Report Criticizes China’s Lax WMD Export Controls

By David Francis
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — China has not effectively implemented and enforced export controls on materials that could be used to produce weapons of mass destruction, according to a report released yesterday by the RAND Corp. (see GSN, May 3).

The report, Chasing the Dragon: Assessing China’s System of Export Controls for WMD-Related Good and Technologies, says that Beijing must devote more resources to bolstering export controls. Without increased efforts, China is failing to meet its goal of behaving like a “responsible major power” in world affairs, the report says.

China’s system of export controls was weak until the late 1980s and early 1990s, when international pressure mounted to improve restrictions on technologies that could be used to create a weapon of mass destruction. Being recognized as a supplier of these materials tarnished China’s international image, says the report, written by RAND Associate Evan Medeiros.

Starting in the mid-1990s, China implemented a set of export controls. “The government began promulgating laws, regulations, and measures that outlined government procedures for internally vetting pending exports of sensitive nuclear, chemical, missile, and conventional military goods and related technologies,” according to the report.

The evolution of the Chinese export control system is attributed to several factors. Specificity of international treaties has led to Chinese responsiveness in adopting strict control measures. Second, the strengthening of Chinese bureaucracy has made it easier to develop these controls. Finally, international pressure and China’s changing views on how much it wants to contribute to international nonproliferation efforts has bolstered Chinese efforts, the report finds.

These reform efforts have led to a law-based export control system, which includes issuing new regulations and notices to make up China’s nonproliferation position. 

“In the past five years, China has promulgated regulations and measures covering exports of nuclear and nuclear dual-use goods, chemical-weapon and related dual-use items, conventional military products, dual-use biological goods and related technologies, and dual-use missile items,” the report says. “Detailed control lists of sensitive goods and technologies are part of each of these regulations; for example, the nuclear regulations incorporate international control lists developed by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).”

However, RAND found that China needs to improve the implementation and enforcement of these controls and the nonproliferation policy it has established. For example, China must to a better job of educating businesses and government officials of their obligations under the export regulations. 

The Chinese government also faces implementation challenges from a lack of resources and properly trained personnel. China also has no electronic tracking of past and current export licenses or where materials are being shipped. “These limitations suggest a lack of political will by the leadership to seriously implement nonproliferation export controls,” the report says.

RAND identifies limited enforcement as the weakest aspect of China’s export control system. “The government’s ability to detect, catch, investigate, and penalize export control violators is significantly underdeveloped,” the report says. Critical gaps exist in many aspects of export control enforcement, especially monitoring, interdiction, and penalization.”

“It is not clear the extent to which this weakness results from a lack of political will to conduct hard-hitting investigations, a lack of resources, or both,” according to the report.

China also is relying largely on foreign intelligence to notify it of WMD-related exports, the report says. This stems from its inability to investigate possible violations internally, forcing Beijing to react to suspect shipments instead of seeking them out. 

As of April of this year, the Chinese government has only issued two public violations of export control regulations, but officials anticipate more in the future. 

Despite these assertions, the report finds China’s export control system lacking. 

“China is still several costly and time-consuming steps away from possessing a fully functioning export control system that can regularly monitor and police the activities of exporters involved in selling WMD-related goods and technologies,” according to the report. “More resources need to be devoted to institutional development and defeating entrenched interests.”

RAND says that implementation of and improved enforcement existing export control laws will continue to cause difficulties. Incentives for increased compliance and eventual self-regulation are needed. Also problematic is the entrance of China into the World Trade Organization and subsequent concerns about Chinese exports. 

China today called the report “irresponsible,” according to Agence France-Presse.

“The organization concerned should adopt a sincere and objective attitude in viewing the Chinese government's efforts and commitment to nonproliferation,” said Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang. “Those reports, disregarding facts, are irresponsible.”

“China is a responsible country and our government opposes the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery,” he added.

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