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U.K. Still Favors Biological Weapons Verification By David Ruppe WASHINGTON — The British government continues to favor creating an inspections mechanism for the Biological Weapons Convention, 4 1/2 years after the United States scuttled extended negotiations on creating such a system, a British official said this week (see GSN, Feb. 15). The United Kingdom, however, does not plan to push for such a mechanism at the sixth Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference in Geneva late this year, recognizing that “a number of countries are not prepared to proceed as rapidly as we would all wish on verification,” David Triesman, parliamentary undersecretary of state for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, said Monday during a question and answer session at the House of Lords. Triesman said, however, that the United Kingdom would be ready in Geneva to discuss creating a scientific advisory panel and a Biological Weapons Convention secretariat, noting “considerable support” for such bodies. “These are interesting ideas, and we are very ready to discuss them, possibly as part of the follow-on work program,” he said. He added, “Our priority at the review conference will be to support proposals that are feasible and add value to the effective implementation of the convention.” In a 2002 paper, British officials had proposed creating a scientific panel for assessing the implications of technological progress on treaty compliance. Nongovernmental experts have said a secretariat could organize treaty meetings, serve as a clearinghouse for treaty-related information, and maintain lists of experts for investigations of chemical or biological use as authorized by the U.N. secretary general. Triesman’s comments were made in response to a series of questions from members of the House of Lords. The back and forth “is quite useful … for people in other countries to see that this is an important issue in the United Kingdom,” said Richard Guthrie, who heads the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s Chemical and Biological Warfare Project. “If nothing is ever said, you could be quite right in interpreting that maybe nobody is interested.” The last treaty review conference in 2001 collapsed amidst intractable U.S. opposition to creating a system to verify the treaty (see GSN, Dec. 10, 2001). U.S. officials have said the Bush administration believes such a mechanism could be used to compromise U.S. biodefense or commercial biotechnology research and would be ineffective at uncovering treaty violations. Nongovernmental experts have argued there are numerous indicators that could identify a covert biological weapons program, such as budget discrepancies and procurement of equipment differing from requirements for civilian production (see GSN, Nov. 18, 2004). Guthrie said some other countries in addition to the United States are “hesitant” about verification, but they “are happy to let the United States take the heat.” A Bush administration official last month reiterated Washington’s opposition to verification, and criticized countries for even discussing the idea. “Times have changed, and therefore we must be prepared to part company with Cold War approaches to arms control,” said State Department International Security and Nonproliferation Bureau Senior Adviser Carolyn Leddy in a speech in Japan. “It has been over four years since the Bush administration rejected the flawed draft BWC Protocol, yet many states parties to the BWC still call for a return to negotiations on a protocol or other form of a verification mechanism. … I will simply note that the energy used to mount such appeals and the mixed messages those send to countries who really want to dilute or undermine the convention only serve to distract us from confronting the challenges at hand with realistic solutions,” she said. Leddy said that countries that signed the treaty should simply “act responsibly” and abide by its terms. She did not suggest an alternative approach for determining whether parties are in violation of the treaty. “In case I was not clear at the outset, let me reiterate for you now that the Bush administration will not return to the protocol negotiations or negotiations on any verification mechanism whatsoever for the BWC,” she said. As for the “number of other ideas that seem to be gaining steam,” she said, “In examining any of these proposals, the litmus test for the United States will be their relevance to the post-9/11 international security environment.”
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