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BWC States Encourage Voluntary Codes of Conduct By David Ruppe WASHINGTON — Nations belonging to the Biological Weapons Convention last week approved a report encouraging scientists worldwide to develop codes of conduct with the aim of reducing the risk of biological weapons proliferation (see GSN, Dec. 8). The final version instead promotes codes “voluntarily adopted” by scientists in fields relevant to the treaty. “While the primary responsibility for implementing the convention rests with states parties,” the report says, voluntary codes of conduct “can support the object and purpose of the convention by making a significant and effective contribution, in conjunction with other measures.” The report does not specify what should be included in the codes, except to say they “should require and enable relevant actors to have a clear understanding of the content, purpose and reasonably foreseeable consequences of their activities, and of the need to abide by the obligations contained in the convention.” Nonaligned Movement nations blocked an earlier proposed text in closed-door discussions, and the final version is weaker, said Jean Pascal Zanders, who directs the nongovernmental Bioweapons Prevention Project from Geneva. The final version “has become more of a recommendation, rather than some sort of obligation for states parties to undertake anything in this area,” he said in a phone interview today. Zanders said, though, that some states parties and independent analysts are skeptical that a stronger version could have significantly strengthened the Biological Weapons Convention. “Codes are important because they raise issue awareness among the scientific and technical communities [worldwide, who] generally aren’t aware of the BWC ban,” he said. “In terms of the treaty itself, it’s peripheral. What the treaty needs is an institutional setup to make its implementation permanent. It’s in need of new mechanisms to generate transparency, to allow verification, to allow confidence in the compliance by states parties,” he said. U.S. officials have argued that because biological technology is inherently dual use, verification is difficult and could be used to compromise U.S. commercial and biological defense research. The United States in 2001 scuttled negotiations on a verification mechanism for the treaty and instead proposed three sets of annual meetings for states to discuss ways to strengthen biological nonproliferation. The final session this year, focused on developing codes of conduct. The two prior meetings addressed improving national and international disease surveillance, improving international capabilities for responding to suspicious outbreaks, creating national mechanisms for security and oversight over dangerous pathogens and toxins, and global promotion of national legislation for implementing the decades-old Biological Weapons Convention. The meetings have kept countries engaged during the period leading to the next treaty review conference, which is expected late next year, Zanders said. The series of meetings “has had its value,” he said, “but whether this is really what the essence of strengthening the treaty is about, I would say except for national implementation, not really.”
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