson Center and the Stanley Foundation, September 2010, p. 19.
[15] Brian Finlay et al., "Beyond Boundaries in the Middle East: Leveraging Nonproliferation Assistance to Address Security/Development Needs With Resolution 1540," The Stimson Center and the Stanley Foundation, September 2010, p. 19.
[16] Brian Finlay et al., "Beyond Boundaries in the Middle East: Leveraging Nonproliferation Assistance to Address Security/Development Needs With Resolution 1540," The Stimson Center and the Stanley Foundation, September 2010, p. 19.
[17] "Summary of Legislation of Jordan Related to Terrorism," United Nations Treaty Collection, January 28, 2002, p. 305-6, www.untreaty.un.org.
[18] "Saudi Arabia," Matrix as Approved by the 1540 Committee on November 24, 2010, www.un.org.
[19] "Even List and Related Documents," United Nations Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1540, www.un.org.
[20] Nicolas Kasprzyk, "The Role of International, Regional, and Sub-regional Organizations," presentation given at the Workshop on UN Security Council Resolution 1540, Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, January 14-15, 2013, www.un.org.
[21] Johan Bergenas, "A Piece of the Global Puzzle," The Stimson Center, December 2010, p. 14.
[22] UN Security Council, "Risks to Non-Proliferation Regime Challenge Resolution 1540 to Ensure States Enact Domestic Controls Over Weapons of Mass Destruction Spread to Non-State Actors," UN document SC/9757, October 1, 2009, www.un.org; Johan Bergenas, "A Piece of the Global Puzzle," The Stimson Center, December 2010, p. 25; "Even List and Related Documents," United Nations Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1540, www.un.org.
[23] Permanent Mission of the Arab Republic of Egypt to the UN, "Note Verbale Dated 28 February 2008 from the Permanent Mission of Egypt to the United Nations Addressed to the Chairman of the Committee," Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1540 (2004), S/AC.44/2007/7, February 28, 2008, p. 2; Michelle Cann, Kelsey Davenport and Margaret Blaza, "The Nuclear Security Summit: Assessment of National Commitments," Arms Control Association, March 20, 2012, p. 18, www.armscontrol.org.
[24] Lars Olberg, "The Implementation of Resolution 1540 in the Middle East," Sandia Report SAND2007-7938, Sandia National Laboratories, February 2008, p. 12.
[25] Lars Olberg, "The Implementation of Resolution 1540 in the Middle East," Sandia Report SAND2007-7938, Sandia National Laboratories, February 2008, p. 12.
[26] Permanent Mission of Algeria to the UN, "Note Verbale Dated 30 April 2008 from the Permanent Mission of Algeria to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Committee," Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1540 (2004), S/AC.44/2007/1, April 30, 2008, p. 12-15.
[27] Lars Olberg, "The Implementation of Resolution 1540 in the Middle East," Sandia Report SAND2007-7938, Sandia National Laboratories, February 2008, p. 31.
[28] Lars Olberg, "The Implementation of Resolution 1540 in the Middle East," Sandia Report SAND2007-7938, Sandia National Laboratories, February 2008, p. 13.
[29] Lars Olberg, "The Implementation of Resolution 1540 in the Middle East," Sandia Report SAND2007-7938, Sandia National Laboratories, February 2008, p. 18; Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the UN, "Note Verbale Dated 28 February 2005 from the Permanent Mission of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Committee," Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1540 (2004), S/AC.44/2004/(02)/105, February 28, 2005.
[30] Lars Olberg, "The Implementation of Resolution 1540 in the Middle East," Sandia Report SAND2007-7938, Sandia National Laboratories, February 2008, p. 12; "National Reports," Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1540 (2004), www.un.org.
[31] Permanent Mission of the Republic of Iraq to the United Nations, "Sharing of Experiences, Lessons Learnt and Effective Practices, in the Areas Covered by Resolution 1540 (2004)," Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1540 (2004), February 4, 2014, www.un.org.
[32] Permanent Mission of the Republic of Iraq to the United Nations, "Sharing of Experiences, Lessons Learnt and Effective Practices, in the Areas Covered by Resolution 1540 (2004)," Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1540 (2004), February 4, 2014, www.un.org.
[33] Permanent Mission of the Republic of Iraq to the United Nations, "Sharing of Experiences, Lessons Learnt and Effective Practices, in the Areas Covered by Resolution 1540 (2004)," Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1540 (2004), February 4, 2014, www.un.org.
[34] Lars Olberg, "The Implementation of Resolution 1540 in the Middle East," Sandia Report SAND2007-7938, Sandia National Laboratories, February 2008, p. 17.
[35] Lars Olberg, "The Implementation of Resolution 1540 in the Middle East," Sandia Report SAND2007-7938, Sandia National Laboratories, February 2008, p. 17.
[36] Permanent Representative of Israel to the UN, "Note Verbale Dated 22 November 2004 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations Addressed to the Chairman of the Committee," Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1540 (2004), S/AC.44/2004/(02)/84, November 22, 2004, p. 5; Lars Olberg, "The Implementation of Resolution 1540 in the Middle East," Sandia Report SAND2007-7938, Sandia National Laboratories, February 2008, p. 17.
[37] Eli Pincu, "Israeli Defense Export Control," presentation for US-Israel High Technology Forum, September 9, 2008, www.ndia.org.
[38] Eli Pincu, "Israeli Defense Export Control," presentation for US-Israel High Technology Forum, September 9, 2008, www.ndia.org; Office of the General Counsel, "Defense Export Control Law, 5766-2007," Israeli Ministry of Defense, October 2007, www.exportctrl.mod.gov.il.
[39] "The Charter," Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, May 25, 1981, www.gcc-sg.org.
[40] "Gulf Links," Gulf Cooperation Council, accessed June 23, 2015, www.gcc-sg.org.
[41] Johan Bergenas, "A Piece of the Global Puzzle: The Role of the Gulf Cooperation Council and the League of Arab States in Implementing Resolution 1540," Stimson Center Report (Washington: Henry L. Stimson Center, December 2010), p. 27, www.stimson.org.
[42] Secretariat General, "The GCC Process and Achievement," Gulf Cooperation Council, 4th Ed., 2009, p. 35; Secretariat General, "The Final Communiqué of the 30th Session of the Supreme Council of the GCC," Gulf Cooperation Council, December 2009, www.gcc-sg.org.
[43] Ghazanfar Ali Khan, "Upheaval in Regions Tops Agenda of GCC Summit," Arab News, May 9, 2011, www.arabnews.com; Nicole Stracke, "Nuclear Non-Proliferation from a Gulf Perspective," FES Briefing Paper 3, April 2008, p. 4, www.library.fes.de.
[44] "Joint Communiqué: 20th EU-GCC Joint Council and Ministerial Meeting," Council of the European Union, June 14, 2010, p. 2, www.consilium.europa.eu.
SAND2007-7938, Sandia National Laboratories, February 2008, p. 27.
[45] Lars Olberg, "The Implementation of Resolution 1540 in the Middle East," Sandia Report SAND2007-7938, Sandia National Laboratories, February 2008, p. 27.
[46] Office of the Permanent Observer to the United Nations, The League of Arab States, "Efforts Made by the League of Arab States to Implement Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) and Prevent Terrorists from Acquiring Weapons of Mass Destruction," Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1540 (2004), December 24, 2013, www.un.org.
[47] In 2008, the LAS faced a $22 million deficit, or about 60% of its annual budget and most of its member states have not paid annual contributions; "Arab League summit to Discuss Dire Financial Straits," The Jerusalem Post, March 17, 2008, www.jpost.com.
[48] CNS experts' discussions throughout 2012 with government officials and NGO practitioners directly involved in these or similar training programs in the Middle East.
[49] "Yemen, Germany discuss counterterrorism cooperation," Yemen News Agency (SABA), April 21, 2012, www.sabanews.net; the UAE had representation at the 13th International Export Control Conference, May 7-9, 2012 in Portoroz, Slovenia, and UAE officials presented on the strategic trade control implementation in the Emirates at CISTEC's 18th Asian Export Control Seminar, February 15-17, 2011 in Tokyo, Japan.
[50] Permanent Mission of the Republic of Iraq to the United Nations, "Sharing of Experiences, Lessons Learnt and Effective Practices, in the Areas Covered by Resolution 1540 (2004)," Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1540 (2004), February 4, 2014, www.un.org.

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This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, or agents. Copyright 2015.

About

This report is part of a collection examining implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, which requires all states to implement measures aimed at preventing non-state actors from acquiring NBC weapons, related materials, and their means of delivery. It details implementation efforts in the Middle East to-date.

Understanding
the Terrorism Threat

WMD terrorism is a threat to global security. In 2010 testimony, the U.S. director of national intelligence said that dozens of identified domestic and international terrorists and terrorist groups have expressed intent to obtain and use WMD in future acts of terrorism.