At least 12 facilities in the DPRK have been linked with the production and/or storage of chemical weapon (CW) agents, their raw chemicals and precursors. CW agents are then moved to either the Sakchu or Kanggye-based CW facilities for weaponization. Some of these facilities, including those that produce synthetic fibers (vinalon, a polymer that is unique to North Korea) and basic chemicals such as sulphuric acid and ammonia, have been profiled in open sources (including North Korean print media). Some of the active and reserve Nuclear and Chemical Defense battalions are also reportedly based at some of these chemical complexes. However, because photographs of some of these manufacturing sites have been published, and thus their location and other details compromised, one must consider their role in the military production of CW agents as questionable at best.

As part of a "heavy industry," chemicals are a key component to the command socialist economy in the DPRK, in which all production is under governmental control. With the emphasis of an economy based on military preparedness, it is not an exaggeration to say that all chemical production (as well as other segments of heavy industry) is militarized in the DPRK. Despite numerous reports alleging large-scale CW production, the extent to which chemicals are diverted or produced for chemical warfare in North Korea is not clear.

Based on the politics of his personality cult and emperor-like succession, Kim Jong Il and his military advisors have complete control over policy and procedure for production of armaments. The highest decision-making body in the DPRK for the military industry is the National Defense Commission (NDC), of which Kim Jong Il was "re-elected" chairman in 1998. Directly subordinate to the NDC is the Second Economic Committee (SEC), which, despite its innocuous-sounding name, is the linchpin for much of North Korean development and production of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Created in the 1970s, the SEC is in charge of the planning, manufacturing, and distribution of all ordnance in the DPRK, including international trade in munitions. Located in Kangdong-kun, Pyongyang, the SEC consists of eight bureaus and 190 munitions factories; in spring 2001, its directors were Kim Man Ch'ŏl and Chŏn Byŏng Ho, both NDC and Korean Worker's Party Central Committee members. The eight bureaus consist of a general affairs office, with seven others dealing specifically with a variety of weapons platforms and technologies:

• machine industry bureau: small arms and ammunition
• machine industry bureau: tanks and armored personnel carriers (APCs)
• machine industry bureau: multi-stage rockets
• machine industry bureau: guided missiles
• machine industry bureau: nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons
• machine industry bureau: battleships and submarines
• machine industry bureau: production and purchase of war planes

With regard to North Korean chemical and biological (CB) weaponry, the Fifth Machine Industry Bureau is of most relevance. From an organizational perspective, the Ministry of Chemical Industry is actually separate from this line of command, but presumably is in coordination with production and transfer of chemical intermediates for CW agent manufacture.

Requirements are established by the Second Economic Committee, while the actual production of CW agents is carried out under the directive of the Fifth Machine Industry bureau. The filling, storage, and handling of munitions is carried out under the auspices of the Nuclear and Chemical Defense Bureau (NCDB) (핵 , 화학방위국). Directly subordinate to the General Staff Department (인민군총참부), the NCDB is responsible for defensive and offensive CW operations.

The Kanggye and Sakchu munitions plants represent the meeting of nominally civilian chemical enterprises, under the titles of the Second Economic Committee's General Machine Industry Bureau and the Equipment Department of the NCDB. At Kanggye and Sakchu, CW agents brought from the Fifth Machine Industry Bureau are filled into artillery (including mortar and artillery rocket) shells, which are requisitioned from the Third Machine Industry Bureau. Reportedly, chemical spray tanks and aerial munitions are also prepared at Sakchu and Kanggye, and can be filled with CW agent from bulk storage at various airfields right before their use in wartime. Also associated with the offensive part of the chemical weapons apparatus, Factory No. 279 is responsible for defensive material, including decontamination chemicals, protective suits, and detection equipment.

Following their final assembly and filling, chemical munitions are brought to "store offices" at the Maram Materials Corporation and the Chiha-ri Chemical Corporation, located in Maram-dong, Pyongyang and Anbyŏn-kun, Kangwŏn Province, respectively. Reportedly, North Korean chemical weapons stores are placed into underground tunnels, with bulk CW agents stored in large (12' high) tanks, along with CW defense equipment supplied from Factory No. 279.

Comprising seven different units, the NCDB is actively involved in the research and development of weapons, as well as nuclear and chemical defense. These are divided into the following departments: operations, training, materials, technology, reconnaissance, section No. 32, and mining/underground facility operations. No. 32 — an organization of which very little is known — has been linked with research and development of chemical weapons and perhaps specialized warheads for chemical delivery on the Nodong-1. Three additional research institutes (연구소) — No. 55, No. 710, and No. 398 — also operate under the aegis of the NCDB. Apparently, No. 710 research institute is involved in laser-related technology, possibly for weapons applications, with a research staff of about 250. With approximately 250 researchers, the No. 398 research institute is involved in decontamination operations in both nuclear and chemical environments and is reportedly developing antidotes, masks, and suits. The No. 55 research institute has about 70 on its research staff and is responsible for simulating nuclear and chemical contamination for decontamination operations and training.

According to a 2002 ROK-based article, North Korea operates the following chemical troops: battalion (army corps), battery (division), and platoon (regiment). At last count (1999), the NCDB consisted of 13,000 personnel. The NCDB has its own department of operations, consisting of eight battalions. Two of these battalions, the 17th and 18th, are considered active, while the remaining (13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 37th and 38th) are on reserve. Some of the billets for these battalions have been identified in the open literature:

• NCDB (reserve) Sunch'ŏn Vinalon Complex
• NCDB (reserve) Namhung Youth Chemical Complex
• NCDB (active) Onjŏng-ri, Sŏngch'ŏn-gun
• NCDB (active) Sŏk'am-ri, P'yŏngwŏn-gun
• NCDB (reserve) Sariwŏn Potash Fertilizer Complex

The 18th Nuclear Chemical Defense Battalion consists of six companies. According to Segye Ilbo, there are two active duty battalions and six reserve battalions. Lee Ch'ung Kuk, a defector who claims to have served with the 18th Battalion, has diagrammed the locations of Factory No. 279 and the No. 398 Research Institute as shown in the "Sŏg'am-ri Recruit Training Center Facilities."

Lee Ch'ung Kuk has also provided details about the organization of the 18th Nuclear and Chemical Defense Battalion, which may be similar to the 17th and other units held in reserve. According to Yi, the battalion had a nuclear/chemical reconnaissance company (1st Company), while the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th companies were described as "decontamination" units. The 6th company was responsible for flame-throwers and presumably obscurant smokes (also referred to as "Smoke Screen Company"). The latter had once been located in Sadong-kuyŏk, Pyongyang, and was transferred to the 18th Battalion in June 1993, also according to Lee. Interestingly, none of these companies that were described by Lee had specific duties with regard to offensive use of chemical weapons, but were responsible mainly for reconnaissance and decontamination operations.

Air Forces

In addition to aerial-delivered chemical ordnance (bombs, possibly other types of ordnance), DPRK military airfields (as of 1993) have posted a platoon of chemical defense personnel equipped decontamination and detection systems.

Sources:
[1] Pak Tong-sam (from the ROK Agency for Defense Development), "How Far Has the DPRK's Development of Strategic Weapons Come?" Pukhan, January 1999, pp. 62-71, translated in FBIS Document ID: FTS19990121001655;
[2] "State of DPRK Defense Industry Viewed," Tong-a Ilbo (Internet version) in English, 5 February 2001, transcribed in FBIS Document ID: KPP20010205000105;
[3] Table 8.2, DPRK chemical warfare facilities, in Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., The Armed Forces of North Korea (New York: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 2001), p. 225;
[4] Ch'oe Yong-chae, "US Strategy Pressuring DPRK on Biological, Chemical Weapon," Sindong-a (Seoul) in Korean, 1 January 2002, pp. 300-313, translated in FBIS: KPP20011220000016;
[5] "State of DPRK Defense Industry Viewed," Tong-a Ilbo (Internet version) in English, 5 February 2001, transcribed in FBIS Document ID: KPP20010205000105;
[6] Pak Hon-ok, "DPRK Military Policy in 2000," Pukan, 1 December 2000, pp. 66-75, translated in FBIS, Document ID: KPP20001212000032;
[7] Yi Ch'ung Kuk, "Assignment to Antinuclear/Antiatomic Analysis Team," in the book "Kim Chong-il's Nuclear Weapons and Army," Kin Seinichi no Kaku to Guntai in Japanese, 21 September 1994, pp. 101-110.

Biological Warfare: Organizations and Dual-Use Infrastructure

Even less is known about the North Korea biological warfare (BW) program and organization than its chemical warfare (CW) program, on which exists only a paucity of data. Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr. suggests that it follows similar lines as the DPRK CW infrastructure. If this is the case, the Second Economic Committee and its subsidiary Fifth Machine Industry Bureau would fulfill requirements for biological weapons set by the North Korean military. The National Defense Commission and the Ministry of People's Armed Forces direct the latter organizations. One South Korean newspaper account alleged the existence of more than 10 facilities responsible for producing biological weapons; some of these are disguised as electrical engineering concerns. In December 2001, a ROK Ministry of National Defense-produced handbook on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) contained a map showing the locations of suspected BW facilities in North Korea. These included three BW production and six BW research facilities. While the locations of the facilities of the latter group were not carefully identified, the three production sites were located somewhere along the coast (described simply as Sohae, Chongju, and Munchon).

A few of these facilities have been specifically linked to ongoing work in biological weapons research, development, and manufacture:

• Research Institute of the Armed Forces Ministry (synonymous with the Bacterium Research Institute, Second Academy of Natural Sciences) is responsible for developing biological weapons.
• Biological research facility, associated with the North Korean BW program, located in Songch'on County, South P'yongan Province, adjacent to the Onjong-ni chemical weapons facility; growth media is reportedly supplied (200 tons per annum) by a facility in Munch'on, Kangwon Province.
• 25 Plant/February 25th Plant is a germ-producing facility located in Chongju, North P'yongan Province.
• National Defense Research Institute and Medical Academy (NDRIMA) perform studies on disease pathogens such as the bacteria and viruses that cause anthrax, cholera, bubonic plague, smallpox, yellow fever, and others.

Few details are known about these facilities or precisely which microorganisms have been or are being weaponized, if any.

Reportedly, there exists within the organizational purview of the Nuclear and Chemical Defense Bureau a Chemical and Biological Defense Research Center, in Changsan-dong, Sosong-ku, Pyongyang, with two additional branches in Pyongwon County (South Pyongam Province). It is unknown to what extent this division is responsible for offensive BW work.

According to defector Choe Ju Hwal, a former sergeant in the North Korean People's Army, there exists a "Joint Research Institute" that is responsible for biological weapons development. This institute is placed within the military-medical department, under the command of the General Rear Service Bureau (GRSB) of the Ministry of People's Armed Forces. The following North Korea facilities have been reported to be conducting BW-related research:

• (Germ) Research Institute, Second Academy of Natural Sciences
• Sanitary Quarantine Institute (also known as the National Sanitary and Anti-Epidemic Center)
• Institute of Microbiology
• Research Institute of the Armed Forces Ministry
• First Institute of Bacteriology
• Second Institute of Bacteriology of Microbiological Diseases, Pyongsong Academy of Science Il-song University
• Workers Party Central Biology Institute
• Institute, Academy of Defense Sciences
• Institute, Academy of Medical Science
• Military Prevention Medical Unit (also known as the Preventive Military Medical Unit)
• Munchon, Kangwon Province (agar growth media plant)
• Defense Research Institute and Medical Academy (NDRIMA)
• 25 February plant, Chongju, North Pyongan Province
• Onjong-ni, Songchon County, South Pyongan Province
• Paekma (rendered Paengma) Section Epidemic Control Center
• Third Institute of Bacteriology
• Medical College
• Military Medical College
• Institute (Mt. Taesong, P'yongyang)

Dual-use facilities/organizations

Various North Korean facilities can be construed as having dual-use purposes that is, could contribute to an infrastructure for the research and development of biological weapons:

• Institute and Syringe Factory
• Reagent Company
• (Synthetic) Pharmaceutical Division of the Hamhung Clinical Medicine Institute Institute (Pyongyang)
• Pharmaceutical Plant (located approximately 40 kilometers from P'yongyang)
• Kyong-t'ae Endocrinology Institute
• Sanitary Quarantine Institute, Ministry of Public Health (germ vaccination institute) also known as the National Sanitary and Anti-Epidemic Center, Moranbong District, P'yongyang

Other facilities that could be utilized for BW-related work include breweries and other fermentative operations, including breweries that possess significant capacity and potential for production of growth media (e.g., yeast extract). However, no evidence has yet surfaced linking any of these types of facilities with the alleged production of BW agents in North Korea.

Sources:
[1] Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., The Armed Forces of North Korea (New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2001) p. 231.
[2] "DPRK Biological Research Institute's Developments in 'Germ Weapons' Detailed," Choson Ilbo (Internet version), 3 December 2001, in FBIS Document KPP20011203000106.
[3] ROK, Seoul, Ministry of National Defense, Hwasaengbang Misail Olmana Algo Kyesimnikka?, 10 December 2001, p. 32.
[4] Kim Tu-hwan, "DPRK 'Rostrum' Rankings Sway Towards Military," Yonhap, (Internet version), in Korean, 6 April 2001, translated in FBIS Document ID: KPP20010406000120.
[5] Testimony, Hearing of the International Security Proliferation and Federal Services Subcommittee of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Weapons Proliferation in North Korea, 21 October 1997.
[6] Pukhan Yongo 400 Sonjip, "DPRK Military Terms Defined," 25 February 2000, pp. 327-350, translated in FBIS, Document ID: KPP20000308000103.
[7] "Kim Jong Il Directs Newly Built Medicine Institute and Syringe Factory," KCNA, in English, 19 December 2000, transcribed in FBIS Document KPP20001219000109.
[8] Yi Chae Sung, "Pukhannul Umjiginun T'ek'unok'uratu" ["Technocrats Who Move North Korea"], 25 August 1998, pp. 180-197, translated in FBIS Document ID: FTS19991006001519.
[9] Song T'ae Chun, "A Dependable Sanitary and Anti-Epidemic Center," Korea Today, in English, 1 July 2001, p. 19, transcribed in FBIS Document KPP20010725000097.
[10] Nuclear, Chemical, Biological Warfare Research Detailed, Naeoe Tongsin, in Korean, No. 903, 9 June 1994, pp. B1-B4, translated in JPRS-TND-94-017, 8 September 1994, p. 4.

As the North Korean political leadership began issuing directives for the procurement and development of missiles in the 1960s, North Korea began to establish the educational institutions to train engineers and technicians to sustain a missile development program. The Soviet Union and China initially provided basic technical and training assistance, as well as deliveries of rockets and anti-ship missiles. North Korean engineers have also gone abroad, especially to China, for training in basic aerospace engineering.

According to North Korean defectors, the Korea National Defense College in Kanggye, Chagang Province, has a "Rocket Engine Department" and the college provides instruction on the "production, operation procedures, and launching of missiles."[1] North Korea's top universities such as Kim Il Sung University, Kim Chaek University of Technology, and the Pyongsong College of Science have programs in science and engineering that would have applications to rocket and missile development. The Science and Education Department under the Korean Workers Party Central Committee exercises overall supervision of science curricula, but the Department of Higher Education in the Ministry of Education manages the administrative affairs of colleges and universities.[2]

The "Number Seven Factory" under the Second Natural Science Academy does design and development work before it produces missile prototypes. This facility is probably the same facility known as the "San'um-dong Factory" or "San'um-dong Missile Research Center." The Second Natural Science Academy is the research and development organization in charge of all weapons development in North Korea. The academy probably draws upon human resources from other scientific institutions under the Academy of Sciences, but the extent of this collaboration is unknown.

Missiles require a tremendous number of components and materials, including steel, semiconductors, and chemicals. North Korea has an industrial base and precision machine tool industry to support missile production. In recent years, North Korea has made efforts to modernize its steel plants and machine tool factories in order to increase production, efficiency and precision. North Korea has been known to import components for its weapons systems, but the level of self-sufficiency in the production of missile components and materials is uncertain. The Second Economic Committee under the National Defense Commission is responsible for all weapons production in North Korea, and the committee's Fourth Machine Industry Bureau, which is also known as the "Fourth General Bureau" or the "Missile Bureau," manages overall missile production.[3] Many of these production facilities are located underground in Chagang Province near the Chinese border.

The Missile Division under the Ministry of the People's Armed Forces commands at least 18 ballistic missile bases in North Korea. Many of these bases are likely to have a number of alternative launch pads near the missile storage site, which effectively increases the number of locations to launch missiles from their mobile transporter-erector launchers (TELs). Chiha-ri Missile Base in Chiha-ri, P'an'gyo-kun, Kangwon Province, is a support base for the Hwasong-5 and Hwasong-6 and is probably also a launch site. A number of surface-to-ship missiles have been deployed to the Mayang Island Missile Base, which is co-located with a large base for submarine production and repairs.[4]

The National Defense Commission has ultimate command and control of the North Korean missile inventory, but little is known about Pyongyang's missile doctrine or the Missile Division's operating procedures. The National Defense Commission also has ultimate control over North Korea's missile exports, which represent a significant source of foreign exchange. The Yong'aksan Trading Company under the Second Economic Committee's External Economic Bureau handles missile exports, and the Ch'anggwang Credit Bank receives payment from buyers.[5] The foreign exchange earnings from missile exports have enabled Pyongyang to continue or expand its procurement of components and technology from abroad in order to continue the missile development program. Unfortunately, there is no reliable open source information about North Korea's internal budget or expenditures on ballistic missiles.

Sources:
[1] Interview with North Korean defector "Kenki Aoyama" by Mari Sudo, research associate, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 20 October 2002, Chiba Prefecture, Japan; Pak Hong Gi and Kim Chae Sun, "Kwisun Pukhan'oe'gyo'gwan Ko Yong Hwan Ssi 1 Mun 1 Tap," Taehan Maeil, 14 September 1991, p. 3, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr.
[2] South Korea Ministry of Unification, Pukhan Kaeyo 2000 (Seoul: ROK Ministry of Unification, 1999), p. 488.
[3] Ha T'ae Won, "Puk Kunsusan'op Hyonjuso/Mugi Taebubun Tokchasaengsan," Donga Ilbo, 5 February 2001, p. 3, in KINDS, www.kinds.or.kr; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., The Armed Forces of North Korea (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2001), pp. 45-54.
[4] Interview with North Korean defector Im Yong Son by Daniel A. Pinkston, senior research associate, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 14 December 2001, Seoul.
[5] Lee Kyo Kwan, "[NK Report] Pukhan Missile Such'ul Oddohke Hana?" Chosun Ilbo, 5 March 2002, www.chosun.com; Yi Kyo-kwan, "How Does North Korea Export Missiles?" Chosun Ilbo, 5 March 2002, in "DPRK Said to Export Body, Main Parts of Missiles Separately," FBIS Document ID KPP20020305000112.

North Korea's nuclear facilities span the complete nuclear fuel cycle, with most of these facilities concentrated in Yongbyon County, North Pyongan Province. This area contains a number of research and development institutes, as well as educational facilities to train the human resources to sustain North Korea's nuclear program, for both civilian and military purposes.[1] The Yongbyon nuclear complex includes a small research reactor called the IRT-2000, a 5MW(e) gas-graphite moderated reactor, an unfinished 50MW(e) reactor, a fuel fabrication complex, a spent fuel reprocessing facility, and multiple waste storage sites. However, the 5MW(e) reactor's cooling tower was destroyed in 2008 as part of the Six-party Talks disablement agreement, and a uranium enrichment facility and light water reactor have since been added.[2] There is also an unfinished and abandoned 200MW(e) nuclear reactor in Taechon County, North Pyongan Province, but work on it was frozen under the Agreed Framework of October 1994. Additionally, North Korea maintains multiple uranium mining and milling sites, as well as research and development facilities.

Relevant Individuals and Institutions

The General Department of Atomic Energy under the Cabinet has direct responsibility for the operation and management of facilities dedicated to electricity generation. Nominally, the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) elects and removes cabinet officials, but the SPA Presidium is empowered to act on behalf of the SPA when it is not in session. Ultimately, the General Department of Atomic Energy is subordinate to Kim Jong Il and a small number of officials who hold senior positions in the Korean Workers' Party (KWP), the government, and the military.[3] The Academy of Sciences manages most of the research institutions that could be described as "dual-use," and the National Defense Commission has ultimate authority over military applications involving nuclear technology and materials.

The Second Economic Committee (SEC) under the National Defense Commission is responsible for the production of all weapons in North Korea, and the SEC's Fifth Machine Industry Bureau—also known as the "Fifth General Bureau"—is responsible for the production of nuclear weapons.

The Second Natural Science Institute, also known as the National Defense Institute, is responsible for all weapons research and development in North Korea, but it likely collaborates with the Academy of Sciences and the Second Economic Committee's Fifth Machine Industry Bureau in the area of nuclear weapons research. The Second Natural Science Institute also conducts research and development for the ballistic missile program, and almost certainly is tasked with responsibility for the design of nuclear warheads suitable for ballistic missiles.[4]

The Nuclear Chemical Defense Bureau (NCDB) under the General Staff Department in the Ministry of People's Armed Forces is responsible for managing the research and development of defensive measures against nuclear, chemical, and biological attacks. The NCDB consists of seven departments and three research institutes, including the "55th Research Institute" or Nuclear and Atomic Defense Laboratory, which runs simulations and estimates damage and fallout from possible nuclear attacks.[5] North Korean doctrine and operating procedures regarding the storage and use of nuclear weapons are unknown, but the National Defense Commission would have ultimate authority over nuclear weapons storage, deployment, and possible use.

Funding for the Program

Little is known about the budget-making process of the Second Economic Committee and its subordinate bureaus.[6] However, a special fund called the "Kim Il Sung fund," the "presidential fund," or the "Number 710 fund" is reportedly used to import materials and technologies for the nuclear program. Ultimate control of this fund is almost certainly exercised by Kim Jong Il and the National Defense Commission, but details are unknown.[7]

Past, Present and Planned Facilities

Pyongyang closely guards information about its nuclear facilities; however several trends can be seen in North Korea's nuclear facilities. Construction on the 50MW(e) reactor at Yongbyon and the 200MW(e) reactor at Taechon was never completed. A North Korean official has since described the facilities as "ruined concrete structures and iron scrap."[8] North Korea's newest facilities focus on uranium uranium enrichment.[9]

Sources:
[1] "Production Capability, Nuclear, Korea, North," Jane's Information Group, 7 January 2010.
[2] "No Construction at Yongbyon Site," ISIS, 4 September 2008, http://isis-online.org; Siegfried S. Hecker, "A Return Trip to North Korea's Yongbyon Nuclear Complex," Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, 20 November 2010, http://iis-db.stanford.edu.
[3] "Production Capability, Nuclear, Korea, North," Jane's Information Group, 7 January 2010.
[4] Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "North Korea's Deadly Industries Revealed," Jane's Defence Weekly, 12 November 1997, pp. 54-57.
[5] "Chemical Directorate," Federation of American Scientists, 22 November 1998, www.fas.org.
[6] "Production Capability, Nuclear, Korea, North," Jane's Information Group, 7 January 2010.
[7] Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A New Emphasis on Operations against South Korea?" 38 North, 11 June 2010, http://38north.org.
[8] Siegfried S. Hecker, "A Return Trip to North Korea's Yongbyon Nuclear Complex," Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, 20 November 2010, http://iis-db.stanford.edu.
[9] Siegfried S. Hecker, "A Return Trip to North Korea's Yongbyon Nuclear Complex," Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, 20 November 2010, http://iis-db.stanford.edu.