|
|||||
|
|||||
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|||||
 |
 |
    |
|
|
|||
 |
|
||
|
|||
|
|
|
|
||||||||
|
Researchers Suggest Risk-Based Decision Making Model to Combat Biological Attacks By David Francis WASHINGTON — Using the 2001 anthrax attacks as a case study, a group of U.S. researchers have developed a risk-based decision-making system which they believe will allow governments to make better judgments following a biological attack (see GSN, June 2). In “Bayes, Bugs and Bioterrorists: Lesson Learned from the Anthrax Attacks,” Kimberly Thompson, Robert Armstrong and Donald Thompson argue that governments must develop “decision trees,” or methods for evaluating several courses of action, following a biological attack. They said this would improve the evaluation of costs, risks and benefits and would create more effective policy development. “Using this type of approach, the government can better characterize the costs, risks and benefits of different policy options and ensure the integration of policy development,” the report states. “Additionally, confirmed use and refinement of decision trees during exercises will provide analysis of the long-term consequences of decisions made during an event and give policymakers insights to improve initial decisions.” The study, dated April 2005 and published by the National Defense University’s Center for Technology and National Security Policy, says poor planning prior to the fall 2001 biological attacks in which anthrax was sent to U.S. Senate office buildings through the mail led to improper allocation of resources after the attack. The report estimates the direct costs to the Postal Service could exceed $3 billion, with additional expenditures of over $1 billion for unnecessary countermeasures. Despite the attack, coordination between U.S. agencies has made development of a comprehensive response plan difficult. To remedy the problem, the report urges establishing a decision tree so that multiple paths of action can be evaluated at once, making individual agency’s responsibility more clear. “With this approach, analysts can quickly communicate with decision makers about the implications of combinations of options,” the report says. “We emphasize that this approach of focusing on decisions provides a means to cross interdisciplinary and other boundaries … and consequently it provides a useful organization and communication tool to promote effective management.” The report says decisions should be separated into different categories, including who should be immunized, what response should be, how to allocate Strategic National Stockpile resources, how to contain biological agents and how much information should be made public. The Health and Human Services Department should head the effort to form the decision tree, drawing on the expertise of other agencies when necessary. The 2001 anthrax attacks clearly demonstrated the need for a better decision making process, the report says. Lack of investment in the public health infrastructure, a poor understanding of the disease caused by anthrax, inadequate training of first responders and poor communication are just a few of the problems that plagued the response to the attack. The report argues that a decision tree would have vastly improved response, allowing for a better understanding of who should be vaccinated, how relevant agencies should have responded, a better plan for containment and improved information management. The report is careful to say that it is not critical of the 2001 response. However, researchers believe a decision tree would have prevented panic and yielded a more appropriate response. Researchers hope decision trees can guide policy discussions as a comprehensive response plan is formulated. “Given our recent experience with anthrax, the specific decision trees for anthrax are offered, as an analytical tool to aid future policy decisions,” the report says. “Indeed, the lessons learned from the 2001 attack should facilitate the use of these trees.”
| ||||||||||
Back to top
