History

One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: 1950s to 1988
Iran's nuclear program began in the 1950s but was slow to progress. The United States supplied the Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC) with a small 5MWt research reactor (TRR), fueled by highly enriched uranium (HEU), in 1967. In 1973, the Shah unveiled ambitious plans to install 23,000MWe of nuclear power in Iran by the end of the century, charging the newly founded Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) with oversight of this task. [1]

In the five years that followed, Iran concluded several nuclear technology related contracts with foreign suppliers and invested in education and training for its personnel. In 1976, Iran paid one billion dollars for a ten percent stake in Eurodif'sTricastin uranium enrichment plant in France and a fifteen percent stake in the RTZ uranium mine in Rossing, Namibia.[2] Tehran signed a $700 million contract to purchase uranium yellowcake from South Africa, and sent Iranian technicians abroad for nuclear training. [3] By the time of the 1979 revolution, Iran had developed an impressive baseline capability in nuclear technologies.

Much of Iran's nuclear talent fled the country in the wake of the Revolution. [4] This loss, compounded by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's opposition to nuclear technology, resulted in the near disintegration of Iran's nuclear program post-1979. Work on nuclear projects that had been ongoing under the Shah, such as construction of the Bushehr nuclear reactors, was suspended. However, in 1984 Khomeini expressed a renewed Iranian interest in nuclear power, seeking the assistance of international partners to complete construction at Bushehr.[5]

Accelerating Under the Radar of the International Community: 1989 to 2003
Freed from the burden of the costly war with Iraq, Iranian leaders began refocusing on nuclear technology acquisition in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Iran signed long-term nuclear cooperation agreements with Pakistan and China, in 1987 and 1990 respectively. [6] Accords with both countries involved the training of Iranian personnel, and China also agreed to provide Iran with a 27KW miniature neutron source reactor (MNSR) and two 300MW Qinshan power reactors. [7] In January 1995, Russia announced that it would complete Bushehr's construction and agreed to build three additional reactors. [8]

U.S. intelligence agencies have long suspected Iran of using its civilian nuclear program as a cover for clandestine weapons development, and the U.S. government has actively pressured potential suppliers to limit nuclear cooperation with Iran. As a result, China did not ultimately supply Iran with the research reactor (which would have been suitable for plutonium production), the two Qinshan power reactors, or the uranium conversion plant it had previously offered Iran. The United States also blocked Iran's agreement with Argentina for uranium enrichment and heavy water production facilities.

Russia and Iran signed a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement in August 1992. [9] In a follow-up agreement in 1995, Russia agreed to complete construction of the Bushehr-1 nuclear power plant and also secretly offered to supply Iran with a large research reactor, a fuel fabrication facility, and a gas centrifuge plant. [10] Hearing of these covert negotiations, U.S. President Bill Clinton expressed concerns about the technology transfers to Russian President Boris Yeltsin, who eventually agreed to scale back Russian-Iranian nuclear cooperation at least until Bushehr's construction had been completed. [11] Despite this top-level ban on nuclear cooperation with Iran, American officials believe that individual Russian scientists and institutes assisted Iranian engineers in sensitive areas of the nuclear fuel cycle and with the construction of a 40MW heavy water research reactor at Arak. [12]

On 14 August 2002, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) revealed the existence of undeclared nuclear facilities in Iran, including Natanz, the address of the Kalaye electric company, a heavy water production plant under construction at Arak, and the names of various individuals and front companies involved with the nuclear program. [13] Between September and October 2003, the Agency carried out a number of facilities inspections and met with Iranian officials to determine the history of Iran's nuclear program. In November, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution welcoming Iran's decision to sign the Additional Protocol and suspend enrichment. However, the Board noted with concern Iran's previous concealment efforts and pointed out that Iran's new declarations contradicted the Agency's previous information about its nuclear program. Furthermore, the Board outlined the procedures for sanctions if Iran failed to meet the requirements of the Resolution. The Board requested that the Director General take all of the necessary steps to confirm Iran's past and present nuclear activities.[14]

At a Diplomatic Impasse with the International Community: 2003 to 2009
To avoid referral to the UN Security Council, Iran entered into negotiations with the EU-3 (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom), and agreed in October 2003 to cooperate with the IAEA, sign the Additional Protocol, and temporarily suspend conversion and enrichment activities. [15] However, Iran exploited ambiguities in the definition of "suspension" to continue to produce centrifuge components and carry out small-scale conversion experiments. [16] Faced with renewed sanctions threats, Iran concluded the Paris Agreement with the EU-3 on 15 November 2004. [17] Tehran agreed to continue the temporary suspension of enrichment and conversion activities, including the manufacture, installation, testing, and operation of centrifuges, and committed to working with the EU-3 to find a mutually beneficial long-term diplomatic solution. [18]

In early November 2004, the CIA received thousands of pages of information from a "walk-in" source indicating that Iran was modifying the nose cone of its Shahab-3 missile to carry a nuclear warhead. Iranian officials continue to dismiss these documents as forgeries. [19] Furthermore, in early 2004, the IAEA discovered that Iran had hidden blueprints for a more advanced P-2 centrifuge and a document detailing uranium hemisphere casting from its inspectors. [20] The IAEA called on Iran to be more cooperative and to answer all of the Agency's questions about the origins of its centrifuge technology. [21] Iran amended its previous declaration and admitted that it had clandestinely imported P-1 centrifuges through a foreign intermediary in 1987. Iran also acknowledged for the first time that it had imported P-2 centrifuge drawings in 1994. [22] The Agency determined that the traces of HEU and LEU on Iranian centrifuge equipment most likely originated from the foreign intermediary, as they did not match any samples from Iran's declared inventory. [23]

Diplomatic progress truly broke down on 1 August 2005, when Iran notified the IAEA that it would resume uranium conversion activities at Esfahan. [24] On 5 August, Iran rejected the EU-3's Long Term Agreement, because Tehran felt that the proposal was heavy on demands, light on incentives, did not incorporate Iran's proposals, and violated the Paris Agreement. [25] The Board of Governors responded by adopting a resolution that found Iran in non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement.

The year 2006 witnessed a series of diplomatic advance and retreat maneuvers from both sides. In February, Tehran ended its voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol and resumed enrichment at Natanz. The IAEA Board of Governors subsequently voted to report Iran's case to the UN Security Council. On 15 March, the United Nations Security Council released a Presidential Statement, calling on Iran to cooperate with the IAEA. [26] Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad responded by delivering a speech in April in which he discussed Iran's possession of a second uranium enrichment facility with P-2 centrifuges. [27] In June, the EU-3 together with the United States, China and Russia (P5+1) offered to provide Tehran with advanced civilian nuclear technology if Iran suspended enrichment activities and resumed implementation of the Additional Protocol. [28] Iran responded to this proposal in a letter addressed to President Bush, blaming U.S. foreign policy for the chaos in the world. The letter made only brief reference to the nuclear issue and did not address the demands of the international community. [29] In response to Iranian defiance, the UNSC unanimously passed Resolution 1696 in July, which demanded that Iran suspend enrichment activities, banned the international transfer of nuclear and missile technologies to Iran and froze the foreign assets of twelve individuals and ten organizations involved with the Iranian nuclear program. [30] President Ahmadinejad vowed to ignore the UNSC resolution and continue enrichment. [31] That same month, Iran inaugurated a heavy water production plant at Arak, prompting yet another UNSC resolution. [32] As it had with Resolution 1696, Iran also ignored Resolution 1737 and continued to operate its enrichment facility and to install 18 cascades at the FEP's 3000-machine hall. [33]

In November 2007, Iran admitted that the foreign intermediary from its previous declarations was the A.Q. Khan network. Iran also admitted to purchasing a complete set of P-2 centrifuge blueprints from the Khan network in 1996, which it used when it began constructing and testing P-2 centrifuges in 2002. However, Iran refused to answer the Agency's outstanding questions about its UF4 conversion activities ("The Green Salt Project"), high explosives testing, and re-entry vehicle design. [34]

On 14 June 2008, Javier Solana met in Tehran with Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki, and Iran's top nuclear negotiator SaeedJalili to deliver a new P5+1 incentives package. The proposal offered economic incentives, access to LWR technology, and a guaranteed nuclear fuel supply in exchange for the freezing of Iran's enrichment efforts. [35] Speaking just days before the deadline set by world powers for Iran's reply, Ayatollah Khamenei said Iran would "continue with its path" of nuclear development. [36] The UN Security Council responded by adopting Resolution 1835 on 27 September 2008. [37]

On 21 September 2009, Iran revealed to the IAEA that it was building a second pilot enrichment facility. [38] According to IAEA Spokesperson Marc Vidricaire, Iran's letter "stated that the enrichment level would be up to 5%," and the Agency was assured that additional information would be provided in due time. According to the U.S. government, the facility is located in an underground tunnel complex on the grounds of an Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Base near the city of Qom. Managed by Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, the enrichment facility is intended to hold 3,000 centrifuges and is not yet operational. [39] The plant's size, secrecy, and location on an IRGC military base have led some analysts in the U.S. government to argue that Iran constructed it in order to produce HEU for nuclear weapons. [40]

In fall 2009, Iran and the P5+1 resumed talks—first on October 1 in Geneva, and then on October 19 in Vienna. During the October negotiations with the P5+1, Iran agreed to IAEA inspections at the FFEP and, in principle, to send 1,200kg of LEU to Russia for further enrichment and to France for fuel fabrication.[41] The Tehran Research Reactor is expected to run out of 19.7% enriched LEU fuel within the next few years. This prompted Iran to seek a replacement for the fuel and, reportedly, to signal readiness to ship its domestically produced LEU to a third country for further enrichment. Representatives from the P5+1 and Iran tentatively agreed to this fuel swap arrangement at the meeting in Geneva on 1 October 2009. [42] Iran, however, subsequently rejected the deal and proposed instead to conduct the exchange in phases, with the first phase involving the swap of 400kg of LEU for fuel on the Gulf island of Kish. The proposal, announced by Iran's Foreign Minister Mottaki, was dismissed by the IAEA and the United States as inconsistent with earlier negotiations. [43]

Tensions with the international community increased after President Ahmedinejad announced that Iran intends to construct 10 additional uranium enrichment facilities. Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of the AEOI, announced that Iran has identified close to twenty sites for these future plants and that construction work on two of the plants will begin "within the year." [44] On 15 December 2009, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a bill stipulating the imposition of sanctions on "foreign companies that help supply gasoline to Iran." [45]

Agency inspectors visited the facility near Qom, now known as the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP), and carried out the first design information verification inspection from 26 to 27 October 2009. The Agency verified that the facility was being built to house 3,000 IR-1 centrifuges. Iranian officials claim that the Qom facility was allocated to the AEOI in 2007 due to repeated threats to bomb the Natanz facility, and that construction of the FFEP began the same year. IAEA officials informed Iran that the Agency had received commercially available satellite photos indicating that construction of the Qom facility began between 2002 and 2004. [46] In November 2009, the IAEA Board of Governors voted to rebuke Iran for building the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant in secret. The resolution urged Iran to clarify the original purpose of the Fordow enrichment site, stop its construction, confirm that there are no more undeclared facilities, and comply with the UN Security Council Resolutions adopted earlier. [47]

Following the breakdown in negotiations, Iran informed the IAEA that it would begin enriching some of its low enriched uranium to twenty percent. [48] Four days later President Ahmadinejad announced that Iran had produced twenty percent enriched uranium and has the ability to enrich it further if it chooses to do so. [49] Following Ahmedinejad's announcement, France, Russia, and the United States sent a letter to the IAEA expressing their commitment to the fuel swap agreement and their resolve to ensuring that the deal would be implemented in full. [50]

Recent Developments and Current Status
In spite of seven UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSC) condemning its actions and five rounds of sanctions, Iran continues to enrich uranium at the Natanz facility. According to the IAEA Director General's report submitted to the Board on 23 November 2010, Iran has accumulated an estimated 3,183kg of low enriched uranium. [51] Since 2007, the Agency has taken a number of environmental samples at the FEP, confirming enrichment levels below 5% U-235. However, samples taken in 2010 indicated a level of enrichment between 5% and 7% U-235, which is higher than the stated levels in the Design Information Questionnaire. An exchange of letters and additional information from Iran provided a satisfactory explanation for the inconsistency. [52] According to the IAEA, as of November 2010 Iran had produced a total of 25.1kg of UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235 at the Natanz PFEP. [53]

The IAEA has called upon Iran to provide additional data regarding design information of new and existing facilities, including a planned new power reactor in Darkhovin, but Tehran refused to provide this information. Construction of the Fordow FEP continues, but the Agency has been refused access to related documentation and design information. Additionally, after the IAEA requested the design information of a newly planned uranium enrichment facility, Iran answered in August 2010 that it will be provided in "due time." [543]

Finally, the Agency has continually requested clarification of a number of outstanding issues related to possible nuclear weapons related experiments. The Agency stated that the intelligence it has received over the past several years raises concerns about the possibility of current and previous experiments relating to the construction of a nuclear warhead for a missile. Iran has maintained that the intelligence documents provided to the IAEA are forgeries and has refused to discuss these issues with IAEA inspectors. Agency inspectors were able to confirm the non-diversion of declared nuclear material, but added that Iran should be more forthcoming with information about the origin of its nuclear program in order to confirm that all nuclear activity in Iran is peaceful. [55]

In a letter dated 19 February 2010, Iran informed the IAEA that it was still seeking to purchase the required fuel for the TRR on the international market and that it is still willing to exchange LEU for fuel assemblies "simultaneously or in one package inside the territory of Iran." Iran requested that the IAEA convey this message to the P5+1.[56]

The breakdown of the P5+1 talks was followed by a new nuclear fuel swap proposal brokered by Brazil and Turkey. On 17 May 2010, Brazil, Turkey and Iran issued a joint statement in which Iran agreed to export half of its LEU stock (1,200kg) to Turkey as a confidence building measure, in return for 120kg of 20% enriched uranium for use in its medical research reactor.[57] The deal, however, has not been implemented to date.

In June 2010, the UN Security Council approved another set of sanctions under UNSCR 1929, primarily aimed at Iran's nuclear-related investments and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.[58] Although pressure from Russia and China removed some of the resolution's toughest measures that targeted Iran's energy sector, French, British, and American leaders have threatened to impose "crippling sanctions" if Iran does not ensure the full transparency of its nuclear program. Specifically, the Obama administration has discussed with its allies the possibility of cutting off Iran's imports of refined petroleum. [59]

In October 2010, the P5+1 extended another invitation to Iran to discuss its nuclear program, but did not accept Iran's request for Turkey or Brazil to attend. [60] Talks resumed on 6 December 2010 in Geneva, during which the P5+1 requested assurances that the Iranian nuclear program remains peaceful and Iran requested that international sanctions be lifted. [61] Diplomats convened for the next round of talks in Istanbul, Turkey in late January 2011. The talks broke down due to Iran's insistence on the lifting of all economic sanctions as a precondition for substantive discussions on its nuclear program. [62] As of February 2011, no new talks had been scheduled.

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