The apartheid-era South African government viewed itself as the target of a total onslaught by Soviet-backed Marxist guerrillas or regimes in neighboring states and black nationalists at home, and to meet this all-encompassing red-black danger it was apparently willing to use almost any means at its disposal to defend itself. The South African government therefore secretly initiated Project Coast in 1981 under the aegis of the SADF Special Forces. Although ostensibly created entirely for defensive purposes, from the outset the program also had offensive features and capabilities. The military front company Delta G Scientific, located between Johannesburg and Pretoria, was the centerpiece of the chemical warfare (CW) component of Project Coast, although several other facilities were set up to develop protective clothing, manufacture exotic assassination devices, and weaponize irritants and incapacitants. Project Officer Dr. Wouter Basson also established an elaborate network of procurement and financial front companies overseas to abet Project Coast. The scientists in this program developed, tested, synthesized small-scale quantities of well-known CW agents (e.g., mustard agent, sarin, tabun, BZ, and perhaps VX) and a host of lethal, hard-to-trace toxic chemicals. Project Coast scientists researched the suitability of using illegal drugs such as incapacitating calmatives. Several chemical compounds, above all the toxic organophosphates, became tools in the apartheid government's assassination program. The South African government officially dismantled the CBW program in 1993, in the midst of a liberalizing transformation of the regime. Project Coast personnel, including Basson, may have provided technical knowledge, equipment, or materials to rogue regimes, to foreign intelligence personnel, to traffickers of dangerous weapons, and to elements of a shadowy international network of right-wing extremists. Like the proliferation that may have resulted from Project Coast, the extent to which various foreign governments covertly assisted South Africa's CBW program remains an open question. [*]

History

On 11 April 2002, a South African judge acquitted Dr. Wouter Basson, the Project Officer for the secret South African chemical and biological weapons (CBW) program, Project Coast, of all that remained of the 46 criminal charges originally filed against him by state prosecutors. Several years' worth of controversial, high-profile hearings and judicial inquiries thereby ended with a whimper rather than a bang, to the astonishment of most observers.[1] Basson's acquittal not only ignored substantial evidence of Basson's role as the mastermind behind Project Coast and his links to kidnappings and assassinations of so-called enemies of the state, it also left unanswered many crucial questions about the possible proliferation of dangerous Project Coast materials and know-how to unsavory regimes and non-state actors.

Project Coast was a bifurcated program, with CW activities operating side-by- side with the biological warfare (BW) components of the program. The chemical and biological elements of Project Coast had the same historical influences, not to mention common objectives and command and budgetary structures. Moreover, the covert assassination program of South Africa's apartheid-era government used both CW and BW agents. Project Coast's chemical and biological weapons infrastructure was simultaneously dismantled, and similar proliferation concerns linger over both sides of Project Coast. Details about the chemical warfare activities that preceded Project Coast, the chemical warfare facilities involved, South Africa's battlefield use of chemical weapons, and South Africa's current status within the international chemical weapons nonproliferation regime can be found in the following narrative.

Chemical Warfare Activities in South Africa before Project Coast
Though a chemical industry materialized in South Africa at the end of the nineteenth century, the effectiveness of chemical warfare on World War I battlefields awakened the country's leaders to the military importance of chemistry, a point underscored by Italian mustard agent attacks in Ethiopia in 1936. Soon after the outbreak of the Second World War the Jan Smuts government agreed to assist the British Ministry of Supply in producing phosgene and mustard. The Klipfontein factory near Pretoria and the Firgrove factory in the Cape Province, which employed a total of 1,697 persons and were capable of producing 250 tons of different chemical substances each month, manufactured these two agents. Accounts vary, but in July 1945 both of these factories were either shut down or redirected to the production of insecticides. Either way, their stocks of phosgene and mustard were destroyed.[2]

The next noteworthy data point in South Africa's CW activities occurred in 1960, when the Mechem company was established as the Chemical Defence Unit of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research. Dr. J. P. De Villiers directed Mechem under the bureaucratic aegis of the Department of Trade and Industry, but the South African Defence Force (SADF) was the sole fiscal sponsor of its work to investigate chemical compounds and monitor the CW and BW threat to South Africa. The research council's policy prohibited work with lethal agents, so Mechem refrained from large-scale production of CW agents. However, Mechem produced compounds such as tear gas and CX (phosgene oxide) powder used for tracking. At that time, the African Explosives and Chemical Industries was manufacturing tear gas for the state Armaments Corporation of South Africa (ARMSCOR), which added these compounds to pyrotechnic smoke munitions, grenades, and cartridges. South African authorities occasionally used tear gas to suppress riots. Mechem produced and tested three other riot control chemicals: CN, DM, and CR. In 1961, South Africa established a Nuclear Biological and Chemical (NBC) Defence School in Cape Town, but until the late 1980s the training there was restricted to the use of gas masks and tear gas.[3]

De Villiers and his colleagues advocated a more expansive offensive CW policy and activities. For example, De Villiers promoted the utility of CW for the South African military although he acknowledged that South Africa was not threatened by foreign CW attack. In a 1971 report, perhaps aware that Rhodesian security forces were poisoning the water supplies of guerilla fighters, De Villiers declared that enemies might find the family of lethal fluoroacetates especially well-suited for that purpose because some fluoroacetates are stable, odorless and colorless, easily made, commercially available as rodenticides, and have delayed symptoms. In a July 1977 report, De Villiers stated that the "treatment of terrorist bases with a non-persistent, non-lethal agent just before a security force attack can affect both the terrorists' ability to defend themselves and their ability to escape." Finally, De Villiers suggested in a 1970s SADF manual that it might be advantageous to use lethal chemical agents against internal enemies, since in his view the 1925 Geneva Protocols did not expressly prohibit such use.[4]

In the early 1970s, SADF chief General Magnus Malan recruited Dr. Jan Coetzee, head of Chemical Defence Unit's Department of Special Equipment, to lead the Defence Research Institute, after which Coetzee worked out of ARMSCOR's premises for a time. Coetzee then went on to lead a new ARMSCOR subsidiary, Electronic, Mechanical, Agricultural and Chemical (EMLC), which Prime Minister P. W. Botha authorized. In August 1980, EMLC moved to SADF Special Forces headquarters at Speskop, and Delta G Scientific later subsumed the company's chemical component.[5]

Project Coast's Chemical Warfare Facilities
Project Coast's CW activities centered at Delta G Scientific, a large biochemical research and production facility. The SADF established Delta G in April 1982 to take over the CW tasks of EMLC, a company that ostensibly provided the Special Forces with defensive CBW capabilities and specialized equipment. Originally located in the Pretoria suburb of Weldegraan, in the mid-1980s Delta G moved to new facilities in Midrand, north of Johannesburg. Delta G eventually consisted of two manufacturing plants, a pilot or pre-production plant, a large laboratory complex, workshops, and administrative offices. This highly sophisticated campus cost about 30 million rand to build and equip.[6]

Delta G was an SADF front company that conducted military work, but SADF set it up as a private company conducting industrial contract work, which facilitated the recruitment of top scientists and acquisition of materials overseas. At its height, Delta-G had a staff of approximately 120, split roughly between work in production or in Dr. Gert Lourens' Research Unit, which included several scientific divisions such as the Biochemical Division that Dr. Hennie Jordaan ran. Common administrative, financial, and security departments logistically supported these units. Wouter Basson recruited Dr. Willie Basson, who headed Pretoria University's chemistry department, to become Delta G's managing director. Dr. Philip Mijburgh, the nephew of General Magnus Malan, replaced Basson in 1985. Delta G's technical director was Dr. Gerrie Rall, its marketing director was Barry Pithy, and its administrative director was Dr. André Redelinghuys. Delta G could synthesize any chemical, but the company focused on military projects geared to preserve public order, including the large-scale production of riot control agents, including irritants such as CS and CR, and incapacitants. Delta G also produced small quantities of mind-altering narcotics to test their potential viability as calmatives. Dr. Lucia Steenkamp headed Delta G's peptide synthesis program, and one of her apparent goals was to enhance the physiological effects of bioregulators. Finally, for its CW research and analysis program Delta G made small quantities of various toxic substances, such as the blister agent mustard and the hallucinogen BZ.[7]

Certain CW facilities also researched the suitability of using illegal drugs such as methaqualone ("Quaaludes"), MDMA ("Ecstasy"), LSD, the marijuana extract tetrahydrocannibol, and cocaine as incapacitating calmatives. Some of these illegal drugs may have been sold for profit. Delta G shipped chemical crowd control agents to other entities for testing, including the pyrotechnical labs at Special Forces headquarters, the SAP's Forensic Sciences Laboratory, universities, or other facilities at various state companies, semi-state companies, and private companies, such as Swartklip Products, an ARMSCOR subsidiary, and the defensive CBW company Systems Research and Development, later renamed Protechnik. Swartklip was among the companies that weaponized riot control agents for Delta G.[8]

South Africa's Possible Battlefield Use of Chemical Weapons
Although Project Coast did not sponsor any large-scale production or weaponization of standard chemical warfare agents, RRL and Systems Research and Development, a company established in part to test CBW protective gear, produced small quantities of such agents. These included blister agents like mustard, nerve agents (e.g., tabun, sarin, and VX), and the military grade psycho-incapacitant BZ.[9] Dr. Stiaan Wandrag described his principal work at the Compression Laboratory at RRL as defensive, namely developing CBW antidotes, ostensibly for the protection of important individuals, security force members, and South African agents who might be exposed to CW and BW agents. Basson, however, tacitly acknowledged that early on the South Africans may have considered deploying CW agents as offensive battlefield weapons when he stated that all research on lethal CBW agents intended for conventional weapons delivery concluded by 1986 or 1987.[10] Indeed, the SADF may have tripped the defensive to offensive line in January 1992 when it bombed Front for the Liberation of Mozambique troops from a pilotless observer aircraft near Ngungwe, killing at least five and injuring several more in a field test of an unspecified CW agent. Basson led a SAMS team to investigate the incident, but the SADF sought to blame the African National Congress for sponsoring this CW attack and a top secret 1992 National Intelligence Service report attributed the attack to the SADF. Shortly thereafter, the U.S. and British governments issued a diplomatic protest to South Africa, alluding to a similar conclusion of SADF culpability.[11] Despite allegations that the SADF carried out other CW attacks against enemy troops in neighboring states, definitive evidence that South Africa used chemical weapons in an offensive capacity has not surfaced.

Current Status

In February 2003, towards the end of a long period of international diplomatic wrangling over how best to disarm Saddam Hussein's Iraq, South Africa dispatched a delegation to Baghdad with great fanfare to advise the Iraqis on how to proceed with a verifiable disarmament process. In doing so, Pretoria was seeking greater world recognition and presenting its experience as a model for future disarmament.[12] While South Africa can take justifiable pride in the dismantling of its nuclear program, such pride would have been largely misplaced if extended to the dismantling of the country's CBW program. Many irregularities marred South Africa's convoluted CBW disarmament process, including the lack of independent verification of the destruction of stocks of chemical and biological agents.

South Africa ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention on 3 September 1995. When the chemical weapons ban entered into force on 29 April 1997, South Africa's industrial chemical facilities became subject to international inspection and any concerns about covert chemical weapons activity in South Africa could be pursued through the treaty's challenge inspection provisions. Since joining the Convention, South Africa has actively supported its full implementation, hosting the first conference in Africa on the treaty's implementation in 1994 as well as a variety of training courses for inspectors and national authorities.

Sources:
[*] The following people provided valuable assistance in the preparation of this report: Chandré Gould and Marléne Burger from the South African Centre for Conflict Resolution; Verne Harris from the South Africa History Project; Gary Ackerman and Richard Pilch; Robert Block from the Wall Street Journal; Joby Warrick from the Washington Post; journalist Ilan Ziv; Stephen Dresch from Forensic Intelligence; American journalist Edward Humes; Milton Leitenberg from the University of Maryland; Swiss journalist Rudolf Maeder; CW specialist Eric Croddy; and BW specialist Michael Moodie.
[1] Centre for Conflict Resolution, Basson Trial: Weekly Summaries of Court Proceedings, October 1999-April 2002, [final] special report; "The long and costly road to acquittal," Sunday Times (14 April 2002); Chris McGreal, "'Dr. Death a free agent once again," The Age (14 April 2002); "Revenge of South Africa's 'Dr. Death'", BBC News Online (12 April 2002). For the detailed charges against Basson, Hooggeregshof, Die Staat teen Wouter Basson, Akte van Beskulding [Indictment] (1999).
[2] For the early history of the chemical industry and CW activities in South Africa, see G. C. Gerrans, "Historical Overview of the South African Chemical Industry, 1896-1998," Chemistry International 21:3 (May 1999), pp. 71-7; Ian van der Waag, review of The Rollback of South Africa's Chemical and [sic] Biological Warfare Program, Journal of Military History (January 2002), p. 272; Stephen Burgess and Helen Purkitt, The Rollback of South Africa's Biological Warfare Program (USAF Academy, Colorado: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, 2001), pp. 2-3; Chandré Gould and Peter Folb, Project Coast: Apartheid's Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2002), pp. 31-2.
[3] Chandré Gould and Peter Folb, Project Coast: Apartheid's Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2002), pp. 32-4.
[4] Chandré Gould and Peter Folb, Project Coast: Apartheid's Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2002), pp. 32-4.
[5] For EMLC, see Centre for Conflict Resolution, Basson Trial: Weekly Summaries of Court Proceedings, October 1999-April 2002, testimony of Coetzee, Jan van Jaarsveld, Jan Lourens, Philip Morgan, Stephanus Redlinghuys, Johan Theron, and Sybie van der Spuy; and Chandré Gould and Peter Folb, Project Coast: Apartheid's Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2002), p. 35.
[6] Bale, Jeffrey. "South Africa's Project Coast: 'Death Squads,' Covert State-Sponsored Poisonings, and the Dangers of CBW Proliferation", Democracy and Security, Vol. 2, Issue 1, July 2006, pp. 27-59.
[7] Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), Hearings on South Africa's Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme, testimony of Jan Lourens, Johan Koekemoer, and Philip Mijburgh (though the last-named's is almost worthless); and Centre for Conflict Resolution, Basson Trial: Weekly Summaries of Court Proceedings, October 1999-April 2002, testimony of Jan Lourens, Johan Koekemoer, Gert Lourens, Hennie Jordaan, Lucia Steenkamp, Steven Beukes, Barry Pithy, and Gerald Cadwell. See also Chandré Gould and Peter Folb, "The Role of Professionals in the South African Chemical and Biological Weapons Programme." www.brad.ac.uk. Note that the Chemical Weapons Convention allows the use of riot control agents for law enforcement purposes, including domestic riot control.
[8] Chandré Gould and Peter Folb, "The South African Chemical and Biological Warfare Program: An Overview," Nonproliferation Review, Fall-Winter 2000, pg. 13.
[9] Centre for Conflict Resolution, Basson Trial: Weekly Summaries of Court Proceedings, October 1999-April 2002, testimony of André Immelman, Stiaan Wandrag, Klaus Psotta, Jan Lourens, and Basson; Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), Hearings on South Africa's Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme, testimony of Jan Lourens.
[10] Centre for Conflict Resolution, Basson Trial: Weekly Summaries of Court Proceedings, October 1999-April 2002, testimony of Stiaan Wandrag and Basson.
[11] United Nations, Report of the Investigations into the Allegations of the Us of Chemical Weapons in Mozambique (New York: United Nations, 1993); U.S., Department of State, "Recent Chemical Weapons (CW) Use Allegations — Africa," 9 March 1992 memo (declassified); RSA, National Intelligence Service, "Staff Paper prepared for the Steyn Commission on Alleged Dangerous Activities of SADF Components," December 1992, Annexure B, p. 14, serial number ii; Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), Hearings on South Africa's Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme, testimony of Jan Lourens; John Yeld, "SADF bombed Frelimo in chemical weapons test and blamed ANC," The Cape Argus (6/17/98); Paul Fauvet, "Mozambican claims on 1992 chemical attack now appear correct," The Star (6/17/98); Klaas de Jonge, "The Chemical Warfare Case," The (Secret) Truth Commission Files, November 1997, pp. 6-12.
[12] Charlayne Hunter-Gault, "S. Africa sending arms experts to Iraq," CNN News (18 February 2003); "SA experts start work in Iraq," BBC News Online (24 February 2003).