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Former Weapons Experts Fight Terrorism By Terrence Henry National Journal WASHINGTON — In the first years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, U.S. officials and nuclear security experts worried about what would happen to the large number of nuclear-, chemical-, and biological-weapons scientists from the old state, an intellectual work force estimated at 35,000 to 60,000. As the Russian ruble fell in value, weapons labs and study centers that had benefited from steady wages and strong state support under communism now stood on their own. In the first three years after the Soviet collapse, state funding for science dropped 75 percent. Soon, for many scientists in the former Soviet Union, better money could be found outside the country, perhaps by working on weapons programs for countries such as Iran, North Korea, or Pakistan. A Russian television documentary this winter claims that in the first half of the 1990s, thousands of Soviet specialists in the fields of nuclear and missile technology left for the Middle East, some of them going to Iran, Iraq, and Libya. “Our scientists are willing to work anywhere they are paid,” the program alleged. Even before 9/11, the destructive potential of these unemployed scientists was easily imagined: In the spy thriller The Sum of All Fears, terrorists fashion a nuclear weapon with the help of rogue Russian nuclear scientists. But with the establishment of several grant programs in the mid-1990s, and a decade of partnerships between these former weapons scientists and American companies and the U.S. government (which provided funding), the possible brain drain of weapons scientists from the former Soviet Union to countries or terrorist groups seeking weapons seems largely to have been averted. In fact, a growing number of former Soviet weapons scientists today are working on programs to better protect against, detect, and treat the victims of potential terrorist attacks. One group helping to make such programs possible is the U.S. Civilian Research and Development Foundation, a nonprofit organization that coordinates grants and projects between weapons scientists in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and U.S. research institutions and companies. It was authorized by Congress in 1992 as part of the Freedom Support Act and was established in 1995 by the National Science Foundation. CRDF, whose goal is to employ the scientists in their hometowns and at their original facilities, has helped to find work on civilian projects for almost 12,000 scientists — 2,200 of whom are former weapons scientists. The group is based in the Rosslyn section of Arlington, Va., and is led by former State Department and National Science Foundation official Charles T. Owens. Owens describes CRDF's mission as more than simply charitable: “We felt that if we took a science project proposed by the scientists, gave it a rigorous technical review, and then provided support, in the end they would have done something worthy of support from their own government or other sources.” Funding for CRDF comes from several government agencies and private institutions: the National Science Foundation, the National Institutes of Health, the State Department, and the MacArthur Foundation, among others. Responsibility for the projects lies with the former weapons scientists themselves: They propose a project with a U.S. partner and apply for a grant through CRDF; if the project is approved, the scientists use their own staff and facilities in Russia or the other countries of the former Soviet Union to complete it. As part of the agreement, the scientists receive 80 percent of the grant funding, ensuring that they are gainfully employed. Of its many projects, CRDF has 17 that focus on antiterrorism: nine to detect weapons; three to better protect against attacks; and five to better treat victims of terrorist attacks. Twelve of these projects employ scientists who used to work on weapons. More than $1.5 million has been committed to antiterrorism projects in the past year. Vladimir Ryzhikov of the Ukrainian Institute of Single Crystals and Craig Smith of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California jointly led a successful project to create the next generation of X-ray technology using radiation detection crystals. The device will allow baggage screeners at airports and border crossings to determine whether material inside is organic or inorganic. Smith describes the technology as a smarter way to look inside luggage: Under the old system, “if something comes up that looks questionable, we open up the bag and inspect it,” Smith says. “What looked like dynamite on the screen might turn out to be a stick of salami, i.e., something with similar density and shape. What this device allows is for different types of chemical materials to be discriminated, one from the other. So you would have different colors for different types of materials — you might have a bright red color to indicate the presence of a chemical in an explosive.” A Ukrainian team did the bulk of the research on the project. Now that a system has been developed, the team has received additional funding from the Ukrainian customs agency to incorporate the device into luggage screening there. The device should speed up screening, result in far fewer baggage inspections, and be harder for terrorists to foil. For Ryzhikov, the transition from working on military weapons to peaceful civilian programs was fairly easy. “It wasn't a big change for us, because we knew it was one we had to make,” he says. “Once the Soviet Union fell, there was no longer a need for much of the military science work our institute had been doing. So we've had to adapt; but now our work is being used for both medical benefits as well as protecting our borders.” A project to improve defenses against terrorist attacks is being led by Edgar Mataradze of the Institute of Mining Mechanics in Tbilisi, Georgia, and Ted Krauthammer at Pennsylvania State University. The two scientists and their staffs are working on a system that responds to explosions in underground structures by activating a set of protective measures. These measures would help control the blast pressure and reduce the impact of an explosion. Such technology could have reduced the level from the 1993 terrorist attack at the World Trade Center, and it may have applications to buildings above ground as well. “I think it was a very rewarding experience, working with colleagues overseas,” Krauthammer says. “These kinds of programs give not just the Russians but also us the opportunity to work on projects that perhaps otherwise we couldn't have done here in the United States. Because they have different regulations over there ... you [can] do things that otherwise would have been impossible.” Although these programs are enjoying success, the possibility remains that some scientists will go to work for other countries, or worse yet, for terrorist groups. A 2002-2003 survey of 602 Russian scientists in weapons-related fields by Deborah Yarsike Ball, an analyst in the Nonproliferation, Arms Control, and International Security Directorate at Livermore, found that those who received foreign grants were considerably less likely to work in another country such as Iran, Iraq, Syria, or North Korea. An alarming 21 percent said they were “willing” to consider relocating to these countries — the most popular of the options. CRDF President Owens noted, “If the scientists decided to try for a grant, they've got a good shot. There are opportunities all around. But we still don't capture all of the people that have weapons experience.” Ryzhikov, the Ukrainian scientist working on luggage screening, believes the programs are effective: “Here in the Ukraine, there are at least 5,000 former weapons scientists. But for the most part, many of them are working on a number of projects now. And I can say that for my institute, at least, no one has left for somewhere like North Korea or Iran.” Ryzhikov's counterpart, Craig Smith, agrees that the former weapons scientists would rather work in their own countries with help from the United States: “I know that there are a lot of scientists and institutes out there [in the former Soviet Union] that are very hungry for work and continue to try and break in to get additional grants. So I think it's very important to make sure that, with these programs, you're not just giving them a fish, you're teaching them how to fish.” An earlier group that Smith had worked with in Ukraine had been recruited by the Iranian government to staff an aerospace factory; grants from the United States kept them afloat and working in Ukraine. It is, however, easy for these scientists to slip through the cracks: No public database exists to track former weapons scientists; it is unknown if such monitoring takes place secretly within the U.S. or Russian governments. Experts in the field say that more funding and attention to these projects would continue to ensure that many of the scientists are employed in worthwhile (and potentially profitable) pursuits. That success, in turn, would encourage other former weapons scientists to seek the funding and support available from the United States and Europe. Indeed, the projects could be expanded to include not just the former weapons scientists, but the security personnel who guard the former weapons sites. Currently, several sites holding fissile materials that could be used in nuclear weapons have inadequate security and accounting. Charles Curtis, president of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, a nonprofit group dedicated to stopping the spread of nuclear weapons, advocates expanding these joint programs to pay guards at the nuclear sites in the countries of the former Soviet Union. Speaking recently at a meeting of the International Science and Technology Center, a group that coordinates grants and work between the U.S. and Russia, Curtis cautioned, “Today, when we also must fight the terrorist threat of nuclear materials, it is not only the recruitment of scientists that presents a worry; it is also the recruitment of security personnel. These individuals may be more susceptible to terrorist offers — because of lower pay, less oversight, or, possibly, a lack of understanding of the proliferation danger.” [EDITOR’S NOTE: The Nuclear Threat Initiative is the sole sponsor of Global Security Newswire, which is published independently by the National Journal Group.]
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