History

Since ratification of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) on July 15, 1974, India has sought to improve its capabilities in biotechnology, largely in a peaceful capacity. India has a well-developed biotechnology infrastructure that utilizes well-trained scientists experienced with infectious diseases and numerous pharmaceutical production facilities and bio-containment laboratories (including BL-3). Some of India's facilities are dedicated to developing defensive measures to combat biological attacks, and these same facilities could theoretically provide offensive agents as well. India's expansive biotechnology infrastructure is centered at the Defense Research and Development Establishment (DRDE) at Gwalior.

The DRDE is the primary establishment for studies in toxicology and biochemical pharmacology and development of antibodies against several bacterial and viral agents. Work here centers on countering disease threats such as anthrax, brucellosis, cholera, plague, smallpox, viral hemorrhage fever, and botulism. Additionally, the Indian government has established nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) warfare directorates in the armed services, as well as an inter-Services coordination committee to monitor the program. The Indian Army has further established an NBC cell at Army Headquarters to study the effects of NBC warfare.

Agents and Delivery

Biotechnology was limited in India until approximately 20 years ago, when the Department of Science and Technology, Department of Biotechnology, Indian Council of Agricultural Research, and a number of private entrepreneurs began to search for means to improve crop yields and seed production. India's need for increases in crop production was especially high, with a significant portion of the population unable to obtain suitable nourishment. India soon made great strides with wheat, pulses, and soy bean hybridization, and as a result food production in India increased from 50 million tons a year in 1950 to about 200 millions tons each year in the last several years. In fact, the rate of crop production has increased proportionally with the rate of population growth, and India has become self-sufficient in certain foods.

Many of these advances were facilitated using extensive knowledge of genetic engineering, which in turn provided information on the de novo synthesis of biological agents. Whether such synthesis has actually been done is uncertain. India has made substantial efforts to prepare its military force for a biological attack. In December of 1998, India began to train its medical personnel to deal with the eventualities of such an attack. The director general of medical services at the time, Lt. Gen. R. Jayaswal, facilitated the Army Medical Corps' restructuring. This change incorporated a three-tiered training program for doctors and paramedical personnel.

The Indian army in April 1999 called for the formation of a National Infrastructure Cell to assess threats, implement and monitor countermeasures, and develop ways to rapidly warn potential targets of impending or ongoing attacks. The army further asked for the establishment of a National Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, comprising of scientists and government and private sector officials, to determine approaches to infrastructure defense and countermeasure formulation. In 2001, India increased the scope of its countermeasure capability after the Indian Postal Department received 17 "suspicious" letters believed to contain Bacillus anthracis spores. A Bio-Safety Level 2 (BSL-2) Laboratory was established at the Institute of Preventive Medicine to provide guidance in preparing the Indian government for a biological attack. B. anthracis is one of many pathogens studied at the institute, which also examines pathogens causing tuberculosis, typhoid, hepatitis B, rabies, yellow fever, Lassa fever, Ebola, and plague. However, representatives of the Indian Army's Medical Corps have publicly expressed reservations that Indian hospitals are not adequately prepared for events arising from biological attacks.

An organization called—the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), is developing the ability to deploy specially-trained first responders to the scene of a nuclear or biological attack. Four companies of CISF have been sanctioned, and specialized training is being imparted to some 400 personnel. This new elite force is deployed in four locations across the country: Ghaziabad to cater to Delhi and other northern areas, Ranchi to the east, Kota to the west, and Chennai to the south. About 13 officers of the unit have already undergone eight weeks of nuclear and biological response training in the United States, and others being trained will share skills with other CISF members in a train-the-trainer approach.

In 2001, several reported anthrax-related scares were reported in India. A number of individuals and institutions received envelopes containing white powder, but none ultimately tested positive for B. anthracis. The series of incidents is thought to have been a hoax undertaken by unknown perpetrators. However, by 2003, Indian security agencies became concerned that terrorist outfits could make use of ricin to launch biological attacks. These concerns grew after the discovery that Al Qaeda training manuals trained terrorists in the production and use of toxins such as ricin. In view of the terrorist attack on the Indian parliament in December 2002, an Indian parliamentary committee also considered plans for underground bunkers to protect members of parliament from a nuclear and biological attack. In an apparent follow-up to some of these concerns, Indian Home Minister Shivraj Patil indicated in August 2004 that Indian scientists were formulating a response to potential biological, chemical, and other non-conventional forms of terrorism. Indian authorities held a meeting in April 2006 to discuss preparation of the armed forces to fight in an environment created by nuclear, chemical, or biological war.

Status

India has ratified the BWC and pledges to abide by its obligations. There is no clear evidence, circumstantial or otherwise, that directly points toward an offensive BW program. New Delhi does possess the scientific capability and infrastructure to launch an offensive BW program, but has not chosen to do so. In terms of delivery, India also possesses the capability to produce aerosols and has numerous potential delivery systems ranging from crop dusters to sophisticated ballistic missiles. However, no information exists in the public domain suggesting interest by the Indian government in delivery of biological agents by these or any other means. To reiterate the latter point, in October 2002, Indian President A.P.J. Abdul Kalam asserted that "we [India] will not make biological weapons. It is cruel to human beings..."

However, Indian companies such as NEC Engineers Private Limited and Protech Consultants Private Limited have sold dual-use plant equipment to the former Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq in violation of the government's regulations. Both companies were sanctioned by the United States in 2003 for their potential role in contributing to Iraq's alleged chemical and biological weapons programs.

Sources:
[1] "How Biotech Improved Agriculture," The Hindu, 23 July 1998.
[2] The Defense Research and Development Organization website, available online at www.drdo.org, 20 May 2001.
[3] "Army Discounts-N-Attack But Goes Through Drill," The Times of India Online, 11 May 2001, www.timesofindia.com, 12 June 2001.
[4] "India Not To Make Biological Weapons: President," Press Trust of India, 28 October 2002; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 6 April 2005, www.lexis-nexis.com.
[5] "Defense Ministry Hasn't Replied to CAG: George," Times of India, 19 December 2002; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 6 April 2005, www.lexis-nexis.com.
[6] "India Establishes a Nuclear Command System," New York Times, 5 January 2003, www.nytimes.com.
[7] "In the Name of an NBC Attack," Economic Times, 10 November 2002; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 6 April 2005, www.lexis-nexis.com.