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Requests for Building Blocks for Biological Agents Can be Made on the Internet
Genetic building blocks for biological agents can be obtained with a simple e-mail request, New Scientist reported last week (see GSN, Nov. 7). A New Scientist investigation found that biotechnology companies are not conducting checks on the orders or on those requesting genetic components of potential biological weapons. Requests for a biotechnology firm to construct specific genes can be made by e-mail or from a company’s Web site. The genes are then sent through the mail a few weeks later. Only five of the 12 companies that replied to questions from New Scientist screened every request. Four said some sequences were screened, while three said no screening took place. Terrorists could order the components of a biological agent such as smallpox from these firms, according to New Scientist. However, ordering all of the genetic parts necessary to construct smallpox would likely raise suspicions. “That would stand out from a technological point of view,” said Drew Endy, a bioengineer at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. More probable is that terrorists would ask for genes for a pathogen such as the Ebola virus and then use them to turn another virus or bacterium into a weapon, according to New Scientist. Genes for a bacterial toxin could also be ordered, although these are already available in nature. Firms that do not run sequence screens on orders are unapologetic. “That's not our business," says Bob Xue, a director at Genemed Synthesis. Other companies said that while they did not screen orders, they did investigate customers. The scope of these investigations varies, however. Some firms explore customers’ published papers and affiliations, while others only confirm that the request came from a legitimate research institution. Endy said that researchers need to better self-regulate by only ordering from companies that screen customers. He said lack of regulation could hamper important research. “As soon as people start dying from a bioengineered organism, there will be a huge security response and research will be clamped down,” he said (Peter Aldhous, New Scientist, Nov. 12).
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