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Washington, Moscow Slow to Take Measures to Secure Russian Nuclear Materials, Report Says By David Ruppe WASHINGTON — U.S. efforts to help Russia secure its vulnerable nuclear weapons and related sensitive materials from terrorists have made some “discrete but noteworthy” progress since September 2001, but could take another 15 to 25 years to complete, according to a report released here yesterday (see GSN, Aug. 24). The Race to Secure Russia’s Loose Nukes: Progress Since 9/11, produced by analysts from the Center for American Progress and The Henry L. Stimson Center, assesses efforts made toward accelerating Russian nuclear threat reduction activities that were recommended by the bipartisan “Baker-Cutler” task force in January 2001. Led by former Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker (R-Tenn.) and former White House Counsel Lloyd Cutler, a Democrat, the task force made some 19 recommendations, including appointing a senior-level White House threat reduction coordinator, accelerating U.S. funding for the problem, and reaching a high-level transparency and access agreement with Russia. The task force report, commissioned by Clinton administration Energy Secretary Bill Richardson, called the prospect of stolen Russian nuclear weapons or materials used by terrorists “the most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States today,” said the pace then of efforts to eliminate the threat left an unacceptable risk of failure,” and urged accelerated efforts to complete the job by 2011. “Of the 19 policy measures identified by the Task Force, only five have seen meaningful progress towards full implementation,” the report released yesterday says. For the remaining 14, “progress has been minimal.” Praise and CriticismThe report praises Congress and the Bush administration since the Sept. 11 attacks for reaching agreements with Russia to improve security at nuclear weapons facilities previously off-limits to cooperation, for revitalizing efforts to secure global civilian highly enriched uranium, and for boosting international political support — though not strong financial support — for threat reduction in Russia. Furthermore, it praises the administration for an effort Baker-Cutler had not recommended — strengthening global efforts to interdict illicit nuclear shipments in transit. “But overall, the Bush administration and the Congress have neither achieved nor made substantial progress towards most of the strategic objectives,” set out by Baker-Cutler, it says. In particular, it cites “no meaningful acceleration of progress” in the following areas: — drastically consolidating the number of nuclear weapons storage sites; — accelerating security upgrades; — minimizing possible proliferation from general-purpose nuclear submarines; — expanding Russian capacity for eliminating highly enriched uranium and accelerating elimination; — halting plutonium production, taking inventory of Russian stocks, and storing at the central Mayak facility and eliminating up to 100 metric tons of Russian plutonium; — beginning a detailed process for transitioning away from U.S. financial support; and — creating a high-level White House coordinator. Reasons attributed to the current pace of progress, the report says, include noncooperation from elements of the Russian bureaucracy, lingering Cold War suspicions about U.S. intentions regarding site access, U.S. bureaucratic and legal obstacles, “lack of high-level coordination and leadership,” and “inadequate and uneven U.S. funding.” The Baker-Cutler task force, it notes, recommended spending $30 billion over 10 years, from fiscal 2002 to fiscal 2012, on Russian threat reduction. So far, only $1.89 billion is set to be appropriated from fiscal 2002 to fiscal 2006, the report says. Speaking at the release of the report yesterday, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Senior Associate Joseph Cirincione warned that trends could worsen in the coming years. “How long can we count on Russian cooperation? … I don’t think we know what the future of Russia is,” he said. Graham Allison, director of Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affair, said he is “much more encouraged” by the Bush administration’s increased efforts in its second term to settle agreements with the Russian government. The report questions Energy Department claims last year that it expects to see upgraded security at all targeted Russian weapon-grade material storage facilities by the end of 2008 (see GSN, Oct. 7, 2004). The authors said completion is possible by 2012 at the current pace, but added that the United States must first negotiate access agreements for some sensitive sites. “A very significant proportion of Russia’s remaining military-origin fissile materials are located at comparatively few buildings. Secure these buildings, and you significantly boost the total proportion of materials subjected to U.S.-sponsored security upgrades,” Center for American Progress Policy Analyst Andrew Grotto, one of the report’s two authors, said in an e-mail. “These buildings, however, are often located at especially sensitive nuclear facilities, such as places where warheads are assembled and disassembled. Russia has resisted granting the U.S. access to these facilities,” he said. Achieving the 2008 goal would require securing access agreements within the next year, he said. “To meet the 2008 goal, [the U.S. Energy Department] is banking on clearing these obstacles, which would enable a rapid increase in the pace of progress. This would obviously be a great development,” he said. If the pace of progress in securing the material is measured by the amount of material secured per year — rather than the number of buildings — the report says, then the upgrades may not be finished until 2030. The Bush administration has achieved a “negligible” increase to the amount of material secured annually since Sept. 11 — an additional 3 percent per year, it says. The report says it could take between 12 and 37 years to fully secure Russian nuclear weapons storage sites at the current pace. The other author was Stimson Center Senior Associate Brian Finlay.
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