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U.S. Needs More Work to Trace Nuke Blasts, Experts Say By Jon Fox WASHINGTON — The interagency network responsible for defending the United States against nuclear terrorism is compiling a global database of nuclear “fingerprints” in an effort to trace fissile material to a source in the event of a nuclear attack, a senior Homeland Security Department official said yesterday (see GSN, June 21). Attribution technology is an element in both deterring attacks and in bringing perpetrators to justice, but experts told a Senate subcommittee on terrorism yesterday that U.S. abilities in that sector are a potential weak spot in the nation’s nuclear defenses. The current effort to fill gaps in U.S. nuclear intelligence involves a number of agencies, including the FBI and the Defense, Energy and Homeland Security departments. Ultimately, it will include cooperation from foreign governments, Oxford said. He called the global initiative against nuclear terrorism, announced by U.S. President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin earlier this month, a major step forward (see GSN, July 19). Still, Oxford was reluctant to gauge just how far the government has come in its more than 10-year effort. “It’s hard to put a metric to this,” he said. Discussion of attribution technology in open sources and public forums is limited, and detailed outlines of U.S. capabilities are shrouded behind a wall of classification. At the hearing before the Senate Judiciary Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security Subcommittee, however, nongovernmental nuclear terrorism experts identified lagging attribution abilities as a serious issue. “That is a deep problem,” said Fred Ikle, a scholar with the Center for Strategic and International Studies and former defense undersecretary under President Ronald Reagan. Ikle’s remarks on the topic were limited given the classified nature of the topic, but his comments to Senator Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.) — the only subcommittee member present — suggested the matter warrants significant attention. “I don’t know if your committee wants a closed hearing sometime, but that is a big problem area,” Ikle said. “That’s all I can say now.” The concept behind robust attribution technologies is somewhat analogous to defense strategies of deterrence during the Cold War. The Soviet Union knew the United States had missiles that would launch in response to a nuclear attack — thus theoretically reducing the likelihood of a nuclear exchange. To deter nations from transferring fissile material or nuclear weapons to a nonstate terrorist group, the United States is developing attribution technology that would enable Washington to track the material back to its origins — even after a blast — thus creating the threat of major U.S. counterstrike. Experts, however, have said that accurate attribution could be very difficult, and the government has been nearly silent about its capabilities. Kyl said he hoped the status of U.S. technology could soon emerge from behind the classified curtain. “If you have that capability, it’s one you probably want to announce in advance,” he said. “Whoever you are thinking about doing it, just like the FBI and the fingerprints, we will find you because we know what each of you have. It would be nice to be able to use that as a deterrent.” The belief that the United States has credible attribution abilities is a core element in deterring nuclear terrorism, said Steven Aoki, deputy energy secretary for counterterrorism. Yet despite its importance, “a lot of hard work remains in fleshing out both the technical and policy dimensions of attribution,” he said in his prepared testimony. A limited release of information on U.S. capabilities could be beneficial, said Michael Levi, a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He suggested a measured dose of information in technical journals that would indicate how far the United States has come. The technique is similar to what India and Pakistan did to indicate movement on their nuclear programs, he said. Those nations, he said, released results in technical journals and studies of experiments indicating they had the technology to separate plutonium, thereby implying the ability to manufacture nuclear weaons. “I have encouraged DOE scientists to try to look at doing something similar, publishing enough to get the other guy worried but not enough that he can evade your defense,” Levi said. He said a complete picture of global nuclear signatures is lacking. “The biggest shortfall right now is having fingerprints to match to whatever we find.” Levi also leveled a sharp critique of interagency communication. “I don’t hold a clearance, but I have been told there is poor sharing in some important cases between critical parts of the U.S. government” regarding attribution, he said. Communication between DNDO, the Energy Department and the Central Intelligence Agency on the subject of attribution has been difficult, Levi said later. Oxford rejected Levi’s criticism following the hearing. The branches of government tasked with defending against nuclear terrorism are in close contact, he said, citing members of other agencies on loan to his staff.
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