Obstacles Surface to Proposed U.S.-Indian Nuclear Deal

By David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON — Evidence of several potentially show-stopping obstacles to the Bush administration’s plan to increase nuclear energy cooperation with India surfaced yesterday at a hearing of the U.S. House International Relations Committee (see GSN, Aug. 17).

While many expressed support for the proposal, a number of Democratic and Republican committee members said they were concerned the deal could severely undercut the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, as well as other U.S. commitments not to transfer nuclear technology to countries that refuse to allow international access to all their nuclear facilities. 

According to the plan announced in July, U.S. and international export controls would be amended to allow India to receive full access to U.S. civil nuclear energy technology. India, for its part, would separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities, subject the civilian sites to full international safeguards, and refraining from nuclear testing, among other concessions.

India, which first tested a nuclear device in 1974 followed by five more in 1998, has never joined the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. It has also not allowed the International Atomic Energy Agency to monitor all of nuclear sites and has given no indication that it intends to relinquish its nuclear arsenal. Nonproliferation experts estimate India has 75 to 100 nuclear warheads.

Bush administration officials yesterday argued the deal was part of a plan to make India a close strategic partner and would bring New Delhi into compliance with most international requirements for controlling nuclear technology, thereby enhancing global nonproliferation. 

“It will have the effect of progressively integrating India into the global nonproliferation order,” said Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns.

“Our desire to improve relations with India is in part a response to the huge security challenges that were unleashed by the attack on our country on Sept. 11, 2001,” he said.

Congressional skeptics, however, noted — and Burns conceded yesterday — that India has not been considered a proliferation concern.   Some said they were concerned the deal would actually undermine the nuclear nonproliferation regime by rewarding a country hostile to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

The Bush administration strategy could lead other nations to demand similar treatment from the United States, critics said yesterday.

“One of the ironies here is that once the NPT mores are compromised, it could open up efforts with states that, frankly, have a very poor record with respect to proliferation to petition for inclusion in the exemption. And frankly, on that list I can’t think of a country that’s been more problematic than Pakistan for the international community,” said Representative Edward Royce (R-Ca.).

Pakistani officials have recently expressed interest in receiving similar benefits to those offered India (see GSN, Sept. 8).

Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Robert Joseph, at a different point in the hearing, said “We have not given consideration to extending this type of cooperation to Pakistan.”

Pakistan doesn’t have the same energy requirements, of course, that India does,” he said. “And also, as we have made very clear, part of our consideration is the establishment of a long, positive, nonproliferation record. And so as we look at that, and as we take that into consideration, we have made the determination that we need not move to establish the same type of cooperation with Pakistan.”

Joseph said the administration was not seeking to break nonproliferation rules, but rather to create an exception for India, which he called a “special case.”

“India was never a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. In fact, India has been very hostile toward the treaty for many years,” he said.

Severe opposition in Congress would threaten the deal, as a number of legislated changes are needed to U.S. nonproliferation export control laws to enable India to receive U.S. nuclear energy technology. The committee seemed divided, with members of both parties for and against the deal.

Representative Tom Lantos (D-Ca.) said the “visionary American proposal” would “promote a greater dialogue between the U.S. and India on preventing the spread of sensitive nuclear technology and materials to other countries or even terrorist groups.”

Chairman Representative Henry Hyde (R-Ill.) expressed uncertainty. He also unsuccessfully sought assurance from the officials that the administration would not bypass the committee by attempting to attach export control change legislation at the last minute to an appropriations bill.

“Mr. Chairman, that’s a fair question, and so we’ll try to give you a straight answer,” Burns said.

“Rather than commit to a specific vehicle this morning, we felt it better to seek your advice and talk to you and talk to members of the Senate who are interested and then come to an agreement on the best way forward,” he said.

“A number of observers have pointed out that it’s going to be very hard to get the Nuclear Suppliers Group to amend its guidelines to allow the kinds of nuclear transfers to India that you’re proposing. Nuclear Supply Group rules require unanimity within the group before any such [an] amendment can be adopted, and it appears likely that a number of NSG members will resist doing this,” Hyde said, citing Sweden, New Zealand and other nations.

The chairman questioned whether the administration might resort to weakening or destroying the group in an effort to secure changes for India.

“We can certainly assure you that we intend to take no action that would undercut the effectiveness of the NSG,” Joseph said in response.

“Our intention is not to change either the consensus procedure of the NSG or to even change the NSG commitment to full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply. Rather, what we seek is to adopt an exception or a set of criteria that would allow, in the context of India taking the actions that I have described on the nonproliferation side, full cooperation with India,” he said.

He added, “It’s not going to be an easy task, but we believe we have a very strong argument to make, and an argument that is persuasive in that taking this action with India in exchange for the Indian commitments will strengthen the purpose of the NPT and strengthen the NSG in that context.”

Another potentially deal-breaking issue emerged at the hearing: opposition by nearly all, including even the strongest supporters of the plan and those testifying, to India’s apparent support for Iran retaining a civil nuclear energy capability.

A reported Sept. 3 statement by a senior Indian official appearing with Iran’s president appeared to criticize the United States, without naming it, for “injustice in international relations” and to endorse Iran’s bid to pursue a supposedly civilian nuclear energy program.

“India’s relations with Iran [are] not predicated on positions and views attributed to some government, Indian Foreign Minister Natwar Singh said, according to the state-run Islamic Republic News Agency.

Singh has reportedly said India opposes an anticipated U.S. bid at the IAEA Board of Governors meeting beginning Sept. 19 to refer Iran to the U.N. Security Council.

“I expect India to recognize that there is reciprocity involved in this new relationship, and without reciprocity, India will get very little help from the Congress,” Lantos said.

“If they persist in this, this great dream of a new relationship will go down the tubes,” he said.

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