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U.S.-British Nuclear Agreement Heads Toward 10-Year Extension Despite Concerns on Pact By Chris Schneidmiller WASHINGTON — The agreement between the United States and United Kingdom to share nuclear weapons information and technology appears set to be quietly extended for another decade, despite some critics’ concerns that it undermines nonproliferation efforts focused on countries such as Iran and North Korea (see GSN, Aug. 8, 2003). Article 3 bis of the 1958 Mutual Defense Agreement would expire on Dec. 31 without action, but that appears unlikely to occur. Over the objections of some members of Parliament, the British government has already approved a 10-year extension. U.S. President George W. Bush also in June signed off on the agreement, which would be automatically approved under federal law if Congress makes no objections within “60 days of continuous session.” “The U.K. side of this is complete,” British Labor Party MP Alan Simpson told Global Security Newswire. “I don’t suspect it will be challenged in the U.S,” he added. In the contract, the United States and United Kingdom pledge to “communicate to or exchange with the other party such classified information, sensitive nuclear technology, and controlled nuclear information” needed for the allies’ nuclear defense plans, delivery systems and military reactors. The agreement does not include transfer of actual nuclear weapons, but allows for exchange of enriched uranium. “The United Kingdom intends to continue to maintain viable nuclear forces,” Bush said in a June 14 message to Congress. “In light of our previous close cooperation and the fact that the United Kingdom has committed its nuclear forces to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, I have concluded it is in our interest to assist them in maintaining a credible nuclear force,” he added. The agreement allows the two allies to ensure the safety, security and reliability of their respective nuclear arsenals, said Simon Shercliff, a spokesman for the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The extension would continue that cooperation, he said. Details of what has been exchanged under this agreement remain classified. However, it is “almost a certainty” that the United States shared warhead design information for its submarine-based Trident ballistic nuclear missiles, given the strong similarities between the two countries’ systems, said Matt Martin, deputy director for the British American Security Information Council (BASIC). Renewing the agreement could open the door for development of a replacement for the British Trident system, according to BASIC (see GSN, Oct. 3, 2002). The two countries could collaborate on new weapons such as low-yield nuclear bombs or the “bunker buster,” according to critics, who also fear the agreement could be used to perform an end-run around barriers to nuclear development in either country (see GSN, July 16). For example, U.S. officials could send information on the bunker buster to the United Kingdom for further work if they are unable to obtain approval for development here, Martin argued. Even if that occurred, the weapon under the pact could not be sent back to its country of origin, countered Stephen Rademaker, U.S. assistant secretary of state for arms control, in an interview last week with GSN. Rademaker also rejected the results of a legal analysis commissioned by BASIC and other nonproliferation groups that found that the agreement violates the spirit — and possibly the letter of the law — of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Article 1 of the treaty forbids member states from transferring any nuclear weapons to another country or entity, while Article 6 requires members to “pursue negotiations in good faith” toward nuclear disarmament. Critics acknowledge that the Mutual Defense Agreement does not involve transfer of weaponry. They argue, however, the pact breaks the commitment to disarm by sharing information and equipment that could be used to develop new weapons. There is nothing in the Nonproliferation Treaty that requires the five recognized nuclear states not to share information or seek new weaponry, Rademaker said. He pointed to the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty, under which the United States and Russia agreed to reduce their respective deployed strategic nuclear warheads to no more than 2,200, as an indication of the administration’s disarmament work (see GSN, June 22). “The United States doesn’t feel that it has any apologies to make,” Rademaker said. Problems with the agreement go beyond its Nonproliferation Treaty implications, critics said. The two countries give up the moral high ground by operating a secretive nuclear agreement while pressing other countries to abandon nuclear or WMD programs, Simpson said. Global opinions on the war in Iraq would be greatly different if Saddam Hussein had been found operating a secret program to share nuclear weapons information with an ally, he said. “It completely undermines any chance the United Kingdom has to organize against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction around the world,” said David Lowry, an independent consultant for nuclear matters for British Labor Party MP Llew Smith. The ScheduleFollowing negotiations during the spring, Rademaker signed the extension agreement with British representative Frank Baker on June 14 in Washington. The amendment changes the expiration date for the information-sharing agreement from Dec. 31, 2004, to Dec. 31, 2014, and updates text in the contract to correspond to personnel and physical security policies made over the last decade. The proposal was forwarded for consideration to the U.S. Congress and the British Parliament in June. The British government, however, rejected a motion signed by 43 members of Parliament to open the matter for debate, Simpson said. Instead, it included the agreement in a series of routine legislative matters that could be removed from the docket but could not be argued. Simpson said he did not recollect if anyone tried to remove the MDA amendment before its passage, but said the British leadership simply would have kept bringing it back until it was approved. Beginning in mid-June, the agreement must sit before Congress for 60 session days under the 1954 U.S. Atomic Energy Act. If no action is taken, it goes into effect following an exchange of messages between the two countries. That is expected to happen before the end of the year. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House International Relations Committee would have jurisdiction over the agreement. The Senate committee has not set its fall schedule, but with most legislators out of Washington during the summer recess, it would be difficult to know if matter would come up before Congress’ Oct. 1 target closing date for the 2004 session, said Andy Fisher, spokesman for committee Chairman Richard Lugar (R-Ind.). Lawmakers could issue a resolution of disapproval for the amendment, but the president could veto any effort to block the extension, Rademaker said. Congress should at least hold a hearing to allow members to be informed and to enable nongovernmental agencies to file their opinions on the extension, Martin said. “I can’t imagine it’s going to happen,” he said. “I don’t know that most members of Congress even know this arrangement exists,” Martin said. “Unless they’re made to look they’re not going to know,” he added.
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