While the Shah of Iran initiated a rudimentary missile program in the 1970s, the Iran-Iraq war precipitated the beginning of large-scale Iranian investment in ballistic missiles. Since the late 1980s, Iran has actively sought to develop an indigenous missile production program, relying heavily on missile components imported from North Korea in the 1980s and 1990s to establish this capability.[2] Iran is outside of international regimes to prevent missile proliferation, such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and has instead commonly been an object of international efforts to limit the spread of sensitive dual-use missile technology. Despite these control efforts, Tehran has continued to utilize a number of foreign suppliers to develop a missile production infrastructure. To date, Iran claims to have developed four different liquid-propelled ballistic missile systems, (the Shahab-1, Shahab-2, Shahab-3, and Ghadr-1 Kavoshgar Satellite Launch Vehicle), though many outside experts contest the degree to which these missiles were truly "indigenous" products.[3]

While the purpose of Iran's nuclear program is unclear and remains hotly disputed, many nonproliferation analysts are especially concerned that Iran's development of more advanced long-range ballistic missiles may be motivated by the desire to establish a nuclear weapons delivery capability. Regardless of the veracity of these assertions, Tehran indisputably possesses a formidable conventional weapons delivery capability, and its ongoing missile program poses serious challenges to regional stability.

Capabilities

Table 1 shows the design characteristics of Iran's ballistic and cruise missile inventory. Nearly all of Iran's deployed ballistic missiles utilize liquid fuels, inertial guidance systems, and are based on Russian Scud technology. Iran continues to work on developing longer range, multiple stage, and solid-fueled missiles.

Iran did not possess the technological or industrial infrastructure to develop missiles or missile components until the late 1980s. After the onset of the "War of the Cities" during the Iran-Iraq War, Iran realized that its missile capabilities were vastly inferior to Baghdad's. While Tehran was unable to make major improvements to its missile inventory until the Iran-Iraq war ended, due to the war's immense drain on its resources, Iran did take interim steps to aid its war effort by importing a number of Scud missiles from Libya in 1985.[4] In the late 1980s, Tehran reached out to North Korea for missile technologies and components. The two sides concluded a $500 million arms agreement that included DPRK assistance with the construction of a missile production facility in Sirjan, Iran.[5]

Estimates about Iran's indigenous technical capabilities vary, and significant divides exist within the expert community on this subject. Experts' opinions on the subject also seem to correlate heavily with their opinions regarding whether the United States should invest in an extensive ballistic missile defense system—those who argue that Iran is close to possessing an ICBM capability generally favor missile defense.[6] Uzi Rubin, the former head of Israel's missile defense program, David Montague, the retired president of the Missile Systems Division at Lockheed Martin, and Stanford University's Dean Wilkening believe that recent Iranian missile tests have demonstrated Iran's ability to overcome many of the problems associated with the development and production of an IRBM and ICBM.[7] Other experts, including Stanford's David Holloway and MIT's Theodore Postol, believe that Iran will have trouble overcoming many of the technical issues associated with ICBMs.[8] Postol asserts, for example, that Iran could develop in the next "six to eight years a ballistic missile capable of delivering a 1,000kg nuclear warhead to a range of 2,000km."[9]

Such a capability would enable Iran to target Israel and U.S. bases throughout the Persian Gulf. However, the road-mobile Shahab-3 is vulnerable to an opponent's disarming strike, in that it requires numerous support vehicles for propellant transport and several hours launch preparation time.[10] Deployment of solid-fueled missiles would enable Tehran to overcome this weakness of the Shahab-3, representing a leap in Iranian technical capabilities, as the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps could store such missiles in mountain tunnel complexes and launch them on short notice.[11] Iran's solid-fueled Sejil is currently in the development and testing phases, and its range is reportedly comparable to that of the liquid-propelled Shahab-3. Referring to an Iranian test of the Sejil, Doug Richardson, editor of Jane's Missiles and Rockets asserted, "Television and press imagery of the launch showed that the Sejil missile is similar in general appearance to the liquid-propellant Shahab 3, complete with Shabab 3-style cruciform tail surfaces and a triconic 'bottle-nose' payload section similar to that seen on the Shahab 3A."[12]

The Sejil also possesses range and payload characteristics similar to Iran's Safir Satellite Launch Vehicle (SLV), whose first stage design is based on North Korea's No-Dong missile.[13] Iran's successful launch of the small communications satellite Omid in February 2009, using the two-stage solid-propelled Safir SLV, demonstrates its technical progress in the exploitation of solid-fuel technologies.[14] Iran successfully test launched the Safir SLV again in February 2010.[15] The Safir rocket has been of interest to U.S. intelligence because its guidance and engine technologies are dual-use.[16] Specifically, a study published by the EastWest Institute, carried out by a group of U.S. and Russian experts concluded that the Safir's staging technology would be critical to Iran's potential development of longer-range ballistic missiles.[17] However, the authors found that, "The Safir upper stage is not likely to be suitable for carrying a nuclear warhead of roughly 1,000kg weight because the thrust of its rocket motor may be too low and because its structure may not be strong enough to support such a heavy payload during flight."[18] David Montague, Uzi Rubin and Dean Wilkening challenged this conclusion, asserting that a ballistic missile based on the Safir could "carry a 1,000kg warhead to a range of approximately 2,000km to 2,500km" if Iran made substantial modifications to the second stage of the missile (e.g. more efficient rocket engines).[19]

Despite the Safir's technical limitations, Iran has now demonstrated its ability to produce a multi-staged rocket. The EastWest Institute asserts, "The Safir SLV can be regarded as a step in the development of staging technology, which is critical for the construction of two- and three-stage ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles." [20] If Iran were to convert the Safir SLV into a ballistic missile it would likely be able to carry a 500kg warhead 3,000km, a 1,000kg warhead approximately 2,000km, and a 1,500kg warhead 1,600km.[21] Longer range missiles would offer a number of tactical advantages to the Iranian military, including the ability to deploy the missiles in the eastern part of the country, which would decrease their vulnerability to preemptive attacks.

Iran is also known to have imported 18 Kh-55 cruise missiles from Ukraine in 2001. The Kh-55 has a range of 3,000 kilometers, enabling it to reach targets as far away as Israel.[22] Iran has also been developing an indigenous cruise missile variant known as the Raad, reportedly based on the Chinese Silkworm airframe.[23] The Raad's range would enable IRGC commanders to strike naval vessels operating in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz.[24] Moreover, the Chinese Silkworm can carry a 500kg warhead, indicating that a similarly designed Raad derivative could hypothetically carry a well-designed nuclear warhead up to a range of 105km.[25] The Raad's limited range is not ideally suited for a nuclear delivery role. Despite their limitations, deploying cruise missiles such as the Raad provides the IRGC with a number of tactical advantages, including diversifying its delivery capabilities and enabling it to rely less heavily on its relatively weak air force. Iranian cruise missiles would also be less vulnerable to interception than ballistic missiles by potential adversaries' missile defense systems, because of their lower and shorter flight trajectory.

History

The Shah's Rockets: 1977 to 1979
Iran's missile program originated in the late 1970s under Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. Beginning in 1975, the Iranian Defense Industry Organization began developing and testing the Arash 122mm system, a short-range unguided rocket based on the Russian Bm-11.[26] The Shah initiated a massive military modernization program in order to supplant the United Kingdom as the traditional military protector of the Sunni Gulf Monarchies, believing that his alliance with Washington and access to U.S. military technology would allow him to control the Strait of Hormuz and shipping access to the Indian Ocean.[27] Despite the Shah's close relationship with the United States, open source evidence does not suggest that the United States played a significant part in Iran's missile program during this era. Instead, the United States provided the Shah with a number of advanced fighter aircraft, including the F-4 Phantom, the F-14 Tomcat, and the F-5A Freedom Fighter, aircraft that remain integral to Iran's air force today.[28]

Instead, the Shah relied on Israel for assistance commencing a missile program. Iran and Israel partnered in a multi-billion dollar project to modify advanced Israeli surface-to-surface missiles for sale to Iran.[29] The project, code named "Flower," was one of six "oil for arms" contracts Iran and Israel signed in 1977.[30] Project Flower reportedly aimed to extend the range of an Israeli Gabriel anti-ship missile by replacing American-supplied parts with Israeli-manufactured components, which would have allowed Israel to re-export the missile to Iran without violating American export control laws.[31] To support this project, a team of Iranian experts began construction of a missile assembly facility near Sirjan, in south-central Iran, and a missile test range near Rafsanjan.[32]

Revolution and the "War of the Cities": 1979 to 1988
Missile developments under the Shah were short-lived, as the Iranian Revolution significantly changed Iran's international standing. With the Shah's overthrow and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomenei's assumption to power in 1979, Israel cancelled all military cooperation with Iran. While Tehran's missile program initially slowed significantly, the Iran-Iraq War forced Iran to begin developing a number of new unguided rocket systems. From March 1985 until June 1985, Iran and Iraq engaged in the "War of the Cities," during which Iran continuously bombed Iraqi cities and Iraqi Scud missiles rained down on a number of Iranian cities. Iraq's missile superiority greatly advantaged it in the War of the Cities, enabling Iraqi military units to rollback the progress previously made by Iranian forces in the ground war, ultimately recapturing the strategic Al-Faw peninsula in Iraq.[33] Iran's inability to respond to Saddam's Scud attacks prompted Iranian officials to clandestinely import a small number of Scud-B missiles from Libya. Iran used these Libyan missiles to target Baghdad in a counteroffensive. Previously, Tehran had been unable to target Baghdad because the Iraqi capital city was outside the range of its artillery units.[34]

The Scud B's success prompted Iranian officials to seek North Korean missile technology assistance.[35] In June 1987, Iran and the DPRK concluded a $500 million arms agreement, which included 90 to 100 Scud-B's and North Korean construction of a missile production facility inside Iran.[36] Iran designated the imported Scud-B the "Shahab-1," and first deployed them with the special Khatam ol-Anbya force attached to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps, which successfully attacked a number of Iraqi cities in 1988.[37] Duncan Lennox, editor of Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems, believes that Iran launched 120 Shahab-1 missiles at Iraqi cities between 1987 and 1988.[38] Using DPRK supplied equipment, Iran began indigenously producing the Shahab-1 in 1988.

Post-War Expansion: 1988 to the Present
Lessons learned during the Iran-Iraq War, in which 350,000 to 400,000 Iranians died,[39] prompted Iranian officials to modernize Iran's armed forces. The regime had become painfully aware of Iran's limited military capabilities. During the war, the Iranian military had been reduced to relying on human wave attacks to repel Saddam's advancing army. In the war's aftermath, Iranian leaders propagated Persian nationalism to gather domestic support and deflect attention away from Iran's struggling economy and depleted military.[40] The Western arms embargo forced Iran to concentrate on building up its domestic manufacturing capabilities, and to rely heavily on North Korea, a country willing to defy Western sanctions efforts in order to do business with Tehran.[41]

In 1990, Iran and the DPRK concluded several new agreements involving the Scud-C. Duncan Lennox reported that Iran tested a Scud-C in 1991, and that Tehran imported 170 missile sets and assemblies from the DPRK.[42] Iranian military commanders dubbed the Scud-C the "Shahab-2," and modified it to carry thirteen to fourteen percent more fuel in order to increase its range.[43] Nonetheless, the missile's range was still rather limited, forcing the IRGC to deploy Shahab-2's along the Iranian coast, a deployment pattern that made the missiles vulnerable to a preemptive attack.[44]

Seeking an even longer range missile, Iran next began developing the Shahab-3, a derivative of North Korea's No-Dong missile. Reportedly, an Iranian delegation traveled to the DPRK in 1993 to discuss ballistic missile cooperation and make arrangements for Iranian participation in DPRK missile tests.[45] Delivery of the No-Dong missile components began in 1994 and continued until 1997. Iran conducted its first flight test of the Shahab-3 in July 1998. U.S. officials monitoring the test with early warning satellites considered it to be a partial success because the missile malfunctioned and exploded after only 100 seconds.[46] It is uncertain whether it was an accidental explosion or officials terminated the flight test to hide the launch from American spy satellites.[47] A 1,300km range makes the Shahab-3 suitable for targets as far away as Tel Aviv, Riyadh, and U.S. bases in the Gulf—all from positions deep within Iranian territory.[48] While the Shahab-3's rudimentary guidance system limits its military relevance, missile proliferation expert Dennis Gormley asserts that, "it could terrorize nearby states – in, particular, Israel, which is now in range of an Iranian ballistic missile."[49]

In early 2004, Iran claimed that it was mass-producing the Shahab-3 and deploying the missile with the elite air units of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps. Iranian officials boasted that they had extended the Shahab-3's range from 1,200km to 2,000km, a range increase that would enable Iranian commanders to target parts of Eastern and Central Europe.[50] This increased range would also afford the IRGC the flexibility to deploy the missile in eastern Iran, outside the range of Israel's F-15i long-range bomber, the Jericho 2, and U.S. submarine-launched cruise missiles in the Gulf.[51] However, the Shahab-3's actual range and payload capacity remain speculative, as Iran's claims are unsubstantiated. A study published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies estimates that a substantially modified version of the Shahab-3 (also called Ghadr-1) can carry a 750kg warhead to a maximum range of 1,600km.[52]

Meanwhile, to increase the mobility and launch readiness time of its missile arsenal, Iran has also developed two solid-fueled missile variants with a range of 2,000km, including the two-stage solid propellant missile "Sejil".[53]

Recent Developments and Current Status

Iran's determination to possess a robust and indigenously sustainable missile program is a direct result of its unique regime politics. Iranian leaders bolster support for their own political continuity by portraying much of the rest of the world as enemies to Iran, and seeking to rally the population around nationalist causes such as programs to increase Tehran's military power. The Clerical Elite view Iran's asymmetric military assets as the most vital dimension of Tehran's national security policy, and place great importance on indigenous weapons production. [54] Ayatollah Khamenei's push for indigenous missile capabilities is likely rooted in his understanding of the four key tenets of the Islamic Revolution: (1) Justice, (2) Self-Sufficiency, (3) Independence and, (4) Islamic Piety. [55] Khamenei believes that technology can insulate Iran from foreign domination and contribute to its economic and political independence,[56] a position evident in such nationalist rhetoric as the following excerpt from a February 2010 speech to Iran's Air Force Staff:

This country with its great capabilities in missile technology, biology, nuclear and laser technology - which you have heard about - and various other areas is the same country that had to import the most basic weapons at the beginning of the Revolution. Our country had to borrow from different countries. We had to buy the most basic things from abroad, and they refused to sell them to us. We had to pay several times more than the real price, and we had nothing of our own. The same Army, the same Armed Forces, and the same Air Force have now made these achievements. And the same academic, scientific, and technological units have now achieved this position.[57]

Currently, Iran is pursuing almost all of the technologies associated with ballistic missiles, focusing particularly on efforts to increase the range and payload of the missiles in its deployed arsenal. [58] IISS's 2010 study points out that Iran, "is deemed to have the capacity to modify existing missiles, to produce indigenously a large percentage of the necessary components to go into a missile, including the airframe and propellant tanks, create new systems by integrating available sub-systems and components, test new configurations, and fix the design or manufacturing flaws discovered during the development of new systems." [59] However, Tehran's missile program remains dependent on foreign suppliers and expertise in key respects, including in the development and production of liquid and solid-fueled engines, and navigation and guidance systems. [60] Tehran's reliance on imported guidance systems means that "Iran's missiles armed with conventional warheads will very likely remain too inaccurate to be militarily effective."[61]

Additionally, Iran has steadily ramped up its investment in cruise missile technologies. One core component of Iran's asymmetric military strategy has been the procurement, production, and deployment of coastal defense cruise missiles, addressed as an issue of U.S. concern in the April 2010 congressionally directed Unclassified Report on Military Power of Iran. [62] In the event of any conflict with the United States, Iran would likely use C801/802 cruise missiles to attack American warships in the Persian Gulf and close the Strait of Hormuz. [63]

Iran's rapidly improving missile capabilities have prompted concern from international actors such as the United States, and from Iran's regional neighbors. The United States has responded to Iran's missile program by implementing a number of unilateral sanctions and continuing to develop and test various components of a proposed ABM shield. In particular, the Iran Sanctions Act is meant to prevent Iran from acquiring missile, nuclear, and conventional weapons technology from foreign suppliers. [64] The Obama administration is also working with other members of the UN Security Council to pass a new sanctions resolution aimed at IRGC front companies. [65] Israel has responded to Iran's weapons programs by improving its Arrow Missile Defense system and working closely with the United States to prevent Iranian acquisition of sensitive missile technology. The media frequently reports on the possibility, supported by regular vaguely threatening statements from Israeli leaders, that Israel will feel compelled by Iran's activities to unilaterally bomb Iranian nuclear facilities. [66] Iran's Arab neighbors are also feeling pressured by its weapons programs and are improving their own capabilities in response. For example, the United Arab Emirates has signed a $3.3 billion dollar agreement with Raytheon and Lockheed Martin to purchase Patriot missile interceptors and radar. [67]

Despite efforts by the international community to stall Iranian missile development, Tehran's ballistic and cruise missile capabilities continue to grow. Iranian engineers have extended the range of Iran's missiles from 600km in the late 1980s, to at least 1,500km today.[68] However, Iran has not yet developed a long-range ICBM, a failure underscoring that such missiles are considerably more challenging to develop than assumed by the Rumsfeld Commission's 1998 report on the ballistic missile threat to the United States.[69]

Iran's cruise missile program will increase the variety of delivery systems available in its strategic portfolio.[70] Iran's development of increasingly sophisticated missiles worries analysts concerned that such missiles could be intended as delivery vehicles should Iran decide to develop nuclear weapons. The IAEA has repeatedly asked Tehran to clarify allegations concerning "Iran's undisclosed activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile." [71] Ali Asghar Soltanieh, Iran's representative to the IAEA, has denounced the documents supporting these alleged activities as forgeries. [72] Iran has ignored the IAEA's request and considers the matter closed. As of October 2010, therefore, the diplomatic standoff between Iran and the international community over the disputed nature of its nuclear program continues, and it is a significant factor in many states' perceptions of the threat posed by Iranian missile ambitions.

Sources:
[1] "Unclassified Report on Military Power of Iran," Congressionally Directed Action, April 2010, p. 11, www.fas.org.
[2] Theodore Postol, "A Technical Assessment of Iran's Ballistic Missile Program," Technical Addendum to the Joint Threat Assessment on Iran's Nuclear and Missile Potential, 6 May 2009, p. 2, http://docs.ewi.info.
[3] To contextualize Iran's grandiose claims about indigenous missile development, it is worth noting that MIT's Theodore Postol asserts that, "Three of these missiles, the Shahab-1, Shahab-2, and Shahab-3, do not appear to be truly indigenous, as their flight characteristics are essentially identical to those of the North Korean SCUD-B, SCUD-C, and Nodong missiles respectively." Theodore Postol, "A Technical Assessment of Iran's Ballistic Missile Program," Technical Addendum to the Joint Threat Assessment on Iran's Nuclear and Missile Potential, 6 May 2009, p. 1, http://docs.ewi.info.
[4] "Scud-B Shahab-1," Federation of American Scientists, www.fas.org.
[5] Joseph Bermudez Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," CNS Occasional Paper, November 1999, p. 12, http://cns.miis.edu.
[6] The above quoted experts provide one example of this correlation. The prominent blog, Arms Control Wonk, has also commented on the subject. See: Geoffrey Forden, "More Debate Re: EastWest Institute JTA," Arms Control Wonk, 31 August 2009, www.armscontrolwonk.com.
[7] David Montague, Uzi Rubin and Dean Wilkening, "Iran's Ballistic Missile Potential," EastWest Institute, August 2009, p.3, www.ewi.info.
[8] David Holloway and Theodore Postol, "Comments on 'Iran's Ballistic Missile Potential': A Paper by David Montague, Uzi Rubin, and Dean Wilkening," 22 August 2009, www.ewi.info.
[9] Theodore Postol, "A Technical Assessment of Iran's Ballistic Missile Program," Technical Addendum to the Joint Threat Assessment on Iran's Nuclear and Missile Potential, 6 May 2009, p, 24, http://docs.ewi.info.
[10] Anthony Cordesman, "Iran, the Gulf and Strategic Competition: Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 10 August 2010, p. 11, www.csis.org.
[11] David Sanger and Nazila Fathi, "Iran Test-Fires Missile with 1,200 km Range," The New York Times, 20 May 2009.
[12] Doug Richardson, "Iran test-flies solid-propellant ballistic missile," Jane's Missiles and Rockets, 2 December 2008.
[13] Iran's Nuclear and Missile Potential: A Joint Threat Assessment by U.S. and Russian Experts," EastWest Institute, May 2009, p. 8, http://docs.ewi.info.
[14] "Iran's Nuclear and Missile Potential: A Joint Threat Assessment by U.S. and Russian Experts," EastWest Institute, May 2009, p. 7, http://docs.ewi.info.
[15] Borzou Daraghi, "Iran Announces Launch of Powerful Rocket Carrying Animals into Space," The Los Angeles Times, 3 February 2010.
[16] Pamela Hess, "Iran's Satellite Raises Alarms," The Associated Press, 3 February 2009.
[17] "Iran's Nuclear and Missile Potential: A Joint Threat Assessment by U.S. and Russian Experts," EastWest Institute, May 2009, p. 8, http://docs.ewi.info.
[18] "Iran's Nuclear and Missile Potential: A Joint Threat Assessment by U.S. and Russian Experts," EastWest Institute, May 2009, p. 8, http://docs.ewi.info.
[19] David Montague, Uzi Rubin and Dean Wilkening, "Iran's Ballistic Missile Potential," EastWest Institute, August 2009, p.5, www.ewi.info.
[20] "Iran's Nuclear and Missile Potential: A Joint Threat Assessment by U.S. and Russian Experts," EastWest Institute, May 2009, p. 8, http://docs.ewi.info.
[21] Theodore Postol, "A Technical Assessment of Iran's Ballistic Missile Program," Technical Addendum to the Joint Threat Assessment on Iran's Nuclear and Missile Potential, 6 May 2009, p. 14, http://docs.ewi.info.
[22] "Cruise Missiles Were Unofficially Smuggled to Iran; says Ukraine," The Irish Times, 19 March 2005.
[23] According to Douglas Barrie of Aviation Week and Space Technology, "images of the missile, referred to as the Raad, clearly shows its design lineage from the Chinese Silkworm and Russian Styx cruise missile family." Douglas Barrie, "Iranian Cruise Effort," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 2 February 2004.
[24] Douglas Barrie, "Iranian Cruise Effort," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 2 February 2004.
[25] Douglas Barrie, "Iranian Cruise Effort," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 2 February 2004.
[26] Duncan Lennox, "Iran's Ballistic Missile Projects: Uncovering the Evidence," Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 June 1998.
[27] John W. Garver, China and Iran: Ancient Partners in a Post-Imperial World, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006) p. 40.
[28] "Unclassified Report on Military Power of Iran," Congressionally Directed Action, April 2010, www.fas.org.
[29] Elaine Sciolino, "Documents Detail Israeli Missile Deal with the Shah," The New York Times, 1 April 1986.
[30] Elaine Sciolino, "Documents Detail Israeli Missile Deal with the Shah," The New York Times, 1 April 1986; Iran Missile Chronology, Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org.
[31] Elaine Sciolino, "Documents Detail Israeli Missile Deal with the Shah," The New York Times, 1 April 1986.
[32] Elaine Sciolino, "Documents Detail Israeli Missile Deal with the Shah," The New York Times, 1 April 1986.
[33] David Segal, "The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis," Foreign Affairs 66, no. 5, 1988, p. 946.
[34] David Segal, "The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis," Foreign Affairs 66, no. 5, 1988, p. 946.
[35] Joseph Bermudez Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," CNS Occasional Paper, November 1999, p. 12, http://cns.miis.edu.
[36] Joseph Bermudez Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," CNS Occasional Paper, November 1999, p. 12, http://cns.miis.edu.
[37] Uzi Rubin, "The Global Reach of Iran's Ballistic Missiles," The Institute for National Security Studies, November 2006.
[38] Duncan Lennox, "Southwest Asia, Iran's Ballistic Missile Projects: Uncovering the Evidence," Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 June 1998.
[39] Daniel Byman et al., Iran's Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2001), p. 31.
[40] Daniel Byman et al., Iran's Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2001), p. 9.
[41] Daniel Byman et al., Iran's Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2001), p. 9.
[42] Duncan Lennox, "Southwest Asia, Iran's Ballistic Missile Projects: Uncovering the Evidence," Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 June 1998.
[43] "Iran's Nuclear and Missile Potential: A Joint Threat Assessment by U.S. and Russian Experts," EastWest Institute, May 2009, p. 7, http://docs.ewi.info/JTA.pdf.
[44] "Shahab-2," The Claremont Institute, www.missilethreat.com.
[45] Joseph Bermudez Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," CNS Occasional Paper, November 1999, p. 24, http://cns.miis.edu.
[46] Bill Gertz and Martin Sieff, "Iran's Missile Test Alarms Clinton; Threat to 'Mideast Stability' Seen," The Washington Times, 24 July 1998.
[47] Bill Gertz and Martin Sieff, "Iran's Missile Test Alarms Clinton; Threat to 'Mideast Stability' Seen," The Washington Times, 24 July 1998.
[48] Dennis Gormley, Missile Contagion: Cruise Missile Proliferation and the Threat to International Security, (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2008) p. 32.
[49] Dennis Gormley, Missile Contagion: Cruise Missile Proliferation and the Threat to International Security, (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2008) p. 32.
[50] Ed Blanche, "Iran Boasts Shahab-3 is in Mass Production," Jane's Defence Weekly, 1 December 2004.
[51] Ed Blanche, "Iran Boasts Shahab-3 is in Mass Production," Jane's Defence Weekly, 1 December 2004.
[52] Iran's Ballistic Missile Capabilities: A Net Assessment, ed. Mark Fitzpatrick, (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2010), p. 5.
[53] Doug Richardson, "Iran test-flies solid-propellant ballistic missile," Jane's Missiles and Rockets, 2 December 2008.
[54] Daniel Byman et al., Iran's Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2001), p. 31.
[55] Karim Sadjadpur, Reading Khamenei: The World View of Iran's Most Powerful Leader, (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008) p. 4.
[56] Karim Sadjadpur, Reading Khamenei: The World View of Iran's Most Powerful Leader, (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008) p. 4.
[57] "Supreme Leader's Speech to Air Force Staff," The Center for Preserving and Publishing the Works of Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei, 8 February 2010, http://english.khamenei.ir.
[58] Uzi Rubin, "New Developments in Iran's Missile Capabilities: Implications beyond the Middle East," Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, August 2009, www.jcpa.org.
[59] Iran's Ballistic Missile Capabilities: A Net Assessment, ed. Mark Fitzpatrick, (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2010), p. 140.
[60] See IISS's analysis: Iran's Ballistic Missile Capabilities: A Net Assessment, ed. Mark Fitzpatrick, (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2010), pp. 140-141.
[61] Iran's Ballistic Missile Capabilities: A Net Assessment, ed. Mark Fitzpatrick, (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2010), p. 141.
[62] "Unclassified Report on Military Power of Iran," Congressionally Directed Action, April 2010, www.fas.org.
[63] "Unclassified Report on Military Power of Iran," Congressionally Directed Action, April 2010, www.fas.org.
[64] "Iran Sanctions," The United States Department of the Treasury, www.ustreas.gov.
[65] Stephen Kaufman, "UN Sanctions Against Iran would Target Revolutionary Guard," U.S. State Department, 15 February 2010, www.america.gov.
[66] "Israel and Iran: The Gathering Storm," The Economist, 7 January 2010, www.economist.com.
[67] "UAE Buys U.S. Missiles in $3.3 Billion Deal: Report," Reuters, 20 December 2008.
[68] Uzi Rubin, "The Global Reach of Iran's Ballistic Missiles," The Institute for National Security Studies, November 2006.
[69] The Rumsfeld Commission concluded that, "With the external help now readily available, a nation with a well-developed, Scud-based ballistic missile infrastructure would be able to achieve first flight of a long range missile, up to and including intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) range (greater than 5,500 km), within about five years of deciding to do so." "Executive Summary of the Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States," 15 July 1998, www.fas.org.
[70] Uzi Rubin, "The Global Reach of Iran's Ballistic Missiles," The Institute for National Security Studies, November 2006.
[71] "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1805 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran," Report by the Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency, 18 February 2010.
[72] "Iran Weapons Project 'continued'," BBC News, 26 February 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk.