Moscow has been a strong supporter of nuclear nonproliferation treaties and regimes; bilateral arms control treaties with the United States had reduced the Russian arsenal to 1,537 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads and 865 deployed and non-deployed launchers as of February 2011. [1] Under the terms of the New START agreement, signed in April 2010, Moscow is required to cut its strategic warhead numbers to 1,550 and 800 total launchers. [2] Thus, the total number of Russia’s operationally deployed warheads is already below the New START limits.

In addition to its nuclear weapons capabilities, Russia possesses an extensive civilian nuclear power infrastructure, which includes 31 operating nuclear power reactors located at 10 nuclear power stations, and a vast fuel cycle infrastructure.[3] The Russian government also plans to expand civilian nuclear energy over the coming decades through the construction of new reactors.

Capabilities and Nuclear Weapons Doctrine

Russia possesses approximately 600 strategic delivery platforms capable of carrying 2,660 nuclear warheads. In order to maintain the effectiveness of its stockpile, Russia periodically produces new warheads and does not extend the service lives of its existing inventory.[4] Russia deploys approximately 370 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) of six different variants.[5] The newest additions to the arsenal are the silo-based and road-mobile Topol-M, as well as the RS-24, which is equipped with Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRV) and was deployed with the 54th missile division at Teykovo in 2010.[6] Robert Norris and Hans Kristensen estimate that each RS-24 carries four or more nuclear warheads.[7]

Russia's sea-based deterrent has traditionally played a more marginal role in Russian strategic planning than its rocket forces. Moscow's active strategic ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) force currently consists of four Delta III submarines, which are all based with the Pacific Fleet in Rybachiy, and six Delta IV submarines based with the Northern Fleet at Yagelnaya Bay.[8] The Delta IV class currently forms the backbone of Russia's naval deterrent. In addition, Russia has three Typhoon-class SSBNs based with the Northern Fleet at Litsa Guba. While none of the Typhoon-class vessels are operational, one is being used as a testing platform for the new Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). A new fleet of SSBNs named the "Borey" class is also being constructed, and the first vessel, the Yuri Dolguruky, recently completed sea trials with the Sevmash shipyard in Severodvinsk. Three more vessels from this class — Alexander Nevsky, Nicholas the Sanctifier and Vladimir Monomakh — are at various stages of construction.[9]

A new liquid-propelled SLBM, named the RMS-54 "Sineva," has been developed for the Delta IV submarines, and the missile has undergone a series of successful tests. It is now being progressively fitted throughout the Delta IV class vessels. Testing of the new SS-N-32 Bulava SLBM has been less successful, with the missile experiencing multiple failures.[10] This poses a number of problems for the operational viability of the new Borey-class SSBNs, which are built to carry the Bulava missile. If technical problems with the Bulava are solved, then each Borey-class submarine will be fitted with 16 missiles with a range of 8,000 to 9,000 kilometers.[11] This new class of submarine will eventually form the core of the Russian naval deterrent, as the Delta IV boats will be approaching the end of their service lives in the 2020s.[12]

Russia's air-leg comprises 76 strategic bombers that include 13 Tu-160 Blackjacks, 32 Tu-95 MS6 Bear H6s, and 31 Tu-95 MS16 Bear H16s.[13] Delivery vehicles include the AS-15A (Kh-55) air-launched cruise missile (ALCM), and a large but unknown number of nuclear gravity bombs. Russia has also been developing a new ALCM for a number of years, the Kh-102, which has not yet been deployed.[14]

Russia also possesses a large number of substrategic, or tactical nuclear weapons that could potentially be used by the air and naval forces. Today, the Russian Navy maintains tactical warheads that can arm cruise missiles, torpedoes, and anti-submarine weapons, but all of them are believed to be stored on land.[15] Non-strategic warheads can also be carried on the AS-4 ALCM and gravity bombs.

No official Russian data exists on current tactical nuclear weapon stockpiles or deployments. Because the so-called Presidential Nuclear Initiatives required no information exchange on tactical nuclear weapons between the United States and Russia, there are no "baseline" figures for estimates. During the Soviet period, tactical nuclear weapons were deployed in almost every republic of the USSR. A Russian scholar, basing his figures on a Newsweek report, indicates the weapons were distributed as follows: Armenia--200; Azerbaijan--75; Belarus--1,180; Estonia--270; Georgia--320; Kazakhstan--330; Kyrgyzstan--75; Lithuania--325; Latvia--185; Moldova--90; Russia--12,320; Tajikistan--75; Turkmenistan--125; Ukraine--2,345; Uzbekistan--105. Total estimated deployment was thus 18,020. [16] By the end of 1991, tactical nuclear weapons had been withdrawn from every republic except for those where strategic weapons were also located. All former Soviet tactical nuclear weapons were also withdrawn from Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine by the end of May 1992.

Since 1992, Russia is believed to have eliminated a significant number of its tactical nuclear warheads. However, the completion of this effort, initially delayed due to funding constraints, has had no clear time frame and may be linked to U.S. reduction of tactical nuclear forces in Europe. A 2011 estimate in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists placed the number of Russian operational tactical nuclear weapons at 2,080. Estimates of exact numbers vary, but are usually placed between 3,700 and 5,400 total warheads. [17]

A public glimpse of Russia’s nuclear doctrine can be found in the document Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation for the Time Period through the Year 2020, released in February 2010. [18] This document replaced the Military Doctrine published in 2000 as well as doctrinal clarifications issued as a part of a 2003 “White Paper” of Russia’s Ministry of Defense. The new 2010 doctrine appears to reduce the role that nuclear weapons have played in Russia's national security policy for over a decade. [19]

Russia’s post-Soviet nuclear doctrine has undergone several iterations. In 1993, Moscow issued a military doctrine that formally dropped the Soviet Union’s no-first-use policy. However, that document also “did not assign any specific missions to nuclear weapons and did not define any threats to which nuclear weapons were supposed to respond.” [20] Thus, Russia’s nuclear reliance was low throughout the early part of the decade.

Russia’s nuclear doctrine changed slowly, and almost the entire first decade of Russia’s existence was spent on debates, most of them behind closed doors. Only in 1999 did a new, post-Soviet nuclear doctrine begin to take shape. Some scholars have argued that analysis of official documents, as well as official and unofficial statements suggests that the main innovation was the new mission assigned to nuclear weapons, that of deterring limited conventional wars. [21] Toward this end, a 1999 Russian Federation Security Council meeting saw the adoption of three documents: one of them covered the development and security of the nuclear weapons research, development, and production complex; another was a concept underlying the use of nuclear weapons, including tactical nuclear weapons; the third document, according to then-Security Council Secretary Vladimir Putin, was so secret that even its title could not be disclosed. [22]

The emergence of the 2000 military doctrine appears to have been influenced by two factors, including a perception of an acute external threat, when Russia anticipated that NATO might threaten to use force on a limited scale to achieve limited political goals akin to the wars in the Balkans, and an acute sense of weakness of Russia's conventional forces faced with the prospect of a limited conventional war, especially with superior NATO forces. Nikolai Sokov of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies has written that, “from the perspective of the Russian military, reliance on nuclear weapons was a logical response to the glaring inadequacy of conventional forces premised on the idea that nuclear weapons had greater utility than simply to deter a large-scale nuclear attack. Official documents suggest, however, that reliance on nuclear weapons was seen as a temporary "fix" intended to provide for security until conventional forces were sufficiently modernized and strengthened.” [23]

Later in 2000, the Security Council made a radical decision to substantially reduce the size and role of the Strategic Rocket Forces, shifting the main focus to naval platforms. The chief argument in support of this decision was that nuclear reductions would free up funding for the modernization of conventional forces, “so that by 2016 Russia could create the ‘foundation’ for a ‘future conventional deterrent capability.” [24] As Sokov notes, however, “these decisions were partially revised in early 2002 following the U.S. notification of its intent to withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (the withdrawal became final in June 2002).” [25]

The publication in 2003 of a Ministry of Defense “White Paper” pointed to the stabilization of Russia’s nuclear policy. This document confirmed and detailed the missions assigned to nuclear weapons, and the future shape of the nuclear posture. That said, “one remaining element of uncertainty [was] related to future U.S. policy on nuclear weapons: if the United States proceed[ed] with the development of a new, more "usable" nuclear weapon and especially if it resume[d] nuclear testing …, then Russian nuclear policy might [have begun] to change and Russia [would have] strive[d] to acquire similar capabilities.” [26]

The publication of the 2010 military doctrine saw multiple delays. In comments preceding the document’s release in 2009, Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev indicated that nuclear weapons might be assigned to “local conflicts,” thus dramatically expanding Russia’s nuclear use threshold. Patrushev’s comments appear to have caused a domestic backlash. [27] Additionally, U.S. policies seem to have influenced Russia’s internal nuclear doctrine debates. As Pavel Podvig of Stanford has written, the “renewed U.S. commitment to nuclear nonproliferation, disarmament, and reduced reliance on nuclear weapons has apparently had an effect on the new Russian military doctrine.” [28] The result of these developments was the publication of a doctrine that reduced the role of nuclear weapons in Russia’s security policy. While the 2000 doctrine, “foresaw the resorting to nuclear weapons 'in situations critical for [the] national security' of Russia,” the 2010 doctrine “allow[ed] for their use in situations when 'the very existence of [Russia] [was] under threat." [29] This change has brought Russia's declaratory policy more in line with the policies of other nuclear weapon states.

History of the Nuclear Weapons Program

Flirting with the Atom
Although the Soviets carried out some initial research on nuclear fission in the 1930s, the country's nuclear weapons program began as a wartime intelligence operation that gathered information on atomic activities in the United States and Nazi Germany. [30] This was coupled with a modest research effort in small-scale Soviet laboratories from 1943 onwards. Research carried out prior to World War II, by individuals such as Iulii Khariton and Iakov Zeldovich, made little impact outside the Soviet Union and did not enjoy significant government backing. [31] It was not until July 1940 that Soviet scientists alerted the government to the possible military applications of nuclear fission. [32]

Soviet nuclear research continued in the early 1940s, but with less urgency than in the West. [33] In 1941 and 1942, scientists researched isotopic separation, focusing on the gaseous diffusion and centrifuge methods.[34] However, following the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, Soviet scientists shifted their focus to conventional military applications. [35] The urgency with which they pursued these military applications resulted in an almost complete suspension of the Soviet Union's nuclear research. It was intelligence relating to the Maud Report in the United Kingdom, and concerns that Nazi Germany had an atomic project, that eventually led to the reestablishment of Soviet nuclear research in early 1943. [36]

Igor Kurchatov was appointed scientific director of the atomic project in March 1943, but at this stage the program remained a hedge against future uncertainties, with the government skeptical that a bomb could be developed quickly enough to affect the outcome of the war. [37] The State Defense Committee issued an instruction to establish a new laboratory known as Laboratory No. 2, which was run by Kurchatov. [38] Laboratory No. 2 grew slowly, and was originally housed in the Seismological Institute on Pyzhevskii Lane in Moscow, but later moved to a site at the All—Union Institute of Experimental Medicine, located outside of the city. [39] Kurchatov began to assemble a team, led by Khariton, which worked on bomb design. [40]

The beginnings of the Soviet nuclear weapons program were heavily influenced by espionage. Scientists working on the Manhattan Project, such as Klaus Fuchs, provided a steady stream of information to the Soviets that included a blueprint for the Fat Man implosion device dropped on Nagasaki. Fuchs was working on the team at Los Alamos that calculated implosion, an area vital for the success of the Soviet effort. [41] This information later enabled Soviet scientists to "skip labor-intensive phases in the solution of problems." [42] To protect the identity of spies such as Fuchs, only four individuals within the Soviet leadership were privy to this information: Josef Stalin, Lavrenty Beria, Igor Kurchatov and one other unknown individual. [43] Although Kurchatov was given access to intelligence reports from abroad, his colleagues did not have access to this information. [44]

Post-Hiroshima: The Crash Program
After the U.S. bombing of Hiroshima in August 1945, Stalin became convinced of the atomic bomb's strategic importance and ordered a crash development program. [45] As a result, the Soviet nuclear weapons effort switched gears and on 20 August 1945 the State Defense Committee (Gosudarstvenny Komitet Oborony, GKO) established a Special Committee (Spetskom) to direct the nuclear effort. Beria chaired the Spetskom, providing prison labor for construction of the nuclear complex, while Kurchatov remained Scientific Director of the program. [46] During this period, Kurchatov used the U.S. Fat Man design to verify the results of independent work carried out by Soviet scientists at Arzamas-16 (where the first Soviet device was built). In 1945, Kurchatov also began designing the first industrial-scale reactor, located in the Urals close to the town of Chelyabinsk. Construction of the site began in early 1946, and was completed by the end of 1947; it became known as Chelyabinsk-40, and would also be the site of the Soviet Union's first plutonium separation plant. [47]

After August 1945, the Soviet Union pursued three methods of isotopic separation: electromagnetic separation, thermal diffusion and gaseous diffusion. [48] Ultimately, the country constructed a gaseous diffusion plant at Sverdlovsk-44, close to the town of Neviansk in the Urals, along with an electromagnetic combine at Sverdlovsk-45, near Severnaya Tura. [49] In order to ensure the accuracy of the implosion information provided by Fuchs, Kurchatov decided to create a design laboratory in Sarov, approximately 400 km east of Moscow, which became known as Arzamas-16. [50]

To ensure the success of the first Soviet nuclear test, codenamed "First Lightning," the Soviet Union copied the U.S. Fat Man design supplied by Fuchs. The first device, named RDS-1 (which never entered service), was detonated on 29 August 1949 at the Semipalatinsk test site in Kazakhstan, and was meant to convey a political message that the Soviet Union had arrived on the atomic scene. A second test took place two years later, on 24 September 1951, which was based on a Soviet design and produced a yield of 40 kilotons, twice that of Fat Man. [51] Given the emphasis that was placed on the U.S. design for the first Soviet test, and the Soviets' use of their own designs thereafter, there is a significant debate over the role that espionage, as opposed to Soviet science, played in the development of the country's atomic bomb. [52] It is clear that both espionage and the progress of Soviet scientists played roles in the program, a fact symbolized by Lavrenty Beria's leadership of both operations.

From Fission to Fusion: Thermonuclear Weapons
While work was underway on the Soviet Union's first atomic weapon, a group of scientists including Andrei Sakharov, Yakov Zeldovich, and Khariton were already conducting work on an early thermonuclear device. [53] In consultation with Igor Tamm, a theoretical physicist at FIAN (Physical Institute of the Academy of Sciences) in Moscow, a design was conceived that used alternative layers of thermonuclear fuel and became known as the "layer cake" ("sloika" in Russian). [54] Another Soviet scientist, Vitaly Ginzburg, also contributed to the design by offering modifications, such as adding lithium-6. [55] The device was named RDS-6s (or Joe-4), and was tested at Semipalatinsk in August 1953. However, there is some debate over whether this particular device can be called a true hydrogen bomb or simply a highly boosted fission device. [56] Russia began work on a staging device soon after — called the "Third Idea" — that was designed primarily by Sakharov. The first test of the RDS-37, as it was called, took place on 22 November 1955 at Semipalatinsk and produced an undisputed thermonuclear detonation. [57]

U.S.-Soviet and U.S.-Russian Arms Control
Following Stalin's death in 1953 - and Beria's subsequent arrest and execution - the military assumed responsibility for the Soviet weapons program. [58] In the mid-1950s, attention turned to possible battlefield uses of nuclear weapons, which followed the trajectory of NATO policy at that time. [59] Subsequent Soviet leaders would increasingly view military strategy and international relations through the prism of nuclear weapons, and although the USSR had not achieved nuclear parity by the time of Stalin's death, both the Soviet Union and the United States quickly realized that nuclear war was unacceptable.

Under the leadership of Nikita Khrushchev, Soviet nuclear weapons were increasingly used as a tool for the pursuit of military and diplomatic strategies. For example, in 1956, Moscow issued veiled nuclear threats to France and the United Kingdom during the Suez Crisis, and a continuation of this strategy — coupled with a perception of U.S. weakness following the failed Bay of Pigs invasion — led to the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis when the Soviet Union deployed medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Cuba. The brinkmanship of the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the tensions that existed during the 1960s, led to a period of détente during the 1970s with both sides trying to control the escalating arms race and build predictability.

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), concluded in 1972, led to two treaties dealing with both offensive and defensive arms: the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. [60] The latter agreement froze the number of strategic ballistic missile launchers at existing levels while the ABM Treaty placed limits on national missile defense systems. [61] SALT I was followed by SALT II talks from 1977 to 1979, which resulted in an agreement reducing both sides to 2,250 strategic delivery vehicles. [62] The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 meant that President Carter withdrew SALT II from U.S. Senate consideration, but both sides continued to honor the treaty until 1986, when President Reagan withdrew the United States from SALT II after asserting that the Soviet Union had violated its political commitment to the treaty. [63]

However, 1986 was also the year of the Reykjavik summit when President Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev came close to an agreement on abolishing all offensive nuclear weapons within a decade, a deal that eventually stumbled on the issue of U.S. missile defense testing. [64] But the summit did pave the way for arms control treaties in the following years, including the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty that eliminated an entire category of nuclear weapons on both sides (all ground-launched cruise and ballistic missiles with intermediate-ranges). [65] The end of the Cold War also created an opportunity for further reductions in strategic arms, including the signing of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) in 1991, which limited both the United States and the Soviet Union to 1,600 deployed delivery vehicles that could carry no more than 6,000 "accountable" warheads. [66] START I was followed by START II, a treaty that was signed in 1993 but never entered into force. START II contained a limit of 3,000 to 3,500 nuclear warheads each. [67] Although the Russian Duma ratified the treaty in 2000, START II never entered into force due to the United States' 2002 withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. [68]

The George W. Bush Administration's aversion to legally binding arms control agreements led to the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), also known as the Moscow Treaty, which codified a 2001 promise from Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin to reduce the number of deployed strategic forces on both sides to a level of 1,700 to 2,200 by 2012. [69] Following the expiration of START I on 5 December 2009, Russia and the United States began negotiations on a follow-on treaty that was signed in April 2010. The agreement, named the "New START Treaty," places a limit on both sides of 1,550 warheads, and 800 deployed and non-deployed strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (of which a maximum of 700 can be deployed). [70] After a spirited debate, the U.S. Senate ratified the treaty on 22 December 2010, with the Russian Duma ratifying it in January 2011. As noted above, at 1,537, the total number of Russia’s operationally deployed warheads is already below the New START limits.

Soviet Nuclear Legacy
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia was faced with the task of controlling, accounting for and securing the Soviet nuclear legacy. Moscow's commitments to START I required it to destroy several strategic delivery vehicles, and to store or dismantle the resulting surplus nuclear warheads. Furthermore, substantial numbers of nuclear weapons and delivery systems located in Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan had to be secured and transported to Russian facilities for dismantlement. Russia also faced the challenge of ensuring the safety and security of weapons and weapons-related materials located at dozens of sites throughout the country. In the tumultuous political and financial climate of the 1990s, Moscow had difficulty managing even to pay salaries at its nuclear facilities, never mind funding security upgrades, scrapping nuclear delivery systems, and undertaking new accounting measures. As a result, foreign assistance was essential for Russia to meet its foreign and domestic commitments. The most prominent assistance programs included the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR), established by the United States, and the multilateral G8 Global Partnership.

Civilian Nuclear Energy Program

Russia has ten nuclear power stations with 31 operational reactors. [71] The State Atomic Energy Corporation (Rosatom) is responsible for the country's civil nuclear assets, which are managed by its holding company Atomenergoprom. [72] Russian nuclear power plants are managed by Atomenergoprom's wholly owned subsidiary Rosenergoatom. Today, Russia has 11 RBMK-1000 reactors, nine VVER-1000 reactors, six VVER-440 reactors, four EGP-6 reactors, and one BN-600 fast-breeder reactor. [73]

From 1992 to 1995, the percentage of Russian energy generated by nuclear power plants averaged 11.8 percent. [74] Nuclear power plants were producing 15.2 percent of generation by the summer of 2000. [75,76] In 2000, Minatom (now Rosatom) announced plans to increase production to 30 percent by 2005 and 40 percent by 2010. [77] However, these targets were not met. At present, Rosatom intends to expand the role that nuclear power plays in the country's energy mix by increasing its share of electricity production to 23 percent by 2030. As part of this plan, Rosenergoatom is currently overseeing the construction of new power units at five separate locations: Rostov-2; Kalinin-4; Beloyarsk-4 (with a fast neutron reactor); Unit 1 of Novovoronezh NPP-2; and Unit 1 of Leningrad NPP-2. [78] Demand for nuclear energy continues to increase, largely as a result of Russia's economic growth and Gazprom's desire to export a greater proportion of its natural gas. [79,80] Rosatom's federal target program (FTP) from 2007 to 2010 included an undertaking from Rosatom to oversee the construction of 26 nuclear power units by 2020. This would be achieved by commissioning two 1200 MWe plants per year from 2011 to 2014, followed by three per year until 2020. However, expansion plans were scaled back in 2009 as a result of the global financial crisis. The planned construction of ten units was deferred until the economy recovered and the demand for energy returned. A revised FTP for the period 2010 to 2015 was approved and signed by President Medvedev in 2010, with Rosatom intending to commission three reactors per year starting in 2016. Although the units will be based on VVER technology until at least 2030, Russia intends to move to fast neutron reactors thereafter. [81]

Nuclear Safety
The Russian nuclear industry is regulated by the Federal Technological and Atomic Supervisory Service (Rostekhnadzor), which was established in 1992 and reports directly to the Russian President. Rostekhnadzor, formerly known as Gosatomnadzor, is responsible for licensing, regulation, implementing safe operating procedures, ensuring the safe transportation of nuclear material, and material accountancy. Nuclear safety appears to have improved in recent years, as no incidents higher than Level 0 (the lowest according to the INES scale), have been reported since 2004. [82]

However, an IAEA Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRSS) mission, a peer-review of a country’s regulatory system by nuclear regulators from other countries, found in November 2009 that while Rostekhnadzor has “particular strengths,” such as an "extensive use of IAEA safety standards in Russian Federation legislation, regulations and guides, proactive international cooperation, and a systematic approach to assess the competence of staff operating nuclear installations," it may need improvement in several areas. In particular, “nuclear safety related legislation should be further enhanced for all nuclear activities, including radioactive waste management, the regulatory system’s independence to decide on its inspection activities should be increased, better coordination should be sought among the different State organizations regulating nuclear and radiation safety, and more resources are needed for nuclear and radiation safety regulation, including competent staff.” [83]

The Rosatom Situation and Crisis Center is the main information and control system to prevent and respond to emergency situations at NPPs. Put into service in 2000, the Center's personnel are specialists from scientific institutions and NPPs who have received several years of training. The opening of the Crisis Center was originally promoted by the International Atomic Energy Agency and the World Association of Nuclear Operators. In addition, Automated Radiation Monitoring Systems (ASKROs) are installed at 23 Rosatom facilities and integrated into an industry-wide ASKRO network that comprises 294 monitoring stations. [84]

Fast Neutron Reactors and Floating Reactors—The Future?
Rosatom's long-term strategy is to utilize fast neutron reactors and mixed-oxide fuel to close the fuel cycle. In order to achieve this, Rosatom intends to adopt a multi-track approach that will allocate funds to three types of Generation IV reactors: BREST (lead-cooled), SVBR (lead-bismuth-cooled), and sodium-cooled (on which continued R&D will be conducted). In addition, Russia also intends to build a commercial complex to fabricate mixed-oxide fuel and to test closed fuel cycle technologies. An additional long-term aim is to embark on research and development into the controlled application of thermonuclear fusion for energy production.

The BN-800 Beloyarsk-4 fast sodium-cooled reactor, designed by OKBM Afrikantov, will initially work in parallel with the BN-600 unit 3 at Beloyarsk, and may eventually replace it. The project has been hampered by a lack of funds since construction began in 2006, and is now scheduled for completion in 2012, followed by testing and commissioning estimated to be finished by 2014. [85] In order to maintain its multi-track approach to the development of fast-neutron reactors, Rosatom has planned an SVBR lead-bismuth-cooled reactor for Obninsk, and a BREST lead-cooled reactor for Beloyarsk (Beloyarsk-5). [86]

Rosatom is also planning to construct seven or eight floating nuclear power plants by 2015. The completion of the first of them, named the Academician Lomonosov, under construction since April 2007, has been delayed by financial challenges and legal proceedings between Rosnergoatom and the vessel’s construction facility, Baltiiskiy zavod. [87] Upon completion, the reactor will provide power to Vilyuchinsk, Kamchatka and the naval base that is located there.

Recent Developments and Current Status

U.S.-Russian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement
In May 2010 President Barack Obama resubmitted the U.S.-Russia Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (also known as the 123 Agreement) to Congress after it had been shelved by President George W. Bush following Russia's 2008 war with Georgia. The agreement, which came into effect in January 2011, will open the door to bilateral trade in atomic energy, including the transfer of technology, material and equipment. [88]

But perhaps most importantly, the agreement will enable Russia to cooperate with the United States in developing innovative fast-reactor technologies and conducting research into controlled thermonuclear fusion - something that is central to Moscow's long-term nuclear energy strategy. [89]

Nuclear Weapons Modernization
In March 2009, President Medvedev announced a "comprehensive rearmament" of the Russian military to address conventional weaknesses identified during the 2008 war with Georgia. [90] The goal of the proposed rearmament is to better equip Russian forces for operations on the modern battlefield, and strategic modernization is an integral part of this effort. [91] The policy also aims to streamline Russia's nuclear forces to suit the current strategic context. A number of Soviet-era ICBMs such as the R-36M2 [NATO designation SS-18], UR-100NUTTH [SS-19] and Topol [SS-25], will be gradually retired and replaced with the Topol-M [SS-24] and MIRVed RS-24. To date, Topol-M missiles have been deployed at an approximate rate of six new missiles per year, and this rate appears likely to remain steady over the short-term. [92] Naval modernization will include the new Borey-class SSBN, its accompanying Bulava SLBM, and the new Sineva SLBM (to be fitted progressively to Delta IV-class submarines). Russia plans to build a total of eight Borey-class submarines, which will eventually form the backbone of the Russian naval deterrent. Production of the Tu-160 strategic bomber is also scheduled to continue. [93]

However, Russia's plans for strategic modernization could be delayed. First, the country's economy was heavily affected by the global financial crisis and the associated decline in hydrocarbon prices—contracting by 10.2% in the first five months of 2009. [94] Economic growth in 2010 was also a "disappointing" 4% (according to Deloitte). [95] Rising oil prices in 2011 are expected to have a positive impact on the Russian economy, as long as they do not lead to high inflation. Such economic problems have precipitated questions over the financial viability of defense modernization. Although full implementation of the State Program of Armaments 2007-2015 (passed by the government in 2005) appears unlikely — given that it was built on high expectations of economic growth — Russian defense expenditure is set to continue rising for the foreseeable future. [96]

Modernization is also being hampered by technical difficulties, the most notable being the failed test firings of the Bulava SLBM. These problems will inevitably delay deployment of the new Borey-class submarines that are designed to carry the Bulava missile. It should be noted, however, that the most recent test launch, in October 2010, was deemed successful, with the missile hitting its designated target on the Kura Test Range. [97] Tests of the Sineva SLBM have enjoyed greater success.

In summary, Moscow's nuclear arsenal will continue to play a significant role in the country's security for the foreseeable future. This is due, primarily, to the extent of the task it faces in modernizing its conventional military forces. Furthermore, it is currently unclear when Russia will agree to negotiate a follow-on to the New START Treaty, given that the United States will insist that such an agreement also address the disparity in the number of nonstrategic weapons possessed by each country. To date, Russia has been keen to avoid any discussion on reducing its stockpile of nonstrategic nuclear weapons until U.S. gravity bombs stationed in Europe are returned to the United States. As a result, only time will tell if and when a subsequent arms reduction treaty will be possible.

Sources:
[1] "New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms," fact sheet of the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, 1 June 2011, www.state.gov.
[2] "The New START Treaty and Protocol," The White House, 8 April 2010, www.whitehouse.gov.
[3] "Nuclear Power in Russia," World Nuclear Association, www.world-nuclear.org; and "Nuclear Fuel Cycle Companies," Rosatom, www.rosatom.ru.
[4] "New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms," fact sheet of the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, 1 June 2011, www.state.gov.
[5] Pavel Podvig, "Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces," www.russianforces.org, 23 August 2011.
[6] Pavel Podvig, "Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces," www.russianforces.org, 7 October 2010.
[7] Robert S. Norris and Hans Kristensen, "Russia Nuclear Forces, 2010," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Volume 66, Number 1, January/February 2010, p.75.
[8] Pavel Podvig, "Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces," www.russianforces.org, 30 September 2009.
[9] "Russian Ballistic-Missile Sub Clears Sea Testing," Global Security Newswire, The Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org, 29 September 2010.
[10] "Russia's Bulava Missile Hits Test Target," Global Security Newswire, 29 October 2010, http://gsn.nti.org.
[11] Robert S. Norris and Hans Kristensen, "Russia Nuclear Forces, 2010," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Volume 66, Number 1, January/February 2010, p.77.
[12] Tim Fish, "Bulava 30 SLBM fails another flight-test," Jane's Defence Weekly, www.janes.com, 17 July 2009.
[13] Pavel Podvig, "Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces," www.russianforces.org, 23 August 2011.
[14] Robert S. Norris and Hans Kristensen, "Russia Nuclear Forces, 2010," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Volume 66, Number 1, January/February 2010, p.78.
[15] Robert S. Norris and Hans Kristensen, "Russia Nuclear Forces, 2010," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Volume 66, Number 1, January/February 2010, p.79.
[16] Vladimir Belous, Takticheskoye yadernoye oruzhiye v novykh geopoliticheskikh usloviyakh, Yadernyy kontrol, No. 14, February 1996, p. 2.
[17] Robert S. Norris and Hans Kristensen, "Russia Nuclear Forces, 2011," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Volume 67, Number 3, May/June 2011, bos.sagepub.com.
[18] Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Voennaya doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii na period do 2020 g.,” 10 February 2011, stat.doc.mil.ru.
[19] Nikolai Sokov, "The New, 2010 Russian Military Doctrine: The Nuclear Angle," CNS feature Story, 5 February 2010, http://cns.miis.edu.
[20] Nikolai Sokov, “The Evolving Role of Nuclear Weapons in Russia’s Security Policy,” in ed. William C. Potter and Cristina Hansell, Engaging China and Russia on Nuclear Disarmament, CNS Occasional Paper 15, April 2009, pp. 76-77.
[21] Nikolai Sokov, "Russia's Nuclear Doctrine," NTI issue brief, August 2004, www.nti.org.
[22] Nikolai Sokov, “The April 1999 Russian Federation Security Council Meeting on Nuclear Weapons,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, June 1999, www.nti.org.
[23] Nikolai Sokov, “Russia’s 2000 Military Doctrine,” revised July 2004, www.nti.org.
[24] Nikolai Sokov, The “Nuclear Debate” of Summer 2000, revised July 2004, www.nti.org.
[25] Nikolai Sokov, “Russian Ministry of Defense’s New Policy Paper: The Nuclear Angle,” CNS feature story, 10 October 2003, http://cns.miis.edu.
[26] Nikolai Sokov, “Russian Ministry of Defense’s New Policy Paper: The Nuclear Angle,” CNS feature story, 10 October 2003, http://cns.miis.edu.
[27] Nikolai Sokov, "The New, 2010 Russian Military Doctrine: The Nuclear Angle," CNS feature Story, 5 February 2010, http://cns.miis.edu.
[28] Pavel Podvig, “Instrumental Influences,” The Nonproliferation Review, 18/1, March 2011.
[29] Nikolai Sokov, "The New, 2010 Russian Military Doctrine: The Nuclear Angle," CNS feature Story, 5 February 2010, http://cns.miis.edu.
[30] Thomas B. Cochran, Robert S. Norris and Oleg A. Bukharin, Making the Russian Bomb from Stalin to Yeltsin, Natural Resources Defense Council, (Oxford: Westview Press, 1995), p.16.
[31] Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), p. 501; and David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, (Yale: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 51.
[31] This is the date highlighted by David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, (Yale: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 62. However, Richard Rhodes suggests that Igor Kurchatov may have alerted his government to the possible military significance of nuclear fission in 1939 (Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), p. 501).
[33] David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, (Yale: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 68.
[34] David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, (Yale: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 68.
[35] Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), p. 501; and David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, (Yale: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 75.
[36] David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, (Yale: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 85.
[37] Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), p. 502; and David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, (Yale: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 89.
[38] David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, (Yale: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 96.
[39] David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, (Yale: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 99.
[40] Michael I. Schwartz "The Russian-A(merican) Bomb: The Role of Espionage in the Soviet Atomic Bomb Project," Journal of Undergraduate Sciences, Volume 3, (Summer 1996), p. 104; and David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, (Yale: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 105.
[41] David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, (Yale: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 107; and Michael I. Schwartz "The Russian-A(merican) Bomb: The Role of Espionage in the Soviet Atomic Bomb Project," Journal of Undergraduate Sciences, Volume 3, (Summer 1996), p. 106.
[42] Thomas B. Cochran, Robert S. Norris and Oleg A. Bukharin, Making the Russian Bomb from Stalin to Yeltsin, Natural Resources Defense Council, (Oxford: Westview Press, 1995), p.21.
[43] Stephen M. Younger, The Bomb: A New History, (New York: Harper Collins, 2009), p.33.
[44] Michael I. Schwartz "The Russian-A(merican) Bomb: The Role of Espionage in the Soviet Atomic Bomb Project," Journal of Undergraduate Sciences, Volume 3, (Summer 1996), p. 106; and David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, (Yale: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 97.
[45] David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, (Yale: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 116.
[46] Thomas B. Cochran, Robert S. Norris and Oleg A. Bukharin, Making the Russian Bomb from Stalin to Yeltsin, Natural Resources Defense Council, (Oxford: Westview Press, 1995), p.24.
[47] David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, (Yale: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 185.
[48] David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, (Yale: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 189.
[49] Michael I. Schwartz "The Russian-A(merican) Bomb: The Role of Espionage in the Soviet Atomic Bomb Project," Journal of Undergraduate Sciences, Volume 3, (Summer 1996), p. 106; and David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, (Yale: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 190.
[50] David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, (Yale: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 196.
[51] Stephen M. Younger, The Bomb: A New History, (New York: Harper Collins, 2009), p.36.
[52] Michael I. Schwartz highlights the vital role that espionage played in "The Russian-A(merican) Bomb: The Role of Espionage in the Soviet Atomic Bomb Project," Journal of Undergraduate Sciences, Volume 3, (Summer 1996); and David Holloway in Stalin and the Bomb, (Yale: Yale University Press, 1994), states that the Soviet scientists did not have access to intelligence passed by Klaus Fuchs to the Soviet government.
[53] Thomas B. Cochran, Robert S. Norris and Oleg A. Bukharin, Making the Russian Bomb from Stalin to Yeltsin, Natural Resources Defense Council, (Oxford: Westview Press, 1995), p.31.
[54] "Russia's Nuclear History," PBS News Hour, www.pbs.org.; and Thomas B. Cochran, Robert S. Norris and Oleg A. Bukharin, Making the Russian Bomb from Stalin to Yeltsin, Natural Resources Defense Council, (Oxford: Westview Press, 1995), p.32.
[55] Thomas B. Cochran, Robert S. Norris and Oleg A. Bukharin, Making the Russian Bomb from Stalin to Yeltsin, Natural Resources Defense Council, (Oxford: Westview Press, 1995), p.33.
[56] Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), p. 778.
[57] David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, (Yale: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 303.
[58] "Russia's Nuclear History," PBS News Hour, www.pbs.org.
[59] David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, (Yale: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 325.
[60] "Strategic Arms Limitation Talks," U.S. Department of State, www.state.gov.
[61] "Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I)," U.S. Department of State, www.state.gov.
[62] "Treaty Between the United States of America and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT II)," U.S. Department of State. www.state.gov.
[63] Michael Binyon, "Analysis: stop, START and a pinch of Salt," The Times, 8 April 2010, www.timesonline.co.uk.
[64] Ambassador James E. Goodby, "Looking Back: The 1986 Rekyjavik Summit," Arms Control Association, September 2006, www.armscontrol.org.
[65] "The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty at a Glance," Arms Control Association, www.armscontrol.org.
[66] "START I at a glance," Arms Control Association, www.armscontrol.org.
[67] "START II: Treaty Text," Department of Defense, www.dod.gov.
[68] "Announcement of Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty," Department of Defense, 13 December 2001, www.dod.gov.
[69] "Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT)," Arms Control Association, 24 May 2002, www.armscontrol.org.
[70] "The New START Treaty and Protocol," The White House, 8 April 2010, www.whitehouse.gov.
[71]  "Nuclear Fuel Cycle Companies," Rosatom, www.rosatom.ru.; "Nuclear Power in Russia," World Nuclear Association, www.world-nuclear.org.
[72] "Nuclear Fuel Cycle Companies," Rosatom, www.rosatom.ru.
[73] "Nuclear Power in Russia," World Nuclear Association, www.world-nuclear.org.
[74] "Data Feature: 1995 World Nuclear Electricity Production," Nukem Market Report, Septermber 1996, p.18.
[75] "Data Feature: 1996/97 World Nuclear Electricity Generating Capacity," Nukem Market Report, November 1997, p.36.
[76] "Obzor otrasli Elektroenergetika," AK&M Information Agency, 10 January 2000; in Integrum Techno, www.integrum.ru.; "Obzor otrasli Elektroenergetika," AK&M Information Agency, 11 September 2000; in Integrum Techno
[77] Yekaterina Kats, "'Yevgeniy Adamov igrayet 'ponyatiyami'," Segodnya, 12 April 2000, http://news.mosinfo.ru.
[78] "Electricity Generation Division," Rosatom, www.rosatom.ru.
[79] Nuclear Fuel Cycle Companies," Rosatom, www.rosatom.ru.
[80] "Nuclear Power in Russia," World Nuclear Association, www.world-nuclear.org.
[81] "Nuclear Power in Russia," World Nuclear Association, www.world-nuclear.org.
[82] "Electricity Generation Division," Rosatom, www.rosatom.ru.
[83] International Atomic Energy Agency, "International Nuclear Safety Experts Conclude IAEA Peer Review of the Regulatory System of the Russian Federation," 27 November 2009, www.iaea.org.
[84] "Automated Radiation Monitoring System," Roastom, www.rosatom.ru.
[85] "BN-800 Expected to Begin Operations in 2014," International Panel on Fissile Materials, www.fissilematerials.org, 21 January 2010.
[86] A.I. Filin, "Current Status and Plans for Development of NPP with Brest Reactors," www.iaea.org.
[87] "Plavuchaya AYeS arestovana v svyazi s bankrotsvom," Barents observer, 16 August 2011, www.barentsobserver.com.
[88] Department of State, "The Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation," 12 January 2011, www.state.gov.
[89] Cole Harvey and Richard Sabatini, "Russia's Lukewarm Support for International Sanctions Against Iran: History and Motivations," Issue Brief for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org, 15 April 2010.
[90] "Russia announces major arms buildup," CNN, 17 March 2009, www.cnn.com.
[91] The Military Balance 2010, International Institute for Strategic Studies, (London: Routledge, 2010), p.216.
[92] Pavel Podvig, "Russia's new arms development," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 16 January 2009, www.thebulletin.org.
[93] Pavel Podvig, "Russia's new arms development," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 16 January 2009, www.thebulletin.org.
[94] The Military Balance 2010, International Institute for Strategic Studies, (London: Routledge, 2010), p.216.
[95] Ira Kalish, "Russia: reengineering the path to recovery," Deloitte, Spring 2011, www.deloitte.com.
[96] The Military Balance 2010, International Institute for Strategic Studies, (London: Routledge, 2010), p.217.
[97] "Russia's Bulava Missile Succeeds in Trial Launch," Global Security Newswire, The Nuclear Threat Initiative, 7 October 2010, http://gsn.nti.org.