Former U.S. Senator Praises U.S. Effort to Recover Nuclear Material, Outlines Recommendations for G-8 Summit

By Mike Nartker
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — Former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) yesterday praised a new U.S. Energy Department program to help secure and eliminate nuclear and radioactive materials that might be attractive to terrorists, and outlined several new nonproliferation measures he hoped would be announced at this year’s Group of Eight summit (see GSN, May 26).

Yesterday in Vienna, U.S. Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham announced the launch of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, which would work to recover U.S.- and Russian-supplied highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel and spent fuel from research reactors around the world. The United States would also work to convert research reactors to use low-enriched uranium fuel.

In remarks yesterday in Washington, Nunn said the new effort represents a “significant breakthrough” in nonproliferation. 

“There should be no higher security priority for our nation than keeping nuclear weapons materials out of the hands of terrorists. … We are in a race between cooperation and catastrophe,” said Nunn, co-chairman of the Nuclear Threat Initiative.

Nunn also called on U.S. President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin to demonstrate “sustained focus [and] leadership” to prevent bureaucratic obstacles from hindering the initiative. Such obstacles have been credited with delaying a U.S.-Russian agreement to eliminate almost 70 tons of weapon-grade plutonium (see GSN, May 10).

In addition, Nunn said, Bush and Putin should each appoint “high-level” officials to brief them “every day” on the progress of the effort.

Russia’s main role in the new effort would be to accept and secure repatriated Russian-origin uranium and spent fuel, said Center for Strategic and International Studies Senior Adviser Michele Flournoy. Moscow would also need to incorporate the returned material into efforts to blend down HEU stockpiles to lower enrichment levels, she said yesterday.

Russia could also help to either recover materials from, or shut down altogether, a U.S.-supplied research reactor in Iran, said CSIS Senior Adviser Robert Einhorn, noting the lack of U.S. diplomatic influence on Tehran. The reactor, provided to Iran through the Cold War-era Atoms for Peace program, has been implicated in nuclear experiments that the International Atomic Energy Agency deemed in violation of Iran’s commitments under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Einhorn said.

Nunn also yesterday discussed the Group of Eight Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction — a nonproliferation effort launched during a 2002 G-8 summit in Canada. Under the effort, the G-8 countries — Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States —agreed to pledge $20 billion over 10 years to fund nonproliferation projects, primarily within Russia. Since its inception, several additional donor countries have joined the partnership and the United States recently expressed a desire to bring both even more donor countries as well as new recipient countries to the effort (see GSN, April 27).

While saying that “real progress” has been made through the Global Partnership, Nunn also said that “dangerous gaps” remain between the response so far of partnership members and the scope of the problem. He said that he hopes that this year’s G-8 summit, set for next month at Sea Island, Ga., would result in several new nonproliferation measures, including an endorsement of the new U.S.-Russian “global cleanout” program, as well as plans to secure nuclear fuel taken from decommissioned Russian nuclear submarines. While the United States has placed less priority on the issue of decommissioned submarines than has Russia, it is important for Washington to acknowledge Moscow’s priorities in nonproliferation projects, Nunn said.

The United States and Russia should also announce plans to increase transparency and security of tactical nuclear weapons, Nunn said. Such weapons are small enough to be placed on the back of a truck, smuggled into a city and detonated, he warned, adding “No more city.”

Nunn also said that he hoped this year’s summit would result in new plans to accelerate funding provided through the Global Partnership for Russian chemical weapons disposal and efforts to improve security at chemical weapons storage sites. At a chemical weapons disposal plant under construction near the Russian town of Shchuchye, more than 1 million canisters of nerve agent, each with the capability to kill as many as 80,000 people, are being stored in buildings “you wouldn’t put a good horse in,” Nunn said (see GSN, May 21).

In addition, the G-8 members should also announce this year plans to secure Russian biological weapons stocks at both civilian and military facilities, Nunn said, adding that the issue was a “fundamental matter … of some urgency.” While progress has been made at civilian sites, similar efforts at Russian military facilities have stalled because of a lack of transparency, he said. Nunn added that if Moscow increased transparency of its military biological research sites, the United States should respond with some degree of reciprocity to help increase confidence (see GSN, May 25). 

There is “10,000 times more risk” that terrorists would conduct a biological weapons attack using agents stolen from Russian sites or with the aid of a Russian scientist than Russia would conduct a deliberate biological attack on the United States, Nunn said.

Reciprocal transparency of biological-related sites, though, should be limited to a bilateral basis between the United States and Russia, he said.

Nunn also called on Bush and Putin to announce “bilateral transparency” of U.S. and Russian biological defense efforts. While saying that he did not believe the United States is conducting biological weapons research for offensive purposes, Nunn added that biological defensive research has raised suspicions of intent both between the United States and Russia and in the greater international community (see GSN, May 21).

Also in the field of biological weapons, Nunn said that G-8 leaders should announce plans to combat infectious diseases around the world, noting that a potential biological weapons attack may be first seen as a natural disease outbreak.

“The fight against biological terrorism and the fight of infectious disease is the same fight,” Nunn said.

[EDITOR’S NOTE: Sam Nunn is chief executive officer of the Nuclear Threat Initiative.  NTI is the sole sponsor of Global Security Newswire, which is published independently by National Journal Group.]

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