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No Evidence of Prewar Iraqi WMD Stockpiles or Programs, Chief U.S. Weapons Inspector Says By Mike Nartker WASHINGTON — There is no evidence that Iraq possessed either WMD stockpiles or active programs to create them at the time of the U.S. invasion last year, according to a report released yesterday by chief U.S. weapons inspector in Iraq Charles Duelfer (see GSN, Oct. 6). The Iraq Survey Group found “no evidence” that Hussein had relaunched his nuclear weapons program following the 1991 Gulf War, according the report. Instead, the unit found that Iraq’s capability to carry out a nuclear weapons program “had progressively decayed” since 1991. U.S. investigators also concluded that Iraq had destroyed its undeclared chemical weapons stockpiles in 1991, and there are “no credible indications” that Baghdad later resumed chemical weapons production, the report says. It also says that no evidence was discovered that Iraqi military units knew of plans for the use of chemical weapons during the war. In addition, the report says that Iraq destroyed its undeclared biological weapons stockpile and probably eliminated most of its bulk biological weapons agents in the early 1990s. There is also no evidence that after the mid-1990s Iraq had either plans to conduct a new biological weapons program or biological research for military purposes, the report says. The report specifically addresses the heavily disputed issue of whether prewar Iraq possessed mobile biological weapons facilities. “In spite of exhaustive investigation, ISG found no evidence that Iraq possessed, or was developing BW agent production systems mounted on road vehicles or railway wagons,” the report says. It also says that the Iraq Survey Group determined that two trailers recovered last year that were initially suspected of being mobile biological facilities were actually intended to produce hydrogen for artillery balloons, as Iraqi officials had claimed. IntentWhile prewar Iraq did not have WMD stockpiles or programs, there is evidence that Hussein intended to resume WMD efforts once U.N. sanctions were lifted. Citing interviews with Iraqi officials, the report notes both Hussein’s concerns over the continuing threat posed by Iran, as well as the former Iraqi leader’s belief that weapons of mass destruction were instrumental in his country’s victory in its war with Iran in the 1980s and in preventing coalition forces from launching a full-scale invasion of Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War. The report also lists a number of examples of efforts by Hussein to retain WMD-related knowledge and infrastructure. For example, during the 1990s Hussein’s regime transferred a number of nuclear scientists to positions at the Iraqi Military Industrial Commission, where they conducted work that helped them to maintain their nuclear weapons knowledge. The Iraq Survey Group also found that in the mid-1990s, Iraq had somewhat improved its chemical production infrastructure and had conducted a “modest amount” of dual-use research. At the time of the U.S. invasion, according to the report, Iraq could have produced sulfur mustard agent within three to six months if it had chosen to do so. Iraq also had the equipment necessary to produce nerve agent within two years, but there is no evidence that Baghdad obtained large quantities of the necessary precursor chemicals, the report says. In addition, Iraq possessed since the mid-1990s a “significant” dual-use biological capability and a cadre of biological weapons scientists, the report says. It could have resumed an “elementary” biological weapons program within a few weeks to a few months, though there are no signs Baghdad planned to do so, the report adds. The Iraq Survey Group also discovered that the Iraqi Intelligence Service had maintained a set of laboratories, undeclared to U.N. inspectors, that conducted research on chemical and biological agents, the report says. It adds, though, that such research was more likely intended for intelligence operations, such as assassination attempts, than military purposes. There is also evidence that Hussein intended to develop ballistic missiles capable of traveling beyond the U.N.-allowed range of 150 kilometers, the report says, citing as evidence the development of a larger liquid-rocket engine test stand, the construction of solid-propellant facilities and research into new types of rocket fuel. In addition, the Iraq Survey Group discovered designs for three types of ballistic missiles with ranges from 400 to 1,000 kilometers, as well as for a cruise missile with a range of 1,000 kilometers, the report says. U.S. Senator Carl Levin (Mich.), the top Democrat on the Senate Armed Services Committee, charged yesterday that Duelfer’s report contradicted the rationale for war offered by the Bush administration prior to the Iraq invasion. “The fundamental conclusion of the ISG effort means that the administration’s two major arguments for going to war against Iraq were incorrect. We did not go to war because Saddam had future intentions to obtain weapons of mass destruction. The administration told the American people that we had to attack Iraq because Iraq possessed stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction and that they were allied with terrorists like al-Qaeda, to whom Iraq would like to give such weapons,” Levin said during a committee hearing on the report. Bush sought to defend the war yesterday, saying that the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks had forced the United States to determine where terrorists may be able to obtain weapons of mass destruction. “One regime stood out: the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein,” Bush said during a re-election campaign stop in Wilkes-Barre, Pa.. “We knew the dictator had a history of using weapons of mass destruction, a long record of aggression and hatred for America. He was listed by Republican and Democrat administrations as a state sponsor of terrorists. There was a risk — a real risk — that Saddam Hussein would pass weapons, or materials or information to terrorist networks. In the world after September the 11th, that was a risk we could not afford to take,” Bush added. SanctionsWhile Hussein may have hoped to resume development of weapons of mass destruction some day, such ambitions were “secondary” to obtaining an end to U.N. sanctions, the report says. “He sought to balance the need to cooperate with U.N. inspections — to gain support for lifting sanctions — with his intention to preserve Iraq’s intellectual capital for WMD with a minimum of foreign intrusiveness and loss of face. Indeed, this remained the goal to the end of the regime, as the starting of any WMD program, conspicuous or otherwise, risked undoing the progress achieved in eroding sanctions and jeopardizing a political end to the embargo and international monitoring,” the report says. According to Duelfer, though, support for international sanctions against Iraq had been gradually weakening prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom. He noted the diplomatic successes Iraq had achieved among some U.N. Security Council members for easing the sanctions. “There is, in my mind, little doubt that … the constraints that the U.N. was able to put around Iraq were collapsing,” he said. Defending his decision to join the Iraq war, British Prime Minister Tony Blair noted Hussein’s efforts to violate U.N. sanctions. “Just as I have had to accept that the evidence now is there were no stockpiles of actual weapons ready to be deployed, I hope others have the honesty to accept that the report also shows that sanctions weren’t working,” Blair was quoted by CNN.com as saying. “On the contrary, Saddam Hussein was doing his best to get around those sanctions, had every intention of redeveloping these programs and weapons of mass destruction,” he said. Hussein’s desire for an end to U.N. sanctions may help explain why he failed to fully cooperate with U.N. weapons inspectors prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, according to Duelfer. “Saddam always wanted to negotiate. If he was going to accept inspectors coming in, he wanted to get something for it. He wanted to get sanctions lifted. And he kept trying to bargain or barter, and he had not realized the nature of the ground shift in the international community,” Duelfer told the Armed Services Committee. Lingering QuestionsIn his testimony before the committee yesterday, Duelfer said there were still several remaining areas of work for the Iraq Survey Group. For example, the unit has recently received a large number of documents recovered by coalition forces that will take months to review, he said. Another unresolved issue is whether WMD-related materials were transferred out of Iraq shortly before the beginning of the war, as some have suspected. “What I can tell you that I believe we know is a lot of materials left Iraq and went to Syria. There was certainly a lot of traffic across the border points. … But whether in fact in any of these trucks there was WMD-related materials, I cannot say,” Duelfer said. Duelfer told the committee that the remaining questions could likely be answered in “the next month or two.” The Iraq Survey Group has discovered evidence that former Iraqi chemical weapons scientists may be aiding insurgents, Duelfer said. He said, though, that a number of raids conducted by coalition forces over the past few months helped to reduce such a threat. “I am convinced that we successfully contained a problem before it matured into a major threat. Nevertheless, it points to the problem that the dangerous expertise developed by the previous regime could be transferred to other hands,” Duelfer said yesterday. Noting that one of stated goals of the invasion had been to prevent terrorists from obtaining weapons of mass destruction, Senator Mark Dayton (D-Minn.) said “a terrible irony of the effort would be if in fact that had not been occurring and did in fact occur as a result of our intervention there.”
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