While many of Taiwan's missile programs and capabilities remain secret, four overarching issues illustrate the program's strategic rationale. First, Taiwan's objectives are to deter and delay potential invasion by the People's Republic of China (PRC), which retains its claims to the island and has not renounced the possible use of force to resolve the issue. Taiwan's "deterrence equation" takes into account how long it would take the PRC to overcome Taiwanese air defenses, the losses the PRC would incur in achieving that goal, and how long it would take for the United States to come to Taiwan's defense. Second, historically Taiwan's missile programs benefitted from U.S. and Israeli designs and technology, but since rapprochement between the United States and the PRC, Taiwan has become more independent in its missile design and manufacture. Third, as U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have become more controversial in U.S.-PRC relations and in Taiwanese politics (namely budget debates), the United States has increasingly emphasized sales of ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems instead of offensive weaponry. Finally, historically the United States has successfully pressured Taiwan to halt the development of medium- and long-range missiles capable of delivering WMD. As Taiwan's qualitative advantage in fighter aircraft decreases and the number of PRC missiles aimed at the island increases, however, Taiwan is reviving longer-range cruise missile programs to improve its deterrence capabilities.

Capabilities

See Design Characteristics of Taiwan's Missile Tables.

Taiwan possesses some ballistic missiles and a growing number of cruise missiles, although it is increasingly focusing on missile defense capabilities as its relationship with the United States and the PRC evolves. Anti-ship missiles intended to deter an invasion from across the Strait include the Hsiung Feng-I and the Hsiung Feng-II.[4] The capability to deny air superiority to an invading force is also a priority, for which Taiwan has invested heavily in surface-to-air missiles, including the Tien Kung series.

The Taiwanese military is currently increasing and upgrading its ballistic missile defense capabilities, and by 2015 will have 10 batteries capable of firing either Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-2/GEM or PAC-3 missiles, with 32 PAC/GEMS or up to 128 PAC-3s per battery.[5] Currently, Taiwan is completing research and development of the Yun Feng, a mid-range missile with a range of 1,200 km that could eventually be extended to 2,000 km.[6]

History

1964 to 1996

Shortly after the PRC's first successful nuclear test in 1964, Taiwan's President Chiang Kai-shek ordered the establishment of the Chung-shan Institute of Science and Technology (CSIST).[7] Completed in 1968, CSIST's mission is the development and production of defense technologies, including missiles.[8]

In 1969, the Nixon Doctrine underlined the concept of allies bearing more responsibility for their own defense, and in 1972 the Shanghai Communiqué signaled rapprochement between the United States and the PRC.[9] After becoming Premier in 1972, Chiang Ching-kuo altered Taiwan's military procurement emphasis in response to this changing security environment.[10] Following China's successful satellite launches, in 1976, CSIST began the Qingfeng Jihua (Green Peak Program) for short-range missiles, completing plans for the Qingfeng missile in 1979, and debuting the missile in a 1981 military parade.[11] Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems notes the design similarities between the Qingfeng missile and the U.S. MGM-52 Lance missile, as well as potential connections to Israel's Gabriel 2 technology.[12] Around the same time, Taiwan began developing its Hsiung Feng missile based on Israel's Gabriel technology. On 4 October 1978, the Taiwanese military publicly claimed it had successfully tested the Hsiung Feng missile, subsequently displaying the system in Taiwan's National Day Parade on 10 October.[13]

In the 1980s, Taiwan was concerned that the PRC would obstruct U.S. sales of advanced weapons systems, and thus began to develop indigenous production capabilities for such systems.[14] The United States shifted diplomatic relations to the PRC in 1979, terminated the U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty in 1980, and pledged to "reduce gradually" its arms sales to Taiwan in the 1982 Shanghai Communiqué.[15] However, a Chinese scholar claims that the Hsiung Feng-II, an anti-ship cruise missile, is based on the Hsiung Feng-I (ballistic missile), complemented with components of the U.S. Harpoon cruise missile, and that the Tien Kung (Sky Bow) surface-to-air missile developed by CSIST was 85% based on American-manufactured Patriot missile technology.[16] Taiwan also began work on the Tien Chien air-to-air missile in conjunction with its Indigenous Defense Fighter program.[17]

In the 1980s Taiwan also began research on the Tien Ma missile as a delivery vehicle for the nuclear weapon it was developing clandestinely. The Tien Kung missile was supposed to be the first step towards developing a missile capable of carrying a larger payload.[18] Ultimately, in June 1982 the United States successfully pressured Taiwan into cancelling the Tien Ma program.[19]

1996 to the Present

Taiwan's defense procurement priorities changed drastically after the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, which culminated in the PRC launching missiles near Taiwanese ports and the United States deploying two battle carrier groups to the region.[20] After the crisis, Taiwanese politicians, including Chen Shui-bian (who became president from 2000 to 2008), advocated an "active defense" strategy that could counter China's missile capabilities, and target assets on the mainland and in transit through the Taiwan Strait. [21]

Taiwan received its first Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-2 systems (including missiles, wheeled vehicles, and multifunctional radar) in 1997, and deployed them around Taipei.[22] Upgrades to the PAC-3 system began in 2001, when the Bush Administration decided to brief the Taiwanese military on the system.[23] In August 2009, the Taiwanese government agreed to the procurement of four PAC-3 systems in a deal worth U.S. $3.2 billion, including 264 PAC-3 missiles from Lockheed Martin, in addition to an existing U.S. $600 million contract with Raytheon to upgrade its three PAC-2 operational fire units to the PAC-3 Standard system.[24]

Taiwan also recently placed increased emphasis on its short- and mid-range missile programs. Before leaving office in 2000, Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui allegedly restarted the Tien Ma program (cancelled in 1982).[25] In June 2000, Chen Shui-bian put forth an "offshore full-scale engagement policy," an active defense strategy including "surgical strikes" by "defense deterrent weapons systems."[26] Under President Chen, CSIST developed weapons systems that increased Taiwan's power projection capabilities across the Strait, including the Wan Chien, the Tien Chien IIA anti-radiation missile, and the Hsiung Feng III high-speed anti-ship missile.[27] In December 2012, Taiwan's Next Magazine reported on the secret development of the Yun Feng (Cloud Peak) missile, which utilizes a solid jet booster and ramjet engine, and with an estimated range of 1,200 km is capable of reaching Shanghai.[28]

Taiwan's development of longer-range missiles is controversial, with many U.S. officials and scholars arguing that these capabilities are destabilizing. In 2007, National Security Council Senior Asian Director Dennis Wilder stated that "offensive capabilities on either side of the Strait are destabilizing," and that Taiwan should emphasize defensive capabilities.[29] Some believe that emphasizing these systems' deterrent effect could lead to "neglecting genuine defense requirements, as well as instilling a false sense of confidence in [Taiwan's] political leadership."[30] Although long-range missiles would be less vulnerable than Taiwan's aircraft, demands for sufficient intelligence and U.S. concerns may affect Taiwan's future decisions.[31]

At an organizational level, Taiwan is in the process of consolidating its different missile command structures. In 2004, Taiwan established Missile Command (飛彈指揮部) to integrate anti-ballistic and air-defense systems, with eventual integration of offensive missile systems planned.[32] Systems under its control include the Hawk, the Tien-kung, the Patriot, and the Hsiung Feng missile systems.[33] One Taiwanese official indicated in January 2013 that Missile Command's 601 Group handles "offensive missile systems," including the Hsiung Feng 2E.[34] The Yun Feng missile, once in production, will also reportedly be placed under Missile Command.[35] Missile Command is subordinate to the Chief of the General Staff, who answers to the Minister of National Defense.[36]

Recent Developments and Current Status

Taiwan's deployment of the Hsiung Feng III anti-ship missile, the Hsiung Feng IIE land-attack cruise missile, and its development of the Yun Feng are receiving considerable international scrutiny. In August 2011, the Taiwanese military displayed a model of its Hsiung-Feng III anti-ship missile, with a backdrop of a burning aircraft carrier resembling the PRC's first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, which had embarked on its maiden voyage earlier that same day.[37] The Hsiung Feng IIE became controversial after bloggers in the PRC discovered that Taiwan was deploying the missile in army vehicles described as commercial delivery service trucks. A Taiwanese military official described the decision as "idiotic" and "embarrassing."[38]

Taiwan's development of the Yun Feng missile was first revealed to the international community with Next Magazine's December 2012 article. The missile's development reportedly required ten years and over 800 million New Taiwan Dollars (~$27 million USD), and Taiwan concealed its flight tests within the Hsiung Feng-III test program.[39] Production of the missile may begin as soon as 2014, and if Taiwan extends the missile's range from 1,200 km to 2,000 km the PRC's capital city, Beijing, would be within the missile's range.[40] According to Next Magazine's article, Taiwan's President Ma Ying-jeou sees the missiles as effective bargaining chips in any future cross-Strait negotiations.[41]

Sources:
[1] See: Togzhan Kassenova, "Strategic Trade Controls in Taiwan," The Nonproliferation Review, 2010, 17:2, pp. 391-394.
[2] Vann Van Diepen, "The Missile Technology Control Regime in U.S. Nonproliferation Strategy," Remarks by the Principle Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, Washington, DC, 30 July 2012, www.state.gov.
[3] See Ed Ross, "Taiwan's Ballistic-Missile Deterrence and Defense Capabilities," China Brief, Volume XI, Issue 3, 10 February 2011, p. 10.
[4] Michael J. Lostumbo, "A New Taiwan Strategy to Adapt to PLA Precision Strike Capabilities," in Roger Cliff, Phillip C. Saunders, and Scott Harold, eds., New Opportunities and Challenges for Taiwan's Security (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation), p. 133.
[5] Ed Ross, "Taiwan's Ballistic-Missile Deterrence and Defense Capabilities," China Brief Volume, Vol. XI, Issue 3, 10 February 2011, p. 11, via: www.jamestown.org.
[6] "Taiwan's Military Successfully Tests a Mid-Range Missile: The (Yun Feng) Special Project Aims for Shanghai [國軍中程飛彈試射成功：（雲峰）專案瞄準上海]," Next Magazine (週刊), 20 December 2012, p. 52, http://tw.next.nextmedia.com.
[7] Special National Intelligence Estimate, "Taipei's Capabilities and Intentions Regarding Nuclear Weapons Development," 1 November 1972, distributed by Central Intelligence Agency, Approved Release December 2001.
[8] "Introduction Prospects of the Chung-Shan Institute, [中科院簡介與前景]," Chung-shan Institute of Science and Technology, 31 October 2012, http://cs.mnd.gov.tw.
[9] Richard Nixon, "Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam," 3 November 1969, www.nixonlibrary.gov; "Joint Communiqué of the United States of America and the People's Republic of China," 28 February 1972, www.taiwandocuments.org.
[10] Bernard Cole, Taiwan's Security: History and Prospects (New York, New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 27-28.
[11] Han Liu, "Taiwan Region's Self-Manufactured Missile Copies [台湾地区自制武器扫描]," Maritime Spectacle [海事大观], Vol. II, 2005, pp. 36-43. Other scholars state CSIST completed the missile in 1980-see Wei-chin Lee, "Thunder in the Air: Taiwan and Theater Missile Defense," The Nonproliferation Review, Fall 2001, pp. 4-5.
[12] "Ching Feng (Green Bee)," Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, 23 June 2005 (archived), www.janes.ihs.com.
[13] Cai Hanxun, "On 4 October 1978, Taiwan First Made Public Its Indigenously Developed Missile, [1978年10月4日台灣首次公開自製飛彈]," PTS News Network [公視新聞議題中心], 4 October 2011, http://pnn.pts.org.tw; "On 4 October 1978, Taiwan First Made Public Its Indigenously Developed Missile, [1978年10月4日台灣首次公開自製飛彈]," Taiwan Times, 4 October 2011, www.twtimes.com.tw.
[14] "Tien Chien II (Sky Sword 2)," Jane's Air-Launched Weapons, 23 October 2012, www.janes.ihs.com.
[15] Bernard Cole, Taiwan's Security: History and Prospects (New York, New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 27-28.
[16] Han Liu, "Taiwan Region's Self-Manufactured Missile Copies [台湾地区自制武器扫描]," Maritime Spectacle [海事大观], Vol. II, 2005, pp. 36-43.
[17] "Tien Chien II (Sky Sword 2)," Jane's Air-Launched Weapons, 23 October 2012, www.janes.ihs.com.
[18] "Taiwan Has No Tien Ma Ballistic Missiles," Jane's Missiles and Rockets, 23 September 2002, www.janes.ihs.com.
[19] Han Liu, "Taiwan Region's Self-Manufactured Missile Copies [台湾地区自制武器扫描]," Maritime Spectacle [海事大观], Vol. II, 2005, pp. 36-43.
[20] For an account of the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, see: Robert Ross, "The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and the Use of Force," International Security, Fall 2000, pp. 87-123.
[21] York Chen, "The Evolution of Taiwan's Military Strategy: Convergence and Dissonance," China Brief, the Jamestown Foundation, Vol. 9, Issue 23, 19 November 2009; Michael D. Swaine and James C. Mulvenon, Taiwan, RAND Corporation, 2001, p. 148.
[23] Shirley Kahn, "Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990," Congressional Research Service report RL30957, 29 November 2012, p. 8.
[24] "Taiwan > Procurement," Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, 31 October 2012, www.janes.ihs.com.
[25] Han Liu, "Taiwan Region's Self-Manufactured Missile Copies [台湾地区自制武器扫描]," Maritime Spectacle [海事大观], Vol. II, 2005, pp. 36-43.
[26] "Taiwan Pushing Ahead with SRBMs," Jane's Missiles and Rockets, 13 December 2001, www.janes.ihs.com.
[27] "Wan Chien," Jane's Air-Launched Weapons, 20 December 2012, www.janes.ihs.com.
[28] "Taiwan's Military Successfully Tests a Mid-Range Missile: The (Yun Feng) Special Project Aims for Shanghai [國軍中程飛彈試射成功：（雲峰）專案瞄準上海]," Next Magazine (週刊), 20 December 2012, pp. 51-56, http://tw.next.nextmedia.com.
[29] AIT Director Stephen Young, Press Conference, 3 May 2007, www.ait.org.tw.
[30] Michael McDevitt, "For Taiwan, the Best Defense is Not a Good Offense," PacNet, Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies, #9, 22 February 2007.
[31] See Richard Bush, Uncharted Strait: The Future of China-Taiwan Relations, Brookings Institution Press, 2012.
[32] Brian Hsu, "Military Revamps Missile Command," Taipei Times, 9 December 2003, p. 4, www.taipeitimes.com.
[33]Taiwan: Army, National Security and Defense Policy Handbook, Volume 1 (Strategic Information and Developments), International Business Publications USA, 2011, Washington, DC, pp. 223-224.
[34] Wendell Minnick, "Taiwan Working on New ‘Cloud Peak' Missile," Defense News, 18 January 2013, www.defensenews.com.
[35] "Taiwan's Military Successfully Tests a Mid-Range Missile: The (Yun Feng) Special Project Aims for Shanghai [國軍中程飛彈試射成功：（雲峰）專案瞄準上海]," Next Magazine (週刊), 20 December 2012, p. 53, http://tw.next.nextmedia.com.
[36] Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of China, "中國民國壹百年, 國防報告書 [National Defense Report, Republic of China, 100th Anniversary]," 2011, p. 103.
[37] J. Michael Cole, "Taiwan Sends Not-So-Subtle Signal on China's Carrier," Taipei Times, 11 August 2011, www.taipeitimes.com.
[38] Wendell Minnick, "Taiwan's Red Bird Express Service, Rain or Shine," Intercepts, 27 February 2013, http://blogs.defensenews.com.
[39] "Taiwan's Military Successfully Tests a Mid-Range Missile: The (Yun Feng) Special Project Aims for Shanghai [國軍中程飛彈試射成功：（雲峰）專案瞄準上海]," Next Magazine (週刊), 20 December 2012, p. 56, http://tw.next.nextmedia.com.
[40] "Taiwan's Military Successfully Tests a Mid-Range Missile: The (Yun Feng) Special Project Aims for Shanghai [國軍中程飛彈試射成功：（雲峰）專案瞄準上海]," Next Magazine (週刊), 20 December 2012, p. 55, http://tw.next.nextmedia.com.
[41] "Taiwan's Military Successfully Tests a Mid-Range Missile: The (Yun Feng) Special Project Aims for Shanghai [國軍中程飛彈試射成功：（雲峰）專案瞄準上海]," Next Magazine (週刊), 20 December 2012, p. 55, http://tw.next.nextmedia.com.