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IAEA Complains of Poor Iranian Nuclear Cooperation From Tuesday, March 1, 2005 issue.

IAEA Complains of Poor Iranian Nuclear Cooperation

By Greg Webb
Global Security Newswire

VIENNA — The International Atomic Energy Agency piled more pressure on Iran today by complaining of a lack of information and by demanding Tehran make its nuclear activities more transparent (see GSN, Feb. 28).

In a statement on recent IAEA actions in Iran, the agency repeatedly urged Iran to provide more information on its nuclear program and disclosed that Tehran has rejected an agency request to revisit a military facility suspected by the United States to be home to nuclear weapons research.

The statement came from the agency’s top nuclear safeguards official, Pierre Goldschmidt, who reported on inspectors’ recent efforts to investigate Iran’s nuclear program. His report to the agency’s Board of Governors described several areas of concern that inspectors need more information to clarify.

Most contentious is the agency’s desire for a second visit to the Iranian military facility at Parchin. The United States has expressed concern that the site houses research into developing the conventional high-explosive components of nuclear weapons. Though not required by any formal obligation, Iran allowed agency officials to tour five buildings of their choice at the site in January (see GSN, Jan. 14).

Today’s report, however, says that Iran rejected a subsequent agency request to visit another portion of the facility. Quoting an Iranian letter to the board delivered Sunday, the report says “the expectation of the [agency’s] safeguards department in visiting [the] specified zone and points in Parchin Complex are fulfilled and thus there is no justification for any additional visit.”

Iran today reiterated its opposition to additional Parchin visits.

“The agency for the time being has extensive information available to them. They need time to assess it,” senior Iranian delegate Sirus Naseri told reporters. “We have been transparent on this. We have gone beyond the obligations.”

Goldschmidt’s report provides additional detail on recent reports that Iran mostly rejected a 1987 offer to purchase uranium enrichment and nuclear weapon technologies. In January, Iran provided agency officials with a one-page document describing the offer from a representative of the former nuclear smuggling network headed by top Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan (see related GSN story, today).

“This document suggests that the offer included the delivery of: a disassembled sample machine (including drawings, descriptions, and specifications for production); drawings, specifications and calculations for a ‘complete plant’; and materials for 2,000 centrifuge machines. The document also reflects an offer to provide auxiliary vacuum and electric drive equipment and uranium reconversion and casting capabilities,” today’s report says.

“Iran stated that only some of these items had been delivered, and that all of those items had been declared to the IAEA,” it continues.

Naseri also rebutted a frequently stated U.S. basis of suspicion about Iran’s nuclear program, namely that the oil- and gas-rich nation has no need for alternative energy sources.

“All forecasts and expectations are that consumption, the need for nuclear energy is on the rise within the next 10 years because of uncertainties in the price and availability of gas, because of the block trading price of oil, because of environmental issues, because of the greenhouse matters, there is a near consensus that nuclear energy will play a much more significant role and prominent role within the next 10-15 years,” he said.

“There has been a very bad experience to rely on fuel supplies, and I think Iran and many other countries would certainly wish to be a nuclear fuel supplier for its own domestic needs and hopefully one day for others,” he added (see GSN, Feb. 2).

The IAEA report also complains that the several agency requests have been refused for more information on Iran’s mid-1990s acquisition of uranium enrichment centrifuges

On another key matter, Iran continues to deny the agency access to the construction site for a heavy water research reactor at Arak (see GSN, Feb. 14). Such access is not required by Iran’s safeguards agreement with the U.N. agency or needed to verify its agreed suspension of uranium enrichment activities while Tehran negotiates with European Union for a long-term resolution of the nuclear crisis.

Nevertheless, last September the agency board asked Iran “as a further confidence-building measure, voluntarily to reconsider its decision to start construction” of the reactor. Today’s statement, however, reports, “No visit to the site of this reactor has taken place since the board adopted that resolution. Iranian officials have indicated that the Heavy Water Research Reactor (IR-40) project is progressing.”

Many nonproliferation experts fear that such reactors are well suited for plutonium production and have questioned Iran’s need for heavy-water reactors as energy sources.

Naseri, however, defended Iran’s research.

“It’s a reactor for research as any other research reactor, and there are advantages to heavy water over light water,” he said.

The report had one more positive note, as it indicates that the agency has successfully monitored Iran’s suspension of its uranium enrichment program. Iran has completed work, started before the suspension, to convert uranium ore to gaseous forms that could be used in centrifuges. That gas is now under agency seal, the statement says.


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