|
|||||
|
|||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||||
 |
 |
    |
|
|
|||
 |
|
||
|
|||
|
|
|
|
||||||||
|
U.S. Military Should Beware of Sub-WMD Biological Attacks, Says Government Study By Joe Fiorill WASHINGTON — The U.S. military should be wary of the potential for biological attacks that fall short of WMD status but still hinder U.S. troops, a National Academy of Sciences committee said last week (see GSN, May 6). Enemies could incapacitate U.S. personnel using Norwalk-like viruses or avian influenza, the National Research Council’s ad hoc Defense Intelligence Agency Technology Forecasts and Reviews Committee said in a report released Friday. “Troops must be ready to respond to threats on short notice as well as to participate in planned military actions,” wrote the committee, which was headed by Analytic Services Inc. President Ruth David. “Disease that incapacitates but does not kill (as opposed to the effects of weapons of mass destruction) can be disabling and the source of the infection difficult to determine. Particular vulnerabilities are the foodborne, vectorborne and zoonotic diseases that could be introduced locally and for which vaccines, good diagnostics and treatment are not available.” The panel noted that the “particularly disabling” Norwalk-like viruses, more formally called noroviruses, are highly contagious, resistant to chlorination and stable in the environment. The viruses, which cause vomiting, diarrhea and fever, cannot currently be cultured, limiting their use in any attack, the committee wrote. “However,” it continued, “this is an area of intense investigation, and the recent report of the culture of a mouse norovirus may lead the way to the culture of human noroviruses. If cultured organisms were available, strains for which immunity is uncommon or does not exist could be chosen for introduction at strategic times and places. The DNA copy of the virus could then be used to produce specifically altered forms of the virus that could be designed to evade immunity, to have increased virulence or to deliver genes encoding toxins or other virulence factors.” The panel said avian influenza, often called bird flu, could be more difficult than noroviruses to introduce into a military population, because it is spread through air rather than through food or water. It added, though, that infecting local animals could result in transmission to soldiers. “The major current barrier to the use of this virus to disable military populations is the lack of human-to-human transmission of current strains,” the panel wrote, but “research that leads to an understanding of the biologic determinants of transmissibility by respiratory secretions will allow scientists to engineer current virus strains for efficient spread. The technology is already available and in use for genetically engineering influenza virus.” Besides using biological agents, attackers seeking to exploit U.S. vulnerabilities could increasingly be inclined to target sensors for detecting chemical weapons, radiation and other threats, the researchers said. Such enemies could attack U.S. sensors, wrote the committee, by overloading, or “jamming,” them “by the deliberate introduction of large levels of artificial signals”; by reducing the signatures of attack agents to make them less easily detectable by the sensors; or by “spoofing” the sensors, directing false signals at them in order to create the false impression of a chemical attack. The latter could be accomplished using simulated toxic agents, the panel said. “There are as many possible targets for spoofing as there are sensors. One category of increasing importance is chemical and biological sensors,” the report reads. “Ground forces are significantly hampered by protective gear to defend them against these threats. Thus, red [enemy] forces gain significant leverage if blue [U.S.] forces must defend against a threat that does not exist while red forces can operate unencumbered.” Indicators that potential enemies may be exploring the possibility of sensor spoofing, according to the report, could include development of agent simulants and testing against commercial sensors. The report was the first by the committee, which is now expected to be disbanded and replaced by a standing panel on the same subject. The initial report was intended to “establish the foundation for a long-term collaborative relationship to support the examination of technology warning issues.” It covers a wide variety of areas where the Defense Department could focus its efforts to forecast future technological threats. “U.S. military strength is built on a foundation of technological superiority that grew from a position of global leadership in relevant technologies and innovative capabilities. That leadership position is no longer assured,” the committee wrote. “The synergistic forces of globalization and commercialization of science and technology are providing current and future adversaries with access to advanced technologies as well as the expertise needed to exploit those technologies. The ability of the U.S. intelligence apparatus to warn of evolving technologies that, in the hands of adversaries, may threaten U.S. military pre-eminence is vital to the ability of the nation’s leadership to make good decisions.” To better forecast technological threats, the panel said, the Defense Intelligence Agency should collaborate systematically with scientists and technicians in industry and academia; track new indicators relevant to science and technology globalization and commercialization, “to complement and focus intelligence collection and analysis”; and focus on potentially threatening capabilities of adversaries, rather than on specific technologies, when setting priorities in the effort.
| ||||||||||
Back to top
