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Nuclear Last updated: October, 2014

Russia became the world's second nuclear weapon state after it tested its first device at Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan, on 29 August 1949. Today it is one of five recognized nuclear weapon states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), a status which it inherited as the legal successor of the Soviet Union. The Cold War arms race also resulted in the Soviet Union accumulating a vast arsenal of strategic and non-strategic (also known as "tactical") nuclear weapons.

Nuclear

Russia became the world's second nuclear weapon state after it tested its first device at Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan, on 29 August 1949. Today it is one of five recognized nuclear weapon states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), a status which it inherited as the legal successor of the Soviet Union. The Cold War arms race also resulted in the Soviet Union accumulating a vast arsenal of strategic and non-strategic (also known as "tactical") nuclear weapons.

Nuclear Table for Russia

· Russia's Land, Air and Naval
Nuclear Deterrent Capabilities

Moscow has been a strong supporter of nuclear nonproliferation treaties and regimes; bilateral arms control treaties with the United States have reduced the Russian arsenal to 1,643 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads and 911 deployed and non-deployed launchers. [1] Under the terms of the New START agreement, signed in April 2010, Moscow is required to cut its strategic warhead numbers to 1,550 and 800 total launchers. [2] Thus, the total number of Russia's operationally deployed warheads is technically already below the New START limits.

In addition to its nuclear weapons capabilities, Russia possesses an extensive civilian nuclear power infrastructure, including 33 operating nuclear power reactors located at 10 nuclear power stations, and a vast network of fuel cycle facilities. [3] The Russian government plans to expand civilian nuclear energy over the coming decades through the construction of new reactors.

Capabilities and Nuclear Weapons Doctrine

Russia possesses approximately 536  strategic delivery platforms capable of carrying 2, 300 nuclear warheads, and has deployed new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and new strategic nuclear submarines with associated ballistic missiles. For the air leg of its triad, Russia currently relies on old strategic bombers, for which it is developing a new long-range cruise missile. The Tupolev Design Bureau, the designer of the Tu-95 and Tu-160, will begin research and development on a new long-range bomber that will eventually take over the roles of the Tu-95MS, the Tu-160 and the Tu-22 non-strategic bomber, currently known as PAK-DA (future long-range aircraft). and Russia's Kazan Plant (KAPO) will begin production by 2020. The bomber is reported to be subsonic but to possess stealth capabilities. [4] In order to maintain the reliability, safety, and effectiveness of its nuclear stockpile, Russia periodically produces new warheads and does not extend the service life of its existing inventory.

Russia's Nuclear Triad

Russia deploys approximately 304 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) of six variants. [5] A number of Soviet-era ICBMs, such as the R-36M2 (NATO designation SS-18), UR-100NUTTH (SS-19), and the Topol (SS-25), are gradually being phased out in favor of the new silo-based and road-mobile Topol-M (SS-24), and the Yars (RS-24), a road-mobile version of the Topol-M equipped with Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRV). The deployment of the Topol-M and the Yars began in 2006 and 2010, respectively, and these variants are scheduled to be updated and maintained through 2013. [6] Russian enterprises are also reportedly working on the development of other ICBM systems in response to the deployment of a U.S. missile defense architecture in Europe. [7] The newest of these systems, so far unnamed, is currently undergoing testing and is scheduled for deployment in 2015. It is being touted as a lower cost, easier to produce model capable of evading existing missile defense systems. [8]

Russia's sea-based deterrent has traditionally played a more marginal role in Russian strategic planning than its strategic rocket forces. Moscow's active strategic ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) force currently consists of three Project 667BDR Kalmar  (NATO: Delta III) submarines, which are all based with the Pacific Fleet in Rybachiy, and six Project 667BDRM Delfin (NATO: Delta IV)submarines based with the Northern Fleet at Yagelnaya Bay. [9] The Delta IV class currently forms the backbone of Russia's naval deterrent. A new liquid-propelled SLBM, the RMS-54 "Sineva," was developed and successfully tested for the Delta IV submarines. All of the Delta IV vessels have been upgraded to carry the "Sineva.” [10] In addition, Russia has several Typhoon-class SSBNs based with the Northern Fleet at Litsa Guba. While none of the Typhoon-class vessels are operational, one is being used as a testing platform for the new Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM).

A new class of SSBNs designated "Borey" is currently in construction and entering active service. The first of these vessels, the Yuri Dolgoruky, was launched from the Sevmash shipyard in Severodvinsk in May 2011, has recently completed sea trials, and entered active duty for the Northern fleet on 10 January 2013. The second of these vessels, the Alexander Nevsky, was launched from the Sevmash shipyard on 23 December 2013. [11] Two additional Borey class vessels, the Alexander Nevsky and the Vladimir Monomakh, are scheduled to be fully operational and at sea later this year. The Alexander Nevsky is currently undergoing sea trials, and will enter-into-service in 2014, while the Vladimir Monomakh left dry dock in December 2012 and underwent trails testing later in 2013. It was completed in December 2013 and is scheduled to enter-into-service in 2014. [12] Russia has two additional Borey class submarines, the Knyaz Vladimir and the Svyatitel Nikolai, in production through 2013 in Severodvinsk. [13] In addition to these named models, a total of eight Borey class submarines are scheduled to enter active service over the coming decade. Three of the Boreyclass ships (Project 955) are expected to carry 16 missiles each, while five (Project 955A) are expected to carry 16 missiles each. [14] Their engagement is part of extensive naval modernization efforts that include improvements to existing SLBM technology and investments in the Pacific Fleet[15] Development and testing of the SS-N-32 Bulava SLBM missile technology for the Borey class vessels has experienced delays and failures. [16] Nevertheless, the Russian Navy Chief announced that the Bulava will not be accepted into service until at least summer 2014. [17]

The air-pillar of Russia's triad is comprised of 72 strategic bombers that include 13 Tu-160 Blackjacks, 29 Tu-95 MS6 Bear H6s, and 30 Tu-95 MS16 Bear H16s. [18] Since 2009, Russia has been researching designs for a new long-range strategic bomber, and hopes to have a prototype ready by 2020. [19] Delivery vehicles include the AS-15A Kent (Kh-55) air-launched cruise missile (ALCM), the AS-16 Kickback (Kh-15) short-range attack missile, and a large but unknown number of nuclear gravity bombs. Russia has also been developing a new ALCM, the Kh-102, for over a decade, but this system has not yet been deployed. [20]

Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons

Russia also possesses a large number of non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons that most analysts believe are assigned to air, naval, and ground-based air-defense and ABM forces. Today, the Russian Navy maintains tactical warheads that can arm cruise missiles, torpedoes, anti-air missiles, depth bombs, and anti-submarine weapons, but all of them are believed to be stored on land. [21] Non-strategic warheads can also be carried on the AS-4 ALCM and gravity bombs.

No official Russian data exists on current tactical nuclear weapon stockpiles or deployments. There are no "baseline" figures for estimates because the 1991-1992 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives saw the United States and Russia reduce tactical nuclear weapons deployments without requiring an information exchange or follow-up verification. During the Soviet period, tactical nuclear weapons were deployed in almost every republic of the USSR. A Russian scholar, basing his figures on a Newsweek report, indicates the weapons were distributed as follows: Armenia-200; Azerbaijan-75; Belarus-1,180; Estonia-270; Georgia-320; Kazakhstan-330; Kyrgyzstan-75; Latvia-185; Lithuania-325; Moldova-90; Russia-12,320; Tajikistan-75; Turkmenistan-125; Ukraine-2,345; Uzbekistan-105. Total estimated deployment was thus 18,020. [22] By the end of 1991, tactical nuclear weapons had been withdrawn from every republic except for those where strategic weapons were also located. All former Soviet tactical nuclear weapons were withdrawn from Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine by the end of May 1992.

Since 1992, Russia is believed to have eliminated a significant number of its tactical nuclear warheads. However, the completion of this effort, delayed due to funding constraints, has had no clear timeline and may be linked to U.S. reduction of tactical nuclear forces in Europe. A 2013 estimate in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists places the number of Russian operational tactical nuclear weapons at 1,800, with an additional 4,000 awaiting dismantlement. Estimates of exact numbers vary, but current estimates have the stockpile at approximately 4,500 total warheads. Russia declares that all nonstrategic nuclear warheads are kept in central storage. [23]

Evolution of Nuclear Doctrine

A public glimpse of Russia's nuclear doctrine can be found in the document Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation for the Time Period through the Year 2020, released in February 2010. [24] The 2010 doctrine appears to have reduced the role that nuclear weapons played in Russia's national security policy for over a decade. This document replaced the Military Doctrine published in 2000, as well as doctrinal clarifications issued as part of a 2003 "White Paper" from Russia's Ministry of Defense. [25]

Russia's post-Soviet nuclear doctrine has undergone several iterations and the role of nuclear weapons has fluctuated. Russia's nuclear reliance was low throughout the early part of the 1990s. In 1993, Moscow issued a military doctrine that formally dropped the Soviet Union's no-first-use policy. However, that document also "did not assign any specific missions to nuclear weapons and did not define any threats to which nuclear weapons were supposed to respond.” [26]

For almost a decade after the fall of communism Russia debated the role and structure of its nuclear forces, mostly behind closed doors. Some scholars have argued that the main innovation of this period was the new mission assigned to nuclear weapons—deterrence of limited conventional wars[27] Toward this end, a 1999 Russian Federation Security Council meeting saw the adoption of three documents: one covered the development and security of the nuclear weapons research, development, and production complex; a second was a concept underlying the use of nuclear weapons, including tactical nuclear weapons; the third document, according to then-Security Council Secretary Vladimir Putin, was so secret that even its title could not be disclosed. [28]

The emergence of the 2000 military doctrine appears to have been influenced by two factors, including a perception of an acute external threat, when Russia anticipated that NATO might threaten to use force on a limited scale to achieve limited political goals akin to the wars in the Balkans, and an acute sense of weakness Russia's conventional forces faced with the prospect of a limited conventional war, especially vis-a-vis superior NATO forces. Nikolai Sokov of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies has written that, "from the perspective of the Russian military, reliance on nuclear weapons was a logical response to the glaring inadequacy of conventional forces premised on the idea that nuclear weapons had greater utility than simply to deter a large-scale nuclear attack. Official documents suggest, however, that reliance on nuclear weapons was seen as a temporary 'fix' intended to provide for security until conventional forces were sufficiently modernized and strengthened.” [29]

Later in 2000, the Security Council made a radical decision to substantially reduce the size and role of the Strategic Rocket Forces, shifting the main focus to naval platforms. The chief argument in support of this decision was that nuclear reductions would free up funding for the modernization of conventional forces, "so that by 2016 Russia could create the 'foundation' for a 'future conventional deterrent capability.'" [30] As Sokov notes, however, "these decisions were partially revised in early 2002 following the U.S. notification of its intent to withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (the withdrawal became final in June 2002).” [31]

The publication in 2003 of a Ministry of Defense "White Paper" pointed to the stabilization of Russia's nuclear policy. This document confirmed and detailed the missions assigned to nuclear weapons, and the future shape of the nuclear posture. That said, "one remaining element of uncertainty [was] related to future U.S. policy on nuclear weapons: if the United States proceed[ed] with the development of a new, more 'usable' nuclear weapon and especially if it resume[d] nuclear testing …, then Russian nuclear policy might [have begun] to change and Russia [would have] strive[d] to acquire similar capabilities.” [32]

The publication of the 2010 military doctrine saw multiple delays. In comments preceding the document's release in 2009, Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev indicated that nuclear weapons might be assigned to "local conflicts," thus dramatically expanding Russia's nuclear use threshold. However, Patrushev's comments appear to have caused a domestic backlash. [33] Additionally, U.S. policies seem to have influenced Russia's internal nuclear doctrine debates. As Pavel Podvig at the UN Institute for Disarmament Research has written, the "renewed U.S. commitment to nuclear nonproliferation, disarmament, and reduced reliance on nuclear weapons has apparently had an effect on the new Russian military doctrine.” [34] The result of these developments was the publication of a doctrine that reduced the role of nuclear weapons in Russia's security policy. While the 2000 doctrine "foresaw the resorting to nuclear weapons 'in situations critical for [the] national security' of Russia," the 2010 doctrine "allow[ed] for their use in situations when 'the very existence of [Russia] [was] under threat.'" [35] This change has brought Russia's declaratory policy more in line with the policies of other nuclear weapon states.

In summary, Moscow's nuclear arsenal will continue to play a significant role in the country's security for the foreseeable future. This is due, primarily, to the extent of the task it faces in modernizing its conventional military forces. Furthermore, it is currently unclear when Russia will agree to negotiate a follow-up to the New START Treaty, given that the United States will insist that such an agreement also address the disparity in the number of nonstrategic weapons possessed by each country. To date, Russia has been keen to avoid any discussion on reducing its stockpile of nonstrategic nuclear weapons unless and until U.S. gravity bombs stationed in Europe are returned to the United States. It is therefore unclear if and when a subsequent arms reduction treaty will be possible.

History of the Nuclear Weapons Program

Flirting with the Atom

Although the Soviet Union carried out some initial research on nuclear fission in the 1930s, the country's nuclear weapons program began as a wartime intelligence operation that gathered information on atomic activities in the United States and Nazi Germany. [36] This was coupled with a modest research effort in small-scale Soviet laboratories from 1943 onwards. Research carried out prior to World War II, by individuals such as Iuliy Khariton and Iakov Zeldovich, made little impact outside the Soviet Union, and did not enjoy significant government backing. [37] Only in July 1940 did Soviet scientists alert the government to the possible military applications of nuclear fission. [38]

Soviet nuclear research continued in the early 1940s, but with less urgency than in the West. [39] In 1941 and 1942, scientists researched isotopic separation, focusing on the gaseous diffusion and centrifuge methods. [40] However, following the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, Soviet scientists shifted their focus to conventional military applications. [41] The urgency with which they pursued these military applications resulted in an almost complete suspension of the Soviet Union's nuclear research. It was intelligence relating to the Maud Report in the United Kingdom, and concerns that Nazi Germany had an atomic project, that eventually led to the reestablishment of Soviet nuclear research in early 1943. [42]

Igor Kurchatov was appointed scientific director of the atomic project in March 1943, but at this stage the program remained a hedge against future uncertainties, with the government skeptical that a bomb could be developed quickly enough to affect the outcome of the war. [43] The State Defense Committee issued an instruction to establish a new laboratory known as Laboratory No. 2, which was run by Kurchatov. [44] Laboratory No. 2 grew slowly, and was originally housed in the Seismological Institute on Pyzhevskii Lane in Moscow, but later moved to a site at the All Union Institute of Experimental Medicine, located outside of the city. [45] Kurchatov began to assemble a team, led by Khariton, which worked on bomb design. [46]

The beginnings of the Soviet nuclear weapons program were heavily influenced by espionage. Some scientists working on the Manhattan Project, such as Klaus Fuchs, provided a steady stream of information to the Soviets that included a blueprint for the Fat Man implosion device dropped on Nagasaki. Fuchs was working on the team at Los Alamos that calculated implosion, an area vital for the success of the Soviet effort. [47] This information later enabled Soviet scientists to "skip labor-intensive phases in the solution of problems.” [48] To protect the identity of spies such as Fuchs, only four individuals within the Soviet leadership were privy to this information: Josef Stalin, Lavrentiy Beria, Igor Kurchatov and one other unknown individual. [49] Although Kurchatov was given access to intelligence reports from abroad, his colleagues did not have this information. [50]

After Hiroshima: The Crash Program

After the U.S. bombing of Hiroshima in August 1945, Stalin became convinced of the atomic bomb's strategic importance and ordered a crash development program. [51] As a result, the Soviet nuclear weapons effort switched gears, and on 20 August 1945 the State Defense Committee (Gosudarstvenny Komitet Oborony, GKO) established a Special Committee (Spetskom) to direct the nuclear effort. Beria chaired the Spetskom, providing prison labor for construction of the nuclear complex, while Kurchatov remained Scientific Director of the program. [52] During this period, Kurchatov used the U.S. Fat Man design to verify the results of independent work carried out by Soviet scientists at Arzamas-16 (where the first Soviet device was built). In 1945, Kurchatov also began designing the first industrial-scale reactor, located in the Urals close to the town of Chelyabinsk. Construction of the site began in early 1946, and was completed by the end of 1947; it became known as Chelyabinsk-40, and would also be the site of the Soviet Union's first plutonium separation plant. [53]

After August 1945, the Soviet Union pursued three methods of isotopic separation: electromagnetic separation; thermal diffusion; and gaseous diffusion. [54] Ultimately, the country constructed a gaseous diffusion plant at Sverdlovsk-44, close to the town of Neviansk in the Urals, along with an electromagnetic combine at Sverdlovsk-45, near Severnaya Tura. [55] In order to ensure the accuracy of the implosion information provided by Fuchs, Kurchatov decided to create a design laboratory in Sarov, approximately 400 km east of Moscow, which became known as Arzamas-16. [56]

To ensure the success of the first Soviet nuclear test, codenamed "First Lightning," the Soviet Union copied the U.S. Fat Man design supplied by Fuchs. The first device, named RDS-1 (which never entered service), was detonated on 29 August 1949 at the Semipalatinsk test site in Kazakhstan, and was meant to convey a political message that the Soviet Union had arrived on the atomic scene. A second test took place two years later, on 24 September 1951, which was based on a Soviet design and produced a yield of 40 kilotons, twice that of Fat Man. [57] Given the emphasis that was placed on the U.S. design for the first Soviet test, and the Soviets' use of their own designs thereafter, there is a significant debate over the role of espionage, versus Soviet science, in the development of the country's atomic bomb. [58] It is clear that both espionage and the progress of Soviet scientists played roles in the program, illustrated by Lavrenty Beria's leadership of both operations.

From Fission to Fusion: Thermonuclear Weapons

While work was underway on the Soviet Union's first atomic weapon, a group of scientists including Andrei Sakharov, Yakov Zeldovich, and Khariton were already conducting work on an early thermonuclear device. [59] In consultation with Igor Tamm, a theoretical physicist at FIAN (Physical Institute of the Academy of Sciences) in Moscow, a design was conceived that used alternative layers of thermonuclear fuel and became known as the "layer cake" ("sloika" in Russian). [60] Another Soviet scientist, Vitaly Ginzburg, also contributed to the design by offering modifications, such as adding lithium-6. [61] The device was named RDS-6s (or Joe-4), and was tested at Semipalatinsk in August 1953. However, there is some debate over whether this particular device can be called a true hydrogen bomb or simply a highly boosted fission device. [62] Russia began work on a staging device soon after - called the "Third Idea" - that was designed primarily by Sakharov. The first test of the RDS-37, as it was called, took place on 22 November 1955 at Semipalatinsk and produced an undisputed thermonuclear detonation. [63]

U.S.-Soviet and U.S.-Russian Arms Control

Following Stalin's death in 1953-and Beria's subsequent arrest and execution-the military assumed responsibility for the Soviet weapons program. [64] In the mid-1950s, attention turned to possible battlefield uses of nuclear weapons, which followed the trajectory of NATO policy at that time. [65] Subsequent Soviet leaders would increasingly view military strategy and international relations through the prism of nuclear weapons, and although the USSR had not achieved nuclear parity by the time of Stalin's death, both the Soviet Union and the United States quickly realized that nuclear war was unacceptable.

Under the leadership of Nikita Khrushchev, Soviet nuclear weapons were increasingly used as a tool for the pursuit of military and diplomatic strategies. For example, in 1956 Moscow issued veiled nuclear threats to France and the United Kingdom during the Suez Crisis, and a continuation of this strategy - coupled with a perception of U.S. weakness following the failed Bay of Pigs invasion - led to the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, when the Soviet Union deployed medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Cuba. The brinksmanship of the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the tensions that existed during the 1960s, led to a period of détente during the 1970s, with both sides trying to control the escalating arms race and improve predictability.

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), concluded in 1972, led to two treaties dealing with both offensive and defensive arms: the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. [66] The latter agreement froze the number of strategic ballistic missile launchers at existing levels, while the ABM Treaty placed limits on national missile defense systems. [67] SALT I was followed by SALT II talks from 1977 to 1979, which resulted in an agreement reducing both sides to 2,250 strategic delivery vehicles. [68] The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 meant that President Jimmy Carter withdrew SALT II from U.S. Senate consideration, but both sides continued to honor the treaty until 1986, when President Ronald Reagan withdrew the United States from SALT II after asserting that the Soviet Union had violated its political commitment to the treaty. [69]

However, 1986 was also the year of the Reykjavik summit, when President Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev came close to an agreement on abolishing all offensive nuclear weapons within a decade, a deal that eventually stumbled on the issue of U.S. missile defense development. [70] But the summit did pave the way for arms control treaties in the following years, including the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which eliminated an entire category of nuclear weapons on both sides (all ground-launched cruise and ballistic missiles with intermediate-ranges). [71] The end of the Cold War also created an opportunity for further reductions in strategic arms, including the signing of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) in 1991, which limited both the United States and the Soviet Union to 1,600 deployed delivery vehicles that could carry no more than 6,000 "accountable" warheads. [72] START I was followed by START II, a treaty that was signed in 1993 but never entered into force. START II contained a limit of 3,000 to 3,500 nuclear warheads each. [73] Although the Russian Duma ratified the treaty in 2000, START II never entered into force, largely because of concerns about the United States' 2002 withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. [74]

The George W. Bush Administration concluded an agreement that relied on START I for its detailed verification provisions. The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), also known as the Moscow Treaty, was a nuclear disarmament treaty between the U.S. and Russia that was signed by Presidents Bush and Vladimir Putin on 24 May 2002.  According to SORT, each party would reduce the number of its deployed strategic nuclear weapons arsenal to a quantity between 1,700-2,200 by the end of 2012. [75] Following the expiration of START I on 5 December 2009, Russia and the United States began negotiations on a follow-on treaty that was signed in April 2010. The agreement, named the "New START Treaty," limits each side to 1,550 warheads, and 800 deployed and non-deployed strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (of which a maximum of 700 can be deployed). [76] After heated debate, the U.S. Senate ratified the treaty on 22 December 2010, with the Russian Duma following suit on 25 January 2011. [77]

Soviet Nuclear Legacy

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia was faced with the task of controlling, accounting for and securing the Soviet nuclear legacy. Moscow's commitments to START I required it to destroy several strategic delivery vehicles, and to store or dismantle the resulting surplus nuclear warheads. Furthermore, substantial numbers of nuclear weapons and delivery systems located in Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan had to be secured and transported to Russian facilities for dismantlement. Russia also faced the challenge of ensuring the safety and security of weapons and weapons-related materials located at dozens of sites throughout the country. In the tumultuous political and financial climate of the 1990s, the government had difficulty paying salaries at its nuclear facilities, and also could not fund security upgrades, scrapping of nuclear delivery systems, or undertaking new accounting measures.

As a result, foreign assistance was essential for Russia to meet its foreign and domestic commitments. The most prominent program was the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR), established by the United States in 1992. Nunn-Lugar included U.S. Department of Defense-led efforts to secure nuclear storage facilities and nuclear weapons in transit, as well as to dismantle and destroy nuclear warheads, ICBMs and their launchers, air-launched missiles and bombers, nuclear submarines, and SLBMs. Efforts led by other U.S. government agencies focused on the engagement of Russian scientists through projects such as materials protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A), and provided financial incentives to reduce fissile material stocks through programs such as Megatons to Megawatts, an initiative that purchased HEU from Russian weapons and downgraded its enrichment to LEU for U.S. nuclear power reactor fuel. Since 2002, the threat reduction agenda has also had a multilateral dimension through the G8 Global Partnership, an effort aimed at reducing the threats of weapons of mass destruction terrorism. [78] Gradually, threat reduction efforts have expanded both outside of the former Soviet states and into other policy areas, such as biosecurity.

In October 2012, Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced Moscow would not renew the framework for implementing Nunn-Lugar efforts on its territory once the current umbrella agreement expires in June 2013. The MFA statement cited Russia's increasing financial contributions to the dismantlement of nuclear and chemical weapons in accordance with its international obligations, and noted a disagreement with "American partners" on "the form and the basis for further cooperation," including the need to develop "other, more modern legal frameworks.” [79] Just before the expiration of the CTR in June 2013, Presidents Barack Obama and Vladimir Putin agreed to continue mutual nuclear security efforts, in which the US would to stop assisting Russia with missile, bomber, and chemical weapon dismantlement and Russia would accept all responsibility for these activities. [80]

Civilian Nuclear Energy Program

Russia has ten nuclear power stations with 33 operational reactors. The State Atomic Energy Corporation (Rosatom) is responsible for all of the country's nuclear assets, including civil, military, research and development, and the nuclear icebreaker fleet. The entirety of Russia's civilian nuclear program is managed by Atomenergoprom, a holding company of Rosatom. Atomenergoprom's subsidiary company Rosenergoatom manages Russia's nuclear power complex. [81] Today, Russia has 11 RBMK-1000 reactors, 11 VVER-1000 reactors, six VVER-440 reactors, four EGP-6 reactors, and one BN-600 fast-breeder reactor. Additionally, 11 more reactors are under construction at six different power stations. [82]

From 1992 to 1995 the percentage of Russian energy generated by nuclear power plants averaged 11.8 percent. [83] Nuclear power plants were producing 15.2 percent of generation by the summer of 2000. [84] In 2000, Minatom (now Rosatom) announced plans to increase production to 30 percent by 2005 and 40 percent by 2010. [85] However, these targets were not met, and Russia currently produces17.78% of its electricity by nuclear power plants. [86] At present, Rosatom intends to expand the role that nuclear power plays in the country's energy mix by increasing its share of electricity production to 25 percent by 2025. As part of this plan, Rosenergoatom is currently overseeing the construction of new power units at six separate locations: Rostov - 2; Kaliningrad - 2; Beloyarsk - 1 (a fast neutron reactor); Akademik Lomonosov(a floating power plant) – 2; Units 1 and 2 of Novovoronezh NPP-2; and Units 1 and 2 of Leningrad NPP-2. [87] Demand for nuclear energy continues to increase, largely as a result of Russia's economic growth and Gazprom's desire to export a greater proportion of its natural gas. [88]

Rosatom's federal target program (FTP) from 2007 to 2010 included an undertaking from Rosatom to oversee the construction of 26 nuclear power units by 2020. This would be achieved by commissioning two 1200 MWe plants per year from 2011 to 2016, followed by three per year until 2020. However, expansion plans were scaled back in 2009 as a result of the global financial crisis and reduced electricity demand expectations. The planned construction of ten units was deferred until the economy recovered and the demand for energy returned. A revised FTP for the period 2010 to 2015 was approved and signed by President Medvedev in 2010, with Rosatom intending to commission three reactors per year starting in 2016. Although the units will be based on VVER technology until at least 2030, Russia intends to move to fast neutron reactors thereafter. [89]

Nuclear Safety

The Russian nuclear industry is regulated by the Federal Environmental, Industrial and Nuclear Supervisory Service (Rostekhnadzor), which was established in 2004 and reports directly to the Russian President. Rostekhnadzor, formerly known as Gosatomnadzor, is responsible for licensing, regulation, implementing safe operating procedures, ensuring the safe transportation of nuclear material, and material accountancy. [90] Nuclear safety appears to have improved in recent years, as no incidents higher than Level 0 (the lowest according to the INES scale), have been reported since 2004. [91]

However, an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRSS) mission, who conducted a peer review of the country's regulatory system, found in November 2009 that while Rostekhnadzor has "particular strengths," such as an "extensive use of IAEA safety standards in Russian Federation legislation, regulations and guides, proactive international cooperation, and a systematic approach to assess the competence of staff operating nuclear installations," it may need improvement in several areas. In particular, "nuclear safety related legislation should be further enhanced for all nuclear activities, including radioactive waste management, the regulatory system's independence to decide on its inspection activities should be increased, better coordination should be sought among the different State organizations regulating nuclear and radiation safety, and more resources are needed for nuclear and radiation safety regulation, including competent staff." [92]

The Rosatom Situation and Crisis Center is the main information and control system to prevent and respond to emergency situations at NPPs. Put into service in 2000, the Center's personnel are specialists from scientific institutions and NPPs who have received several years of training. The opening of the Crisis Center was originally promoted by the IAEA and the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO). In addition, Automated Radiation Monitoring Systems (ASKROs) are installed at 23 Rosatom facilities and their surrounding areas and integrated into an industry-wide ASKRO network that comprises 294 monitoring stations. [93] Measurements from about 200 stations at 18 different facilities are available to the public through the website "Radiation Environment at Rosatom Enterprises," which is maintained by the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute for the Safe Development of Nuclear Energy. [94]

Fast Neutron Reactors and Floating Reactors-The Future?

Rosatom's long-term strategy is to utilize fast neutron reactors and mixed-oxide fuel to close the fuel cycle. In order to achieve this, Rosatom intends to adopt a multi-track approach that will allocate funds to three types of Generation IV reactors: BREST (lead-cooled); SVBR (lead-bismuth-cooled); and sodium-cooled (on which continued R&D will be conducted). Russia also intends to build a commercial complex to fabricate mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel and to test closed fuel cycle technologies. An additional long-term aim is to embark on research and development into the controlled application of thermonuclear fusion for energy production. The BN-800 Beloyarsk-4 fast sodium-cooled reactor, designed by OKBM Afrikantov, will initially work in parallel with the BN-600 unit 3 at Beloyarsk, and may eventually replace it. The project has been hampered by a lack of funds since construction began in 2006, and the reactor is now scheduled to begin operations in 2015. [95] In order to maintain its multi-track approach to the development of fast-neutron reactors, Rosatom has planned an SVBR lead-bismuth-cooled reactor for Obninsk, and a BREST lead-cooled reactor for Beloyarsk (Beloyarsk-5). [96]

Rosatom is also planning to construct seven or eight floating nuclear power plants by 2015.[97] The completion of the first, named the Academik Lomonosov and under construction since April 2007, has been delayed by financial challenges and legal proceedings between Rosenergoatom and the vessel's construction facility, Baltiiskiy zavod. [98] Upon completion, the reactor will provide power to Vilyuchinsk, Kamchatka and the naval base that is located there.

U.S.-Russian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation

The long-awaited U.S.-Russia Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (also known as the 123 Agreement), entered into force in January 2011. In May 2010, President Barack Obama resubmitted the agreement to Congress after it had been shelved by President George W. Bush following Russia's 2008 war with Georgia. The agreement opens the door to bilateral nuclear trade, including technology, nuclear materials, and equipment transfers, and cooperative research and development initiatives. [99] The agreement will also enable Russia to cooperate with the United States in developing innovative fast-reactor technologies and conducting research into controlled thermonuclear fusion - something that is central to Moscow's long-term nuclear energy strategy. [100]

The Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Security Working Group, a project under the aegis of the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission, has been engaged in developing avenues for mutual cooperation. As a 2012 Report stated, "[t]he two sides continue a discussion of scientific-technical cooperation and interaction in the area of innovative technologies, including the Multi-Purpose Fast Research Reactor, modeling and simulation, safeguards by design, new structural and clad materials development, and Global Civil Nuclear Energy Framework development. In order to accelerate this work, the two countries are negotiating an intergovernmental R&D Agreement on cooperation in the area of scientific research and design, which should also include interaction in innovative technologies." [101]

Sources:
[1] U.S. Department of State, "New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms," Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, October 1, 2014, www.state.gov.
[2] "The New START Treaty and Protocol," The White House, 8 April 2010, www.whitehouse.gov.
[3] "Nuclear Power in Russia," World Nuclear Association, updated 25 March 2012, www.world-nuclear.org; "Производство электроэнергии [Electricity production]," Rosatom, accessed 29 March 2012, www.rosatom.ru.
[4] First flight prototype of new strategic bomber will appear by 2017 - Air Force commander," Interfax: Russia & CIS Defense Industry Weekly, 24 December, 2012; "Russian Air Force Approves New Bomber Design – Commander." RIA Novosti, 11 April  2013, http://en.ria.ru.
[5] Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, "Russian Nuclear Forces, 2014," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 70 (2014), pp. 75-85.
[6] Pavel Podvig, "Strategic Rocket Forces," Russian strategic forces blog, 12 April 2012, russianforces.org.
[7] "Russia Ramps up Deployment of Modern ICBMs," Global Security Newswire, 20 November 2012, www.nti.org
[8] Pavel Podvig, "Russia tests prototype of a new ICBM," Russian strategic nuclear forces blog, 23 May 2012, russianforces.org; "Russia Preps ICBM for 2014 Fielding," Global Security Newswire, 21 November 2012, www.nti.org
[9] Pavel Podvig, "Strategic Fleet," Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces blog, www.russianforces.org, 12 May 2012.
[10] "Звездочка» передала военно-морскому флоту РПКСН «Новомосковск [Zvezdochka handed over the Novomoskovsk SSBN to the Navy]," ZAO Zvezdocka News, 30 July 2012, www.star.ru.
[11] “Крейсер "Александр Невский" вошел в состав Тихоокеанского флота [Cruiser “Alexander Nevsky” joined the Pacific Fleet],” RIA Novosti, 23 December 2013, www.ria.ru.
[12] “Выбор РИА Новости: главные события 2014 года в области обороны [The choice of RIA Novosti: the main events in the field of defense for 2014],” RIA Novosti, 23 December 2013, www.ria.ru.
[13] "Россия начнет строить новые АПЛ «Борей» в 2012 году [Russia to begin construction of new Borey-class nuclear submarines in 2012]," RIA Novosti, 2 December 2011, www.ria.ru; "Alexander Nevsky submarine to join Russian Navy on Nov 15," 6 July 2013, voiceofrussia.com; "Russia's Third Borey Class Sub Blessed for Sea Trials," RIA Novosti, 10 June 2013, en.rian.ru.; "Russian navy shipyard gives details of latest missile submarine's status, trials." BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union - Political Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring. January 11, 2013 Friday. Date Accessed: 2013/01/17. www.lexisnexis.com.
[14] Передачу новых «Бореев» флоту отложат из-за неудачного пуска «Булавы» (Peredachu novyx 'Boreev' flotu otlozhat iz-za neudachnogo puska 'Bulavy' – The Transfer of the New 'Boreas' Fleet Will Be Postponed Due to the Bulava's Ill-fated Launch)," Lenta, 9 September 2013, http://lenta.ru.
[15] “Новые АПЛ "Борей-А" будут вооружены 16, а не 20 "Булавами" [New nuclear submarines “Borei-A” will be armed with 16 not 20 “Bulava” missiles], RIA Novosti, 20 February 2013, www.ria.ru.
[16] "Russia's Northern and Pacific Fleets to adopt Borei-class submarines." ITAR-TASS. January 11, 2013. Date Accessed: 2013/01/15. www.lexisnexis.com .
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[18] “Два серийных "Борея" из-за проблем с "Булавой" передадут флоту не раньше лета 2014 года [Two “Borei” type submarines will not be adopted by the fleet earlier than 2014 because of problems with the “Bulava” missiles],” ITAR-TASS, 14 November 2013, www.itar-tass.com.
[19] Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, "Russian Nuclear Forces, 2012," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 68 (2012), pp. 87-97.
[20] Pavel Podvig, "Russia begins R&D on a new strategic bomber," www.russianforces.org, 28 December 2011; "Новый бомбардировщик – к 2025 году [New bomber by 2025]," Voenno-promyshlennyi Kurer, vpk-news.ru, 28 December 2011.
[21] Hans M. Kristensen, and Robert S. Norris, "Russian Nuclear Forces, 2012," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 68 (2012), pp. 87-97.
[22] Vladimir Belous, Takticheskoye yadernoye oruzhiye v novykh geopoliticheskikh usloviyakh, Yadernyy kontrol, No. 14, February 1996, p. 2.
[23] Hans M. Kristensen, and Robert S. Norris, "Russian Nuclear Forces, 2013," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 69 (2013), pp. 71-81..
[24] Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, "Voennaya doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii na period do 2020 g.," 10 February 2011, stat.doc.mil.ru.
[25] Nikolai Sokov, "The New, 2010 Russian Military Doctrine: The Nuclear Angle," CNS feature Story, 5 February 2010, http://cns.miis.edu.
[26] Nikolai Sokov, "The Evolving Role of Nuclear Weapons in Russia's Security Policy," in ed. William C. Potter and Cristina Hansell, Engaging China and Russia on Nuclear Disarmament, CNS Occasional Paper 15, April 2009, pp. 76-77.
[27] Nikolai Sokov, "Russia's Nuclear Doctrine," NTI issue brief, August 2004, www.nti.org.
[28] Nikolai Sokov, "The April 1999 Russian Federation Security Council Meeting on Nuclear Weapons," Nuclear Threat Initiative, June 1999, www.nti.org.
[29] Nikolai Sokov, "Russia's 2000 Military Doctrine," revised July 2004, www.nti.org.
[30] Nikolai Sokov, "The 'Nuclear Debate' of Summer 2000," revised July 2004, www.nti.org.
[31] Nikolai Sokov, "Russian Ministry of Defense's New Policy Paper: The Nuclear Angle," CNS feature story, 10 October 2003, http://cns.miis.edu.
[32] Nikolai Sokov, "Russian Ministry of Defense's New Policy Paper: The Nuclear Angle," CNS feature story, 10 October 2003, http://cns.miis.edu.
[33] Nikolai Sokov, "The New, 2010 Russian Military Doctrine: The Nuclear Angle," CNS feature Story, 5 February 2010, http://cns.miis.edu.
[34] Pavel Podvig, "Instrumental Influences," The Nonproliferation Review, 18/1, March 2011.
[35] Nikolai Sokov, "The New, 2010 Russian Military Doctrine: The Nuclear Angle," CNS feature Story, 5 February 2010, http://cns.miis.edu.
[36] Thomas B. Cochran, Robert S. Norris and Oleg A. Bukharin, Making the Russian Bomb from Stalin to Yeltsin, Natural Resources Defense Council, (Oxford: Westview Press, 1995), p.16.
[37] Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), p. 501; and David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, (Yale: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 51.
[38] This is the date highlighted by David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, (Yale: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 62. However, Richard Rhodes suggests that Igor Kurchatov may have alerted his government to the possible military significance of nuclear fission in 1939 (Richard Rhodes,The Making of the Atomic Bomb, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), p. 501).
[39] David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, (Yale: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 68.
[40] David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, (Yale: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 68.
[41] Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), p. 501; and David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, (Yale: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 75.
[42] David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, (Yale: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 85.
[43] Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), p. 502; and David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, (Yale: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 89.
[44] David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, (Yale: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 96.
[45] David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, (Yale: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 99.
[46] Michael I. Schwartz "The Russian-A(merican) Bomb: The Role of Espionage in the Soviet Atomic Bomb Project," Journal of Undergraduate Sciences, Volume 3, (Summer 1996), p. 104; and David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, (Yale: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 105.
[47] David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, (Yale: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 107; and Michael I. Schwartz "The Russian-A(merican) Bomb: The Role of Espionage in the Soviet Atomic Bomb Project," Journal of Undergraduate Sciences, Volume 3, (Summer 1996), p. 106.
[48] Thomas B. Cochran, Robert S. Norris and Oleg A. Bukharin, Making the Russian Bomb from Stalin to Yeltsin, Natural Resources Defense Council, (Oxford: Westview Press, 1995), p.21.
[49] Stephen M. Younger, The Bomb: A New History, (New York: Harper Collins, 2009), p.33.
[50] Michael I. Schwartz "The Russian-A(merican) Bomb: The Role of Espionage in the Soviet Atomic Bomb Project," Journal of Undergraduate Sciences, Volume 3, (Summer 1996), p. 106; and David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, (Yale: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 97.
[51] David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, (Yale: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 116.
[52] Thomas B. Cochran, Robert S. Norris and Oleg A. Bukharin, Making the Russian Bomb from Stalin to Yeltsin, Natural Resources Defense Council, (Oxford: Westview Press, 1995), p.24.
[53] David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, (Yale: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 185.
[54] David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, (Yale: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 189.
[55] Michael I. Schwartz "The Russian-A(merican) Bomb: The Role of Espionage in the Soviet Atomic Bomb Project," Journal of Undergraduate Sciences, Volume 3, (Summer 1996), p. 106; and David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, (Yale: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 190.
[56] David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, (Yale: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 196.
[57] Stephen M. Younger, The Bomb: A New History, (New York: Harper Collins, 2009), p.36.
[58] Michael I. Schwartz highlights the vital role that espionage played in "The Russian-A(merican) Bomb: The Role of Espionage in the Soviet Atomic Bomb Project," Journal of Undergraduate Sciences, Volume 3, (Summer 1996); and David Holloway in Stalin and the Bomb, (Yale: Yale University Press, 1994), states that the Soviet scientists did not have access to intelligence passed by Klaus Fuchs to the Soviet government.
[59] Thomas B. Cochran, Robert S. Norris and Oleg A. Bukharin, Making the Russian Bomb from Stalin to Yeltsin, Natural Resources Defense Council, (Oxford: Westview Press, 1995), p.31.
[60] "Russia's Nuclear History," PBS News Hour, www.pbs.org.; and Thomas B. Cochran, Robert S. Norris and Oleg A. Bukharin, Making the Russian Bomb from Stalin to Yeltsin, Natural Resources Defense Council, (Oxford: Westview Press, 1995), p.32.
[61] Thomas B. Cochran, Robert S. Norris and Oleg A. Bukharin, Making the Russian Bomb from Stalin to Yeltsin, Natural Resources Defense Council, (Oxford: Westview Press, 1995), p.33.
[62] Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), p. 778.
[63] David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, (Yale: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 303.
[64] "Russia's Nuclear History," PBS News Hour, www.pbs.org.
[65] David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, (Yale: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 325.
[66] "Strategic Arms Limitation Talks," U.S. Department of State, www.state.gov.
[67] "Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I)," U.S. Department of State, www.state.gov.
[68] "Treaty Between the United States of America and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT II)," U.S. Department of State. www.state.gov.
[69] Michael Binyon, "Analysis: stop, START and a pinch of Salt," The Times, 8 April 2010, www.timesonline.co.uk.
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[72] "START I at a glance," Arms Control Association, www.armscontrol.org.
[73] "START II: Treaty Text," Department of Defense, www.dod.gov.
[74] "Announcement of Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty," Department of Defense, 13 December 2001, www.dod.gov.
[75] "Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT)," Arms Control Association, 24 May 2002, www.armscontrol.org.
[76] "The New START Treaty and Protocol," The White House, 8 April 2010, www.whitehouse.gov.
[77] "New START," Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, updated 31 January 2012, cns.miis.edu/inventory.
[78] The National Academies, Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction (National Academies Press, 2009), www.nap.edu.
[79] "Комментарий Департамента информации и печати МИД России по вопросу о сроке действия ‘Программы Нанна-Лугара’" [Commentary of the Department of Information and Print of the Russian MFA on the question regarding the expiration date of the Nunn-Lugar Program]," 10 October 2012, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, www.mid.ru.
[80] “A New Legal Framework for U.S.-Russian Cooperation in Nuclear Nonproliferation and Security,” The United States’ Department of State, 19 June 2013, www.state.gov.
[81] "Предприятия [Enterprises]," Rosatom, accessed 3 April 2012, www.rosatom.ru.
[82] "Производство электроэнергии [Electricity production]," Rosatom, accessed 3 April 2012, www.rosatom.ru.
[83] "Data Feature: 1995 World Nuclear Electricity Production," Nukem Market Report, Septermber 1996, p.18.
[84] "Data Feature: 1996/97 World Nuclear Electricity Generating Capacity," Nukem Market Report, November 1997, p.36; "Obzor otrasli Elektroenergetika," AK&M Information Agency, 10 January 2000; in Integrum Techno, www.integrum.ru.; "Obzor otrasli Elektroenergetika," AK&M Information Agency, 11 September 2000; in Integrum Techno.
[85] Yekaterina Kats, "'Yevgeniy Adamov igrayet 'ponyatiyami'," Segodnya, 12 April 2000, http://news.mosinfo.ru.
[86] “Power Reactor Information System – Russian Federation,” The International Atomic Energy Agency, 14 January 2014, www.iaea.org.
[87] "Производство электроэнергии [Electricity production]," Rosatom, accessed 3 April 2012, www.rosatom.ru.; "Развитие атомной энергетики в России [Nuclear Energy Development in Russia]," Rosenergoatom, accessed 3 April 2012, www.rosenergoatom.ru.
[88] Nuclear Fuel Cycle Companies," Rosatom, www.rosatom.ru; "Nuclear Power in Russia," World Nuclear Association, www.world-nuclear.org.
[89] "Nuclear Power in Russia," World Nuclear Association, accessed 4 April 2012, www.world-nuclear.org.
[90] "Историческая справка [Background]," Rostekhnadzor, accessed 4 April 2012, www.gosnadzor.ru; "Основная деятельность службы [Primary activities]," Rostekhnadzor, accessed 4 April 2012, www.gosnadzor.ru.
[91] "Производство электроэнергии [Electricity production]," Rosatom, accessed 17 April 2012, www.rosatom.ru.
[92] International Atomic Energy Agency, "International Nuclear Safety Experts Conclude IAEA Peer Review of the Regulatory System of the Russian Federation," 27 November 2009, www.iaea.org.
[93] "Automated Radiation Monitoring System," Roastom, www.rosatom.ru.
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[95] "Large Fast Reactor Approved for Beloyarsk," World Nuclear News, 27 June 2012, www.world-nuclear-news.org; "Реактор БН-800 может быть запущен в 2013 году [BN-800 reactor may be commissioned in 2013]," Atomic Construction Projects in Russia blog, Rosatom, 11 November 2011, blogstroyka.rosatom.ru.
[96] A.I. Filin, "Current Status and Plans for Development of NPP with Brest Reactors," www.iaea.org.
[97] “Ещё четыре плавучих АЭС [Another four floating NPPs],” Barents Observer, 2 March 2009, www.barentsobserver.com; “Rosatom to help develop Yakutia region,” World Nuclear News, 25 February 2009, www.world-nuclear-news.org.
[98] "Plavuchaya AYeS arestovana v svyazi s bankrotsvom," Barents Observer, 16 August 2011, www.barentsobserver.com.
[99] Department of State, "The Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation," 12 January 2011, www.state.gov; "US-Russia 123 Agreement Activated," Nuclear Engineering International, 17 January 2011, www.neimagazine.com.
[100] Cole Harvey and Richard Sabatini, "Russia's Lukewarm Support for International Sanctions Against Iran: History and Motivations," Issue Brief for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org, 15 April 2010.
[101] "U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission: Spring 2012 Joint Report," 26 March 2012, available at www.state.gov.

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This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, or agents.

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