There is very little detailed information available about the organizations and facilities associated with the Syrian CW program. It appears, however, that all research, development, and production activities and facilities associated with the CW program are under the direct control of the Centre D'Etude et Recherché Scientifique (CERS). This agency is run by a Director-General, with the rank of minister, who is directly responsible to the President.[1] The Centre D'Etude et Recherché Scientifique provides most research and development functions for the Syrian military. Since the 1970s, the Centre D'Etude et Recherché Scientifique has also been responsible for the development of civilian science and technology in Syria, and it was in this context that the institute was able to develop cooperative relationships with Western chemical companies.

Although no private companies have been directly connected with the CW program, the Syrian economy has only begun to be privatized in the last decade. The government has established front companies to acquire chemicals from overseas sources, none of which has been publicly identified. The exception to this is the company known as Setma Limited, which was associated with the import of chemical weapons precursors in the early 1990s.[2] No further mention of this company has been made since 1993.

Open sources assert that there are at least four, potentially five, Syrian chemical weapons production facilities. One or two are located near Damascus, and one each situated in Hama, Latakia, and Al-Safira village (in the Aleppo area). The facilities are spread throughout Syria, which may indicate a deliberate effort to avoid concentrating its strategic facilities in a single center. All the production facilities are described as heavily defended and located underground to maximize survivability in the event of conflict, as Syria has apparently accepted that it is not currently capable of effectively maintaining control over its airspace. In addition, some sources claim that the Syrian CW program has been able to use the increasing number of pharmaceutical plants spread around the country as a covert means to import restricted precursors.[3] It is difficult to make a clear determination of the value of these facilities to the CW program without a better understanding of the capabilities and requirements of the individual plants.

All Syria's chemical weapons production facilities appear to have been constructed in the same period of the early to mid-1980s. The construction of these facilities would have been impossible without technical and material support from foreign companies, especially West European firms.[4] Reports of efforts to modernize and expand these production facilities since their initial construction have focused on Damascus and Al-Safira. The Damascus chemical weapons production facility, which may or may not be co-located with the Centre D'Etude et Recherché Scientifique (CERS), appears to have added a production line for chemical bomblets in 1997.[5] No clear indications exist as to the number or location of facilities responsible for loading CW agents into munitions or the production of the specialized munitions themselves.

Two facilities—Khan Abu-Shamat and Furqlus—were positively identified in 1993 as storage depots for CW munitions.[6] Chemical weapons storage facilities may also be presumed to exist at, or near to, launch facilities for those Scud missiles claimed to be armed with chemical warheads. One such facility is co-located with the Al-Safira chemical weapons production facility.[7] Depending on the quantity of stockpiled chemical weapons agents available and the degree to which there are plans for their tactical use, it is possible that CW munitions are stored near units deployed for the defense of the Golan Heights. It should be noted that no information on any such storage facilities is currently available in open sources.

There is no detailed information available on facilities for testing Syrian chemical weapons or CW agent delivery systems. On 1 July 2001, Syria tested a Scud-B missile fitted with a simulated chemical warhead. The missile was fired from Haleb in northern Syria, traveling to an unspecified target area 300km away in southern Syria.[8] Earlier reports of chemical weapons-related testing have simply referred to unidentified bombing and practice ranges in the Syrian Desert.[9]

The main focus of the Syrian CW program has been on the provision of a strategic deterrent, and this now exists in the form of warheads for Scud-C and -D missiles. These missiles may be held outside the regular command structure of the Syrian military, under direct presidential control. Reportedly, there is a chemical department within the Syrian general staff that is responsible for coordination of all NBC related activities within the Syrian Army.[10] It remains unclear to what degree chemical weapons have been integrated into the Syrian Army at an operational or tactical level.

Sources:
[1] Dany Shoham, "Gas, Guile and Germs: Syria's ultimate weapons," Middle East Quarterly (Summer 2002), www.meforum.org.
[2] "Poison Gas for Syria is intercepted," International Herald Tribune, 10 August 1992, p. 2.
[3] Global Security, "Syrian CW," www.globalsecurity.org.
[4] Gordon M. Burck and Charles C. Flowerree, International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), pp. 214-215.
[5] Paul Beaver, "Syria to Make Chemical Bomblets for Scud C's," Jane's Defence Weekly, 3 September 1997, p. 3.
[6] E.J. Hogendoorn, "A Chemical Weapons Atlas," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 53 (September/October 1997), www.bullatomsci.org.
[7] Global Security, "Syrian CW facilities: Al-Safir," www.globalsecurity.org.
[8] David C Isby, "Syrian Scud carried a simulated chemical warhead," Jane's Missiles and Rockets (September 2001), www.janes.com.
[9] "Israeli claims that Syria is making VX nerve gas," Jane's Defence Weekly, 7 May 1997, p. 6, "Syria's 'nerve gas' missiles," Jane's Foreign Report, 31 July 2003, www.janes.com.
[10] "The Great Arsenal of Autocracy: Syria's Weapons of Mass Destruction," Middle East Intelligence Bulletin (February 1999), www.meib.org.

There is very little detailed information available about the organizations and facilities associated with the Syrian BW program. It is believed that all research, development, and production activities and facilities associated with the BW program are under the direct control of the Centre D'Etude et Recherché Scientifique (CERS). This agency is run by a director-general with the rank of minister, who is directly responsible to the president.[1] The Centre D'Etude et Recherché Scientifique provides most research and development functions for the Syrian military. Since the 1970s, CERS has also been responsible for the development of civilian science and technology in Syria, and it was in this context that the institute was able to develop cooperative relationships with Western chemical companies.

The primary biological weapons agent facility is reported to be located at the Damascus-based Scientific Research Council, where anthrax, cholera, and botulism are developed by the Biological Research Facility are produced.[2] It should be noted that research on infectious diseases is part of the mandate of this agency and that anthrax is endemic to Syria and the region, where it affects the health of pastoralists and agricultural workers. In regards to this situation, Syria has a program for the vaccination of livestock against anthrax.

There are also speculative suggestions that the Damascus production line for chemical bomblets established in 1997 may be capable of producing bomblets suitable for the dissemination of biological weapons.

In 1992, an additional facility in the Syria coastal town of Cerin was identified as being responsible for biological weapons production.[3] These reports conflict with the general thrust of open source information, which generally suggests the existence of a Syrian BW research program.

Since the late 1980s, Syria has undertaken a sustained effort to increase its national capabilities in the fields of pharmaceuticals and bio-technology. This effort has involved the establishment of a number of joint-venture companies and the construction of approximately 12 pharmaceutical factories. These facilities produce for local and export markets. Although no specific allegations have been leveled at any of these facilities, it is possible that their construction and operation has resulted in the transfer of skills and technologies to Syria that might be of relevance to a biological weapons program. However, if these transfers of dual-use capabilities have resulted in the construction of any dedicated facilities for biological weapons applications, this information has not appeared in open sources.

Sources:
[1] Dany Shoham, "Gas, Guile and Germs: Syria's ultimate weapons," Middle East Quarterly (Summer 2002), www.meforum.org.
[2] Richard M. Bennett, "The Syrian Military: A Primer," Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, August/September 2001, www.meib.org.
[3] "Investigation: Syrian CW programs," Middle East Defense News (Paris), 28 September 1992, pp. 5-6.

The below entries provide analytical descriptions of selected missile facilities in Syria. Since definitive information on Syria's missile facilities is often classified, the descriptions and locations of these facilities are sometimes speculative, based on the most credible available open source material. Entries are regularly updated as further information becomes available.

Since the mid-1970s, the majority of Syria's nuclear facilities have been constructed under the auspices of IAEA technical cooperation projects, relying heavily on additional foreign assistance. Syria's few facilities, the most notable being the Chinese-built miniature neutron source reactor (MNSR), or SRR-1, and the Ion Beam cyclotron facility, are research-related and located primarily at the Atomic Energy Commission of Syria (AECS) headquarters in Damascus and the Der Al-Hadjar Research Center, southeast of Damascus. Ironically, if the destroyed facility near Al-Kibar was indeed a nuclear reactor, it would have been Syria's most advanced nuclear facility. However, the IAEA investigation regarding the site's intended purpose is ongoing, rendering any definitive conclusions premature.

Relevant Individuals and Institutions

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, (and prior to 2000, his father, President Hafez al-Assad), is the highest governing authority and is therefore ultimately responsible for all key decisions regarding Syria's nuclear program. Prime Minister Muhammad Naji al-Utri's office helps to guide and regulate Syria's top nuclear agency, the Atomic Energy Commission of Syria (AECS). [1] The AECS, currently led by Director General Ibrahim Othman, is composed of Syria's top nuclear experts and manages Syrian nuclear research. It is "responsible for the peaceful utilization of atomic and nuclear technologies." [2] An administrative council manages the AECS's departments, including those involved in nuclear energy, safety, and regulation. The AECS also serves as the Syrian government's representative for IAEA technical, regional, and interregional cooperative projects. [3]

Two additional ministries play a significant role in shaping Syria's nuclear policies and work extensively with the AECS. The first is the Ministry of Electricity, which has consistently been involved in IAEA-Syria technical cooperation projects, including the 1979 feasibility study for Syrian nuclear power options. [4] Ahmad Qusay Kayali is the current minister of electricity. Additionally, the Ministry of Higher Education is responsible for all Syrian universities, higher institutes and professional and technical training institutions, including Damascus University. [5] The current minister is Dr. Ghitath Barakat.

The most controversial entity often linked to Syria's nuclear program is the Syrian Scientific Research Center (SSRC). The SSRC's stated goals are to conduct research and development for the economic and social advancement of Syria. [6] Outside analysts suspect it serves as a front for Syrian military research, however, most likely including chemical weapons and missile research, and possibly including biological and/or nuclear weapons research. [7] However, there is insufficient evidence available in the open source literature to confirm this speculation about the SSRC.

Funding for the Nuclear Program

Information on the total cost of Syria's nuclear program is unavailable in the open source literature. However, Syria received approximately $14.5 million in IAEA Technical Cooperation Assistance from 1997-2007. [8]

Past, Present and Planned Nuclear Facilities

In 1976, President Hafez al-Assad established the AECS, which undertook limited technical projects with the IAEA in the 1970s, most notably including nuclear energy feasibility studies. [9] Only in the early 1980's did the AECS's work begin to progress. In 1982, Syria constructed a nuclear analytical laboratory with the assistance of the IAEA. This was soon followed by discussions with the IAEA regarding Syria's ambition to construct six 600MWe power reactors by the 1990s, but the project never progressed into reactor construction. [10]

During the mid-1980s, Syria began researching processes to recover uranium from phosphate rock in the hopes of ensuring itself an indigenous uranium supply. Syria possesses abundant sources of phosphate rock and conducts mining at several locations, including Charkia and Knifes. [11] The IAEA also provided the AECS with a uranium recovery micro-pilot plant at Homs, located northeast of Damascus, which was completed in 1992 and remains operational today. According to the IAEA, a "pilot plant, an industrial scale plant and then possibly operations such as refining, conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication," would potentially follow the micro-pilot plant, which was the logical first step in Syria's civil nuclear program. [12] Syria also signed a contract with the IAEA and an unnamed supplier in 1996 to improve its technical process for recovering uranium from triple super phosphate and completed the project in late 2001. [13] However, Syria is not currently capable of conversion, enrichment or fuel fabrication, and it would not be financially feasible for Damascus to industrialize its limited uranium extraction efforts. [14] In 1991, under IAEA technical project SYR/4/004, China began constructing the Der Al-Hadjar Nuclear Research Center near Damascus, the centerpiece of which is the SRR-1 miniature neutron source reactor (MNSR). [15] The SRR-1 is Syria's sole (declared) research reactor, went critical in 1996, and is under IAEA safeguards. [16]

In 1997, the Belgian company, Ion Beam Applications, built Syria's cyclotron facility. The facility is intended to produce short-lived radiopharmaceuticals and to help modernize Syria's national health care system. It is located at the AECS Dubaya Center in Damascus, also home to Syria's Nuclear Medicine Center. [17]

The IAEA also approved a technical project in 1999 to assist Syria in establishing radioactive waste management technology and infrastructure at Der Al-Hadjar. [18] Syria's Department of Radiation and Nuclear Safety and the Radiation Protection Division also contributed to this project, which concluded in 2007. Syria's AECS has since taken the lead role in waste management and "all relevant technological and control operations that are required in the framework of Syria's nuclear programme." [19]

On 6 September 2007, Israel destroyed a facility near Dawr az Zwar. Commonly known as the "Al-Kibar" facility, it is alleged by U.S. and Israeli intelligence to have been a partially completed 25MWth gas-cooled graphite-moderated nuclear reactor, which would have been capable of producing enough plutonium for one or two weapons per year. [20] The IAEA visited the site on 23 June 2008, but has not been permitted to return since. [21] As of its 5 June 2009 report, findings regarding the site's purpose remained inconclusive. [22]

Despite the Al-Kibar controversy, the IAEA has continued to engage Syria on technical cooperation, regional, and interregional projects. [23] More than a dozen technical projects remain ongoing, including a feasibility study and site selection for what would be Syria's first nuclear power plant. [24] Approved in early 2009, the project's stated objective is "to perform technical specification and economic evaluation to obtain the most technically beneficial and economically advantageous nuclear power plant." [25] However, even if proven feasible, the project would be unlikely to move forward into construction for many years.

Sources:
[1] Magnus Normark et al., "Syria and WMD Incentives and Capabilities," FOI Swedish Defence Research Agency, June 2004, p. 56.
[2] For more information see, the Atomic Energy Commission of Syria's website, www.aec.org.sy.
[3] See Ibrahim Othman's presentation at the IAEA Workshop on "Steps for Conducting Nuclear Power Plant Technology Assessments," in Vienna, Austria, 17-20 November 2008, www.iaea.org.
[4] Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East: In the Shadow of Iran, ed. Mark Fitzpatrick, (London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008), pp. 73-82.
[5] Magnus Normark et al., "Syria and WMD Incentives and Capabilities," FOI Swedish Defence Research Agency, June 2004, p. 51.
[6] Magnus Normark et al., "Syria and WMD Incentives and Capabilities," FOI Swedish Defence Research Agency, June 2004, p. 28.
[7] Ellen Laipson, "Syria: Can the Myth Be Maintained Without Nukes?", in Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell B. Reiss, The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices, (Washington, DC: 2004), pp. 83-110; Dany Shoham, "Guile, Gas and Germs: Syria's Ultimate Weapons," The Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 3, Summer 2002, www.meforum.org; U.S. Department of the Treasury, "Three Entities Targeted by Treasury for Supporting Syria's WMD Proliferation," 4 January 2007, www.treas.gov.
[8] "Nuclear Nonproliferation: Strengthened Oversight Needed to Address Proliferation and Management Challenges in IAEA's Technical Cooperation Program," United States Government Accountability Office, Report to the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, 2 March 2009, www.gao.gov.
[9] Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East: In the Shadow of Iran, ed. Mark Fitzpatrick, (London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008), pp. 73-82; and "SYR/0/003: Nuclear Energy Planning," IAEA Technical Cooperation Projects, 1979, www-tc.iaea.org.
[10] "SYR/1/002: Nuclear Analytical Laboratory," IAEA Technical Cooperation Projects, 1982, www-tc.iaea.org; Wyn Q. Bowen and Joanna Kidd, "The Nuclear Capabilities and Ambitions of Iran's Neighbors," in Henry Sokolski and Patrick Clawson, Getting Ready for a Nuclear Iran, (Carlisle, PA: 2005), pp. 51-88.
[11] "SYR/3/003: Uranium Recovery from Phosphoric Acid," IAEA Technical Cooperation Projects, 1986, www-tc.iaea.org.
[12] "SYR/3/003: Uranium Recovery from Phosphoric Acid," IAEA Technical Cooperation Projects, 1986, www-tc.iaea.org.
[13] "SYR/3/005: Purification of Phosphoric Acid," IAEA Technical Cooperation Projects, 1996, www-tc.iaea.org; Wyn Q. Bowen and Joanna Kidd, "The Nuclear Capabilities and Ambitions of Iran's Neighbors," in Henry Sokolski and Patrick Clawson, Getting Ready for a Nuclear Iran, (Carlisle, PA: 2005), pp. 51-88.
[14] "SYR/3/003: Uranium Recovery from Phosphoric Acid," IAEA Technical Cooperation Projects, 1986, www-tc.iaea.org; Wyn Q. Bowen and Joanna Kidd, "The Nuclear Capabilities and Ambitions of Iran's Neighbors," in Henry Sokolski and Patrick Clawson, Getting Ready for a Nuclear Iran, (Carlisle, PA: 2005), pp. 51-88.
[15] "SYR/4/004: Miniature Neutron Source Reactor," IAEA Technical Cooperation Projects, 1991, www-tc.iaea.org.
[16] International Atomic Energy Agency, "Syrian Arab Republic: Research Reactor Details-SRR-1," www.iaea.org; Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East: In the Shadow of Iran, ed. Mark Fitzpatrick, (London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008), pp. 73-82.
[17] "SYR/4/007: Cyclotron Facility for Medical Radioisotopes," IAEA Technical Cooperation Projects, 1997, www-tc.iaea.org; Magnus Normark et al., "Syria and WMD Incentives and Capabilities," FOI Swedish Defence Research Agency, June 2004, p. 55.
[18] "SYR/4/008: Radioactive Waste Management Facility," IAEA Technical Cooperation Projects, 1999, www-tc.iaea.org.
[19] "SYR/4/008: Radioactive Waste Management Facility," IAEA Technical Cooperation Projects, 1999, www-tc.iaea.org.
[20] David Albright and Paul Brannan, "ISIS Report: The Al Kibar Reactor: Extraordinary Camouflage, Troubling Implications," Institute for Science and International Security, 12 May 2008, www.isis-online.org; "North Korea and Syria: Oh what a tangled web they weave," The Economist, 1 May 2008.
[21] IAEA Board of Governors, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic," 19 November 2008, www.iaea.org; It is important to note that subsequent to the airstrike Syria leveled and then built over the Al-Kibar site, greatly impeding inspectors' ability to determine the site's previously intended function.
[22] David Albright and Paul Brannan, "IAEA Report of Syria: Undeclared Uranium Particles Found in Hot Cell Facility in Damascus; Syria Not Answering IAEA's Questions," Institute for Science and International Security, 5 June 2009, www.isis-online.org; IAEA Board of Governors, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic," 5 June 2009, www.iaea.org.
[23] For more information on active IAEA-Syria Technical Cooperation Projects, see IAEA Technical Cooperation Projects, "Query Project by Country: Syria," www-tc.iaea.org; Magnus Normark et al., "Syria and WMD Incentives and Capabilities," FOI Swedish Defence Research Agency, June 2004, p. 64.
[24] "SYR/020: Conducting a Technical and Economic Feasibility Study and Site Selection for a Nuclear Power Plant," IAEA Technical Cooperation Projects, 2009, www-tc.iaea.org.
[25] "SYR/020: Conducting a Technical and Economic Feasibility Study and Site Selection for a Nuclear Power Plant," IAEA Technical Cooperation Projects, 2009, www-tc.iaea.org.