U.S. Senators Plan New Chemical Security Measures

By Joe Fiorill
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — U.S. senators planning new laws on security at chemical facilities heard expressions of approval and detailed legislative proposals today from top experts in the field (see GSN, April 26).

The federal government and the chemical industry have done too little to address glaring vulnerabilities at sites that could prove attractive to terrorists, the experts told the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee.

“It is my conviction that al-Qaeda or one of its many radical jihadist imitators will attempt to carry out a major terrorist attack on the United States within the next five years. At the top of the list of likely targets is the chemical industry,” Council on Foreign Relations national security expert Stephen Flynn said.

“There are practical steps that can be taken right now at a reasonable cost that can reduce the risk that the next terrorist attack will be catastrophic,” said the former Coast Guard commander, who after the 2001 al-Qaeda attack directed the council’s Independent Task Force on Homeland Security Imperatives.   “We must necessarily begin with a far more active role by the federal government in advancing security within an industry that has long been accustomed to managing its own affairs.”

Homeland Security Department data cited by committee Chairwoman Susan Collins (R-Maine) indicate that there are about 300 chemical facilities nationwide where a toxic release could affect more than 50,000 people.

Lawmakers and panelists repeatedly noted that many industrial chemicals found at such sites are similar to the chemical weapons of the early 20th century. An attack on such a facility, they said, would amount to a WMD strike carried out without the need for transporting a weapon.

Meanwhile, Homeland Security Department programs that could address the weakness are “still in their infancy,” U.S. Government Accountability Office Natural Resources and Environment Director John Stephenson told the committee, adding that the overall state of U.S. chemical security is essentially unknown.

Collins said existing legislation on the facilities was designed with accidents, not attacks, in mind and that new laws were needed that would require companies to assess and remedy vulnerabilities. “I’m confident,” top committee Democrat Joe Lieberman (Conn.) told the chairwoman, “that under your leadership, we’re going to get something done to protect the American people from the risk of a chemical accident in this Congress.”

Senator George Voinovich (R-Ohio) provided a voice of caution on the legislative push, recommending “a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis” to ensure legislation on the matter would not unduly harm chemical companies. Voinovich focused in particular on protecting information that could compromise companies’ competitiveness if revealed, calling it important that “only responsible government authorities … have access to such information.”

Flynn and former White House antiterrorism adviser Richard Falkenrath each laid out a set of priorities that should be addressed by new legislation, which they portrayed as sorely needed because of a lack of effective action to date.

“There has been no significant reduction in the inherent vulnerability of the most dangerous TIH [toxic-by-inhalation] chemical facilities and conveyances to terrorist attack since Sept. 11, 2001,” said Falkenrath, now a Brookings Institution visiting scholar.

“Government officials who have been responsible for this issue … tend to confuse bureaucratic activity with results,” he said, and “seem to believe that their only options for improving the security of chemical facilities and conveyance systems in the United States are voluntary measures conducted in cooperation with the chemical industry.”

In his proposals for legislation, Falkenrath called for requiring an inventory of facilities, mandatory standards of security, a certification procedure for facilities that meet the standards, a verification process to confirm the certifications, compliance mechanisms including “tough civil and criminal penalties” for violations, and an appeal procedure through which site owners could contest government actions.

Flynn said lawmakers should consider providing resources that Homeland Security, the FBI and local emergency officials could use to develop standards on site security, exercises, training and community outreach.

Legislation on the subject, he said, could also establish an outside auditing process on site security; create a “chemical security compliance office” in Homeland Security; support research and development on less dangerous chemical production, handling and storage processes, on technologies to mitigate the risk of chemical releases and on “lower-cost, more user-friendly” protective equipment for emergency personnel; and prohibit new development near chemical sites without risk assessments that have been reviewed by state officials.

Both experts said existing voluntary measures are insufficient and that a government-defined, risk-based approach is needed.

“Clearly, where results can be achieved on a voluntary basis, they should be,” Falkenrath said, “but it is a fallacy to think that profit-maximizing corporations engaged in a trade as inherently dangerous as the manufacture and shipment of TIH chemicals will ever voluntarily provide a level of security that is appropriate given the larger external risk to society as a whole.”

After all, he said, “The body politic does not trust nuclear power plant or commercial airport operators to provide appropriate levels of security on a voluntary basis, and for good reason.”

Flynn identified two factors behind what he called the lack of effective industry action.

“Executives in this increasingly competitive industry worry that such [security] investments will place them at a competitive disadvantage,” he said, and “there are unique liability issues associated with industry-led efforts to define and implement adequate security.”

The need for action is urgent, said Falkenrath, because of both the danger of the chemicals and the potential ease with which an attack could be mounted.

“Without going into details, it should suffice to say that there are a large number of possible terrorist tactics for triggering a large-scale release of a TIH chemical in proximity to a dense population concentration, none of which are particularly difficult,” he said.

“The casualty potential of a terrorist attack against a large TIH chemical container near a population center is comparable to that of a fully successful terrorist employment of an improvised nuclear device or effective biological weapon,” he said. “The key difference is that TIH chemical containers are substantially easier to attack than improvised nuclear devices or effective biological weapons are to acquire or fabricate.”

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