Historical Overview

India's nuclear program was conceived in the pre-independence era by a small group of influential scientists who grasped the significance of nuclear energy, and persuaded political leaders from the Indian National Congress to invest resources in the nuclear sector. In the aftermath of independence in August 1947, the Congress government led by Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru launched an ambitious dual-use, three-stage nuclear program to exploit India's abundant natural thorium reserves. The primary focus of the program was the production of inexpensive electricity. However, the decision to develop the complete nuclear fuel cycle — ore mining, processing and fuel fabrication facilities, research and power reactors, spent-fuel reprocessing plants, heavy water production plants, and waste treatment and disposal facilities — also led to India's acquiring the technical capability to pursue nuclear weapons.[1]

India's defeat in the 1962 war with China, and the latter's 1964 nuclear test, triggered a debate within the Indian government over whether India should follow suit. Ultimately, in November 1964 Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri authorized theoretical work on the Subterranean Nuclear Explosion for Peaceful Purposes (SNEPP) project. [2] The SNEPP project culminated in the test of a fission device on 18 May 1974 during Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's tenure. India described the test as a peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE). However, India did not follow the 1974 test with subsequent tests, nor did it immediately weaponize the device design that it had tested. [3]

During the brief tenure of the Janata Party government (1977 to 1979), the nuclear weapons program was put on hold. India resumed its weapons program after Indira Gandhi returned to power in 1980. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi authorized preparations for additional nuclear tests in 1982, but the tests were canceled for reasons that have never been explained publicly.[4] However, in the late 1980s, advances in Pakistan's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons and the oblique nuclear threats issued by Islamabad in the wake of the 1986 to 1987 Brasstacks crisis appear to have persuaded Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to authorize weaponization of India's nuclear capability.[5]

By May 1994, India had acquired the capability to deliver nuclear weapons using combat aircraft; by 1996, Indian scientists had also succeeded in developing a nuclear warhead deliverable by the Army's Prithvi-1 ballistic missile. In the winter of 1995, in an apparent reaction to the indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and advances in negotiations on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Narasimha Rao government considered a crash program of nuclear tests. However, India's test preparations were detected by U.S. intelligence agencies, and the resultant U.S. diplomatic pressure convinced the Rao government to postpone the tests.[6]

Plans for testing were renewed when the Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) led by Atal Bihari Vajpayee came to power for a brief period in 1996. However, Vajpayee's government was unable to win a parliamentary majority and decided not to go through with the tests, as they would have created a political crisis for the incoming administration. When it returned to power in 1998, the BJP authorized two rounds of nuclear tests in May 1998, after which it formally declared India's nuclear status. Subsequent to the tests, the Vajpayee government declared that India would build a "credible minimum deterrent."[7] Successive Indian governments have formally articulated a nuclear doctrine of "no-first-use" and spelled out the broad outlines of India's nuclear command, control, and communications framework. India has put into place various delivery systems and extended the range of its missiles in line with its credible minimum deterrence doctrine. In recent years, India has placed increased importance on the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines to strengthen its nuclear deterrent.[8] Given the persistent threat from terrorist groups in the region, New Delhi has also focused on securing its nuclear facilities more effectively from the threat of a terrorist attack.[9]

The U.S.-India Nuclear Agreement and India's Participation in Nuclear Commerce

A key development in recent years has been the U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement, which was first unveiled in July 2005. This agreement and the subsequent endorsement of India's case by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) will enable India to engage in international nuclear trade. In return, New Delhi has agreed to allow safeguards on a select number of nuclear facilities that will be classified as "civilian" in purpose. The remaining "military" facilities will remain off-limits to international inspectors.

The agreement process required a number of steps, including passage of the Hyde Act by the U.S. Congress to authorize the United States government to negotiate a bilateral nuclear agreement with India (December 2006); adoption of a bilateral 123 agreement between India and the United States under the U.S. Atomic Energy Act [10]; approval of a safeguards agreement between India and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (August 2008); and an NSG waiver to its rules allowing Indian participation in nuclear trade (September 2008).[11]

In October 2008, the bilateral '123' nuclear cooperation agreement was approved by the U.S. Congress and signed into law by President George W. Bush. In March 2009, the IAEA formally approved the Additional Protocol (AP) to the Indian safeguards agreement, which differs in several ways from previous APs concluded between the Agency and other states.[12] India signed the safeguards agreement with the IAEA in February 2009, and subsequently the agreement was certified by the U.S. government in February 2010.[13]

The first two nuclear power plants, units at the Rajasthan Atomic Power Station (RAPS), have been formally placed under the safeguards agreement.[14] In October 2009, India announced a plan to put 14 out of its 22 nuclear reactors under IAEA safeguards by 2014.[15] In late July 2010, India and the United States signed a bilateral agreement on reprocessing spent fuel, in accordance with the '123' agreement between the two countries.[16] The adoption of appropriate legislation dealing with liability in case of a nuclear accident represented a significant challenge. In August 2010, after contentious debate, the Indian Parliament approved the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Bill. The bill imposes liability not only on nuclear facility operators, but also on the suppliers of nuclear equipment and materials in the event of an accident. [17] This clause has greatly concerned U.S. firms, which might find it difficult to obtain insurance coverage for such scenarios, making them less competitive than government-supported suppliers from other countries. [18]

Following the NSG waiver, India signed nuclear cooperation agreements involving the supply of nuclear reactors and uranium, with France (October 2008), Russia (December 2008), Namibia (August 2009), and Argentina (October 2009). India also plans to sign an agreement with Kazakhstan, under which the Central Asian state will provide uranium to India and in return India may build several medium-sized 200 to 300MW nuclear reactors for Kazakhstan. [19] Discussions on nuclear cooperation have also taken place with South Korea and Turkey.

The Indian Nuclear Fuel Complex (NFC) received the first batch of 60 tons of uranium from Areva in March 2009, under a December 2008 agreement between the French company and the NPCIL to supply India with 300 tons of uranium.[20] Additionally, the Russian company TVEL supplied a first batch of 30 tons of natural uranium fuel pellets to the NFC in April 2009.[21]

According to Indian officials, New Delhi could import up to 40 nuclear reactors in the next decade.[22] The U.S.-India Business Council stated that India might spend up to $175 billion to expand its nuclear sector in the next 25 years.[23] According to October 2008 reports, in the next five years, India will construct 21 nuclear power facilities, including six French reactors (1,600MW each), four Russian reactors (1,000MW each), and four American reactors (1,500MW each).[24]

In pursuit of these goals, agreements have already been struck with nuclear suppliers. In February 2009, the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL) and Areva concluded an agreement for the supply of two European Pressurized Reactors (EPR) of 1650MW each.[25] In March 2010, New Delhi and Moscow signed nuclear deals under which Russia will construct 12 nuclear plants in India.[26] In October 2009, New Delhi identified two locations, in the states of Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh that would host reactors constructed by GE Hitachi and Westinghouse. [27] However, given the constraints on any agreement imposed by the civil nuclear liability law, it is unclear whether U.S. companies will conclude any reactor supply deals in the near future.

New Delhi has approved NPCIL's identification of five locations across the country which will host about 30 nuclear plants.[28] A total of six reactors are currently under construction—work dating prior to the NSG waiver. These include two Russian reactors at Kudankulam, a 500MW fast breeder reactors at Kalpakkam, two 220MW PHWRs, and a 220MW unit at Kaiga.[29]

Capabilities

There is considerable controversy over the yield and reliability of India's nuclear devices. When India tested its first fission device in May 1974, Indian scientists claimed the device had a yield of about 12 kilotons (kt). However, that figure has been disputed by independent analysts who estimate that the yield was far lower, probably between 2 and 6kt.

Similar controversy surrounds India's May 1998 tests. After the first of round of tests on May 11, India's Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) announced that it had tested three nuclear devices: a fission device with a yield of 12kt; a thermonuclear device with a yield of 43kt; and a sub-kiloton device with a yield of 0.2kt. The figures were later revised to 45kt for the thermonuclear device and 15kt for the fission device. However, these figures have been disputed by independent analysts, who — citing evidence from seismic data — claim that the cumulative yield of the Indian tests was more likely between 20 and 30kt, the implications being that the thermonuclear test likely failed. Senior Indian scientists including P.K. Iyengar have also publicly suggested that it is likely that the fusion device only burned partially.

However, the former head of India's Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Dr. R. Chidambaram has claimed that a "post-shot" analysis of the Pokhran II tests confirmed that the May 1998 tests yielded about 60kt. Chidambaram subsequently asserted that the tests provided India with "the capability to design and fabricate nuclear weapons [in the range] of low-yields up to 200 kilotons." Following the May 11 tests, India carried out two tests of sub-kiloton devices on May 13 "to generate additional data for improved computer simulation of designs and for attaining the capability to carry out sub-critical experiments, if considered necessary."[30]

Controversy regarding the 1998 tests was provoked once again in 2009 following the assertion by K. Santhanam, field director during the 1998 tests, that the thermonuclear test had failed, leading to calls by some senior scientists that New Delhi should conduct another test and should not join the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).[31] In its response, the Indian government refuted these allegations, and reaffirmed its voluntary moratorium on tests.[32]

Fissile Material Stocks

The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists estimated in November 2008 that India has approximately 70 assembled warheads, with about 50 of them completely operational.[33] According to the 2010 SIPRI Yearbook, the Indian arsenal comprises 60 to 80 warheads. [34] The ranges of such estimates are generally dependent on estimates of India's stockpile of weapons-grade plutonium.[35]

The plutonium for India's nuclear stockpile is most likely obtained from two research reactors: the 40 megawatts (MW) CIRUS and the 100MW Dhruva, which went critical in 1960 and 1985, respectively. The CIRUS reactor is capable of producing 9 to 10 kilograms (kg) of weapons-grade plutonium annually; the corresponding figure for the Dhruva reactor is 20 to 25kg. The irradiated fuel from the reactors is probably reprocessed at either the Plutonium Reprocessing Plant in Trombay (50 tons per year) or the Kalpakkam Reprocessing Plant at Kalpakkam (100 to 125 tons per year). The Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) plans to construct additional enriched uranium-fueled Light Water Reactors (LWRs) for future nuclear submarines, while also increasing uranium enrichment capability through the construction of a new facility.[36]

According to published sources, India produces 20 to 40kg of plutonium annually and has probably accumulated 280 to 600kg of weapons-grade plutonium, enough to build 40 to 120 weapons. India also has a small stock of highly enriched uranium, but it is unclear if the HEU has been used to build nuclear weapons.

Custody, Command, and Control

India does not maintain a constituted nuclear force on a heightened state of alert. The nuclear-capable missiles, bombers, non-nuclear warhead assemblies, and fissile cores are maintained in a de-alerted state by their respective custodians — the individual armed services, the DRDO, and the DAE — with plans to reconstitute them rapidly during an emergency or national crisis.

India maintains a Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) at the apex of the command and control framework, which is controlled by the civilian authorities and includes the tri-service Strategic Forces Command (SFC), which administers the nuclear-capable missiles and aircraft.[36] However, despite the existence of the SFC, the actual control of the delivery systems remains with the individual services.[37]

Nuclear-Use Doctrine

India's primary goal is to achieve "economic, political, social, scientific, and technological development" and autonomy in domestic and strategic decision-making, in an environment free of coercion from either the threat or use of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. With these objectives in view the Indian government has adopted nuclear "no-first-use," or a doctrine of "retaliation only." The doctrine's central goal is to deter the threat of nuclear weapons use (subsequently revised to include chemical and biological weapons use), by any state or entity against India or its armed forces. In the event of deterrence failure, the doctrine states that India will resort to punitive strikes to inflict unacceptable losses on the adversary state or entity. However, India will not resort to the threat or use of nuclear weapons against states that do not possess nuclear (subsequently revised to include chemical and biological) weapons, or are not aligned with states that possess such capabilities.

The most recent review of India's nuclear posture, in 2007, recommended a "comprehensive and integrated nuclear defense capability," taking into account the persistent political instability in the region and China's continued nuclear cooperation with Pakistan.[38]

India and the Nonproliferation Regime

India remains steadfastly opposed to joining the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Since the late 1960s, a consensus has emerged in India that the NPT is an inequitable instrument that divides the world into "nuclear haves" and "have nots," and that the solution to the problem of nuclear proliferation is comprehensive global nuclear disarmament. Although India was initially one of the most enthusiastic supporters of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) when that treaty was first proposed in the 1950s, and was among the first to sign the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) in 1963, the Indian government's position has changed radically since that time. By the early 1990s, when negotiations on the CTBT rapidly moved towards a resolution, Indian elites came to regard the CTBT not as an instrument of controlling the nuclear arms race—its original goal—but rather as an instrument of nonproliferation that sought to freeze countries along the nuclear learning curve. However, after conducting nuclear tests in May 1998, the Indian government announced that it would abide by a self-imposed moratorium on further nuclear testing and declared that India would not be the first state to resume nuclear tests.

Despite some reservations, India has participated in discussions at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). In 2007, New Delhi stated that it would not impede movement on drafting an FMCT.[39] In general, India has asserted that it would support an FMCT that is "universal, non-discriminatory, and internationally and effectively verifiable."[40] Indian officials reiterated this position prior to the Conference on Disarmament session in New York in late September 2010. [41]

As a non-signatory to the NPT, India remains the target of nuclear supplier export controls. Although India is not a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, it formally abides by strict domestic export control laws and regulations to control the export of nuclear and related dual-use technologies. In this context, legislative mechanisms have been strengthened, such as through the "Weapons of Mass Destruction and their Delivery Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities) Act 2005," officially notified in June 2005. Additionally, under the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act 1992, the Indian government banned transfers of any technology and products that could assist Iran's nuclear weapons and delivery systems programs.[42]

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[4] George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (University of California Press: Berkeley, 1991), pp. 242-244.
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