Japan's nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation policy is comprised of four main pillars:

1. The Atomic Energy Basic Law of 1955-,which restricts Japan's nuclear energy use exclusively to peaceful purposes;
2. The "Three Non-Nuclear Principles" adopted in 1968 by the Japanese Diet, in which Japan pledges not to manufacture, possess, or permit the introduction of nuclear weapons onto Japanese soil;
3. Tokyo's compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and its active participation in strengthening the NPT regime; and
4. Tokyo's reliance on the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent.

Despite Japan's long-standing stance against nuclear weapons, there was an internal debate in the late 1960s through the early 1970s about whether Japan should sign the NPT, in part due to concerns about assuring access to nuclear technology to meet national energy needs, and the discriminatory nature of the treaty. Some conservatives were also concerned that closing off the nuclear option might negatively impact future national security needs. In 1968, then Prime Minister Sato commissioned a secret nongovernmental study on the costs and benefits to Japan of developing nuclear weapons capabilities. The existence of this report was leaked to the public in 1994. The report concluded that nuclearization would negatively affect Japanese security and that the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent would be sufficient. [1]

At Japan's parliamentary elections in December 2012, the opposition Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which had ruled Japan for nearly half a century until 2009, returned to power with a landslide victory in the lower house of Japan's national Diet over the ruling Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). While the political changes generated speculation that there might be differences between the two parties over Japan's post-Fukushima nuclear energy policy, no significant change in disarmament and nonproliferation policy has been observed.

Before the DPJ came to power in 2009, the LDP was in the process of preparing the country's new National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), presumed to include a more assertive security policy. However, due to the political power shift, the DPJ postponed the adoption of the NDPG until the end of 2010 for further consideration. The 2010 NDPG, the first one published under the DPJ government, introduced a major shift in the country's strategic concept from "basic defense force" to "dynamic defense capability" in response to a rapid transformation of the security environment in the region. These included the increasing threats posed by North Korea's nuclear and missile programs, and concerns over China's military modernization and naval activities in the East China Sea. [2] However, Japan's nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament policy remained the same under the DPJ government, namely that "Japan will play an active role in international nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation efforts, and will continue to maintain and improve credibility of U.S. extended deterrence, with nuclear deterrent as a vital element, through close cooperation with the U.S." [3]

While no significant change was observed in Japan's nuclear disarmament policy under the DPJ government, then-DPJ Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada ordered a probe into the secret agreement between Japan and the United States concluded in 1969 that allowed the United States to bring nuclear weapons into Okinawa in case of emergency. Under the earlier LDP administrations, the existence of the secret agreement had been denied for decades. [4] Given that this secret agreement contradicts one of the Three Principles, non-introduction of nuclear weapons to Japan, the issue of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles was rekindled when the existence of the secret agreement was ascertained by the DPJ government.

During the preparation period of the 2010 NDPG, debates over the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, and particularly the third principle of non-introduction, intensified. In the past, hawkish politicians and scholars often advocated reconsidering the non-introduction principle, although successive Prime Ministers have expressed their official support for it. An expert panel, which was formed to prepare the 2010 NDPG, submitted its final report in August 2010, including several recommendations. The panel recommended that Japan maintain its Three Non-Nuclear Principles, notwithstanding some speculation that it would recommend reconsideration of the non-introduction principle. [5] As expected, the 2010 NDPG stipulated, "Japan will continue to uphold ...the Three Non-Nuclear Principles." [6] Despite sporadic debates over the issue of non-introduction, for the foreseeable future it is highly unlikely that Japan will change the Three Principles.

When it returned to power, the LDP government decided to review the NPDG adopted by the DPJ government, and plans to compile a new NPDG by the end of 2013. While it is expected that the LDP will favor a more conservative and robust defense policy than the DPJ, it is highly unlikely that the LDP will change any nuclear nonproliferation or disarmament related policies. [7]

Disarmament Initiatives

Japan's commitment to nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation and its support for the NPT have remained unchanged since it acceded to the treaty in 1976. Tokyo has been further intensifying its efforts toward strengthening multilateral nonproliferation and disarmament regimes since the early 1990s. These efforts reflect a shift in its foreign policy after the Cold War in which Tokyo has been increasingly emphasizing the importance of international cooperation on disarmament and nonproliferation, and actively participating in efforts to strengthen international peace and security. Japan has submitted disarmament resolutions to the United Nations General Assembly every year since 1994, and ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1997 while pushing for its early entry into force. Japan has also strongly supported a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). [8] Japan's Hiroshima and Nagasaki experiences, coupled with its highly developed technology sector and an economy which enables it to commit resources to international nonproliferation and disarmament efforts, have uniquely situated it to uphold and promote the principles of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. In particular, Tokyo has actively promoted disarmament and nonproliferation education since the United Nations General Assembly endorsed the Secretary General's report on the UN Study on Disarmament and Nonproliferation Education in November 2002. [9]

In 2008, Japan and Australia established the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND) to reinvigorate international nonproliferation and disarmament efforts, and to help shape a consensus at the then-upcoming 2010 NPT Review Conference. [10] The ICNND's final report, containing 76 recommendations, was issued in December 2009. [11] While the report does not represent the official policy of Japan or Australia, the two governments are closely working together to promote nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. They have reached out to non -nuclear weapon states to form an alliance to further promote disarmament and nonproliferation. As part of these efforts, the two countries launched the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI) with eight other countries, including Canada, Germany, Mexico, Turkey, Chile, the Netherlands, Poland, and the United Arab Emirates. The two countries co-sponsored a ministerial-level meeting on nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly meeting in September 2010. [12] The NPDI has held five ministerial-level meetings in September 2010, April 2011, September 2011, June 2012, and September 2012 in New York City, Berlin, New York City, Istanbul, and New York City, respectively. Each meeting adopted a ministerial statement urging, among other things, the immediate commencement of FMCT negotiations, early entry-into force of the CTBT, concrete progress in nuclear disarmament, and the universalization of the IAEA Additional Protocol. [13]

Despite these concrete disarmament initiatives, Japan is often criticized for its relatively reticent approach to the vision of a world without nuclear weapons. At the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference, 16 countries issued a joint statement on the humanitarian dimension of nuclear disarmament in May 2012. [14] However, Japan was not a sponsoring country, which triggered debates over Japan's role in nuclear disarmament, especially among civil society advocating nuclear disarmament. Furthermore, the Japanese government officially expressed its refusal to be a sponsor of the joint statement on the same topic at the UN General Assembly First Committee in the same year, while 34 other countries sponsored the statement. [15] This drew further criticism from disarmament advocates both inside and outside of Japan. The reason why the Japanese government did not endorse the statement is that parts of the statement were not completely congruent with Japan's national security policy that relies on U.S. extended nuclear deterrence. [16]

U.S. Extended Nuclear Deterrence

Japan's security relationship with the United States has tempered Tokyo's emphasis on disarmament, as Japan remains a beneficiary of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence. Despite its intensified nonproliferation and disarmament efforts since the 1990s, Tokyo's two seemingly contradictory nuclear weapons-related policies have complicated its efforts to champion nuclear disarmament. Japan's National Defense Program Guidelines state, "Against the threat of nuclear weapons, rely on the U.S. nuclear deterrent, while working actively on international efforts for realistic and steady nuclear disarmament aiming at a world free from nuclear weapons." [17] Critics often assert that such a statement represents the Japanese government's ultimate dilemma. However, as long as nuclear weapons threats exist, Japan's official stance acknowledges that both disarmament and extended deterrence are necessary to enhance its national security.

Increased U.S. and international interest in the nuclear disarmament process has therefore created mixed feelings in Japan, where stronger commitment to nuclear disarmament is welcomed on the one hand, while there is a cause for concern about the U.S. extended deterrent commitment on the other. The U.S. and Japan therefore in July 2009 set up an official framework to conduct periodic dialogues, including issues such as extended nuclear deterrence, in which the United States reiterated its commitments to Japan. [18] Contrary to Tokyo's official policy, both mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in their Peace Declarations urged the Japanese government to pursue security without relying upon U.S. extended nuclear deterrence. [19]

Nuclear Energy Issues

Japan has an advanced civilian nuclear sector. Prior to March 2011, Japan increasingly relied on nuclear power for its electricity needs. With almost no indigenous energy sources, Japan's nuclear energy accounted for over 30% of the country's total electricity production. Japan had planned to increase this to 40% by 2017, and 50% by 2030. [20] However, the Great East Japan Earthquake that devastated the Tohoku region in Japan on 11 March 2011 caused a catastrophic nuclear accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station of Tokyo Electric Power Co., and as a result significantly affected Japan's nuclear energy policy and public opinions of nuclear energy.

Japan had 54 operational nuclear power reactors (the third largest number of power reactors after the United States and France) before the Fukushima accident. As Units 1, 2, 3, and 4 at the Fukushima Daiichi Station are subject to decommissioning, the current total number of operable reactors is 50. As of February 2013, however, only two of the 50 nuclear reactors are operating due to safety reviews. [21] Between May and July 2012, no nuclear power reactors in Japan were operating.

Japan was in the process of constructing two new reactors, and had been planning to construct 11 additional power reactors before 11 March 2011. However, in the wake of the Fukushima accident Japan's nuclear energy policy underwent comprehensive review, and all of the new plant constructions have been halted. The post-Fukushima nuclear energy policy review was completed in September 2012 under the then-ruling DPJ government. The policy document entitled "Innovative Strategy for Energy and the Environment," issued on 14 September 2012 with input from several government agencies, stated that Japan would phase out nuclear energy by the end of the 2030s. [22]

However, the new LDP government is more pro-nuclear energy, and is advocating a conservative approach to reducing Japan's nuclear energy dependence. As such, the LDP has decided to review the DPJ's decision to phase out nuclear energy by the end of 2030s. [23]

How far and how fast the new government plans to reduce nuclear energy's share of Japan's total energy generation still remains to be seen.

One of the most notable developments in Japan's nuclear energy policy since the Fukushima accident was the decision by the Japanese government to establish a new agency in charge of nuclear safety under the Environment Ministry, given acute criticism that its old system failed to appropriately and effectively respond to, or even prevent, the nuclear crisis. The old regulatory agency, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, was under the Ministry of Economy, Trade, & Industry, which promotes nuclear energy. The new regulatory agency, the Nuclear Regulation Authority, was established in September 2012, combining safety and regulatory functions that are completely separated from those parts of the government responsible for promoting nuclear power. [24]

Backend of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle

Japan has a controversial program for recycling spent nuclear fuel that has produced large quantities of plutonium in the form of metal-oxide nuclear fuel. [25] By the end of 2011, Japan possessed 44.3 metric tons of separated plutonium; 9.3 metric tons within the country, and 35 metric tons at reprocessing plants in Britain and France. [26] All of the nuclear fuel stockpile is currently slated to return to Japan for use in domestic nuclear facilities. The original plan called for consumption of the stored fuel by 2010, but due to technical and safety issues, this timetable has been delayed, and the return of the stored fuel to Japan is proceeding slowly. Some argue this material could provide Japan with a latent nuclear weapons capability.

Japan's strong commitment to the development of a self-sufficient plutonium-based nuclear fuel cycle led to the construction of the Rokkasho spent fuel recycling complex in Aomori Prefecture (Northernmost prefecture of Japan's Main Island). This will be the first commercial nuclear fuel reprocessing plant in Japan, and the first one in an NPT non-nuclear weapon state. Despite strong domestic and international criticism and opposition, the reprocessing plant started active testing on 31 March 2006. Once the reprocessing plant moves beyond the testing phase to become commercially operational, it will separate and stockpile up to eight metric tons of plutonium annually. This amount would be enough to produce 1000 nuclear weapons. The Rokkasho reprocessing plant was originally scheduled to become operational in November 2008, a date subsequently pushed back to October 2010. [27] However, complications during test operations caused Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd. to postpone this date again, resulting in a new estimated operational date of October 2012, and now, postponement to October 2013. This is the 19th postponement so far. [28]

While the new LDP government will review the nuclear energy strategy issued under the DPJ that states nuclear energy would be phased out by the end of 2030s, it is clear that Japan is reducing its reliance on nuclear energy. Moreover, even if Japan decides not to phase out nuclear energy by that time, separated plutonium in Japan is accumulating faster than it is being used. Currently, there is no prospect for commercialization of a fast breeder reactor, and the prospect of burning MOX fuel in conventional light water reactors (pluthermal cycle) is bleak. Therefore, there is no concrete plan to utilize accumulated plutonium.

Nevertheless, the Japanese government largely decided to continue its current nuclear fuel-cycle policy, including a stated policy of reprocessing all the spent fuel from nuclear power reactors. [29] Japan's stockpile of excess plutonium concerns both neighboring countries and the United States.

After the then-DPJ government released the nuclear energy strategy in September 2012, U.S. officials expressed concern that continuing reprocessing while aiming to phase out nuclear energy increased the quantity of separated plutonium, contradicting an important U.S. policy goal. Only a few months earlier, President Barack Obama, in a speech at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies in South Korea, had stated that the "smallest amount of plutonium-about the size of an apple-could kill hundreds of thousands and spark a global crisis. We simply can't go on accumulating huge amounts of the very material, like separated plutonium, that we're trying to keep away from terrorists."[30]

Nuclearization Debates

Anti-nuclear sentiment among the Japanese public has far outweighed support for keeping a nuclear weapons option open. It has long been considered taboo for Japanese officials to argue in favor of the possibility of a nuclear weapons option.

Nevertheless, several neighboring countries have expressed concerns about possible Japanese nuclear ambitions due to Japanese officials' occasional nuclearization debates. Recent tension developing in the region, particularly on the Korean peninsula, has led to increased discussions in Japan about the once-taboo subject of nuclear weapons development, including comments by high-ranking officials on the possibility of amending the three non-nuclear principles in 2002. Most recently, after North Korea conducted its nuclear weapon test in October 2006, high-ranking Japanese officials made some comments advocating that the debate over developing nuclear weapons should not be prohibited. It appears that the threshold for the debate of nuclear weapons in Japan has been lowered. [31]

Still, despite speculation that Japan may reconsider its nuclear options, the Japanese public's deep aversion to nuclear weapons and Tokyo's strong commitment to international nonproliferation regimes make any move in this direction unlikely.

Sources:
[1] Yuri Kase, "The Costs and Benefits of Japan's Nuclearization: An Insight into the 1968/70 Internal Report," The Nonproliferation Review, Summer 2001.
[2] Japanese Ministry of Defense, Summary of National Defense Program Guidelines, FY2011, www.mod.go.jp.
[3] Japanese Ministry of Defense, Summary of National Defense Program Guidelines, FY2011, www.mod.go.jp.
[4] "Japan confirms secret pact on US nuclear transit," BBC, 9 March 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk.
[5] "Japan Advised to Keep Non-Nuclear Principles," Global Security Newswire, 27 August 2010, www.nti.org.
[6] Japanese Ministry of Defense, Summary of National Defense Program Guidelines, FY2011, www.mod.go.jp.
[7] "Japan to Set Up Panel for New Defense Guidelines," Jiji Press Ticker Service in Lexis Nexis, 23 January 2013.
[8] "Japan's Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Policy," 4th edition, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 2008, www.mofa.go.jp.
[9] "Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education: Promoting Cooperation with Civil Society Towards a World without Nuclear Weapons," Joint Working Paper Submitted by Japan and the United Nations University at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. www.un.org.
[10] International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament, www.icnnd.org.
[11] "Eliminating Nuclear Threats," ICNND Final Paper, December 2009, www.icnnd.org.
[12] "Nonnuclear nations seek bigger say via alliance," The Yomiuri Shimbun, 22 July 2010, www.yomiuri.co.jp.
[13] "Statement of the Third Ministerial Meeting of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, New York, 21 September 2011," Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 21 September 2011, www.mofa.go.jp.
[14] "Joint Statement on the Humanitarian Dimension of Nuclear Disarmament," First Session of the NPT Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference, 2 May 2012 www.reachingcriticalwill.org.
[15] "Joint Statement on the Humanitarian Dimension of Nuclear Disarmament," 67th Session of the United Nations General Assembly First Committee, 22 October 2012, www.reachingcriticalwill.org.
[16] "Hiroshima mayor to urge gov't to sign int'l anti-nuke petition," Japan Economic Newswire in LexisNexis, 24 October 2012.
[17] "National Defense Program Guidelines, FY 2005," Japanese Ministry of Defense, www.mod.go.jp.
[18] Kyoko Hasegawa, "US, Japan agree to set up official talks on nuclear deterrence," in Lexis Nexis, 18 July 2009.
[19] Hiroshima Peace Declaration, Hiroshima Peace Cite, www.pcf.city.hiroshima.jp, Nagasaki Peace Declaration, Nagasaki City- Peace & Atomic Bomb, www1.city.nagasaki.nagasaki.jp.
[20] "Nuclear Power in Japan," World Nuclear Association, www.world-nuclear.org.
[21] "Nuclear Power in Japan," World Nuclear Association, www.world-nuclear.org.
[22] "Innovative Strategy for Energy and the Environment," Japanese EEC, 14 September 2012, www.npu.go.jp.
[23] Abe administration puts plans to end nuclear power by 2030s under review, The Mainichi, 27 December 2012, http://mainichi.jp.
[24] Japan launches new nuclear regulatory body, Kyodo News Service in LexisNexis, 19 September 2012.
[25] "Nuclear Power in Japan," World Nuclear Association, www.world-nuclear.org
[26] "Japan's 2011 civilian plutonium declaration" IPFM blog http://fissilematerials.org.
[27] "Rokkasho plant faces two-year delay," The Japan Times, 2 September 2010, www.japantimes.co.jp.
[28] Rokkasho N-fuel plant completion delayed, the Daily Yomiuri, 20 September 2012, www.yomiuri.co.jp.
[29] "Innovative Strategy for Energy and the Environment," Japanese EEC, 14 September 2012, www.npu.go.jp.
[30] Office of the Press Secretary, the White House, "Remarks by President Obama at Hankuk University," 26 March 2012.
[31] "Nuclear Logic Fails," The Japan Times, 19 October 2006.