Syria has pursued a CW program despite the damage to its international reputation and its economy as a consequence of increasingly stringent export controls aimed at preventing WMD proliferation. Despite substantial investments of materiel and resources, Syria appears to have remained heavily dependent upon imports of materials and expertise for CW production. Since the early 1990s, Syria is believed to have has shifted its focus from developing CW agents to improving long-range delivery systems, such as Scud missiles. Syria's ability to produce and deploy these long-range delivery systems also appears to be dependant upon continued foreign support. By the late 1990s, the limited information made available about the Syrian CW program suggested that it was in a form of stasis. This may have been because the program had achieved its core production and capability goals earlier in the decade. Alternatively it may be that Syria has reached a technological plateau beyond which it is either unwilling to, or incapable of, progressing at this time. However since 2005 Jane's has alleged that Syria is engaged in efforts to upgrade or enhance its CW capabilities, mainly in the area of production technology, in cooperation with Iran. Although these allegations have been repeated on a number of occasions they have not been independently confirmed or publicly supported by any government agency.[1]

History

There is a general consensus that Syria first obtained chemical weapons from Egypt in 1972 or 1973 as part of the two countries' preparations for their joint attack on Israel in October 1973.[2] Reports that Israeli troops captured stockpiles of Syrian chemical weapons support the view that these weapons were made available to combat units during the Yom Kippur war.[3] It is notable that although Syrian forces were severely defeated, at no point did they make use of their CW capability. In the absence of access to Syrian personnel or records, all explanations for why the Syrians did not use chemical weapons in 1973 must remain largely speculative.

The next major development in Syrian efforts to acquire chemical weapons took place following the defeat of Syrian air and land forces deployed to Lebanon during Israel's invasion of that country in 1982. However, a direct causal relationship has not been established and a decision to pursue chemical weapons as a counter-balance to Israel's strategic nuclear superiority may have been nascent prior to 1982. Nevertheless, it is likely that Syria's vulnerability to Israeli conventional forces was a significant factor in Syria's decision to build a CW arsenal. Prior to 1982, there were no reports of Syria's large-scale acquisition of materials and construction of CW facilities.

The Syrian CW program was established under the aegis of the Centre D'Etude et Recherché Scientifique (CERS), an ostensibly civilian research institute that appears to be responsible for all research, development, and production activities and facilities. Once Syrian officials decided to proceed with a CW program, their initial focus was the establishment of a facility for research and development, and possibly pilot production, in the Damascus area. This facility has continued to be used for CW-related research. Simultaneously, work commenced on the construction of larger dedicated CW production facilities. These plants in Al-Safira, Hama, and Homs all came online in the mid- to late 1980s.

The first priority of the Syrian CW program was the production of sarin; small-scale production appears to have started in 1984. Originally, this agent was to be carried by Syrian Air Force bombers, but this was an unreliable delivery method given Israeli air superiority. Intense efforts were undertaken to provide a more dependable delivery system. By 1987, Syria was able to fit sarin-filled warheads, probably unitary rather than cluster, on some of its Scud missiles creating a limited long-range CW strike capability. Since that time, Syria has concentrated its efforts on increasing the range and effectiveness of its missiles' strike capability by obtaining longer-range missiles from foreign suppliers such as North Korea and by improving the sophistication of the warheads. The fitting of bomblet-filled cluster warheads to Scud-C missiles after 1997 was a significant development that greatly increased the potential effectiveness of Syria's chemical weapons.

Following the successful weaponization of sarin in the 1980s, Syria turned to developing additional agents, most notably vesicants. Syria appears to have built up a stockpile of mustard and sarin for tactical uses in the 1990s. Additionally, Syria has sought to increase the lethality and utility of its force by developing V-agents. Accusations that Syria has been researching this type of agent began to appear in the late 1980s. Throughout the 1990s, reports pointed to continuing work on V-agents but also suggested a lack of success.[4] On numerous occasions Syria has been described as possessing weaponized VX or an analogue only to be described as seeking to obtain the same agent several years later. The CIA never publicly committed to the view that Syria possessed VX, instead limiting itself through the 1990s to claiming that Syria "may be trying to develop more potent nerve agents"[5] or that it "apparently tried to develop more toxic and persistent nerve agents."[6] In 2006 the ODNI stated that "Syria is developing the more toxic and persistent nerve agent VX."[7] By the mid-1990s, the Syrian CW program seems to have reached a plateau in terms of capability and production. There is no current information conclusively suggesting that Syria is engaged in ongoing large-scale production and stockpiling of CW agents.

The driving motivation behind Syria's CW program has been the need to find a way to balance Israel's growing conventional warfare capabilities. During the 1980s and 1990s, the differences in the relative capabilities of the two countries rapidly widened, leaving Syria in a position of heightened vulnerability. The distancing of Syria from its Soviet patron in the mid-1980s—combined with the all too apparent inadequacies of Soviet-supplied equipment—required Syria to seek an equalizer. In this sense, the objective of the Syrian CW program has been to provide Syria with room to reduce the significance of Israel's military superiority by threatening the expansion of a conventional conflict to include direct attacks against the civilian population or, alternately, by inflicting unbearable losses on Israeli forces. The key dilemma facing Syria has been the need to develop and maintain a credible threat while not being so threatening as to trigger an Israeli attack, which would expose Syria's inadequate conventional forces to the risk of severe defeat. In this regard, Syria has found it advantageous to adopt an opaque policy, not unlike Israel's nuclear policy, in which it neither confirms nor denies the existence of chemical weapons even as it continues to deploy and improve them.

From the start, Syria's CW program has been heavily dependent on outside support. As a consequence of its low levels of industrial and technological development, Syria has been a voracious importer of materials, technologies, and expertise. Although indigenous development efforts have been made, they have been constrained by Syria's relative isolation from the world community, its relative poverty, and the diversion of substantial proportions of its national resources to military activities. Consequently, it is not clear that Syria has achieved significant breadth or depth in terms of its ability to pursue indigenous development of chemical weapons or their delivery systems. Open sources continue to refer to extensive efforts to secure materials and expertise from overseas suppliers, implying substantial limitations on internal capabilities. However, these open sources generally do not provide details about these imports; and, as a consequence, it is difficult to identify any changes in the character of import activity except in the broadest sense. In the early 1980s, Syria was engaged in importing the key process equipment and technology required to establish its CW infrastructure.[8] Since that time, it appears that the scale of imports, though not the need for them, has declined as the requirement becomes one of supporting an existing program.

The Syrian CW development program appears to have involved relatively few tests, whether of agents or delivery systems. It is possible that additional tests occurred that were not detected by foreign intelligence agencies or were not reported in the open sources. The most recent publicly described test was of a Syrian missile test in July 2001, which probably involved the use of a simulated chemical warhead.[9] Since that time, the CW program has maintained a very low profile. Syria may have received foreign support for the development of delivery systems, particularly warheads for its Scud missiles. Although outside support, particularly from North Korea, might lead to an expectation that Syria has a high degree of confidence in its systems, this assessment may be unwarranted.[10]

Syria has not publicly announced doctrines related to the use of chemical weapons; indeed, it has continually denied possessing such weapons. All conclusions regarding doctrines or policies are accordingly extrapolations from the limited information about force structures and production history available in the open sources. Assessments of Syrian doctrine have variously claimed that Syria intends to use its CW capability in a tactical role, primarily in a battle on the Golan Heights or as a strategic deterrent targeted at the Israeli civilian population rather than tactical battlefield use.[11] Generally these assessments support one view while discounting the other. However, given source limitations, confirmation of either strategy is impossible, and commentary on any possible changes is highly speculative. One rare insight into Syrian thinking on the use of CW may have been provided in early 2008 in a published article discussing the Israeli raid against an alleged Syrian nuclear reactor under construction on the banks of the Euphrates. In this article a Syrian official is quoted as saying "Syria had concluded...that chemical warfare had little deterrent value against Israel, given its nuclear capability."[12]

Very little reliable information exists regarding Syrian CW defensive efforts in part because open source information has been focused on Syrian offensive rather than defensive capabilities. A major part of the Syrian protective capability consists of military vehicles from the Soviet Union that were usually fitted with chemical protection systems as standard equipment. It is believed that the Soviet Union provided Syria with a full range of decontamination equipment in the 1970s and 1980s.[13] It is assumed, though not demonstrated, that personal protective equipment was distributed to individual Syrian soldiers during the same period. There is one known instance in which Syria purchased more than 11,000 Chinese MF-11 protective masks; however, it is not clear whether this was a single purchase or part of a broader effort to replace all existing masks.[14]

For several decades, Damascus has expressed a generalized opposition to WMD. At the same time, Syria has supported the right of any state to adopt those measures that it feels are most appropriate to securing itself against outside threats. On numerous occasions at the United Nations, in negotiations for the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and in more general forums, Syria has repeatedly indicated that it would not renounce the right to possess chemical weapons, nor destroy any arsenal if it possessed one, until Israel first abandoned its nuclear weapons program. It is unclear whether this position represents a willingness to bargain away Syria's CW program in exchange for Israel's nuclear weapons program or is simply a useful argument to justify the possession of chemical weapons. In practice, Syria remains adamantly opposed to CWC membership, aligns politically with Egypt in opposition to membership, and has attempted with diminishing effectiveness to discourage other Arab nations from joining.

Status

Technology
Syria is currently believed to deploy between 100 and 200 Scud missiles fitted with sarin warheads. Some of these missiles may be fitted with V-agent warheads although this information is less reliable. In addition, Syria is believed to have stockpiled several hundred tons of sarin and mustard agents for tactical uses in the form of artillery shells and air-dropped munitions. Syria retains its production infrastructure of at least three and possibly four facilities; however, it is not known whether these are currently being used to produce new agent. In 2005, Jane's began publishing claims that Syria was engaged in efforts, assisted by the Iranian government, to expand its capability to produce precursors that it had previously been obliged to import.[15] In early 2009, Jane's published assertions to the effect that Syria was modernizing and expanding its Al-Safira facility basing these claims in part on satellite photography and in part on information from confidential sources.[16]

In general, previously noted trends established in the early 1990s continue. Despite regular Israel-sourced announcements of Syrian success,[17] Syria is apparently still working to perfect its V-agent capability and to enhance the range and effectiveness of its delivery systems.

Policies
In 2003, the United States directed fresh public attention to Syrian WMD capabilities, leveling numerous accusations that Syria had received and hidden Iraqi chemical and biological weapons. Although the assertion that Syria received Iraq's WMD prior to the spring 2003 U.S.-led invasion ultimately proved unsustainable it was nevertheless important, signaling U.S. determination to pursue WMD issues and a refusal to maintain relations with Syria on a "business as usual" basis. This new approach resulted in a number of policy shifts, the most significant of which was U.S. support for ultimately successful efforts to expel Syria from Lebanon. Syria came under additional pressure after Libya publicly repudiated all of its WMD efforts in late 2003 and then allowed the dismantling and conversion of all WMD-related equipment and facilities in 2004 and 2005.

In 2004, Syrian officials met with the Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Syrian representatives also began to attend regional seminars organized by the OPCW. In November 2005, a Syrian delegation attended the Annual Conference of the States Party in The Hague. In the absence of information on the motivations behind these actions the significance of these developments remains unclear. However, they may be the first signs of an impending change in Syrian policy on chemical weapons, or more likely, an attempt to relieve international pressure on Syria by suggesting that a change is being considered.

In mid-2009, Syria finds itself confronting a difficult international situation that is further complicated by its suspected WMD capabilities. A military capability that was established to enhance national security through its deterrent effect, now endangers it, by threatening to attract the wrath of Syria's enemies. Although abandoning these programs might actually improve national security, too much has been invested in the combined missile and CW arsenals to easily surrender them, the more so given the critical role they play in Syria's national strategy.

Sources
[1] Robin Hughes, "Iran aids Syria's CW Programme," Janes Defense Weekly, October 21, 2005, www.janes.com; Robin Hughes, "Iran and Syria sign mutual assistance accord," Jane's Defense Weekly, December 21, 2005, www.janes.com; Bhupendra Jasani, Chemical romance - Syria's unconventional affair develops, Jane's Intelligence Review, February 17, 2009, www.janes.com.
[2] W. Seth Carus, "Chemical Weapons in the Middle East," Research Memorandum No. 9 (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy), 1988.
[3] Statement in U.S. House of Representatives by Representative Bobbi Fielder (California), Congressional Record, Daily Edition, May 17, 1984, p. H4088.
[4] Bill Gertz, "North Korean Scuds added to Syrian arsenal," Washington Times, March 13, 1991, p. 3; "Syria's Secret Poison Gas Plants," Jane's Foreign Report, 10 September 1992, www.janes.com; "Israeli claims that Syria is making VX nerve gas," Jane's Defence Weekly, May 7, 1997, p. 6, www.janes.com; Steve Rodan and Andrew Koch, "Israel warns of Syria's work on CW-tipped Scuds," Jane's Defense Weekly, December 12, 2001, www.janes.com.
[5] Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions for the period 1 January to 31 December 2007, (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, 1998), www.cia.gov.
[6] Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, January - June 1998, (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, 1998), www.cia.gov.
[7] Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions for the period 1 January to 31 December 2006, (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2008), p. 6, www.dni.gov.
[8] John J. Fialka, "Fighting Dirty: Western Industry Sells Third World the Means to Produce Poison Gas," Wall Street Journal, September 16, 1988, p. 1.
[9] David C. Isby, "Syrian Scud carried a simulated chemical warhead," Jane's Missiles and Rockets, September 1, 2001, www.janes.com.
[10] Robin Hughes, "Explosion aborts CW project run by Iran and Syria," Jane's Defense Weekly, September 26, 2007, (first posted on Jane's website on September 17, 2007). For a discussion contesting the conclusions of the Jane's article see .Markus Binder, "Explosion at Syrian Military Facility: A Chemical Weapons Accident?" in WMD Insights, No. 20 November 2007, p. 7-11, www.wmdinsights.com.
[11] M. Zuhair Diab, "Syria's Chemical and Biological Weapons: Assessing Capabilities and Motivations," The Nonproliferation Review 5 (Fall 1997), p. 108-110; Ahmed S. Hashim, The Deterrence Series: Chemical and Biological Weapons and Deterrence: Case Study 1: Syria (Alexandria, VA: Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 1998) p. 19-22.
[12] Seymour M. Hersh, "A Strike in the Dark: What Did Israel Bomb in Syria?" New Yorker, February 11, 2008, www.newyorker.com.
[13] Gordon M. Burck and Charles C. Flowerree, International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 215.
[14] Gordon M. Burck and Charles C. Flowerree, International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 215.
[15] Robin Hughes, "Iran Aids Syria's CW Programme," Jane's Defense Weekly, October 21, 2005 and Robin Hughes, "Iran and Syria Sign Mutual Assistance Accord," Jane's Defense Weekly, December 21, 2005, www.janes.com.
[16] Bhupendra Jasani, "Chemical Romance - Syria's Unconventional Affair Develops, Jane's Intelligence Review, February 17, 2009, www.janes.com.
[17] Cf. fn. 3.