Most of China's existing nuclear delivery systems were designed in the 1960s and 1970s, and it is currently in the process of modernizing many of its missile systems. At the same time, it has maintained a nuclear doctrine based on a minimum deterrent, as emphasized in the 2010 Chinese Defense White Paper: “China remains committed to the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, pursues a self-defensive nuclear strategy, and will never enter into a nuclear arms race with any other country."[2] Beijing has portrayed current modernizations as updates, rather than additions, to its missile force, with a special focus on enhancing the survivability of its nuclear deterrent.

U.S. policymakers have often voiced concern over China's transfers of missile components and related technology to nations of concern, most notably Iran and Pakistan.[3] In 2002, China issued missile-related export control regulations and a control list, which was mostly in accordance with the control list issued by Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).[4] Beijing has engaged in consultation with the MTCR and in 2004 applied to join the regime, but its application has so far been blocked by current members, particularly the United States, who believe that China's missile-related export controls are still too weak.[5]

Capabilities

See Table: Design Characteristics of China’s Ballistic and Cruise Missile Inventory

History

Ballistic Missiles
The vast majority of China's nuclear-capable missile force is land-based, and much of China's nuclear delivery system modernization has been focused in this area. China has several types of operational land-based systems that are nuclear-capable: the medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) Dongfeng (DF)-3 and DF-21/21A, intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) DF-4, and inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) DF-5/5A and DF-31/31A.[6] China also has deployed nuclear capable short-range DF-11 and DF-15 missiles; however, most of China's estimated 1,000 short-range missiles are aimed at Taiwan and unlikely to be armed with nuclear warheads.[7]

China is currently in the process of modernizing its ballistic missile inventory. The upgraded version of the DF-3 — first deployed in 1971 — is the new DF-21/21A; the upgraded versions of the DF-4 — which started operation in 1981 — are the DF-21 and DF-31; and the upgraded version of the DF-5/5A — deployed in 1981 — is the DF-31A.[8] The DF-31 and DF-31A, deployed in 2006 and 2007 respectively, are both road-mobile, solid-fueled missiles and have shortened launch preparation times.[9] In this sense, the new additions can be seen as more survivable replacements in order to maintain China’s nuclear deterrent. However, it is unclear whether the older missiles will continue to be deployed alongside the newer ones, which would amount to a quantitative increase in China’s ballistic missile arsenal.

Furthermore, China is developing ballistic missile defense countermeasures including “maneuvering re-entry vehicles (MaRV), multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRV), decoys, chaff, jamming, thermal shielding, and ASAT weapons.”[10] There is speculation that China could use a DF-31-type re-entry vehicle for a MRV payload sometime in the near future. The DF-31 and JL-2 will also likely employ GPS technology for improved accuracy. This will strengthen China's deterrent and enhance its strategic strike capabilities.

Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles
China's first ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) the Xia-class, or Type-092, has not been actively deployed. It first became operational in 1981 and has since undergone numerous refits. In 2008, China's single Xia-class SSBN left dry dock at the Jianggezhuang Naval Base near Qingdao, on China's eastern coast, where it had undergone a multi-year overhaul.[11] However, whether it will finally become operational or function as a test platform remains uncertain. The Xia-class submarine can deploy 12 JL-1 missiles, which are China's first generation of operational submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM).[12]

China has recently launched its Jin-class or Type-094 SSBNs, which are expected to replace the Xia-class. It is believed that these new SSBNs will have 12 launch tubes each and will deploy a longer range SLBM known as the Julang-2 (JL-2) that is the sea-based version of the DF-31.[13] Two Jin-class SSBNs appear to be ready for deployment, but difficulties with the JL-2 SLBMs require further flight tests, delaying the deployment of the submarines.[14] A next-generation undersea deterrent would give Beijing the strategic option to hedge against sudden shifts in the international security environment.[15] However, it remains uncertain which strategy Chinese leaders will follow regarding the People’s Liberation Army’s Navy (PLAN)'s future SSBN flotilla.

Cruise Missiles
China is currently developing and testing several different models of land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs). China's first LACM was ground-launched. The Hongniao-1 (HN-1) has a range of 600 km and can carry a 300 to 400 kg conventional warhead or a 90 kT nuclear warhead. The HN-1 is believed to use inertial guidance with terrain comparison or GPS updates. An improved version, the DH-10, has an increased range of 1,500 to 1,800 km and can be ground- or ship-launched.[16] It is estimated that 200-500 DH-10 missiles are deployed as of 2009, and while they may be capable of fielding a nuclear warhead, they currently appear to be conventionally armed.[17]

Anti-Ship Missiles
As a part of China's anti-access strategy it is also developing an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) based on a variant of the DF-21 MRBM (DF-21D). In a cross-strait conflict this could counter third party intervention. The missile has a range of 1,500 km, is armed with a maneuverable warhead, and is intended to provide China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) the capability to attack ships at sea, including aircraft carriers in the western Pacific Ocean.[18] With regard to anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), “The PLA Navy has or is acquiring nearly a dozen ASCM variants, ranging from the 1950s-era CSS-N-2 to the modern Russian-made SS-N-22 and SS-N-27B.”[19]

Chinese Missile Exports and the MTCR
While China in the past has transferred missile technology to countries of proliferation concern such as Pakistan, Iran, Syria, Iraq, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and North Korea, Beijing has taken steps to develop and strengthen its export control legal infrastructure. Nevertheless, concerns remain about Chinese enforcement of these new rules.

In its missile sales, as with its conventional arms sales in general, China's official policy states that the weapons being exported:
(1) Must be meant for legitimate self-defense;
(2) Must contribute to regional stability; and
(3) Must not be intended for interference in another country's internal affairs.[20]

China developed the “M” class of short-range ballistic missiles for export in the 1980s as a source of hard currency to continue funding defense research and development during the early stages of the country’s economic reform.[21]  Sales included transfers of M-11 (DF-11) missiles and technology to Pakistan, M-9 (DF-15) missiles and technology to Syria, and DF-3 missiles to Saudi Arabia.[22]  Although Beijing began to make commitments to nuclear nonproliferation during this period, it was less concerned about missiles, which are inefficient weapons without nuclear warheads.  It viewed the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) as a discriminatory tool by a small group of developed countries, who continued to sell other delivery systems such as combat aircraft while restricting sales of ballistic missiles, in which developing countries such as China had invested heavily.[23]

However, in the 1990s China's views on missile nonproliferation slowly began to change. In response to U.S. pressure, including sanctions imposed in 1991 for transfers of missiles and technology to Pakistan, and Syria, China issued a unilateral pledge to abide by MTCR guidelines.[24] Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, the United States intermittently placed sanctions on China or Chinese entities for missile-related transfers to countries of proliferation concern, while also occasionally lifting sanctions in response to Chinese pledges with regard to export controls and MTCR guidelines.[25]

In a major policy development, China promulgated the long-awaited regulations on missile-related transfers in August 2002 entitled Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Export Control of Missiles and Missile-related Items and Technologies, and Missiles and Missile-related Items and Technologies Export Control List. These regulations appeared to demonstrate Beijing's increasing willingness to abide by international norms at controlling missile trade.[26] The 2002 regulations and control list were relatively comprehensive and in some fields are stricter than MTCR guidelines. The regulations also follow the MTCR's "presumption of denial" approach, requiring specific approval and an export license for exports to authorized end-users.[27]

In September 2003, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing indicated to the chair of the MTCR that China was ready to positively consider membership in the MTCR. In a statement at the Plenary for the 2004 session of the Conference on Disarmament, Ambassador Hu Xiaodi announced the start of the first round of China-MTCR dialogues in Paris.[28] According to Liu Jianchao, the Spokesman of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China reaffirmed its willingness to join the MTCR in the second round of China-MTCR dialogues.[29] However, a number of MTCR member states, most notably the United States, have blocked China's entry into the suppliers’ regime. Washington's hesitation to admit China to the MTCR stems from anxiety about Beijing's unwillingness or inability to fully enforce their domestic laws.[30]

Recent Developments and Current Status

China continues to actively develop new missile technologies such as highly accurate cruise missiles and anti-ship ballistic missiles, as well as to modernize its existing ballistic missile arsenal by introducing newer versions that have longer ranges, increased accuracy, and increased survivability.[31] Within the past half-decade it has deployed the DF-31 and DF-31A road-mobile ICBMs, the DH-10 LACM, and tested an anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon. It is also developing the DF-21D ASBM and the JL-2 SLBM. With this modernization, Beijing seeks to increase its capability to shape and respond to the dynamic security environment.

Despite the continued existence of export control legislation in China that aligns with MTCR guidelines, China is not a member of the regime, and Chinese entities continue to proliferate missile-related technology, including to Iran and Pakistan.[32] The trend in these proliferation activities has been toward “more ambiguous technical assistance (vs. transfers of hardware), longer range missiles, more indigenous capabilities, and secondary (i.e., retransferred) proliferation.”[33]

Sources:
[1] U.S. Department of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” 2011, www.defense.gov.
[2] Information Office, State Council of the People's Republic of China, "China's National Defense in 2010," Editor Wang Guanqun, March 2011, www.xinhuanet.com.
[3] U.S. Department of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” 2011, www.defense.gov.
[4] “外交部：防扩散合作将成为中美关系亮点 [Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Nonproliferation Cooperation will be the Highlight of China-U.S. Relations],” Sina News, 20 November 2002, http://news.sina.com.cn.
[5] Shirley A. Kan, “China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues,” CRS Report RL31555, 21 May 2006, via: www.fas.org.
[6] Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2010,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 66(6), p. 135-136, http://bos.sagepub.com.
[7] U.S. Department of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2009,” www.defense.gov.
[8] Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2010,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 66(6), p. 135-136, http://bos.sagepub.com.
[9] U.S. Department of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” 2011, www.defense.gov.
[10] U.S. Department of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2009,” www.defense.gov.
[11] Hans M. Kristensen, “China’s Xia-Class SSBN Leaves Dry Dock,” FAS Strategic Security Blog, 3 August 2008, www.fas.org.
[12] “Type 092 Xia Class SSBN,” GlobalSecurity.org, www.globalsecurity.org.
[13] Robert Sherman, “JL-2 (CSS-NX-4),” Federation of American Scientists, 3 September 1999, www.fas.org.
[14] Hans M. Kristensen, “China’s Bulava?” FAS Strategic Security Blog, 17 August 2010, www.fas.org; Hans M. Kristensen, “Chinese Jin-SSBNs Getting Ready?” FAS Strategic Security Blog, 2 June 2011, www.fas.org; and U.S. Department of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” 2011, www.defense.gov.
[15] Toshi Yoshihara, James R. Holmes, "China's New Undersea Nuclear Deterrent: Strategy, Doctrine, and Capabilities," Joint Force Quarterly, Issue 50, 3rd Quarter, 2008, pp. 31-38.
[16] "Land-Attack Cruise Missiles (LACM) Hong Niao/Chang Feng" in the China Nuclear Forces Guide, August 2002, www.globalsecurity.org; Duncan Lennox, "China's New Cruise Missile Programme 'Racing Ahead'," Jane's Defence Weekly, 12 January 2000, p. 12.
[17] Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2010,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 66(6), p. 135-136, http://bos.sagepub.com.
[18] "Ballistic Trajectory- China Develops New Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile," Jane’s Intelligence Review, 4 January 2010.
[19] U.S. Department of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” 2011, www.defense.gov.
[20] Zhou Rong, Speech at the 5th International Defence Exhibition and Seminar, South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI), 24-28 November 2008, www.sassi.org.
[21] Hua Di, "China's Case: Ballistic Missile Proliferation," in The International Missile Bazaar: The New Suppliers' Network, ed. William C. Potter and Harlan W. Jencks (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), p. 164.
[22] Hua Di, "China's Case: Ballistic Missile Proliferation," in The International Missile Bazaar: The New Suppliers' Network, ed. William C. Potter and Harlan W. Jencks (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), p. 168-172.
[23] Hua Di, "China's Case: Ballistic Missile Proliferation," in The International Missile Bazaar: The New Suppliers' Network, ed. William C. Potter and Harlan W. Jencks (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), p. 176.
[24] R. Jeffrey Smith, "U.S. Lifts Sanctions against Chinese Firms," The Washington Post, 22 February 1992, p.A15, via: www.lexis-nexis.com.
[25] Shirley A. Kan, “China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues,” CRS Report RL31555, 21 May 2006, via: www.fas.org.
[26] Jing-Dong Yuan, "Missile Export Controls Significant Step for Beijing," South China Morning Post, 29 August 2002, via: http://cns.miis.edu; Philip P. Pan, "China Issues Rules on Missile Exports," The Washington Post, 26 August 2002, p. 11.
[27] Phillip Saunders, “Preliminary Analysis of Chinese Missile Technology Export Control List,” James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 6 September 2002, http://cns.miis.edu.
[28] “Statement by Mr. Hu Xiaodi, Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs of China, at the Plenary of the 2004 Session of the Conference on Disarmament (February 12, 2004, Geneva),” Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations Office at Geneva, 16 April 2004,  www.china-un.ch/eng/.
[29] “中方愿加入第二轮导弹及其技术控制制度对话会 [The Second Round of China-MTCR Dialogue],” Sohu News, 3 June 2004, http://news.sohu.com.
[30] Paul Kerr and Wade Boese, “China Seeks to Join Nuclear, Missile Control Groups,” Arms Control Today, March 2004, www.armscontrol.org.
[31] U.S. Department of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” 2011, www.defense.gov.
[32] Office of the Director of National Intelligence (U.S), “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, Covering 1 January to 31 December 2010,” www.dni.gov.
[33] Shirley A. Kan, “China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues,” CRS Report RL31555, 21 May 2006, via: www.fas.org.