D.P.R.K. Test Spurs U.S. to Discuss Nuclear Attribution

By Jon Fox, Global Security Newswire

WASHINGTON – Spurred in part by North Korea’s recent test, the U.S. government is beginning to speak out about its ability to trace the source of nuclear material, which experts say could be crucial tool in deterring atomic terrorism (see GSN, Oct. 17).

Last week, Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff told the director of the U.S. nuclear detection agency to begin speaking more openly about the program.  However, precise capabilities still remain closely guarded.

Speaking on Oct. 9, after North Korea detonated what would later be determined to be a plutonium-fuel nuclear device with a yield of less than one kiloton, President George W.  Bush appeared to set a red line at which Pyongyang would face serious consequences for its nuclear program.

“The transfer of nuclear weapons or material by North Korea to states or nonstate entities would be considered a grave threat to the United States, and we would hold North Korea fully accountable for the consequences of such action,” he said.

Nuclear attribution — tracking weaponized plutonium or uranium back to its point of origin, either before an explosion or after — could be a crucial element in holding any state accountable for a leak, sale or transfer of such material.

Experts, though, have questioned the U.S. capability to trace and identify the sources of nuclear material, and government officials have been reluctant to discuss the program.  Without robust attribution technologies, a statement like that made by the president last week could appear empty.

A technology that is rarely discussed in the media, attribution was forced toward the spotlight last week by North Korea’s test and the president’s response.  In Washington Post on Oct. 11, columnist David Ignatius wrote:  “To make this accountability principle work, the United States needs a crash program to create the ‘nuclear forensics’ that can identify the signature of fissile material of every potential nuclear state.”

Sometime last week, Secretary Chertoff picked up a newspaper and read an article addressing questions of attribution and nuclear accountability.  “He read it and said, ‘Aren’t we doing something in this area?  And if we are, we should be getting the word out,’” Vayl Oxford, head of the agency’s Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, told Global Security Newswire yesterday.

Chertoff then gave Oxford the go-ahead to begin talking more openly about U.S. attribution programs.

“There hasn’t this kind of emphasis on this for a while, publicly,” Oxford said.  Still, he said “when you start to talk about this, it’s very sensitive.”

Oxford carefully avoided most specifics about U.S. capabilities, such as what the timeframe might be to track any nuclear material back to its nation of origin in the wake of an act of nuclear terrorism.

The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office was created April 2005 to centralize the far-flung government efforts to prevent nuclear smuggling, and on the first of this month Oxford launched the National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center (see GSN, Aug. 3).

 “There was never a concerted government effort, which is what we’re trying to bring to the table at this point,” he said.

The new forensics center’s staff of eight, housed with the detection office on Vermont Avenue, does not go into the field to collect samples of nuclear material for analysis, Oxford said.  For nuclear events overseas — either in the case of an intercept of nuclear material or a device going off — the Defense Department would field a team to collect samples.  Domestically, the Energy Department would provide experts to assist the FBI in its investigation.

Oxford’s forensics center is “not in the attribution business,” he said.  “We are a support function to attribution.”  The new center is responsible for developing techniques to analyze nuclear material and expanding the database of samples that could be used for comparison against intercepted or detonated material.

Determining the isotopic fingerprint of either plutonium or highly enriched uranium is of little value unless there is a catalogue of data to check it against.  It would be like having a fingerprint with no criminal to match it to, according to Ashton Carter, assistant defense secretary under President Bill Clinton.

The United States has been compiling such a catalogue of nuclear data, but there remain doubts from experts about just how complete it is.

Oxford said there is a “vast array” of sources for nuclear material that in a perfect world he would like to have noted in the U.S. attribution database.  He declined to discuss specifics, such as the present size of the catalogue.

“It’s really hard to gauge that at this point,” he said.  “They continue to add to the library with every opportunity.  The harder question that I couldn’t answer either is when do feel like it is complete.  I don’t think this is one of those things that are ever quite complete.”

Government officials, he said, are analyzing data from the North Korean test and “that then will feed this knowledge base.”

“We’ve got to stay as far in front of this issue as we can.  This is not something you react to after the fact,” he said.

A more complete catalogue and confidence in U.S. attribution capabilities could help dissuade a nation inclined to transfer nuclear material to another state or a terrorist organization.  “It has a certain deterrent effect that says if you do something we’re going to know where it came from,” Oxford said.

Still, some experts who acknowledge the crucial nature of attribution technology say the U.S. database needs bolstering.

Carter, speaking here yesterday, said the U.S. catalogue of nuclear fingerprints is incomplete.  “That is, there would be circumstances where a bomb would go off and we couldn’t pin down where it came from,” he said.

U.S. capabilities are improving, he said, suggesting in many cases the United States could pinpoint nuclear origins in about 72 hours.  “It’s a little bit of deterrence in a world where we’re afraid nuclear weapons are going to be used in a way where deterrence isn’t given a chance,” Carter said.

“The significance of attribution is important,” he said.  “What we’re telling the North Koreans is we know what your stuff smells like.  If one goes off and it smells like you, we’re coming after you.”

While attribution could play a central role in deterring an unconventional delivery of a nuclear device, it is not foolproof, said nuclear weapons expert Michael May, a professor at Stanford University.

In the era of the Cold War and the threat of an ICBM strike, there was no question about tracing an attack back to the origin.  With the threat of nuclear terrorism, there is the possibility of a device exploding and the United States being unsure where it came from.  May also says the U.S. nuclear database is incomplete.

Attribution is “really kind of an overall detective process,” he said.  “It isn’t foolproof but it can be very helpful.”

There might be instances in which weapon-grade nuclear material from one reactor closely resembles material from another, he said.  That could be the case with the North Korea plutonium used in the recent test, likely taken from the North Korean facility at Yongbyon.

“It may well be that it would be hard to distinguish that reactor from similar reactors elsewhere; it’s a fairly widespread type of reactor that is usually used to make weapons-grade plutonium,” he said.

May also raised questions about attribution’s deterrent effect.  “We’re talking about terrorism now.  If it comes from a state, we’ll know damn well where it came from,” he said.  “If it’s surreptitious there’s a whole chain. … The question is who in that chain can be deterred by attribution.”

Perhaps a nation fearful of retaliation could be deterred from selling or transferring nuclear material.  However, deterring the actors becomes less likely the farther the material moves from its origin, May said.

“Down the chain they couldn’t care less if you could attribute the original material,” he said.  “The deterrent effect is there, but it’s partial. It’s not black and white.”

In the wake of an act of nuclear terrorism, there might remain an element of uncertainty about the provenance of the material, even with attribution technology.  Part of what Oxford’s office is doing is educating policy-makers about the gray areas they could be faced with, he said.

“These are always not something you can script, so you have to exercise (policy-makers) to understand the uncertainty they’ll have to deal with,” Oxford said.

To effectively harness attribution technologies “you need all the precision you can get to enhance the decision-making process,” he said. “You can’t be close in this case.”

Back to top
About Newswire  |  Contact National Journal  |  Re-Use Guidelines © Copyright 2008 by National Journal Group, Inc. The material in this section is produced independently for NTI by National Journal Group, Inc. Any reproduction or retransmission, in whole or in part, is a violation of federal law and is strictly prohibited without the consent of the National Journal Group, Inc. All rights reserved.