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IAEA Seeks Iranian Clarifications on Heavy Water Reactor By Joe Fiorill The absence of hot cells from design plans Iran submitted to the agency in August is “contrary to what would be expected, given the radioisotope production purposes of the facility,” the report says. According to the report, Iran has said it is building the heavy water reactor as a “research reactor suitable for medical and industrial isotope production and for R&D [research and development] to replace the old research reactor in Tehran.” The reactor is scheduled to begin construction next year. In explaining its request for clarification from Iran, the IAEA also made reference to recent reports of Iranian efforts to import equipment that could be used in hot cells. The request comes amid widespread allegations that Iran is seeking to develop nuclear weapons even as it claims it is maintaining its Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty commitments. While a heavy water reactor could be used to produce isotopes and for research, such reactors are also among the most popular for producing plutonium for nuclear weapons. Experts said the inconsistencies inherent in Iran’s description of the heavy water reactor, while not damning in isolation, constitute an important plank in the case against Iran. “It’s a curious thing with the Iranian story in general that everything kind-of-sort-of makes sense by itself, but … all together, it’s starting to look really suspicious,” Federation of American Scientists Strategic Security Project Director Ivan Oelrich said yesterday. Oelrich said isotope production and research is “certainly a plausible explanation for what they’re doing” but that the “buildup” of inconsistencies in Iran’s claims gives pause. Institute for Science and International Security President David Albright said Iran’s explanations of its heavy water activity are “just viewed as not very credible. … It inevitably increases suspicions that they had some secret plutonium activities going on.” According to the IAEA report, Iranian officials have said they tried repeatedly to import a reactor to produce the isotopes and conduct research but failed and “concluded, therefore, that the only alternative was a heavy water reactor” using indigenously produced uranium dioxide. Albright said, though, that if Iran came into compliance with its NPT obligations and signed the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement, “It’s quite likely that they could import a research reactor.” He added that Iran’s stated purposes could be served by a 10-megawatt reactor — the planned Arak facility is a 40-megawatt reactor — and that if it is making isotopes, the country would do better to use enriched uranium than the natural uranium planned for Arak. Asked about the hot cells, Albright said, “Again, it’s just one of these things — are they trying to avoid a discussion of reprocessing? … I’m just waiting for them to say, ‘Yeah we’re going to build a reprocessing plant.” Nevertheless, added the former U.N. inspector, “The evidence that there is secret reprocessing activity is lacking right now.” Heavy water activity in Iran first came to light in August of last year with the revelation by the National Council of Resistance of Iran of a heavy water production facility at Arak, which was subsequently visited by the IAEA. After denying for a time that the heavy water production implied eventual use in a reactor, Iran presented details in July on the Arak reactor and submitted updated design information to the IAEA Aug. 4. In a letter dated Aug. 19, Iran told the IAEA it decided two decades ago to begin heavy water research and development and conducted laboratory experiments in the mid-1980s, finally deciding in the mid-1990s to build a reactor.
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