|
|||||
|
|||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||||
 |
 |
    |
|
|
|||
 |
|
||
|
|||
|
|
|
|
||||||||
|
Security Teams at U.S. Nuclear Weapons Facility Cheated During Exercises, Investigators Charge
U.S. Energy Department investigators revealed yesterday that security exercises at a U.S. nuclear weapons facility in Tennessee were repeatedly undermined when plant security forces received advance information about the plans of mock attacking forces. The findings raise doubts about the credibility of security team performance assessments from the last 20 years, according to Energy Daily (see GSN, Jan. 20). The exercises were conducted at the Y-12 facility, which houses nuclear weapons components and weapon-grade uranium, and were designed to test the ability of security forces to repel terrorist attacks (see GSN, Jan. 16). “Several current and former protective force personnel provided us with compelling testimony that there had been a pattern of actions by site security personnel going back to the mid-1980s that may have negatively affected the reliability of site (security) performance testing,” said Energy Department Inspector General Gregory Friedman in a report sent Friday to Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham and released yesterday. Friedman began his investigation after Y-12 security teams achieved suspiciously surprising success against mock attacks during exercises held June 26, 2003. The teams repelled attacks in each of four scenarios they faced when they were only expected to succeed in two of the scenarios. Friedman later learned that the security teams had been provided in advance with details of the mock attacks, such as which site building would be attacked, whether a diversionary tactic would be used and what specific target the attackers were seeking. The investigation also revealed a long-standing pattern of cheating by security personnel during exercises, including: deploying additional personnel on security exercise days; tampering with specialized clothing worn during drills to indicate whether the wearer had been “shot;” monitoring attack team testers as they visited Y-12 in preparation for their mock attacks; and prepositioning trucks or other equipment in tactically useful places to provide cover during the attacks. Officials at the National Nuclear Security Administration, which oversees all U.S. nuclear weapons facilities, said they accepted Friedman’s findings and were implementing remedial measures. “If such testing were in any way compromised so as to skew the quality of information we have about our ability to protect, the results could have extremely significant effects in a way which is entirely unacceptable. We will take all appropriate steps to ensure that is not the case,” said Michael Kane, NNSA’s associate administrator for management and information, in a response to a draft version of Friedman’s report (George Lobsenz, Energy Daily, Jan. 27).
| ||||||||||
Back to top
