Introduction

More than sixty years after their development, nuclear weapons continue to be the basis for a number of states' national security policies. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) prohibits its non-nuclear weapon state parties from developing nuclear weapons. The treaty, however, exempts five de jure nuclear weapon states (NWS) (France, the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States) from this ban. These five states had tested nuclear weapons before the treaty was negotiated in 1968. This "exemption" is, however, countered with a legal obligation in Article VI of the treaty for the five nuclear weapon states to eventually disarm. Three other nuclear armed states—India, Israel, and Pakistan—have not joined the NPT, but are commonly considered as de facto nuclear weapon states. North Korea withdrew from the NPT in 2003, and tested nuclear devices in 2006 and 2009. Iran's opaque intentions, further fueled by its refusal to comply fully with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and UN Security Council resolutions, have led many to speculate that Iran may be pursuing an option to produce nuclear weapons.

Two decades after the Cold War, approximately 20,500 nuclear warheads remain in the arsenals of eight states (China, France, Israel, India, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States) of which approximately 5,000 are actively deployed. [1] Large quantities of weapon-grade fissile material that remain in the military stockpiles of several of these states could potentially be converted into many thousands of additional warheads.

In addition to the nuclear warheads on the territories of the existing de jure (China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, and the United States) and de facto (Israel, India, and Pakistan) nuclear weapon states, as well as North Korea, five European NATO countries (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey) may have up to 200 U.S. nuclear weapons deployed on their territories in accordance with declared NATO nuclear policies. [2] Some states believe that the U.S. deployments of nuclear weapons in Europe are contrary to Article I of the NPT, which requires that NWS not "transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly." [3] Previously, the United States deployed nuclear weapons in South Korea and Greece, but it withdrew these weapons in 1991 and 2001, after 33 and 40 years respectively. (Most recently, credible open source evidence suggests that an estimated 130 U.S. nuclear weapons at the Ramstein Air Base in Germany appear to have been removed in July 2007, which reportedly reduced the number of U.S. nuclear weapons in Germany to only 20.) [4]

In sharp contrast to the large number of nuclear weapons in the arsenals or on the territories of a handful of countries, the majority of countries in the world—the non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) —are committed to remaining free of nuclear weapons. South Africa, long suspected of having developed a clandestine nuclear weapons program, announced in July 1993 that it had developed a small arsenal before destroying it in 1991 in order to join the NPT as an NNWS. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine returned large arsenals of nuclear warheads and associated delivery systems inherited from the former Soviet Union to Russia in the mid-1990s, subsequently joining the NPT as NNWS.

Other countries, including Brazil and Argentina, considered acquiring nuclear weapons, but abandoned their programs before accepting binding restraints on nuclear weapons development. Brazil and Argentina decided to join the NPT in 1994 and 1995, respectively, as NNWS. In further support of their legal obligations under the NPT, a large number of NNWS are parties to nuclear weapon-free zones (NWFZs), and have thereby accepted additional legal obligations not to develop, manufacture, stockpile, acquire, possess, or control any nuclear explosive devices on their territories. Today, more than 110 countries belong to NWFZ treaties. [5]

Nuclear Disarmament and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

The NPT prohibits nuclear weapon states (France, the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States) from transferring nuclear weapons to, or assisting NNWS in the development of nuclear weapons. At the same time, NNWS are legally required not to receive, manufacture, or acquire nuclear weapons, and to place all their peaceful use nuclear materials and facilities under IAEA safeguards. [6]

The NPT not only prohibits the manufacture, acquisition, and transfer of nuclear weapons, but Article VI of the treaty also requires all of its state parties to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." The article does not specify a timeframe in which nuclear disarmament should occur, nor does it provide a verification mechanism to monitor disarmament, but it places a legal obligation on states with nuclear weapons to stop the nuclear arms race and to disarm. As such, this obligation is one of the three main "pillars" of the treaty, the other two being nuclear nonproliferation and the right to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

At the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, state parties agreed to indefinitely extend the treaty based on a package of decisions that included Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament, which called for a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), negotiations on a verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, and for "systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally." It is widely understood that it would not have been possible to indefinitely extend the NPT without the concurrent commitment to this program of action. The president of that historic conference, Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala, pointed out in his concluding remarks at the meeting, that "permanence of the treaty does not represent a permanence of unbalanced obligations, nor does it represent the permanence of nuclear apartheid between nuclear haves and have nots." [7]

Further building on this action plan, the 2000 NPT Review Conference, in its consensus final document, laid out 13 practical steps towards nuclear disarmament, including an "unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear weapons states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals." [8] This "unequivocal undertaking" was significant in that it re-committed NWS to their Article VI obligations, and for the first time in the NPT's history the NWS agreed to "the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals."

The successes of the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences were not repeated in 2005. State parties could not agree upon an agenda until the second week, and failed to adopt further substantive recommendations to build upon those adopted in 1995 and 2000. [9] Failure at the 2005 NPT Review Conference epitomized what proved to be, at best, an idle decade for progress in nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. However, the election of Barack Obama as President of the United States heralded a new era for U.S. engagement in multilateral disarmament diplomacy. In the lead-up to the 2010 NPT Review Conference, the United States signed the New START Treaty with Russia, diminished the role of its nuclear arsenal in its new Nuclear Posture Review, and held the first in a scheduled series of Nuclear Security Summits. Although these initiatives will not lead to near-term nuclear disarmament, they demonstrated a commitment by the United States to make progress toward the ultimate goal of a "world free of nuclear weapons" as stated in President Obama's speech in Prague in April 2009. [10]

Widely considered a success, the 2010 NPT Review Conference's final outcome document included a 64-item action plan covering the NPT's three pillars and a commitment to implement the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. While the review conference indicated clear divergences continue to exist between the priorities of the NWS and the NNWS, state parties were able to compromise and generate the political will necessary to produce a successful outcome. [11] Many NNWS, and mainly the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) countries, strongly supported the idea of negotiating a nuclear weapons convention that would delegitimize nuclear weapons and eliminate them within a clear timeframe. Although these ideas were opposed by the NWS, the final document noted the Secretary General's five-point proposal for nuclear disarmament, including consideration of negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention. [12] The forward-looking action plan sets clear benchmarks for the next review conference in 2015.

Has Any Progress Been Made Towards Disarmament?

Gauging progress towards nuclear disarmament is complicated, because both shifts in numbers of weapons and in the overarching policies governing these weapons are relevant. In terms of quantitative reductions, measurable steps have been undertaken by key NWS both unilaterally and bilaterally. The NWS collectively reduced the size of their nuclear arsenals from over 70,000 warheads at the height of the Cold War to fewer than 20,000 by 2011. [13] These reductions have been carried out unilaterally by at least four NWS, as well as through bilateral legally binding arrangements between the United States and the Soviet Union/Russian Federation.

On 18 December 2007, the White House announced that the 2004 decision to reduce the size of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile by nearly 50 percent from 2001 levels was accomplished in December 2007, five years earlier than projected. [14] France and the United Kingdom have reduced their arsenals unilaterally, but have recently reconfirmed their intention to retain a nuclear deterrent for the foreseeable future. [15] In contrast to the unilateral reduction measures taken by the NWS, India and Pakistan are believed to be rapidly expanding their nuclear arsenals. [16]

There is an extensive precedent for bilateral U.S.-USSR/Russia arms control. Since 1969, the United States and Russia have been limiting/reducing their strategic nuclear arsenals through bilateral treaties. These arrangements began modestly with SALT I, which only limited the number of ICBMs and SLBMs, leaving both nations to increase numbers of both bombers and warheads. SALT I also produced the ABM treaty in 1972, which banned nationwide strategic missile defenses. [17] Following the Cold War, START I (enacted in 1994), placed limitations on the numbers of deployed launchers, and for the first time warheads. While both START II and III failed to materialize, the United States and Russia negotiated the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) in 2002. SORT provided for a significant reduction of deployed strategic nuclear warheads in each arsenal to less than 1,700 to 2,200. However, SORT was often criticized for having a weak verification regime that relied on the START I regime. Fears that this treaty and the START agreement would expire without anything to fill the void were allayed with the signing of the New START Treaty in April 2010, and its subsequent entry into force in February 2011. New START limits the United States and Russia to no more than 1,550 deployed nuclear warheads and 700 launchers by 2018. [18]

Attempts at negotiating legally binding multilateral nuclear disarmament treaties have proven challenging. The United Nations established the Conference on Disarmament (CD) as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum in 1979. The 65-member, consensus-ruled body has only negotiated one treaty related to nuclear disarmament over the past 30 years, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996. Widely considered to be a milestone towards nuclear disarmament, the CTBT would prohibit all nuclear testing. Fifteen years after it opened for signature the CTBT has yet to enter into force. Entry into force of the CTBT requires ratification by all states with nuclear power reactors and/or research reactors (in 1996), known as Annex II states. As of August 2011, nine of these states, including the United States and China, have yet to ratify. [19]

Since the conclusion of CTBT negotiations in 1996, the CD has been locked in a perpetual stalemate. Negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) have not commenced even 15 years after agreement on the Shannon Mandate. Many consider an FMCT ripe for negotiation and the next logical step toward nuclear disarmament. In 2009, CD member states agreed upon a program of work, CD/1864, but were unable to implement it due to procedural blockages. [20] Over the past two years Pakistan has emerged as the single detractor, objecting on the basis of national security and substance. In regard to the latter concern, Pakistan argues that an FMCT would not address existing stockpiles of fissile materials, and would therefore further only nonproliferation and not disarmament. [21]

Pakistan's conceptual argument taps into the longstanding confrontation between the nuclear weapon "haves and have nots." Paradoxically, as Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) members, Pakistan and India vocally support nuclear disarmament while simultaneously maintaining ever larger nuclear arsenals. Many NAM members and other NNWS believe that the NWS are not fully meeting their Article VI obligation to pursue in good faith negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament. [22] Apart from the bilateral negotiations by Russia and the United States on New START in 2009, there have been no negotiations or efforts on disarmament measures since the conclusion of the CTBT negotiations. Moreover, unilateral and U.S.-Russia reductions have been perceived by many NNWS as nothing more than efforts to streamline existing nuclear arsenals, rather than steps towards complete nuclear disarmament.

Other Efforts to Promote Nuclear Disarmament

Certain national governments and members of civil society have cooperated on initiatives to promote progress towards a world free of nuclear weapons. One of the most progressive approaches to promote nuclear disarmament was taken by the New Agenda Coalition (NAC). In June 1998, foreign ministers from Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia (which later withdrew from the NAC), South Africa, and Sweden issued a statement calling for a new nuclear disarmament agenda, "Toward a Nuclear-Weapons-Free World: Time for a New Agenda." The aim of these like-minded countries is to increase political momentum towards a world free of nuclear weapons. The NAC have proposed that a number of concrete steps be taken by the five NWS and the three non-NPT nuclear weapon possessors. The NAC played an instrumental role in convincing the NWS to agree to the thirteen practical steps towards nuclear disarmament in the final document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Since its establishment in 1998, the NAC has consistently submitted to the United Nations General Assembly resolutions calling for a world free of nuclear weapons. [23]

Around the same time, the Middle Powers Initiative was established in support of non-nuclear weapon states' efforts to reduce and eliminate worldwide nuclear weapons arsenals. The Middle Powers Initiative, in cooperation with middle power governments, works as a catalyst in promoting practical steps toward the elimination of nuclear weapons, and to encourage and educate nuclear weapon states to be more attentive to their disarmament obligations. Following the failure of the 2005 NPT Review Conference, the Middle Powers Initiative launched the "Article VI Forum" in October 2005 to examine the legal, technical, and political requirements to fulfill nonproliferation and disarmament commitments for a nuclear weapon-free world. [24] Since 1994, the Japanese government has sponsored a United Nations General Assembly resolution. In recent years, Japan and Australia have increased their cooperation on nuclear disarmament, including the establishment of the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI) with eight other countries (Canada, Germany, Mexico, Turkey, Chile, the Netherlands, Poland, and the United Arab Emirates). [25]

Several independent international commissions have played an important role by providing expert recommendations in the form of nuclear disarmament action plans. These commissions include the 1996 Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons sponsored by the Australian Government, the 1998 Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament sponsored by the Japanese government, and the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Commission.

The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission was established in 2003 amidst stagnation on nuclear disarmament and serious challenges facing the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Its report concluded that stagnation in global arms control and disarmament forums could be attributed to the fact "that the nuclear weapon states no longer seem to take their commitment to nuclear disarmament seriously-even though this was an essential part of the NPT bargain, both at the treaty's birth in 1968 and when it was extended indefinitely in 1995." Based on this observation, the Blix Report offered several recommendations for furthering nuclear disarmament through multilateral cooperative actions.

Significant among these recommendations was the call on all NPT nuclear weapon states to take steps toward nuclear disarmament as required by the NPT, and the commitments made in connection with the treaty's indefinite extension. [26] Other important recommendations included the early entry-into-force of the CTBT; the immediate commencement of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty without preconditions; the revision by all nuclear possessor states of their nuclear defense doctrines and their use policies; an agreement between Russia and the United States to de-alert their nuclear weapons; and the withdrawal of all non-strategic nuclear weapons to central storage on national territories pending eventual elimination. The commission also encouraged all states possessing nuclear weapons to "start preparing for the outlawing of nuclear weapons through joint practical and incremental measures that include definitions, benchmarks and transparency requirements for nuclear disarmament."

In 2008, Japan and Australia established the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND), an independent commission co-chaired by Yoriko Kawaguchi, former Foreign Minister of Japan, and Gareth Evans, former Foreign Minister of Australia, to reinvigorate international nonproliferation and disarmament efforts, and to help shape a consensus at the then-upcoming 2010 NPT Review Conference. The ICNND's final report, containing 76 recommendations, was issued in December 2009, advocating a phased approach toward a nuclear weapons free world. [27]

An initiative undertaken by four former high ranking U.S. officials — George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn — has created significant momentum. The four statesmen originally published their proposals in a 4 January 2007 Wall Street Journal op-ed, "A World Free of Nuclear Weapons," followed by another op-ed, "Toward a Nuclear Weapon Free World," a year later. This initiative came at a critical juncture, with the international community facing new and ongoing nuclear threats, when no new significant arms control reductions between the United States and Russia were being pursued. [28] In addressing the "tremendous dangers" presented by nuclear weapons, the four statesmen argued that "U.S. leadership will be required to take the world to the next stage - to a solid consensus for reversing reliance on nuclear weapons globally as a vital contribution to preventing their proliferation into potentially dangerous hands, and ultimately ending them as a threat to the world." They called on the leaders of the countries in possession of nuclear weapons "to turn the goal of a world without nuclear weapons into a joint enterprise." Such a joint enterprise, they considered, "would lend additional weight to efforts already underway to avoid the emergence of a nuclear-armed North Korea and Iran."

The important role of disarmament and nonproliferation education in promoting and facilitating nuclear disarmament must also be recognized, as evinced by the adoption of UN General Assembly Resolution 57/60 in November 2002. Education and training will remain vital to the success of future disarmament initiatives.

Sources:
[1] "World Nuclear Forces," in SIPRI Yearbook 2011: Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 320-359.
[2] Robert S. Norris and Hans Kristensen, "U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, 2011," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February 2011, pp. 64-73, www.thebulletin.org.
[3] NPT full text, www.nti.org.
[4] Hans M Kristensen, "United States Removes Nuclear Weapons from German Base, Documents Indicate," Strategic Security Blog, 9 July 2007, www.fas.org.
[5] "Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (NWFZ) Clearinghouse," James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 28 April 2010, http://cns.miis.edu.
[6] NPT full text, www.nti.org.
[7] Statement by the President of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, NPT/CONF. 1995/PV.19, 13 May 1995, www.un.org.
[8] 2000 NPT Review Conference Final Document, www.nti.org.
[9] Rebecca Johnson, "Politics and Protection: Why the 2005 NPT Review Conference Failed," Disarmament Diplomacy 80 (Autumn 2005), www.acronym.org.uk.
[10] "Remarks by President Barack Obama," The White House Office of the Press Secretary, 5 April 2009, www.whitehouse.gov.
[11] William Potter, Patricia Lewis, Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, and Miles Pomper, "The 2010 NPT Review Conference: Deconstructing Consensus," James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 17 June 2010, http://cns.miis.edu.
[12] NPT 2010 Review Conference Final Document, http://cns.miis.edu.
[13] "World Nuclear Forces," in SIPRI Yearbook 2011: Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 320-359.
[14] The United States and Article VI: A Record of Accomplishment by Thomas D'Agostino, Administrator, NNSA at the Conference on Disarmament, 7 February 2008, www.reachingcriticalwill.org.
[15] "Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review," Prime Minister of the United Kingdom by Command of Her Majesty (London: Crown Copyright, 2010); "The French White Paper on Defence and National Security," Presidency of the Republic of France, 5 December 2008, www.cfr.org.
[16] "World Nuclear Forces," in SIPRI Yearbook 2011: Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 320-359.
[17] "U.S.-Soviet/Russian Nuclear Arms Control," Arms Control Today 32 (June 2002), www.armscontrol.org.
[18] Amy F. Woolf, "The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions," Congressional Research Service, 18 June 2010, www.crs.gov.
[19] The other seven states that have yet to ratify the CTBT include the DPRK, India, Pakistan, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran and Israel. "Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty," Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, http://cns.miis.edu.
[20] Ray Acheson, "The Conference on Disarmament in 2009: Could do Better," Disarmament Diplomacy 91 (Summer 2009), www.acronym.org.uk.
[21] The Shannon Mandate, as contained in CD/1299, was agreed upon in March 1995 as the basis for negotiations of a FMCT. Document text, www.reachingcriticalwill.org.
[22] John Burroughs, "Reaching Nuclear Disarmament," in Beyond arms control: challenges and choices for nuclear disarmament, ed. Ray Acheson (New York: Reaching Critical Will, 2010), pp. 161-162.
[23] The most recent resolution A/RES/65/59 was entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments"
[24] "About MPI," Middle Powers Initiative, www.middlepowers.org, 8 August 2011.
[25] Find more about Japan's disarmament initiative on Japan's nuclear overview, www.nti.org.
[26] At the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, the state parties agreed to extend the treaty indefinitely as part of a package of decisions that included the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament and the program of action on nuclear disarmament contained therein. The program of action included the conclusion and early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test ban Treaty (CTBT); the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT); and the determined pursuit by the NWS of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons.
[27] "Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policy Makers," ICNND Final Report, www.icnnd.org.
[28] "Toward a World Free of Nuclear Weapons," Wall Street Journal Op-Ed, George P Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn, January 15, 2008.; "A World Free of Nuclear Weapons: Wall Street Journal Op-Ed, George P Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn, January 4, 2007.