U.S. Advocates “Incremental” Nuclear Disarmament

By David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — Facing apparent foreign criticism that U.S. policies are undermining global nuclear nonproliferation efforts, a senior U.S. diplomat last week said that a newly emerged “nexus” of terrorism and illicit WMD development argues for “incremental,” unregimented nuclear disarmament.

“Events of the past few years have introduced a new and destabilizing unpredictability into world affairs,” Ambassador Jackie Sanders, the senior U.S. representative to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, said in a speech Thursday to the conference.

The new threat “poses a risk to the very pillars of civilization,” Sanders said.

She added, “These developments do not mean the nuclear disarmament process needs to stop. … But it illustrates the obvious point that disarmament of any type does not take place in an international security vacuum and reinforces the conclusion that sweeping, unfocused approaches to disarmament such as a nuclear weapons convention or setting timetables are illusory and will not work.”

“As history teaches us, progress will come only through incremental approaches that take account of states’ threat perceptions,” she said.

Sanders’ comments followed speeches at the conference earlier this month by representatives of friendly nations who appeared to criticize the United States indirectly for pursuing policies perceived counter to its commitments to move toward nuclear disarmament.

The discussion comes as parties to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty prepare for a major review conference next year. Article 6 of the treaty requires parties to work “in good faith” toward nuclear disarmament and, in the even longer term, toward “general and complete disarmament.” 

At a 1995 treaty review conference, the nations permitted by the treaty to possess nuclear weapons — the United States, Russia, France, China and the United Kingdom — agreed to move toward eventual nuclear disarmament in exchange for a permanent extension to the treaty. At the 2000 review, the five powers agreed to take 13 steps toward disarmament.

Critics have charged the United States with making insufficient progress on those commitments, citing research and development of new nuclear weapons capabilities, a 2002 strategic policy document that identified certain non-nuclear countries as potential nuclear-weapons targets, and the U.S. refusal to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (see GSN, June 20, 2003).

In a March 16 statement to the conference, Swedish Foreign Minister Laila Freivalds appeared to restate that concern, though without identifying the United States directly.

“We see a trend toward increased emphasis on nuclear weapons as part of security strategies and signs that a new generation of nuclear weapons might be in the making,” according to a released text of her speech. 

“Such pursuits would undermine the credibility of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and could prompt a new arms race,” she said.

Canadian Foreign Minister Bill Graham, in a speech delivered that same day, said his government would be “pressing hard” for progress on the 1995 deal and said failure could encourage proliferation, according to a released text of his speech.

“Without progress toward nuclear disarmament, it will be very difficult to keep non-nuclear countries from seeing nuclear weapons as [a means of] deterrence or even to obtain political prestige,” he said.

Similarly, Irish Foreign Minister Brian Cowen in a released text called progress on disarmament and nonproliferation “mutually reinforcing.”

He added, “There is a tendency for some members of the treaty to stress its nonproliferation aspects to the neglect of the disarmament provisions of the NPT.”

In her address last week, Sanders listed a number of U.S. policy developments that she said demonstrate a “strong U.S. record” on nuclear arms reduction.

She said the United States in the 1990s withdrew from service “large numbers” of nonstrategic weapons, dismantled more than 13,000 nuclear weapons, and with Russia removed large quantities of fissile material from military stockpiles.

During the Bush administration, she continued, the United States signed a 2002 treaty with Russia to withdraw from operational deployment all but a maximum of 2,200 strategic warheads by the end of 2012.

“This reflects a commitment at the highest political level in both countries to Article 6 implementation,’ she said.

Critics, though, have said that the latest treaty requires no destruction of any weapons and that the off-loaded warheads could be quickly returned to service.

Sanders also cited a policy outlined in the administration’s 2002 Nuclear Posture Review to focus less on overwhelming nuclear retaliation against Russia, and more on pursuing a variety of nuclear capabilities including low-yield weapons for addressing other threats, as well as conventional weapons, national missile defense and “revitalized defense infrastructure.”

The approach “represents an historic break from the past,” she said, adding that by integrating non-nuclear weapons into offensive strategic capabilities, the United States is “thereby reducing dependence on nuclear weapons.”

Critics have charged the opposite, saying the administration’s interest in developing less-destructive, lower-yield weapons and weapons for destroying chemical and biological agents, could increase the prospect of nuclear use.

Ireland’s Cowen appeared to echo that concern, saying the development of new types or new uses for nuclear weapons “suggests that the taboo on the use of such weapons could be weakened.”

Sweden’s Freivalds said military planners could be tempted to use “nonstrategic” nuclear weapons as “battlefield weapons” and that “blurring the lines between conventional weapons and nonstrategic nuclear weapons would lower the threshold against the use of nuclear weapons.”

Citing the global proliferation of underground bunkers that might offer defense against nuclear attack, U.S. officials have argued that lower-yield weapons could be useful for threatening foreign leaders who either do not value the welfare of their people and would risk overwhelming retaliation, or who believe the United States would not strike a populated area with large-scale nuclear weapons. The Bush administration also is studying improving a high-yield earth-penetrating weapon, citing an inability to strike very deeply buried bunkers.

“Greater flexibility is needed with respect to nuclear forces and planning than was the case during the Cold War,” said the Nuclear Posture Review.

“Today’s nuclear arsenal continues to reflect its Cold War origin, characterized by moderate delivery accuracy, limited earth penetrator capability, high-yield warheads, silo- and sea-based ballistic missiles with multiple independent reentry vehicles, and limited retargeting capability,” it said.

Sanders said that non-nuclear states share a responsibility for creating an international climate to enable nuclear-armed states to reduce their stockpiles.

“While the nuclear weapon states have the primary responsibility to pursue measures related to nuclear disarmament, all parties can contribute meaningfully toward that goal by helping to fashion an international environment that is conducive to a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons and to their eventual elimination,” she said.

“Achieving nuclear disarmament is a gradual process that will be long and difficult. Political realities and changes in science and technology are among the factors that make it so,” she said.

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