Regional Overview

The South Asia region includes eight countries (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka). These countries possess a diverse spectrum of technological capabilities and face a range of challenges from NBC proliferation and terrorism. The region remains critical to the implementation of UNSCR 1540 because it has growing nuclear arsenals and stockpiles of fissile material; known terrorist and separatist activities; porous and often ill-defined borders; and is in close proximity to key global shipping lanes.

NBC Capabilities and Technological Status

Three countries in the region (India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh) operate facilities and possess materials that present a proliferation risk. However, there exists a wide and persistent gap between the NBC capabilities of two countries in South Asia and those of the remaining six. Both India and Pakistan have advanced capabilities in research and production of NBC and missile-related materials and technology. With regard to nuclear weapons, the evidence is clear: India continues to develop a triad of nuclear capable delivery systems, and Pakistan possesses the "world's fastest growing nuclear stockpile" of fissile material.[1]

Bangladesh operates a light water research reactor and has expressed an interest in establishing a civilian nuclear power program.[2] To that end, Bangladesh signed an intergovernmental agreement with Russia in May 2010 providing the legal framework for nuclear cooperation. [3] Bangladeshi officials have subsequently concluded contracts with ROSATOM for the provision of two medium-sized nuclear power plants. Construction is expected to begin in 2013, and the first plant is expected to be operational by 2018. [4] Bangladesh has negotiated a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and ratified the Additional Protocol (AP).[5]

One country that does not currently operate facilities or possess materials that present a proliferation risk but may do so in the future is Sri Lanka. In 2010, Sri Lanka commissioned its Atomic Energy Authority to explore the feasibility of nuclear power generation beginning in 2025 and sent scientists and technical experts to Russia for training.[6] In 2011, Sri Lanka announced the establishment of an Atomic Energy Regulatory Council to facilitate the introduction of nuclear power generation in the country.[7]

While New Delhi and Islamabad maintain industrial bases capable of supporting chemical and biological weapons programs, India verifiably destroyed its declared chemical weapons arsenal in 2009 under the supervision of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), and Pakistan is not known to possess offensive programs of this nature.[8]

With regard to missile capabilities, India's strategic missile program has matured to the point where short- and medium-range ballistic missiles can now be deployed against Pakistan and China. In April 2012 India successfully tested the Agni-V, a nuclear-capable ballistic missile with a range approaching the 5,500 km required for the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) designation.[9] Pakistan currently fields short- and medium-range ballistic missiles capable of striking most of India.

Internal Security and Terrorist Threats

Terrorist and insurgent violence is a common feature of many South Asian countries. A number of groups included on the U.S. Department of State's "List of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO)" are active in five of the eight countries in the region (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka). [10] The most active groups located in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India generally promote Islamic fundamentalist political ideology and, while the weighting of priorities is variable, remain dedicated to the annexation of Indian Kashmir and the expulsion of Coalition forces from Afghanistan.[11] India also contends with numerous attacks from Maoist Naxalite insurgents each year. Large ungoverned spaces along the Afghan border in Pakistan's North West Frontier and Federally Administered Tribal Areas, as well as porous and ill-defined borders in Jammu and Kashmir have enabled terrorist organizations to plan and execute cross-border attacks against the governments of Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and Coalition forces.

Organizations of concern, including Lashkar E-Tayyiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), and Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), serve as force multipliers for Al Qaeda (AQ) in the region.[12] In September 2012 U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton requested that the Haqqani Network be added to the FTO list.[13] The increasing frequency and intensity of terrorist violence in Pakistan has called into question the Pakistani government's ability to effectively secure its nuclear arsenal, materials, and related facilities. On 16 August 2012 terrorists launched an attack on the Aeronautical Complex at Kamra, 45 miles northwest of Islamabad.[14] The airbase is believed to serve both conventional military and nuclear functions. This was the third such attack on Kamra since 2007.

Illicit Trafficking

Illicit trafficking in NBC materials is of particular concern in South Asia because of the presence of sensitive technologies, active terrorist organizations, porous and ill-defined borders, and the region's location between two major sea lanes of communication: the Strait of Hormuz and the Malacca Straits. Two of the top fifty container ports, as measured by volume, are located in the region (Jawaharlal Nehru, India and Colombo, Sri Lanka).[15]

According to the Database on Nuclear Smuggling, Theft and Orphan Radiation Sources (DTSO), there were nine recorded trafficking cases involving uranium ore, yellowcake and low enriched uranium (LEU) in India between 1993 and 2005.[16] Relying on open source information, the NTI Trafficking Collection documents an additional eight cases of theft and attempted trafficking in India between 2008 and 2011.[17] Most instances of uranium theft seem to have occurred at local facilities in the northeastern states of Assam and Meghalaya, the location of India's most productive uranium mines.[18] A joint analysis by the Royal United Services Institute and the Observer Research Foundation detailing the security risks posed by chemical, biological, and radiological materials in India found a vast gap between large- and small-scale industrial operations in terms of their security perceptions and the measures undertaken to mitigate the risk of theft and trafficking. [19] Much of this illicit material was discovered along the border with Bangladesh.

Since the revelation of A.Q. Khan's international nuclear smuggling network in 2003, Pakistan has been viewed as a major hub of illicit trafficking in nuclear technology. The so-called "father" of Pakistan's nuclear bomb recalibrated the clandestine import operation for Pakistan's weapons program into a sophisticated export operation for personal profit. Khan's network managed to elude detection by the intelligence community, exploit weaknesses in export control systems, and recruit a number of suppliers, including some operating in Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) member states.[20] The network is known to have assisted Libya, North Korea, Iran and Iraq with their illicit nuclear ambitions. Many analysts believe that the Pakistani intelligence service (ISI) was at least aware of, if not actively assisting, the Khan network. David Albright and Corey Hinderstein maintain that the Khan network "could not have evolved into such a dangerous supplier without the utter corruption and dishonesty of successive Pakistani governments."[21]

International Treaties and Agreements

Regional participation in the major arms control and disarmament-related treaties is extensive for chemical and biological weapons nonproliferation, but suffers key gaps vis-à-vis nuclear proliferation. All states in the region are members of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and only Nepal has failed to ratify Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). While all other states in the region are non-nuclear weapon state parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), however, neither India nor Pakistan are members of the treaty. Both have active nuclear weapons programs, and neither are members of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

The countries in South Asia who possess nuclear facilities (Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan), have joined two out of three conventions relating to the protection of nuclear materials and facilities. These include the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS), but not the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management (JC). Those countries in the region that have elected not to participate in the above conventions do not possess relevant materials or facilities to protect. Additionally, as a result of the nuclear deal with the United States, India was able to conclude an item-specific safeguards agreement with the IAEA on 1 August 2008, and received an exemption from the Nuclear Suppliers Group's standard export prerequisites on 6 September 2008.[22]

While both Afghanistan and Sri Lanka are listed as participants in the U.S. Department of State's Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),[23] neither country is heavily engaged in its activities. Both Pakistan and Sri Lanka have ports under the Container Security Initiative (CSI), a program that allows officials from U.S. Customs and Border Protection to examine high-risk maritime cargo at foreign seaports before they are loaded on vessels destined for the United States.[24] Both of the above-mentioned initiatives address obligations devolving from operative paragraphs 3c and 10 of UNSCR 1540, and allow for some indirect capacity-building opportunities related to implementation of the resolution.

UNSCR 1540 Implementation

All eight countries in South Asia have submitted national reports to the 1540 Committee, though these reports vary dramatically in terms of their quality and comprehensiveness.[25] With the exception of India and Pakistan, most reports simply highlight each country's non-possession of NBC weapons, reaffirm membership in and support for the major nonproliferation and disarmament-related treaties, and list national legislation that is often archaic and seldom more than tangentially relevant to the spread of NBC materials to non-state actors.

In September 2004, following the April adoption of UNSCR 1540, India promulgated an ordinance to amend the "Unlawful Activities Prevention Act" of 1967, which enhanced penalties for the "unauthorized possession of any bomb, dynamite, or hazardous explosive substance capable of mass destruction or biological or chemical substance of warfare."[26] No other country in the region has revised old legislation or promoted new legislation specifically addressing the possession or distribution of NBC materials.

Export Controls and Related Measures

The two countries in the region with the most advanced NBC capabilities are also the countries with the most developed export control systems. This is a relatively recent development. India began to develop and institutionalize a structured system of export controls in the early 1990s, when mature scientific, technological and industrial capacities made it a producer and end-user of sensitive dual-use material, equipment and technologies. An inter-ministerial group finalized the first control list in 1993, called "Special Materials, Equipment and Technology (SMET)."[27] On 1 April 2000, the Director General of Foreign Trade announced an updated control list of "Special Chemicals, Organisms, Materials, Equipment and Technologies (SCOMET)."[28] India significantly expanded the scope of its export controls in 2005 with the "WMD and their Delivery Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities) Act."[29] In October 2008, U.S. President George W. Bush signed the U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act. Since then, India has sought membership in the four main multilateral export control regimes: the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group (AG), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA). To that end, India has begun to harmonize its domestic system with the guidelines and practices of those regimes.[30]

Following UNSCR 1540, Pakistan announced new comprehensive national legislation on 23 September 2004 entitled the "Export Control on Goods, Technology, Material and Equipment Related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their Delivery Systems Act."[31] This law called for comprehensive control lists, including a catch-all provision; created an Oversight Board; and included licensing and record keeping provisions. Implementation proceeded slowly. In October 2005, Pakistan promulgated a control list incorporating items included by the NSG, Australia Group (AG), and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). In April 2007, Pakistan established the Strategic Export Control Division (SECDIV) within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. SECDIV is responsible for formulating and implementing export control regulations.[32] Pakistan last updated the control lists in October 2011.[33]

Regional Outreach

A number of international organizations and donor states have conducted outreach activities in South Asia to address limited capacity and facilitate the full implementation of UNSCR 1540. The 1540 Committee hosted a "Workshop on Implementing UNSCR 1540 in South Asia" in Colombo (Sri Lanka, 2009).[34] In 2011, the Committee hosted an additional event in the United States designed to train Afghan officials on national reporting as it related to UNSCR 1540 and a number of other Security Council resolutions.[35] Conscious of the need to demonstrate responsibility commensurate with their capabilities, both India and Pakistan have offered assistance through the Committee website.[36] However, no country in the region has requested assistance through this matching mechanism.

Despite the lack of assistance requests through 1540 Committee channels, the United States has provided assistance to align export control systems in South Asia (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka) with international standards through the Department of State Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS) Program.[37] This assistance includes technical exchanges, the provision of inspection and interdiction equipment, training, and regional seminars to promote best practices.

The IAEA has hosted numerous training courses in the region on both "Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities and Materials" and "Response to Illicit Trafficking Incidents Involving Nuclear and Other Radioactive Materials." Additionally, the OPCW has organized a number of regional "Workshops for Customs Authorities on the Technical Aspects of the Transfers Regime," focusing on improving the capacity of CWC member states to track transfers of scheduled chemicals. New Delhi hosted the latest installment in December 2012.[38]

Few if any opportunities exist for 1540 cooperation through regional organizations in South Asia. While the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) generally exhibits a tendency towards timidity on security issues, the organization has previously embraced regional conventions in recognition of obligations devolving from UN Security Council Resolutions. Citing UNSCR 1373 (2001), SAARC signed into law an Additional Protocol to its "Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism" at the 12th SAARC Summit in Islamabad in January 2004.[39]

Regional Progress and Challenges

Growing nuclear arsenals and stockpiles of fissile materials; widespread terrorist and insurgent activity; porous and often ill-defined borders; and proximity to key global shipping lanes make implementation of UNSCR 1540 in South Asia critical to the larger mission of preventing the proliferation of NBC weapons and related technologies.

The IAEA and the OPCW have hosted numerous workshops in South Asia to address the demonstrated need for capacity-building in physical protection of NBC-related materials and strategic trade controls. These ongoing efforts must be continued and strengthened. 1540 supporters in the international community can emphasize how securing trade in sensitive materials, improving port security, and strengthening border controls can have an overarching positive effect on economic growth for the South Asia region.

Given the current state of the relationship between Pakistan and India, few if any opportunities exist for 1540 cooperation through regional fora. Despite these political challenges, Pakistan and India should be encouraged to demonstrate responsibility commensurate with their capabilities. Taking a leadership role on full implementation of UNSCR 1540 on the sub-continent would go a long way towards repairing the reputational damage suffered by both countries in the aftermath of the May 1998 nuclear tests and the disclosures of the A.Q. Khan network's activities.

Sources:
[1] Hans Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, "Indian Nuclear Forces 2012," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 2012, pp. 96-101; Hans Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, "Pakistan's Nuclear Forces 2011," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 2011, pp. 91-99.
[2] "Emerging Nuclear Energy Countries," World Nuclear Association, September 2012, www.world-nuclear.org.
[3 "Emerging Nuclear Energy Countries," World Nuclear Association, September 2012, www.world-nuclear.org.
[4] "Emerging Nuclear Energy Countries," World Nuclear Association, September 2012, www.world-nuclear.org.
[5] "Conclusion of Additional Protocols: Status as of 24 October 2012," International Atomic Energy Agency, www.iaea.org.
[6] "Landmark Events of the Atomic Energy Authority of Sri Lanka," Atomic Energy Authority, updated 18 November 2011, atomic.atsrilank.com; "Emerging Nuclear Energy Countries," World Nuclear Association, September 2012, www.world-nuclear.org.
[7] "Sri Lanka to Establish an Atomic Energy Regulatory Council," ColomboPage, 23 June 2011, www.colombopage.com; "Emerging Nuclear Energy Countries," World Nuclear Association, September 2012, www.world-nuclear.org.
[8] "Update on Chemical Demilitarisation,"Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 21 April 2009, www.opcw.org.
[9] "India test launches Agni-V long-range missile," BBC News, 19 April 2012, www.bbc.co.uk
[10] "Foreign Terrorist Organizations," United States Department of State (Bureau of Counterterrorism), 27 January 2012, www.state.gov.
[11] "Foreign Terrorist Organizations," United States Department of State (Bureau of Counterterrorism), 27 January 2012, www.state.gov.
[12] "Foreign Terrorist Organizations," United States Department of State (Bureau of Counterterrorism), 27 January 2012, www.state.gov.
[13] "US to Designate Haqqani Network as Terror Group," BBC News, 7 Sept 2012, www.bbc.co.uk.
[14] "Militants Attack Pakistan Nuclear Air Base," The Daily Telegraph, 16 August 2012, www.telegraph.co.uk.
[15] "Top 50 World Container Ports," World Shipping Council, www.worldshipping.org.
[16] Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the Rise of Proliferation Networks (IISS Strategic Dossier, 2007), p. 130.
[17] "NIS Trafficking Collection," 2 October 2012, www.nti.org.
[18] Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the Rise of Proliferation Networks (IISS Strategic Dossier, 2007), p. 130.
[19] "Chemical, Biological and Radiological Materials: An Analysis of Security Risks and Terrorist Threats in India," Joint Study by the Royal United Services Institute and the Observer Research Foundation, 2012, p. 67.
[20] David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, "Unraveling the A.Q. Khan and Future Proliferation Networks," The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2005, p. 112.
[21] David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, "Unraveling the A.Q. Khan and Future Proliferation Networks," The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2005, p. 119.
[22] Wade Boese, "NSG, Congress Approve Nuclear Trade with India," Arms Control Today, October 2008, www.armscontrol.org; International Atomic Energy Agency, "India Safeguards Agreement Signed," Press Release, 2 February 2009, www.iaea.org.
[23] U.S. Department of State, "Proliferation Security Initiative Participants," www.state.gov.
[24] "Container Security Initiative Ports," U.S. Department of Homeland Security, www.dhs.gov.
[25] "National Reports," 1540 Committee, www.un.org.
[26] "India's National Report to the 1540 Committee," 1540 Committee, 6 December 2004, www.un.org.
[27] "India's National Report to the 1540 Committee," 1540 Committee, 6 December 2004, www.un.org.
[28] "India's National Report to the 1540 Committee," 1540 Committee, 6 December 2004, www.un.org.
[29] "India's Export Controls: Current Status and Possible Changes on the Horizon," SECURUS Strategic Trade Solutions, 2011, www.securustrade.com.
[30] "India's Export Controls: Current Status and Possible Changes on the Horizon," SECURUS Strategic Trade Solutions, 2011, www.securustrade.com.
[31] IAEA, "Communication of 17 October 2011 from the Permanent Mission of Pakistan to the Agency concerning the Export Control Policies of the Government of Pakistan and a Statutory Regulatory Order," INFCIRC/832, 30 November 2011, www.iaea.org; "Pakistan's National Report to the 1540 Committee," 1540 Committee, 5 November 2004, www.un.org.
[32] Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Prime Minister approves the Establishment of Strategic Export Control Division (SECDIV) in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs," 30 April 2007, www.mofa.gov.pk.
[33] Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Pakistan Notifies Revised Control Lists Under The Export Control Act of 2004," 19 October 2011, www.mofa.gov.pk.
[34] 1540 Committee, "Event List and Related Documents," United Nations, www.un.org.
[35] 1540 Committee, "Event List and Related Documents," United Nations, www.un.org.
[36] 1540 Committee, "Summary Offers of Assistance from Member States," United Nations, www.un.org.
[37] Justin Friedman, "The Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) Program," U.S. Department of State, www.exportcontrol.org.
[38] "OPCW Calendar of Events," Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, www.opcw.org.
[39] "Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism and Its Additional Protocol," SAARC, www.saarc-sec.org.