The International Panel on Fissile Materials (IFPM) concluded in 2010 that Pakistan had stockpiled about 2.6±1 tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU). [1] U.S. intelligence estimates in 2011 concluded that the number of nuclear weapons deployed by Pakistan ranged from the mid-90s to higher than 110. [2] Moreover, according to the IFPM's 2010 annual report, Pakistan has produced sufficient fissile material to produce 40 to 100 more devices. [3]

History

The origins of Pakistan's nuclear program lie in its threat perceptions vis-à-vis India and have been reinforced by successive conflicts with New Delhi, centered mainly on the state of Jammu and Kashmir. A key point was the January 1972 directive by then President of Pakistan Z.A. Bhutto, after the December 1971 defeat against India, which instructed the country's nuclear establishment to build a nuclear device in three years. [4] But the initial steps toward development of a nuclear program dated back to the 1950s, including with the inception of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) in 1957. [5] Bhutto had forcefully advocated the nuclear option since the late 1950s and famously said in 1966 that if India acquired a nuclear weapons capability, "even if Pakistan had to eat grass, we will make the bomb."[6]

India's detonation of a nuclear device in May 1974 pushed Islamabad to accelerate its nuclear weapons program, although the PAEC had already constituted a group in March that year to manufacture a nuclear weapon. [7] By the late 1970s, nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan was at the forefront of Pakistan's nuclear program, although other senior officials and scientists including Munir Ahmad Khan, played important roles. Pakistan exploited inadequate export controls and deployed various tactics to evade regulations (e.g., buying individual components, rather than complete units), and acquired a variety of equipment related to its highly enriched uranium program. [8] Several Western companies cooperated with Islamabad in providing such equipment. [9] Eventually, from the 1980s onwards, the Khan network diversified its activities and illicitly transferred nuclear technology and expertise to Iran, North Korea, and Libya. The Khan network was officially dismantled in 2004, although questions still remain concerning the extent of the Pakistani political and military establishment's involvement in the network's activities.

Pakistan also received assistance from state actors, especially China. Since the late 1970s, Beijing provided Islamabad with various levels of nuclear and missile-related assistance, including centrifuge equipment, warhead designs, highly enriched uranium (HEU), components of various missile systems and technical expertise. [10]

Current Status

In recent years Pakistan has continued to expand its nuclear weapons program, both in terms of delivery systems and through more effective warheads, by proceeding from highly enriched uranium (HEU)-based devices to those based on plutonium. [11] According to analyses in 2010, a second plutonium production reactor is likely to have begun operations by late 2009. [12] (In 1998, Pakistan had commissioned its first plutonium production reactor, also at Khushab, which is capable of yielding 10 to 15kg of weapons-grade plutonium annually.) Construction of a third plutonium production reactor at Khushab began in 2006, and satellite imagery analysis in September 2010 suggested that construction is proceeding at a brisk pace leading to possible completion in 2011. [13] Associated facilities are also being expanded, especially plutonium separation facilities at New Labs, Pakistan Institute of Science and Technology, to reprocess spent fuel from the new reactors at Khushab. [14] Thus, Islamabad appears to be expanding and diversifying its nuclear weapons capability through the plutonium route's more compact and powerful warheads in its quest for a secure second-strike capability against India.[15] There is no confirmed data regarding the location and production sites of Pakistan's nuclear weapons, but Islamabad is considered to have about half-a-dozen storage locations.[16]

In late April 2010, reports stated that the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) had agreed to supply two 650-MW reactors to Pakistan, as Chashma 3&4. [17] This followed periodic, albeit unconfirmed, reports in recent years that the two countries were discussing such a deal. [18] The existing Sino-Pakistani nuclear cooperation framework covers Chashma 1&2 reactors, with the first reactors completed in 2000, and the second to be completed in 2011. [19] Currently, the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) has not approved additional reactors at Chashma, and the United States government had stated in 2004 that it would not accept pre-2004 Sino-Pakistani nuclear agreements as the basis for additional reactors at Chashma. [20] Additionally, after the agreement was announced, U.S. government officials said that the deal had to be in accordance with NSG rules, and that China would have to seek an exemption from NSG regulations. [21]

Islamabad has been critical of the U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement, but at the same time has periodically sought a similar arrangement for itself, a demand Washington has so far turned down. [22] At the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington in April 2010, Islamabad sought "non-discriminatory access" to civilian nuclear technology, while also offering nuclear fuel cycle services covered by IAEA safeguards to the international community. [23] Previously, in 2008, it pushed for a criteria-based exemption in the rules of the NSG to enable Pakistan to be eligible for similar treatment, rather than a country-based exception benefitting only New Delhi. Despite these reservations, Islamabad joined in the approval of India's safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) by the Agency's Board of Governors in August 2008. [24]

Pakistan is not a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). On the proposed Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), Pakistan has expressed its opposition because of its insistence that the FMCT cover reduction of existing stocks of fissile materials (to prevent a permanent gap vis-a-vis India), and because of its backing for a verification framework. [25] At the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in January 2011, Pakistan reiterated its opposition to commencement of negotiations towards an FMCT. [26] While declaring its opposition to the FMCT in its current format at the CD in January 2010, Islamabad had called for the CD's agenda to be enlarged to consider aspects of regional conventional arms control as well as a regime on missile-related issues, while also maintaining its opposition to a treaty that did not cover fissile stocks retroactively. [27]

In general, Pakistan's position on nuclear disarmament has been that it will give up its nuclear weapons if India gives up its own nuclear arsenal, but given Islamabad's objective of balancing India's conventional military and nuclear superiority, Pakistan is unlikely to agree to a denuclearization agreement. [28] It has also consistently refused to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and from 2009 to 2010, official Pakistani statements indicated that even if India signed the treaty, Islamabad would not necessarily follow suit. [29]

Pakistan is a member of some multilateral programs, including the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. It has also been involved in the U.S. government's Secure Freight Initiative through the stationing of systems at Port Qasim in Pakistan to scan containers for nuclear and radiological materials. [30]

Doctrine

Pakistan's nuclear doctrine is centered on a minimum deterrent, and it has repeatedly eschewed a no-first use policy. Its nuclear posture is primarily aimed at deterring a conventional Indian attack. [31] Islamabad has not yet formally issued its nuclear doctrine, although in at least one instance a senior military official attempted to define the threshold for nuclear use. [32]

Islamabad has put in place a command-and-control system centered around the National Command Authority (NCA), which is the main nuclear decision-making body, and the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), which controls the country's nuclear weapons and facilities. [33] The NCA is headed by the President of Pakistan. The SPD, which acts as the secretariat of the NCA, also oversees the Armed Strategic Force, which consists of the strategic commands of the army, navy, and air force. [34] Reports in 2007 indicated that since 9/11, there has been significant cooperation between Islamabad and Washington on securing Pakistan's nuclear facilities. [35]

In December 2007, the NCA was formally and legally established through an ordinance, although it had been in existence since 2000. [36] Eventually, the legislation governing the NCA was approved by the Pakistan National Assembly in January 2010. [37] Previously, in November 2009, Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari announced that he was transferring his role as head of the National Command Authority to the Prime Minister, Yusuf Gilani. But regardless of this handover, the Pakistani military remains the main decision-maker with respect to nuclear weapons.

Nuclear Security

The security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons has been a key concern in recent years, with the rise of terrorist and insurgent violence, and the expansion of geographical areas of the country under Taliban control. The fear is that such developments increase the likelihood of scenarios in which Pakistan's nuclear security is put at risk. Scenarios include: (1) personnel working in Islamabad's nuclear program collaborate with militant groups and proliferation networks; (2) the Taliban captures nuclear facilities located in western Pakistan as they expand areas under their geographical control; (3) deliberate or inadvertent attacks on Islamabad's nuclear facilities; and (4) persistent political instability weakening nuclear command-and-control.

Since 2007, Taliban-linked groups have successfully attacked tightly guarded government and military targets in the country, raising questions over whether nuclear facilities are insulated from such attacks. Several Pakistani nuclear facilities, including the Khushab facility and the Gadwal uranium enrichment plant, are in proximity of areas under attack from the Taliban. [38] Additionally, there have been some attempts to kidnap officials and technicians working at nuclear sites in western Pakistan, although it is not clear who was responsible and what their intentions were. [39] Additionally, in recent years senior Al Qaeda leaders have expressed an interest in taking over Pakistan's nuclear weapons [40]

Nevertheless, Islamabad has consistently asserted that it has complete control over its nuclear weapons and that it is impossible for groups such as the Taliban or proliferation networks to gain access to the nuclear facilities or weapons. Islamabad has disclosed measures it has taken in recent years to strengthen physical security of nuclear weapons and installations. [41] Additionally, Pakistan has also put in place more stringent export control mechanisms, including the 2004 Export Control Act and the establishment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Strategic Export Control Division (SECDIV) to regulate exports of nuclear, biological, and missile-related products. [42]

It has also strengthened its personnel reliability program (PRP) to prevent radicalized individuals from infiltrating the nuclear program, although various experts believe that nevertheless potential gaps do exist. [43] Pakistani analysts and officials state that they have developed their own version of "permissive action links" or PALs to safeguard their warheads, and have not relied on U.S. assistance for this technology. [44] Nevertheless, in recent years, Washington has provided various levels of assistance to Pakistan to strengthen the security of its nuclear program. [45] For example, the United States has installed radiation detection devices at a few ports in Pakistan to prevent the transfers of weapons of mass destruction-related material. According to some reports in April 2009, with the expansion of Taliban control in western Pakistan, Islamabad shared some highly classified information about its nuclear program with Western countries in order to reassure them of the country's nuclear security. [46]

Sources:
[1] "Global Fissile Material Report 2010," International Panel on Fissile Materials, Fifth Annual Report, December 2010, www.fissilematerials.org.
[2] David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, "Pakistani Nuclear Arms Pose Challenges to U.S. Policy," The New York Times, 31 January 2011, www.nytimes.com.
[3] "Global Fissile Material Report 2010," International Panel on Fissile Materials, Fifth Annual Report, December 2010, www.fissilematerials.org; David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, "Pakistani Nuclear Arms Pose Challenges to U.S. Policy," The New York Times, 31 January 2011, www.nytimes.com.
[4] George Perkovich, "Could Anything Be Done to Stop Them? Lessons from Pakistan's Proliferating Past," in Henry D. Sokolski (ed) Pakistan's Nuclear Future: Worries Beyond War, (1998: Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA).
[5] Samina Ahmed, "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program: Turning Points and Nuclear Choices," International Security, Spring 1999, Vol. 23, No. 4.
[6] Samina Ahmed, "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program: Turning Points and Nuclear Choices," International Security, Spring 1999, Vol. 23, No. 4.
[7] Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the Rise of Proliferation Networks, (International Institute for Strategic Studies: London, 2007)
[8] Bruno Tertrais, "Not a 'Wal-Mart', but an 'Imports-Exports Enterprise': Understanding the Nature of the A.Q. Khan Network," Strategic Insights, Vol. VI, Issue 5, August 2007.
[9] Bruno Tertrais, "Not a 'Wal-Mart', but an 'Imports-Exports Enterprise': Understanding the Nature of the A.Q. Khan Network," Strategic Insights, Vol. VI, Issue 5, August 2007.
[10] T.V. Paul, "Chinese-Pakistani Nuclear/Missile Ties and the Balance of Power," The Nonproliferation Review, Summer 2003.
[11] Robert S. Norris and Hans Kristensen, "Nuclear Notebook: Pakistani Nuclear Forces, 2009," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 2009, http://thebulletin.metapress.com.
[12] Paul Brannan, "Steam Emitting From Second Khushab Reactor Cooling Towers; Pakistan Maybe Operating Second Reactor," Institute for Science and International Security, 24 March 2010, http://isis-online.org.; Zia Mian, "Pakistan May Have Completed New Plutonium Production Reactor, Khushab-II" International Panel on Fissile Materials, 28 February 2010, www.fissilematerials.org.
[13] David Albright and Paul Brannan, "Pakistan Expanding Plutonium Separation Facility Near Rawalpindi," Institute for Science and International Security, 19 May 2009, www.isis-online.org; Paul Brannan, "Construction of Third Heavy Water Reactor at Khushab Nuclear Site in Pakistan Progressing," Institute for Science and International Security, 5 October 2010; "Global Fissile Material Report 2010," International Panel on Fissile Materials, Fifth Annual Report, December 2010, www.fissilematerials.org.
[14] David Albright and Paul Brannan, "Pakistan Expanding Plutonium Separation Facility Near Rawalpindi," Institute for Science and International Security, 19 May 2009, www.isis-online.org.
[15] David Albright and Paul Brannan, "Pakistan Expanding Plutonium Separation Facility Near Rawalpindi," Institute for Science and International Security, 19 May 2009, www.isis-online.org; Samina Ahmed, "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program: Turning Points and Nuclear Choices," International Security, Spring 1999, Vol. 23, No. 4.
[16] Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, "Nuclear Notebook: Worldwide Deployments of Nuclear Weapons, 2009," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 2009, http://thebulletin.metapress.com.
[17] Mark Hibbs, "Pakistan Deal Signals China's Growing Nuclear Assertiveness," Nuclear Energy Brief, 27 April 2010, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, www.carnegieendowment.org.
[18] Khaleeq Kiani, "27 pacts signed with China: N-cooperation discussed: Aziz," Dawn, 18 April 2007, www.dawn.com; "Pak-China Technical Level Talks on Nuke Power Sharing Underway," Press Trust of India, 21 December 2006, Lexis-Nexis; Farhan Bokhari and Jo Johnson, "Chinese Soft-Pedal on Nuclear Aid for Pakistan," The Financial Times, 25 November 2006; Shahid-ur-Rehman, "China Offers to Help Pakistan Build Two More Reactors at Chashma," Nucleonics Week, 23 October 2008; Mark Hibbs, "No New Sino-Pakistan Agreement Reached for Export of Chinese PWRs," Nucleonics Week, 6 November 2008.
[19] Mark Hibbs, "Pakistan Deal Signals China's Growing Nuclear Assertiveness," Nuclear Energy Brief, 27 April 2010, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, www.carnegieendowment.org.
[20] Mark Hibbs, "No New Sino-Pakistan Agreement Reached for Export of Chinese PWRs," Nucleonics Week, 6 November 2008.
[21] "US 'Favours' China-Pak Nuke Deal," Indian Express, 25 May 2010, www.indianexpress.com; Ananth Krishnan, "China Must Seek NSG Exemption, Says U.S.," The Hindu, 5 May 2010, http://beta.thehindu.com.
[22] Baqir Sajjad Syed, "Expectations for civilian nuclear deal dampened by US," Dawn, 9 April 2010, www.dawn.com.
[23] "Pakistan Seeks Equal Access to Civil Nuclear Technology," Dawn, 12 April 2010, www.dawn.com; Louis Charbonneau, "Pakistan Offers Global Nuclear Fuel Services Again," Reuters, 13 April 2010, www.reuters.com.
[24] "UN Endorses India-US Nuclear Pact," The Australian, 4 August 2008, www.theaustralian.news.com.au.
[25] Shireen M. Mazari, "The FMCT Threat," The News, 8 August 2007, thenews.jang.com.pk.
[26] "Pakistan warns against India nuclear support," Dawn, 25 January 2011, www.dawn.com; Narayan Lakshman, "Top U.S. official says Pakistan holding up FMCT negotiations," The Hindu, 1 February 2011; Brian Rose, "Bleak Outlook for 2011 Conference on Disarmament," USIP Peace Brief 78, 28 January 2011, www.usip.org.
[27] "Pakistan Blocks Agenda at UN Disarmament Conference," The Daily Times, 20 January 2010, www.dawn.com; "Pakistan Rejects Atom Bomb Material Cut-Off Talks, Cites Danger From India," Reuters, 25 January 2010, www.reuters.com.
[28] "Pakistan Ready to Phase Out Nukes if India Does So," The Daily Times, 24 May 2009, www.dailytimes.com.pk; "Country Perspectives on the Challenges to Nuclear Disarmament," International Panel on Fissile Materials, 2010, www.fissilematerials.org.
[29] "Pakistan Rules Out Test Ban Treaty Endorsement," Global Security Newswire, 19 June 2009, www.globalsecuritynewswire.org; "No Proposal to Sign Nuclear Ban Treaty," GlobalSecurity.org, 1 January 2010, www.globalsecuritynewswire.org.
[30] "Radiation Detection Testing Underway at Two Foreign Sea Ports," Press Release, Department of Homeland Security, 11 April 2007, www.dhs.gov.
[31] Peter Lavoy, "Pakistan's Nuclear Posture: Security and Survivability," Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, January 2007, pp. 4-5, www.npec-web.org.
[32] See statement by Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai, head of Pakistan's Strategic Plans Division, in "Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Stability, and Nuclear Strategy in Pakistan," Concise Report of a Visit by Landau Network - Centro Volta, January 2002, p. 5, http://lxmi.mi.infn.it.
[33] See Khalid Banuri and Adil Sultan, "Managing and Securing the Bomb," The Daily Times, 30 May 2008, www.dailytimes.com.pk.
[34] "Pakistan Sets up Tri-Command Nuclear Force: Officials," Yahoo News Asia, 9 August 2006, asia.news.yahoo.com.
[35] David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, "U.S. Secretly Aids Pakistan in Guarding Nuclear Arms," The New York Times, 18 November 2007, www.nytimes.com.
[36] "Musharraf promulgates ordinance to establish NCA," The Daily Times, 14 December 2007, www.dailytimes.com.
[37] "NA passes National Command Authority Bill 2009," The Daily Times, 29 January 2010, www.dailytimes.com.
[38] Simon Tisdall, "Pakistan Nuclear Projects Raise U.S. Fears," The Guardian, 3 May 2009, www.guardian.co.uk.
[39] "Pakistan Nuclear Staff Go Missing," BBC News, 12 February 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk; "Pakistan 'Nuclear Kidnap' Foiled," BBC News, 15 January 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk.
[40] Abdul Hameed Bakier, "Jihadis Discuss Plans to Seize Pakistan's Nuclear Arsenal," Terrorism Monitor, 26 May 2009, Vol. VII, Issue 14, pp. 4-5, www.jamestown.org; "Al-Qaeda Commander Threatens U.S.," AlJazeera.Net, 22 June 2009, http://english.aljazeera.net.
[41] See Michelle Marchesano, "Meeting the Nuclear Security Challenge in Pakistan," Partnership for Global Security, Conference Report, April 2008, www.partnershipforglobalsecurity.org.
[42] "Pakistan Joins Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, Establishes Strategic Export Control Division," International Export Control Observer, June/July 2007, p. 3, http://cns.miis.edu.
[43] Peter Wonacott, "Inside Pakistan's Drive to Guard It's A-Bombs," Wall Street Journal, 29 November 2007, http://online.wsj.com.
[44] Mark Thompson, "Does Pakistan's Taliban Surge Raise a Nuclear Threat," Time, 24 April 2009.
[45] Sharad Joshi and Togzhan Kassenova, "Pakistan and Cooperative Threat Reduction," Nuclear Threat Initiative, Issue Brief, 4 August 2008, www.nti.org.
[46] Farhan Bokhari and James Lamont, "Obama Says Pakistan Nukes in Safe Hands," The Financial Times, 29 April 2009, www.ft.com.