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Missile Last updated: September, 2014

Motivated by ongoing hostilities with India, Pakistan embarked upon an intensive ballistic missile development program in the early 1980's. [1] Overcoming technical naiveté, substantial disadvantages in infrastructure and human capital relative to India, the imposition of U.S. and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) sanctions, and the uncertainties of democratization, Pakistan developed a rudimentary missile arsenal in 30 years. [2]

Design Characteristics Tables
 

Breaking down Pakistan's missile development, and its procurement of foreign materials and expertise alongside inter-agency competition, provides important insights into "the way a semi-isolated and poor country still can pursue technically demanding ballistic missile capabilities." [3]

The perceived strategic necessity of displaying the ability to execute a nuclear strike deep within India has sustained Pakistan's interest in medium- and long-range missiles. [4] Despite this interest, Pakistan is still reliant on foreign partners to acquire and develop missile technology. Pakistan also remains a non-signatory to the MTCR, but the U.S. waived the last U.S. missile sanction laws against Pakistani entities in 2003. [5] Pakistan considers its nuclear weapons to be national "crown jewels" and likely holds missile delivery systems in a similar regard. Barring substantial changes in South Asian geopolitics, a change in attitude seems unlikely.

Capabilities

Ballistic Missiles

Pakistan has a variety of deployed ballistic missiles ranging from tactical battlefield weapons to medium-range ballistic systems with the ability to hit any target in India. Pakistan currently deploys three tiers of ballistic missiles: battlefield short range ballistic missiles (BSRBMs), short range ballistic missiles (SRBM), and medium range ballistic missiles (MRBMs).

The Army's primary BSRBM is the Hatf I (1, 1A and 1B models) with a range of 70 to 100 km depending on the variation. Although listed as a ballistic missile capable of carrying an unconventional warhead, the Hatf I is not a guided missile, and more closely resembles battlefield artillery. In November 2013 the Army successfully test fired the Nasr (Hatf-IX) BSRBM. [6] The Nasr is a 60-120 km range missile, launched from a multi-tube launcher capable of launching four missiles before reloading. [7] The Nasr reportedly is designed to counter India's Cold Start and limited war strategy. [8] The system is a quick reactionary shoot-and-scoot missile that can be launched on minimal notice and quickly moved to another location for a second launch. The development of the Nasr raises serious proliferation concerns, as it provides a quick-launch battlefield nuclear deterrent weapon that could easily lead to force escalation or an arms race of similar weapons and deterrent systems in the region.

In February 2013 Islamabad conducted a test launch of the Abdali (Hatf II) BSRBM. [9] The Abdali is a more traditional launch system with a single vertical launch capability. Whereas the Nasr fulfills the role of a tactical, battlefield deterrent, the Abdali, with a range of 180km, will serve as a more traditional short-range strategic deterrent. [10]

Pakistan deploys three SRBMs: the Ghaznavi (Hatf III), Shaheen I (Hatf IV), and Ghauri I (Hatf V). The Ghaznavi has a range of 320 km and the Shaheen I 900 km. The Shaheen I, based on the Chinese M-11 (China: Dongfeng-11; NATO: CSS-7). The Ghauri I is based on the North Korean NoDong and has a range of 1200 km.

Islamabad's most advanced missiles, and the cornerstones of Pakistan's deterrent arsenal, are the Ghauri II (Hatf V) and Shaheen II (Hatf VI) MRBMs. The Ghauri II (Hatf V), a follow-on to the Ghauri I based on North Korea's NoDong, has a range of 1500-1800 km and carries a 1200 kg payload. The Shaheen II (Haft VI) is a two-stage road mobile missile with a 2500 km range capable of carrying a 1000 kg payload.

Cruise Missiles

Pakistan currently has three cruise missiles in development with land, air, and sea launch capabilities.

The Babur (Hatf-VII) is a mobile land-based missile unveiled in September 2012. [11] The Hatf-VII is designed to fly at low altitudes to avoid radar detection and can carry nuclear warheads. [12] In June 2012 Pakistan conducted its fourth test of the Ra'ad (Hatf VIII) air-launched cruise missile (ALCM), armed with conventional warheads and capable of hitting targets at a range of 350 km. [13] Pakistan tested its first sea-launched cruise-missile, the Land Attack Missile (LAM), in December 2012. [14]

History

1960 to 1990: Space Research and a Nascent Missile Program
Pakistan began to develop rocketry expertise in the early 1960s at the Space Sciences Research Wing of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC). In September 1961, the PAEC Space Sciences program began sending lead engineers and scientists to the United States for rocket launch training with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). [15] In June 1962, Pakistan successfully launched a two-stage rocket. [16] By the account of at least one U.S. missile proliferation official, Pakistan's sounding rocket program directly enabled its future missile programs. [17]

Functioning de facto as an independent agency since 1964, President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq formally established the Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO) as Pakistan's national space agency in 1981. [18] In 1989, a year after India's Prithvi test, Pakistan launched the Hatf-I and Hatf-II missiles. [19] Both American and Indian observers denoted the Hatf-I and Hatf-II as SUPARCO-modified French sounding rockets. [20] Analysts also concluded that SUPARCO benefited from substantial technical assistance from China. [21]

The Hatf-I and Hatf-II suffered from limited range and accuracy. The lack of mass production efforts suggests that Pakistan intended their use primarily as training tools. [22] Thus, despite the successful test-flights of SUPARCO's Hatf-I and Hatf-II, U.S. assessments into the 1990's continued to name American F-16 combat aircraft sold to Pakistan in the 1980's as Pakistan's most likely nuclear delivery option. [23]

1990 to 2001: Arms Race with India, Interagency Competition, and Foreign Assistance
Despite political reforms during the 1988 to 1990 Benazir Bhutto government, democratization efforts in Pakistan did not moderate the country's zeal for missile acquisition. [24] With the limited scope of the democratization, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, a strong ally of Dr. A.Q. Khan, and General Aslam Beg continued to dominate military and national security issues. Insurgency in Kashmir further exacerbated relations with India and strengthened the military's control over nuclear and missile programs. Finally, the relatively unstable political regimes in both India and Pakistan in the early 1990s prevented sustained dialogue and normalization of relations. Thus, democratization failed to abate the organizational, security, and cognitive factors encouraging missile proliferation, and no "democratic peace" occurred in Pakistan.

Unlike India's more regional outlook, Pakistan's security concerns remained focused on the threat from India. Interestingly, however, Indian-Chinese relations indirectly motivated Pakistani missile proliferation. India's disastrous military campaigns against China, and the emergence of a nuclear China in the early 1960s, motivated both an Indian arms build-up as well as India's refusal to participate in missile control agreements absent Chinese participation. [25] The difficult relationship between India and China thus increased the perceived security threat in Pakistan and created an irresolvable logistical hurdle to any India-Pakistan missile control regime. [26]

In 1990, the Bush administration imposed Pressler Amendment sanctions on Pakistan, banning military assistance to Pakistan while it maintained a nuclear weapons program. [27] Pakistani officials, noting the resulting lack of a realistic option for improving Pakistan's limited Air Force and further motivated by the Indian military's continued technological gains, concluded the necessity of intermediate-range missile development. [28] In the decade that followed, intense clandestine missile projects culminated with the successful launch of several intermediate-range missiles. In so doing, Pakistan demonstrated the effectiveness of an organizational structure characterized by contentious interagency competition between the Chinese-assisted solid-fuel PAEC program under Dr. Samar Mubarakmand and the North Korea-assisted liquid-fueled program at Khan Research Lab (KRL) under Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan. [29]

China, motivated in part by competition with Soviet-armed India, agreed to sell M-11 missiles, launchers, and support equipment to Pakistan in 1988. [30] SUPARCO subsequently surfaced as the destination for numerous illicit materials transfers. In 1995, the United States warned European suppliers of potential illicit procurement attempts. [31] In 1996, Taiwan and Hong Kong seized numerous shipments of several tons of Ammonium perchlorate (AP), a solid-propellant component, bound for SUPARCO from North Korea and routed through China. [32] Intelligence sources also detected numerous M-11 component deliveries to a new missile factory at Tarwanah, which itself bears a strong physical resemblance to the M-11 plant in Hebei, China. [33]

In June 1991, the Bush administration imposed missile sanction laws against SUPARCO and two Chinese firms for M-11 missile technology transfers. [34] In August 1993, the Clinton administration imposed new sanctions after discovering additional M-11 exports to Pakistan. [35] These sanctions weakened Chinese largesse, and Pakistan responded by turning to other sources. [36] In 1993, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, who would come to regard herself as the "mother of the missile program," travelled to Pyongyang and secured the transfer of Nodong missile technology on behalf of Dr. A.Q. Khan and his solid-fueled missile development program at Khan Research Lab (KRL). [37] Fearing obsolescence, and unsuccessful through much of the 1980's, A.Q. Khan leveraged North Korean assistance to quickly transform KRL into a vibrant rival for PAEC. [38] Some report that A.Q. Khan struck additional technology transfer deals with North Korea outside the purview of Pakistan's state negotiations. [39] Circumstantial evidence points to an agreement by either the Pakistani government or A.Q. Khan to exchange nuclear secrets for missile technology. [40]

By the end of the decade, both programs would demonstrate intermediate-range missile launch capabilities. On 3 July 1997, SUPARCO successfully launched the Hatf-3/Ghaznavi missile. Analysts immediately noted design similarities with the Chinese M-11 missile; some even speculated that the Ghaznavi was merely a renamed imported M-11. [41] One year later, KRL test fired the liquid-fueled Hatf-V (Ghauri) missile. Winning the race for an intermediate-range missile, KRL's Ghauri brought New Delhi within range. [42] Analysts immediately noted design similarities with the North Korean Nodong missile. [43] A year later, KRL launched the Hatf-5A (Ghauri-2), with increased range capable of striking most of India. A day later, PAEC successfully fired the Hatf-IV (Shaheen-1), introducing solid-fueled intermediate-range capabilities to the Pakistani arsenal.

The successful launches of the Ghauri and Shaheen missiles occurred nearly concurrently with the debut of India's Prithvi and Agni-2 missiles. The chronology of Pakistani missile tests is consistent with arms competition not only with India, but also between KRL and PAEC.

2001 to 2007: Interagency Harmonization and Technological Maturity
In October 1999, General Pervez Musharraf seized power and overhauled Pakistan's nuclear command-and-control structure. [44] While the official justification for the reforms was to "establish harmony between Pakistan's poorly coordinated and competitive" agencies, some speculate that Musharraf also sought to "knock out the one person in Pakistan most likely to eclipse him: the Father of the Bomb." [45] Under the new organizational scheme, weaponization and delivery activities were transferred from PAEC and KRL to the National Development Complex (NDC). [46] While uncertainty exists about whether KRL retained the Ghauri program, NDC nevertheless now stands as Pakistan's primary missile development agency. [47]

The period between 2002 and 2006 marked a flurry of missile test-flights in a "tit-for-tat" pattern with India, with the two countries generally scheduling flight tests within days of each other and often concurrent with politically sensitive events such as elections. [48] In total, three Hatf-III (Ghaznavi) tests, six Hatf-IV (Shaheen-1) tests, five Hatf-V (Ghauri-1) tests, and five Hatf-VI (Shaheen-2) tests occurred. [49] By the conclusion of this period, Pakistan would claim solid-fueled capabilities of 2,000-2,500km range with 1,000kg payload, and liquid-fueled capabilities of 1,300km with a 1,000kg payload, bringing almost all of India within nuclear strike range.

The 2005 inaugural test-flight of the Hatf-VII (Babur) cruise missile stunned many observers for its technological complexity and because its development had gone undetected. [50] The extent of foreign assistance remains unclear; analysts identified design similarities with Chinese cruise missiles as well as American Tomahawk missiles, which previously crash-landed over Pakistan. [51] In 2007, Pakistan test-fired the Hatf-VIII (Ra'ad) cruise missile, adding air-launch missile capabilities to the Pakistan Air Force. [52] While Pakistan officially claimed that NDC indigenously developed the Hatf-VIII, some believe that the modest range of the missile suggests foreign assistance by a country unwilling to contravene MTCR range and payload restrictions. [53]

In 2005, India and Pakistan signed an agreement requiring both parties to provide advance notice of any ballistic missile tests. [54] Since 2007, testing activity of the Ghauri and Shaheen missiles has slowed, and the majority of new developments have appeared in cruise, rather than ballistic missile systems. [55] Potential causes for this include India's investment in a ballistic missile defense system, the Ghauri and Shaheen missiles acquiring sufficient range and payload to target strategic locations in India, international pressure against intermediate- and long-range ballistic missile tests, and a shift in focus toward developing a tactical nuclear capability. [56]

Recent Developments and Current Status

More recently, Pakistan test-fired the Hatf-IX (NASR), a short-range nuclear-capable ballistic missile in April 2011 and November 2013. [57]

In December 2012, the Pakistan Navy tested the Land Attack Missile (LAM) system for the first time, firing at onshore targets from the Arabian Sea. [58] This test signaled a move towards sea-launched platforms that could expand the country's missile capabilities and add a Naval component to its nuclear force in the future. Pakistan also tested the short-range ballistic missile Hatf-II (Abdali) in February 2013. [59]

Despite flight test successes, however, analysts remain skeptical about Pakistan's indigenous design and manufacturing capabilities. The lack of robust government-industry-university R&D linkages, a known dependence on foreign suppliers for key raw materials such as steel alloys, and the technological inexperience of private industry cast doubt upon Pakistan's missile design claims. [60] While Pakistani scientists increasingly participate in basic science collaboration with foreign laboratories, such as the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN), the country's industrial base lacks a demonstrated history of producing quality high-tech products. [61] A history of indigenous design claims refuted by intelligence sources further complicates assessments. [62] Thus, Pakistani missile development will likely remain dependent on foreign assistance for both materials and expertise in the near-term. Nevertheless Pakistan has maintained a successful missile acquisition strategy in spite of foreign dependence and a history of MTCR and U.S. Arms Export Control Act and Export Administration Act sanctions, and already boasts one of the top ten ballistic missile manufacturing capabilities in the world. [63]

Barring unprecedented industrial growth and a substantially enhanced defense-industrial base, Pakistan will likely continue its strategy of developing advanced missile systems with foreign assistance rather than pursuing the more expensive and less feasible option of pure indigenous development or advanced aircraft acquisition. [64] The LAM, Pakistan's first sea-launched missile, will be an important development to monitor in the future, as it could lay the foundation for a Naval-based second strike capability. Continued state patronage, fueled by competition with India, the high prestige accorded to Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, and the symbolic value of diversifying missile delivery systems will likely sustain continued missile development in Pakistan. [65]

Sources:
[1] Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats, Second ed. (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), p. 213.
[2] Dinshaw Mistry, Containing Missile Proliferation: Strategic Technology, Security Regimes, and International Cooperation in Arms Control (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003), p. 118.
[3] Aaron Karp, "The Spread of Ballistic Missiles and the Transformation of Global Security," The Nonproliferation Review, Fall-Winter 2000, pp. 106-122.
[4] Keith Payne and Robert Rudney, "The Unique Value of Ballistic Missiles for Deterrence and Coercion," in The Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States,Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, 15 July 1998.
[5] Missile Technology Control Regime, "Plenary Meeting of the Missile Technology Control Regime: Canberra, Australia, 5-7 November 2008," November 2008, www.mtcr.info; U.S. Department of State, "Missile Sanction Laws," updated 4 December 2009, www.state.gov.
[6] Shakil Shaikh, "Pakistan Test-Fires Hatf-IX", The News International, 20 April 2011.
[7] Shakil Shaikh, "Pakistan Test-Fires Hatf-IX", The News International, 20 April 2011.
[8] Shakil Shaikh, "Pakistan Test-Fires Hatf-IX", The News International, 20 April 2011.
[9] The Express Tribune, "Hatf II (Abdali): Pakistan conducts missile test," 15 February 2013.
[10] The Express Tribune, "Hatf II (Abdali): Pakistan conducts missile test," 15 February 2013.
[11] BBC Monitoring, "Pakistan test-fires nuclear-capable cruise missile," Associated Press of Pakistan, 17 September 2012.
[12] BBC Monitoring, "Pakistan test-fires nuclear-capable cruise missile," Associated Press of Pakistan, 17 September 2012.
[13] "Pakistan tests Ra'ad missile," Flight International, 12 June 2012.
[14] BBC Monitoring. "Pakistan Naval Fleet conducts live weapons firing in North Arabian Sea," Associated Press of Pakistan, 21 December 2012.
[15] Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission, "History," accessed 14 February 2011, www.suparco.gov.pk.
[16] Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission, "History," accessed 14 February 2011, www.suparco.gov.pk.
[17] "Pakistan Derives Its First 'Hatf' Missiles from Foreign Space Rockets," The Risk Report, October 1995, p. 4.
[18] Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission, "History," accessed 14 February 2011, www.suparco.gov.pk; The President of Pakistan, "SUPARCO Ordinance No. XX of 1981,"Gazette of Pakistan, 21 May 1981.
[19] "Pakistan tests long-range missiles," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 15 February 1989, in LexisNexis Academic Universe, www.lexisnexis.com.
[20] "Pakistan Derives its First 'Hatf' Missiles from Foreign Space Rockets," The Risk Report, October 1995, p. 4; and Subrahmanyan Chandrashekar, "An Assessment of Pakistan's Missile Capability," Missile Montior, No 3, Spring 1993, pp. 5-6.
[21] Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction, (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003), p. 213.
[22] Dinshaw Mistry, Containing Missile Proliferation: Strategic Technology, Security Regimes, and International Cooperation in Arms Control (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003), p. 118.
[23] Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction, (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003), p. 213.
[24] Dinshaw Mistry, Containing Missile Proliferation: Strategic Technology, Security Regimes, and International Cooperation in Arms Control (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003), p. 125.
[25] Dinshaw Mistry, Containing Missile Proliferation: Strategic Technology, Security Regimes, and International Cooperation in Arms Control (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003), p. 116.
[26] Dinshaw Mistry, Containing Missile Proliferation: Strategic Technology, Security Regimes, and International Cooperation in Arms Control (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003), p. 123.
[27] Dianne E. Rennack, "India and Pakistan: U.S. Economic Sanctions," CRS Report for Congress RS20995, (Washington, DC: The Library of Congress, 3 February 2003).
[28] Dinshaw Mistry, Containing Missile Proliferation: Strategic Technology, Security Regimes, and International Cooperation in Arms Control (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003), p. 122; Dilip Ganguly, "Launch of India's First Intermediate-Range Missile Postponed," Associated Press, 20 April 1989, in LexisNexis Academic Universe, www.lexisnexis.com; and Dinshaw Mistry, Containing Missile Proliferation: Strategic Technology, Security Regimes, and International Cooperation in Arms Control (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003), p. 123.
[29] Gordon Corera, Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network, (New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 2009).
[30] Bill Gertz, Betrayal: How the Clinton Administration Undermined American Security, (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 2001), p. 268.
[31] Abu Sabeen, "Purchase of ballistic missile equipment; Washington warns Islamabad," Middle East Newsfile (Moneyclips), 27 May 1995 in LexisNexis Academic Universe, www.lexisnexis.com.
[32] "Taiwan confiscates chemicals bound for Pakistan," Deutsche Presse-Agentur (Hamburg), 28 March 2006, in LexisNexis Academic Universe, www.lexisnexis.com; Michelle Chin and Glenn Schloss, "Customs raid uncovers huge haul of rocket fuel," South China Morning Post, 18 September 1996, p. 1; in LexisNexis Academic Universe, www.lexisnexis.com; and Glenn Schloss, "North Korean firm behind shipment," South China Morning Post, 13 December 1996, p. 4, in LexisNexis Academic Universe, www.lexisnexis.com.
[33] Dinshaw Mistry, Containing Missile Proliferation: Strategic Technology, Security Regimes, and International Cooperation in Arms Control (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003), p. 119; and R. Jeffrey Smith, "China Linked To Pakistani Missile Plant; Secret Project Could Renew Sanctions Issue," Washington Post, 25 August 1996, p. A01; in LexisNexis Academic Universe, www.lexisnexis.com.
[34] Shirley A. Kan, "China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues," CRS Report for Congress RL31555, (Washington, DC: The Library of Congress, 16 August 2010).
[35] "Imposition of Missile Proliferation Sanctions Against Chinese and Pakistani Entities," 56 Federal Register 137 (25 June 1991), p. 32601.
[36] Gordon Corera, Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network, (New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 2009), p. 88.
[37] Gordon Corera, Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network, (New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 2009), pp. 88-89.
[38] Gordon Corera, Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network, (New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 2009), p. 89.
[39] Gordon Corera, Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network, (New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 2009), p. 96.
[40] Gordon Corera, Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network, (New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 2009), p. 90.
[41] Duncan Lennox, ed., "Hatf 3 (Ghaznavi)," Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, Issue Forty-eight, January 2008, pp. 111-112; and Duncan Lennox, ed., "Hatf 3 (Ghaznavi)," Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, Issue Forty-eight, January 2008, pp. 111-112.
[42] Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, Deception: Pakistan, the United States, and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons, (New York: Walker & Company, 2007), p. 268.
[43] "Pakistan's Missile 'was a Nodong,'" Jane's Missiles & Rockets (Surrey), 1 May 1998.
[44] Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the rise of proliferation networks -A net assessment, (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007), p. 109.
[45] Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the rise of proliferation networks -A net assessment, (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007), p. 110; and Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark, Deception: Pakistan, the United States, and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons, (New York: Walker & Company, 2007), p. 277.
[46] Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the rise of proliferation networks -A net assessment, (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007), p. 110.
[47] Usman Ansari, "Pakistan Pushes To improve Missile Strike Capability," DefenseNews, 17 November 2008, www.defensenews.com.
[48] "India and Pakistan in tit-for-tat missile tests," The Guardian (London), 4 October 2002, www.guardian.co.uk.
[49] "Missile Flight Tests," The International Institute for Strategic Studies, accessed 31 January 2011, www.iiss.org.
[50] Robert Hewson, "Cruise missile technology proliferation takes off," Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 October 2005.
[51] Robert Hewson and Andrew Koch, "Pakistan tests cruise missile," Jane's Defence Weekly,12 August 2005; Robert Hewson, "Cruise missile technology proliferation takes off," Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 October 2005.
[52] Doug Richardson, "Pakistan tests Hatf 8 air-launched cruise missile," Jane's Missiles & Rockets, 1 September 2007.
[53] Doug Richardson, "Pakistan tests Hatf 8 air-launched cruise missile," Jane's Missiles & Rockets, 1 September 2007.
[54] "India, Pakistan sign missile test deal," Associated Press, 3 October 2005.
[55] Farhan Bokhari, "Pakistan test-fires medium-range ballistic missile," Jane's Defence Weekly, 23 December 2010; Farhan Bokhari, "Pakistan test fires Shaheen 2," Jane's Defence Weekly, 21 April 2008; and Robert Hewson, "Cruise missile technology proliferation takes off," Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 October 2005.
[56] Rahul Bedi, "India's AAD missile interceptor completes another successful test," Jane's Defence Weekly, 28 July 2010; Michael Krepon, "Pakistan's Nuclear Requirements," Arms Control Wonk, krepon.armscontrolwonk.com, accessed 8 July 2011.
[57] Michael Krepon, "Pakistan's Nuclear Requirements," Arms Control Wonk, krepon.armscontrolwonk.com, accessed 8 July 2011; Chris Allbritton, "How Pakistan's nuclear weapons could be jeopardized," Reuters, 1 June 2011, accessed 8 July 2011.
[58] BBC Monitoring. "Pakistan Naval Fleet conducts live weapons firing in North Arabian Sea," Associated Press of Pakistan, 21 December 2012.
[59] Inter Services Public Relations, "No PR20/2013" News release, February 15, 2013.
[60] Angathevar Baskaran, "An Assessment of Nuclear and Missile Developments in South Asia," Paper Presented at Seventh Annual Conference on Economics and Security, Burwalls Hall, Bristol University, 26-28 June 2003, p. 19.
[61] "Pakistani, European atomic energy bodies mark 20 years of cooperation," PTV World (Islamabad), 15 December 2004.
[62] Gordon Corera, Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network, (New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 2009).
[63] Dianne E. Rennack, "India and Pakistan: U.S. Economic Sanctions," CRS Report for Congress RS20995, (Washington, DC: The Library of Congress, 3 February 2003); and Duncan Lennox, ed., "Ballistic Missile Capabilities, Manufacturing Countries," in Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, Issue Forty-eight, January 2008, p. 553.
[64] Angathevar Baskaran, "An Assessment of Nuclear and Missile Developments in South Asia," Paper Presented at Seventh Annual Conference on Economics and Security, Burwalls Hall, Bristol University, 26-28 June 2003, pp. 16-26.
[65] Keith Payne and Robert Rudney, "The Unique Value of Ballistic Missiles for Deterrence and Coercion," in The Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, 15 July 1998.

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This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, or agents.

Get the Facts on Pakistan

  • Conducted its first five nuclear tests on 28 May 1998
  • Widely believed to have produced enough fissile material for 90-110 nuclear warheads
  • Signed agreement with India in 2005 to provide advanced notice of ballistic missile tests