Damascus has continued its pursuit of chemical weapons despite the damage to its international reputation and the rising costs of evading international export controls on chemical weapons materials. Since embarking on a CW program in the 1970's, Syria has obtained both chemical agents and CW-capable missiles from foreign suppliers. [3] Currently, Syria's ability to produce CW agents and delivery systems appears to remain heavily dependent on foreign support for materials and expertise. Since 2005, Jane's Defense has reported on alleged Iranian assistance to Syria in upgrading and enhancing its CW production infrastructure. [4] Despite numerous such allegations by Jane's, U.S. government sources have not made similar claims. Information about the exact location of Syria's CW assets, from stockpiles to production sites, remains vague. The ongoing civil war raises questions about the physical security of these sites. Furthermore, many in the international community have become increasingly concerned as the conflict worsens that the Assad regime might choose to use chemical weapons against its own people; U.S. officials have repeatedly warned that doing so would constitute a "red line" requiring some form of American action. [5]

History

1972 to 1986: The Israeli Threat and Initial CW Imports

Although the majority of open source information focuses on Syrian offensive, rather than defensive capabilities, defensive CW equipment were among the first CW-related imports purchased by Syria. A major part of the Syrian protective capability consists of military vehicles from the Soviet Union that were usually fitted with chemical protection systems as standard equipment. According to Gordon Burck and Charles Flowerree, the Soviet Union provided Syria with a full range of decontamination equipment in the 1970s and 1980s.[6] Allegedly, personal protective equipment was distributed to individual Syrian soldiers during the same period. Syria is known to have purchased more than 11,000 Chinese MF-11 protective masks; whether this represented a single purchase or a portion of a broader acquisition effort to replace all existing masks remains unknown. [7]

Numerous press and U.S. government sources indicate that Syria first obtained chemical weapons from Egypt on the eve of the attack on Israel in October 1973. [8] Reports that Israeli troops captured stockpiles of Syrian chemical weapons support the view that Syrian combat troops received these weapons during the Yom Kippur war. [9] Notably, although Syrian forces suffered severe defeat, at no point did they deploy chemical weapons. Although the lack of access to Syrian personnel or records renders all explanations for this restraint speculative, Syrian-born security analyst M. Zuhair Diab and Israeli military analysts both suggest that Syria may have planned to use its chemical arsenal only in the event of a total military collapse, which never occurred. [10]

Suboptimal military coordination among Syria, Egypt, and Iraq during the 1973 Yom Kippur War revealed fissures in Arab unity against Israel. The 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty deprived Syria of an important military ally against the Israeli threat, and according to M. Zuhair Diab, motivated a pursuit of greater military self-sufficiency. [11] Further, Diab notes that the near-disastrous clashes with Israeli forces during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 exposed Syria's land and air vulnerabilities and further motivated Syria's military to acquire chemical weapons.

Other regional developments may also have motivated Syria's pursuit of a CW capability. Water-sharing conflicts with Turkey over the Euphrates River contributed to tense Syrian-Turkish relations during this period, as did Turkish allegations of Syrian support for the Kurdish independence movement. Syria may also have sought CW as a deterrent against a show of force or as a form of leverage. [12] Perhaps more directly troublesome to Syrian leadership, the Soviet Union chose to support Iran during the Iran-Iraq War, weakening Syria's partnership with the USSR and further isolating Syria. [13] The combination of increasing political isolation and observed military deficiencies vis-à-vis Israel together provided incentives for Syria to develop a self-sufficient CW capability.

1986 to 1997: Building CW Self-Sufficiency

According to Israeli media, Syria began developing an indigenous chemical production capability in 1971 at the Centre D'Etudes et de Recherches Scientifiques (CERS) – a facility in Damascus that today administers Syria's CW program while also contributing directly to research and development efforts. [14] According to Gordon Burck and Charles Flowerree, however, most reports indicate that Syria's CW production capability came online sometime in the mid-1980's. [15] In 1989, CIA Director William Webster testified that Syria had begun producing CW agents in the early 1980's. [16] In 1983, a U.S. Special National Intelligence Estimate first identified a Syrian CW production facility. By 1986, Seth Carus wrote that in just five years, Syria had obtained CW production technology from Western Europe and had focused its attention on producing nerve agents. [17] Reportedly, unidentified U.S. officials also indicated that Syria could produce sarin, a charge repeated by Shimon Peres. [18] By the end of 1986, Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, and Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin had all openly stated that Syria was producing nerve agents and delivery systems. [19] By 1990, both media and statements by U.S. officials indicated that Syria had converted several agrochemical factories into sarin production facilities. [20] Reports then appeared alleging that Syria had begun researching the more toxic V-series nerve agents. Throughout the 1990s, reports pointed to continuing work on V-agents but also suggested a lack of success. [21] While the CIA never publicly committed to the view that Syria possessed VX, 721 reports in the 1990s claimed either that Syria "may be trying to develop more potent nerve agents," or that it "apparently tried to develop more toxic and persistent nerve agents." [22]

Signaling growing official concern over Syria's burgeoning CW production capability, in June of 1986 the Reagan Administration banned the sale of sarin and mustard precursors to Syria. [23] However, by the early 1990's numerous reports of illicit trade began to emerge. In 1996 Russian authorities charged retired Lieutenant General Anatoliy Kuntsevich with shipping 800-kilograms of precursor chemicals to Syria. [24] Although these charges were eventually dropped, Israeli press reported that Kuntsevich later admitted to the transfer of nerve agent precursors. [25] It later emerged that Kuntsevich and Syria first agreed to collaborate on the transfer of equipment and materials to Syria in 1992. [26] By 1997, both U.S. and Israeli sources claimed that Syria's CW program, under the administration of CERS, included production facilities in Damascus, Homs, and Aleppo and could produce sarin, mustard, and potentially VX. [27]

Despite Syria's ongoing development of its chemical weapons capability, there have been no confirmed incidences of combat use. [28] In 1982, Amnesty International charged that the Syrian government had used cyanide gas against a Moslem Brotherhood uprising in Hama. [29] The report, which could not be further substantiated, alleges that Syrian troops connected rubber piping to chemical gas tanks and pumped these substances into buildings.

The regional security trends that drove Syria's CW program – namely, counter-balancing Israel's growing conventional warfare capabilities amid increasing military isolation – continued throughout the next decade. During the 1980s and 1990s, Israel's military superiority over Syria increased, leaving Syria increasingly vulnerable. The distancing of Syria from its Soviet patron in the mid-1980s—combined with the all too apparent inadequacies of Soviet-supplied equipment—required Syria to seek an equalizer. While the overall objective of projecting a capability to inflict unacceptable losses on Israel's military and civilian population remained, Syria also likely recognized the careful balancing act of maintaining a credible threat without provoking an Israeli attack. In this regard, Syria likely found it advantageous to adopt an opaque chemical weapons policy, not unlike Israel's nuclear policy, in which it neither confirms nor denies the existence of chemical weapons even as it continues to deploy and improve them.

Syria built its CW program off foreign support and has been a voracious importer of CW materials, technologies, and expertise. Due to Syria's relative isolation from the international community the capacity of Syria's indigenous capability built during this period remains unknown. Open source reports generally do not include sufficient details about Syrian CW imports to further characterize any changes or trends in Syria's import activities. However, the overall scale of Syrian CW imports in this era declined when compared to that of the early 1980s. [30]

1997 to the Present: Silence and Reinvigoration

Reporting on the Syrian CW arsenal remained relatively stable throughout the next decade. Since the initial reports alleging sarin production and potential VX research and production, few new developments have emerged in public reporting. From 2002 to 2006, reports from the U.S. Director of Central Intelligence repeated that "Damascus already held a stockpile of the nerve agent sarin, but apparently tried to develop more toxic and persistent nerve agents." [31] The 2009 and 2010 versions of this report repeated a similar line, that Syria "has had a CW program for many years and already has a stockpile of CW agents" and that "Syria remains dependent on foreign sources for key elements of its CW program, including precursor chemicals." [32]

Relatively few open source reports of Syrian tests on CW agents or delivery systems emerged during this decade. [33] The most recent publicly described test, a Syrian missile test in July 2001, probably involved the use of a simulated chemical warhead.[34] Since that time, Syria's CW program has maintained a very low profile, although Jane's Defense has continued to report on foreign support for the development of chemical warheads for Scud missiles and other delivery systems. [35] In 2005, Jane's began publishing claims that Syria was engaged in efforts, assisted by the Iranian government, to expand its capability to produce precursors. [36] In early 2009, Jane's published assertions to the effect that Syria was modernizing and expanding its Al-Safira facility, basing these claims in part on satellite photography, and in part on information from confidential sources. [37]

In early 2008, Seymour Hersh reported that a Syrian official had commented that "Syria had concluded...that chemical warfare had little deterrent value against Israel, given its nuclear capability" following an Israeli raid on an alleged Syrian nuclear reactor being constructed. [38] While the comments of this Syrian official could provide some insight into Syria's overall CW calculus, Syria during this period made no official statements regarding chemical weapons doctrine, nor has it publically acknowledged possessing such weapons. Whether Syria views its CW arsenal as a realistic component of a potential battle in the Golan Heights or as a strategic deterrent to threaten the Israeli civilian population remains a topic of debate. [39]

For several decades, Damascus has expressed a generalized opposition to WMD while also supporting the right of any state to secure itself against outside threats. On numerous occasions at the United Nations, in negotiations for the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and in more general forums, Syria has repeatedly indicated that until Israel abandons its presumed nuclear weapons program, Syria will neither renounce the right to possess chemical weapons nor destroy any arsenal it may possess. Whether Syrian leadership would in fact consider bargaining away Syria's CW program in exchange for Israel's nuclear weapons program remains unknown. What is more concretely known is that Syria remains adamantly opposed to CWC membership, aligns politically with Egypt in opposition to membership, and discourages other Arab nations from joining.

Recent Developments and Current Status

Syria is currently believed to possess Scud-class missiles and SS-21 missiles that can carry chemical warheads. [40] In addition, Syria is believed to possess sarin nerve agents and mustard agents, and may also possess VX nerve agents. [41] Syria also probably possesses chemical-capable artillery shells and air-dropped munitions. [42] Reports of CW-related infrastructure investments and of new international collaborations suggest that Syria remains interested in enhancing its CW arsenal. [43]

The outbreak of civil unrest in late 2011 raised questions about both the security of Syria's chemical weapons sites and the potential use or transfer of such weapons. While the exact locations of Syria's CW storage and production facilities remain unknown, open literature lists several suspected sites and questions have arisen about the physical security of suspected sites that share geographic proximity with protest locations. [44] On 23 July 2012 Syrian Foreign Ministry spokesman Jihad Makdissi stated that Syria would never use "any chemical and biological weapons . . . .inside Syria," that the Syrian army was storing "all stocks of these weapons" securely, and that such weapons would only be used in the event of "external aggression."[45]. In subsequent Twitter exchanges, he tried to walk back this apparent acknowledgement of Syria's possession of chemical and biological weapons, something Syria had previously denied. [46]

In recent months, the international community has become increasingly concerned that Syrian President Assad might use chemical weapons amid Syria's deteriorating situation and rebel gains. On 20 August 2012, President Obama warned, "a red line for us is we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized." [47] Several days later UK Prime Minister David Cameron underscored President Obama's remark that the threat or use of chemical weapons by President Assad's regime would warrant a revised approach, alluding to military intervention. [48] The newly elected President of France, François Hollande, took the podium at the United Nations 67th General Assembly to let the Assad government know, "that the international community will not stand aside if they were to use chemical weapons." [49]

Between late November and early December 2012, Western intelligence agencies obtained clear evidence that Syrian government units were preparing chemical weapons for potential use. At one base, soldiers were observed to be mixing precursor chemicals and taking other steps to make the chemical weapons battlefield ready. Surveillance photos further confirmed another army unit loading chemical weapons onto special military transport vehicles. [50] These actions prompted President Obama to warn Syria again on 3 December 2012 that "the use of chemical weapons is and would be totally unacceptable… [and] there will be consequences and you will be held accountable." [51] Shortly afterwards Syrian forces appeared to have ceased chemical weapons preparations, and U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta attributed the halt of Syrian chemical weapons activities to President Obama's warning. [52]

On 19 March 2013, allegations arose concerning a chemical weapons attack in the village of Khan al-Assal in the Aleppo province. According to the Assad regime, a rocket spewing a toxic gas in Khan al-Assal caused 26 fatalities and more than 100 injuries. Both the Assad regime and Syrian rebels denied responsibility for the alleged attack. [53] At the request of the Syrian Government, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon appointed Åke Sellström on 27 March 2013 to head a fact-finding mission to investigate the incident. Sellström said that following mission preparation, the team would spend three to four days for inspection, and two to three weeks to write its report and conduct chemical analysis. [54 ]Despite the inspection team's preparations, the Assad Government denied the team entrance into Syria. The denial of access came amid calls by the United Kingdom, France, Luxembourg, South Korea, and Japan to increase the scope of the inspections to include allegations of chemical weapons use in Homs, Damascus, and Aleppo. [55]

On 19 April 2013, the United Kingdom and France announced they had "hard evidence" of chemical weapons use in at least one case. [56] On 23 April 2013 Israeli Brigadier General Itai Brun asserted sarin had been used "in a number of incidents" in Syria, based on photographs of victims foaming at the mouth and with constricted pupils and other unspecified symptoms. [57] Then, on 25 April 2013, U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel stated that the "U.S. intelligence community assesses with some degree of varying confidence that the Syrian regime has used chemical weapons on a small scale in Syria, specifically, the chemical agent sarin." The basis for Western governments' assessments remains unclear, as it would presumably be very challenging to maintain chain of custody over collection and handling of any soil or other physiological evidence. [58]

Sources:
[1] M. Zuhair Diab, "Syria's Chemical and Biological Weapons: Assessing Capabilities and Motivations," The Nonproliferation Review 5 (Fall 1997), p. 107.
[2] Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, "Non-Member States," About OPCW, www.opcw.org, 9 December 2011; and Daniel Williams, "Syria-EU Trade Deal Stalls Over Chemical Weapons Issue," The Washington Post, 8 April 2004, p. A18.
[3] Gordon M. Burck and Charles C. Flowerree, International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 213.
[4] Robin Hughes, "Iran aids Syria's CW Programme," Jane's Defense Weekly, 21 October 2005, www.janes.com; Robin Hughes, "Iran and Syria sign mutual assistance accord," Jane's Defense Weekly, 21 December 2005, www.janes.com; Bhupendra Jasani, "Chemical romance - Syria's unconventional affair develops," Jane's Intelligence Review, 17 February 2009, www.janes.com.
[5] Peter Baker and Michael R. Gordon, "Obama Administration Warns Syria Against Using Chemical Weapons," The New York Times,3 December 2012, www.nytimes.com.
[6] Gordon M. Burck and Charles C. Flowerree, International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 215.
[7] Gordon M. Burck and Charles C. Flowerree, International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 215.
[8] W. Seth Carus, "Chemical Weapons in the Middle East," Research Memorandum No. 9 (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy), 1988; and Gordon M. Burck and Charles C. Flowerree, International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 213.
[9] Statement in U.S. House of Representatives by Representative Bobbi Fielder (California), Congressional Record, Daily Edition, 17 May 1984, p. H4088.
[10] M. Zuhair Diab, "Syria's Chemical and Biological Weapons: Assessing Capabilities and Motivations," The Nonproliferation Review 5 (Fall 1997), p. 104; and "Israeli alarm at Syrian gas warhead," Times (London), 11 January 1988.
[11] M. Zuhair Diab, "Syria's Chemical and Biological Weapons: Assessing Capabilities and Motivations," The Nonproliferation Review 5 (Fall 1997), p. 104.
[12] M. Zuhair Diab, "Syria's Chemical and Biological Weapons: Assessing Capabilities and Motivations," The Nonproliferation Review 5 (Fall 1997), p. 107.
[13] Gordon M. Burck and Charles C. Flowerree, International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 208.
[14] David Eshel, "Syria's Chemical Weapons Proliferation Hydra," Defense Update News Analysis, 23 September 2007, www.defense-update.com, accessed 11 December 2011; and E.J. Hogendoorn, "A Chemical Weapons Atlas," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 53, No. 5 (September/October 1997), pp. 35-39.
[15] Gordon M. Burck and Charles C. Flowerree, International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 210.
[16] Gordon M. Burck and Charles C. Flowerree, International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 211.
[17] Macarthur DeZchazer, Sr., Chemical Weapons Proliferation in the Middle East: What is the Proper Response? (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College), 9 April 1990, p. 10
[18] Gordon M. Burck and Charles C. Flowerree, International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 211-212.
[19] Gordon M. Burck and Charles C. Flowerree, International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 210.
[20] Gordon M. Burck and Charles C. Flowerree, International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 212-213.
[21] Bill Gertz, "North Korean Scuds added to Syrian arsenal," Washington Times, 13 March 1991, p. 3; "Syria's Secret Poison Gas Plants," Jane's Foreign Report, 10 September 1992, www.janes.com; "Israeli claims that Syria is making VX nerve gas," Jane's Defence Weekly, 7 May 1997, p. 6, www.janes.com; Steve Rodan and Andrew Koch, "Israel warns of Syria's work on CW-tipped Scuds," Jane's Defence Weekly, 12 December 2001, www.janes.com.
[22] Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions for the period 1 January to 31 December 2007, (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, 2008), www.cia.gov; Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, January - June 1998, (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, 1998), www.cia.gov.
[23] Bernard Gwertzman, "U.S. Includes Syria in Chemicals Ban," The New York Times, 6 June 1986, Section A, p. 11.
[24] Marion Blackburn, "Russia Suspected of Aiding Syria in Acquiring Stock of Chemical Weapons," Prague Post, 27 November 1996.
[25] Daniel Leshem, "Syria's deadly secret," The Jerusalem Post, 6 May 1997.
[26] Jonathan Tucker, War of Nerves: Chemical Warfare from World War I to al-Qaeda, (New York, New York: Panthen, 2006) p. 324.
[27] Dany Shoham, "Chemical and Biological Weapons in Syria," in Yoash Tsiddon-Chatto, Shawn Pine, Mordechai Nisan and Dany Shoham, Peace with Syria: No Margin for Error (Shaarei Tikva: ACPR Publications, 2000), pp. 73-109.
[28] Gordon M. Burck and Charles C. Flowerree, International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 209.
[29] Amnesty International, Report from Amnesty International to the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, (London; Amnesty International Publications, 1983).
[30] John J. Fialka, "Fighting Dirty: Western Industry Sells Third World the Means to Produce Poison Gas," Wall Street Journal, 16 September 1988, p. 1.
[31] Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions for the period 1 January to 30 June 2002, (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2002), p. 4, www.dni.gov; and Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions for the period 1 January to 31 December 2006, (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2008), p. 6, www.dni.gov.
[32] Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions for the period 1 January to 31 December 2009, (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2009), p. 7, www.dni.gov; and Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions for the period 1 January to 31 December 2010, (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2010), p. 7, www.dni.gov.
[33] This could be attributed to the lack of open access to intelligence about Syrian CW tests, the inability to detect Syrian CW tests, or a decline in Syrian CW testing activity.
[34] David C. Isby, "Syrian Scud carried a simulated chemical warhead," Jane's Missiles and Rockets, 1 September 2001, www.janes.com.
[35] Robin Hughes, "Explosion aborts CW project run by Iran and Syria," Jane's Defense Weekly, 26 September 2007, (first posted on the Jane's website on 17 September 2007).
[36] Robin Hughes, "Iran Aids Syria's CW Programme," Jane's Defense Weekly, 21 October 2005 and Robin Hughes, "Iran and Syria Sign Mutual Assistance Accord," Jane's Defense Weekly, 21 December 2005, www.janes.com.
[37] Bhupendra Jasani, "Chemical Romance - Syria's Unconventional Affair Develops, Jane's Intelligence Review, 17 February 2009, www.janes.com.
[38] Seymour M. Hersh, "A Strike in the Dark: What Did Israel Bomb in Syria?" New Yorker, 11 February 2008, www.newyorker.com.
[39] M. Zuhair Diab, "Syria's Chemical and Biological Weapons: Assessing Capabilities and Motivations," The Nonproliferation Review 5 (Fall 1997), pp. 108-110; Ahmed S. Hashim, The Deterrence Series: Chemical and Biological Weapons and Deterrence: Case Study 1: Syria (Alexandria, VA: Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 1998) pp. 19-22.
[40] Dinshaw Mistry, Containing Missile Proliferation: Strategic Technology, Security Regimes, and International Cooperation in Arms Control (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003); Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, Covering 1 January to 31 December 2008, (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, 2008), www.cia.gov, pp. 6-7; Duncan Lennox, ed. "Offensive weapons tables," Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, Issue 50, pp. 527-529.
[41] Jonathan Tucker, Testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services, "The Proliferation of Chemical and Biological Weapons Materials and Technologies to State and Sub-State Actors," 7 November 2001
[42] E.J. Hogendoorn, "A Chemical Weapons Atlas," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 53, No. 5 (September/October 1997), pp. 35-39.
[43] Robin Hughes, "Iran Aids Syria's CW Programme," Jane's Defense Weekly, 21 October 2005; Robin Hughes, "Iran and Syria Sign Mutual Assistance Accord," Jane's Defense Weekly, 21 December 2005, www.janes.com; Bhupendra Jasani, "Chemical Romance - Syria's Unconventional Affair Develops, Jane's Intelligence Review, 17 February 2009, www.janes.com.
[44] Michelle E. Dover, "Syria's Chemical Weapons an Opaque but Alarming Risk," World Politics Review, 5 December 2011, www.worldpoliticsreview.com.
[45] Jihad Makdissi, "Press Conference by Dr. Jihad Makdissi," Syrian TV Official, 23 July 2012, www.youtube.com.
[46] Jihad Makdissi, Twitter Post, 23 July 2012, 7:08 AM, https://twitter.com/Makdissi.
[47] James Ball, "Obama issues Syria a ‘red line' warning on chemical weapons," Washington Post, 20 August 2012, www.washingtonpost.com.
[48] Nicholas Watt, "Cameron echoes Obama's warning to Syria over chemical weapons," The Guardian, 22 August 2012, www.guardian.co.uk.
[49] "France calls on UN to give Syrians all the support they request against Assad," UN News Centre, United Nations, 25 September 2012, www.un.org.
[50] Joby Warrick, "Intelligence on Syrian troops readying chemical weapons for use prompted Obama's warning," The Washington Post, 14 December 2012, www.washingtonpost.com.
[51] Amy Gardner, "Obama hails progress on loose nukes, warns of chemical weapons risk in Syria," The Washington Post, 03 December 2012, www.washingtonpost.com.
[52] Joby Warrick, "Intelligence on Syrian troops readying chemical weapons for use prompted Obama's warning," The Washington Post, 14 December 2012, www.washingtonpost.com.
[53] "UN to Probe Syrian Chemical Arms Strike Claim," Global Security Newswire, Nuclear Threat Initiative, 21 March 2013, www.nti.org.
[54] "Head of UN probe into chemical weapons use in Syria says preparatory work has begun," UN News Centre, United Nations, 27 March 2013, www.un.org.
[55] Ken Dilanian and Paul Richter, "Britain and France suggest possible chemical weapons use by Syria," Los Angeles Times, 18 April 2013, www.latimes.com.
[56] Adam Entous and Julian E. Barnes, "U.S. Probes New Syria Weapons Allegations," The Wall Street Journal, 19 April 2013, www.wsj.com.
[57] "Syria has used chemical weapons, Israeli military says," BBC News, 23 April 2013, www.bbc.co.uk.
[58] Judy Woodruff, "U.S. Believes Syrian Regime Has Used Chemical Weapons, Waits for Confirmation," PBS Newshour, 25 April 2013, www.pbs.org.