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Efforts to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism Should Focus More on “Failed States,” Report Says From Friday, October 29, 2004 issue.

Efforts to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism Should Focus More on “Failed States,” Report Says

By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — International efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism should focus more on so-called “failed states” rather than the nuclear programs being pursued by Iran and North Korea, according to a report released this week by the Foreign Policy Center, a British think tank (see GSN, Oct. 20).

“Each failing state is like hundreds of actors with too wide of a variety of motives and too low a visibility for them to be easily deterred,” says the report, written by Amitai Etzioni, a former senior adviser to the Carter administration.

Etzioni singled out Russia and Pakistan, which he wrote are “most in need of repair.”  

Among the concerns regarding Russia, according to the report, are the large amount of poorly secured fissile materials and small nuclear weapons, “rampant” corruption and Moscow’s weak control over various provinces.

Etzioni also criticized efforts since the fall of the Soviet Union to return to Russia Soviet-era nuclear weapons and highly enriched uranium from countries outside its borders. Over the past few years, the United States and Russia have jointly conducted several missions to repatriate Russian-origin fuel from research reactors in Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia. Instead of returning this material to the “failed state” of Russia, Etzioni wrote, it would have been better to transport it to a “stable” country such as France for disposal.

“Given how ineffectual and corrupt the Russian government is, it fully qualifies as a failing state,” he wrote. “These bombs and materials should be moved to a truly reliable safe haven and blended down there.”

Regarding Pakistan, the report says that terrorists could acquire nuclear weapons from Islamabad’s arsenal by overthrowing the present government, working with some sections of the government or by corrupting those responsible for nuclear weapons security. The poor security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is often ignored because of the country’s assistance in the war on terrorism, Etzioni wrote. As an example, he accused the United States of ignoring in 2003 reports of the international nuclear network headed by top Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan in order to obtain Islamabad’s aid in efforts to capture terrorist mastermind Osama bin Laden.

“This is like letting a serial killer go because he promised to help catch an inebriated driver,” Etzioni wrote.

In addition to Russia and Pakistan, there are a “considerable number” of other failing states around the world where terrorists may be able to steal or purchase highly enriched uranium for use in a crude nuclear bomb, according to Etzioni. These include Ghana, Kyrgyzstan and Nigeria, the report states. It also warns of countries that may turn into failing states “in short order,” such as Egypt.

Etzioni recommended that failing states should be pressured and offered incentives to surrender their stockpiles of highly enriched uranium in exchange for low-enriched uranium, other energy stockpiles or economic resources. Should such efforts fail, he wrote, then it may become necessary to use “all available means” to remove HEU stockpiles from these countries.

While praising many of the recommendations made in Etzioni’s report, Charles Ferguson, a nuclear nonproliferation expert at the Council on Foreign Relations, noted yesterday the difficulties the United States and its allies would face in removing nuclear materials and weapons from Russia and Pakistan. He cited the intense national pride Pakistan places on its nuclear arsenal, as well as Islamabad’s belief that it serves as a deterrent against nuclear-armed rival India.

A forcible removal of HEU or nuclear weapons from Pakistan could precipitate the very event we are hoping to prevent. That is, it could lead to a collapse of the Pakistani government and loss of control of these materials and weapons,” Ferguson said in a written statement to Global Security Newswire

“The Pakistani government may also consider in extremis a nuclear attack against the nation or coalition of nations seeking to ‘deproliferate’ Pakistan,” he added.


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